Special volume of Philosophical Topics in honor of Sydney Shoemaker.

This paper examines the legal and ethical aspects of traceback testing, a process in which patients who have been previously diagnosed with ovarian cancer are identified and offered genetic testing so that their family members can be informed of their genetic risk and can also choose to undergo testing. Specifically, this analysis examines the ethical and legal limits in implementing traceback testing in cases when the patient is deceased and can no longer consent to genetic testing.

The structural-systematic philosophy requires a moral theory. This essay seeks to determine whether either of two recent works, Joshua Greene’s Moral Tribes and Michael Tomasello’s A Natural History of Human Morality, should influence that theory. It first argues that Greene’s fails to make its case for utilitarianism over deontology. It then argues that Tomasello’s thesis that early humans developed moralities of sympathy and fairness, particularly when taken in conjunction with aspects of Alan Gewirth’s moral theory, fits well with the (...) moral theory envisaged by extant works on the structural-systematic philosophy. The envisaged theory maintains the objectivity of human rights. (shrink)

Alan Gewirth’s work on moral and political philosophy attracted a great deal of attention between 1978 and 2000, but has received very little attention since then. This essay aims to revive interest in Gewirth’s work by providing a more direct and straightforward version of his core argument for objective moral rights and duties and clarifying how a Gewirthian moral and political theory can proceed beyond the conclusion of the core argument.

There are various ways in which a person's freedom of action may be diminished or restricted. Instead of acting, he may be acted upon; or he may be unable to help doing what he does. He may suffer from some disability, have a duty imposed on him or do something because he is obliged to do it. In this essay, I wish to examine the notion of being obliged to do something. I shall investigate the differences between ‘being obliged by (...) A to do X’ and ‘being obliged to A for X’; between ‘being obliged to do X’ and ‘having an obligation to do X’; between being physically obliged and being morally, legally and logically obliged; and between saying ‘X is something I am obliged to do’, ‘X is something I choose to do’ and ‘X is something I ought to do’. (shrink)

It has been widely held that presentism cannot easily accommodate Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity account of the relativity of simultaneity because presentism privileges successively unique times ontologically. Recently Brogaard and Marlow argued that presentism does not deserve the attribution of this defect because it may well be that Einstein’s account of the relativity of simultaneity is defective, leaving it open to establishing a view of absolutist simultaneity friendlier to presentism. Specifically Brogaard and Marlow present an argument against one of (...) Einstein’s most famous accounts of the relativity of simultaneity, and moreover raise doubts about whether Einstein availed himself of absolutist frames in some of his explanations of relativity. I will dismiss both of these charges, and thus argue that the complaint against presentism from SR stands. (shrink)

Mr. T. H. Mcpherson has given, in a recent article in PHILOSOPHY , various reasons for supposing that there was a development in Butler's ethics from the Sermons to the Analogy . He argues that Butler was in the Sermons a “rational egoist” or “Ethical Eudaemonist,” and in the Analogy an Intuitionist. By “Ethical Eudaemonism” he seems1 to mean that “the ground or criterion of rightness is conduciveness to the agent's interest” or that “it is the happiness-producing character of acts (...) that makes them right” . I shall use the phrase “McPherson's view” to denote the theory that this was Butler's view in the Sermons. (shrink)

I believe that Moore's appeal to common sense has been misunder-stood both by his defenders and his critics. Besides the mistakes of the latter, there is one enormous howler which, in my opinion, the former have committed. This is to confuse or coalesce two quite distinct appeals which he made, namely the appeal to common sense and the appeal to ordinary language.

Alan R. White; I*—The Presidential Address: Shooting, Killing and Fatally Wounding, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 80, Issue 1, 1 June 1980, Pa.

Moral values are real—we don't just make them up. Beauty is in the world—it's not just in the eye of the beholder. You are free—what you do is not always determined by electrochemical processes in your brain. And the universe we live in is God's creation. These are radical claims. But they are widely rejected in contemporary philosophy because they are almost always considered in relative isolation from one another. This book shows that when they are considered in conjunction, they (...) gain mutual support. And it shows this both clearly and concisely. But its systematic approach to philosophy also reveals that various philosophical positions currently widely accepted and defended can appear plausible and perhaps even compelling only when they are considered in relative isolation—as they, too, almost always are. When the issues on which these positions are taken are considered in conjunction, problems come into view and the alternative positions defended in this book emerge as superior. Toward a Philosophical Theory of Everything is a ground-breaking work that shows the importance of systematic thinking, while also defending positions, on central philosophical issues, that are widely rejected in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Alan R. White; IV—Seeing What is Not there1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 61–74, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

Alan R. White; IX—Attending and Noticing, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 63, Issue 1, 1 June 1963, Pages 103–126, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.

Alan R. White; IV—Seeing What is Not there1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 61–74, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

Alan R White; Needs and Wants, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 159–180, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1974.tb004.

This thesis is an examination of Alfred North Whitehead's epochal theory of time. Two necessary conditions for Whitehead's epochal theory are analyzed. First, Whitehead's requirement that events "become" is examined, with the result that becoming is found not to be an objective, physical feature of events in Whitehead's theory as is commonly thought. Second, the requirement that events be discrete is examined, with the result that this requirement is found to be incompatible with contemporary quantum theory, contrary to Whitehead's claim (...) that it is compatible. (shrink)