Recently there has been a strong movement towards reflections about the “geography of reason,” especially among philosophers who deal with postcolonial thinking. There is also a renewed interest among different schools of thought, both analytical and continental, in the ways our “life world,” or “embodiment,” or “situated cognition,” shape our minds and eventually the philosophy we do. As a result, we have seen some recent publications on the nature and import of the concept of “place” by authors such as Edward (...) Casey, Jeff Malpas, and Bruce Janz. In Philosophy in an African place, Bruce Janz introduces the concept of “philosophy-in-place” with the question as to what it is to do philosophy in a particular context of lived experience or, more specifically, what it is to do philosophy in an African place. This paper expands on Janz's “philosophy-in-place” by developing what will be called a “philosophy through place.” It starts with Janz's discussion of the problem of placing philosophy and a philosophy-in-place. Then it attempts to develop an argument for a “philosophy through place” and its implications for considering the place of philosophy in Africa and the challenge it poses to philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give a critical discussion of Sartre’s concept of sexual desire and its relation to self-identity and freedom. Why Sartre? Sartre is one of very few philosophers who offers a systematic account of sexual desire. He has influenced eminent philosophical concepts of sexual desire held by, for instance, de Beauvoir, Lacan, Foucault, Levinas, Irigaray and Butler, but not much is written about his own notion of sexual desire. This alone is reason to explore Sartre’s (...) view. What makes his view of sexual desire particularly interesting is that it is framed by his theory of freedom. Sartre offers the original, radical notion that freedom is absolute. Because consciousness is never self-identical, he argues, human identity is not fixed. Instead, we are consequently nothing else but what we keep desiring to make of ourselves. He concludes that we are always free to choose our drives and desires, even what seem to be our most enslaving, natural sexual instincts. The question raised in this article, however, concerns what the nature of sexual desire is and how free we really are to choose our sexual desires. I first contextualise Sartre’s view of sexual desire within his notion of desire in general and its relation to instinct, drive, consciousness, freedom and identity. Then, I give a detailed discussion of his analysis of sexual desire, its relation to freedom, and, what Sartre calls its failures. Finally, I discuss a critique of, and alternative to, Sartre’s theory of sexual desire from the perspective of my own notion of heteronomous and autonomous desire and freedom. (shrink)

This chapter aims to contribute to the endeavour of investigating nonhuman animals as experiencing subjects in their own right with their own species-specific histories. Our focus is on the examination of pain experience in animals. We argue that there is need for more research in which pain experience in animals is accounted for in species-specific terms. Making use of empirical studies in the fields of neurobiology, evolutionary-developmental biology, comparative psychology, and cognitive ethology, we try to offer a phenomenological analysis of (...) indications and expressions of pain experience in animals. We attempt to show how different animals are capable of indicating and expressing specific and unique experiences of pain in terms of their particular species, evolution, and places of living in human and natural contexts. (shrink)

This paper addresses two issues. The first part deals with the classic question of human nature by focussing on the problem of human consciousness, in particular, the relationship between subjective and intentional consciousness. I argue for an essential link between subjectivity and intentionality by suggesting a phenomenological conception of the human condition. On this basis, the second part deals with what I call ‘humane’ ethics. This part shows that my conception of the human condition contains a humane approach to morality.

How far can one ascribe a spatial meaning to pain? When I have a pain, for instance, in my leg, how should one understand the “in” in the “pain in my leg”? I argue (contrary to Noordhof) that pain does have a spatial meaning, but (contrary to Tye) that the spatiality of pain is not to be understood in the standard sense of spatial enclosure. Instead, spatiality has a special meaning with regard to pain. By defining pain in phenomenological terms (...) as a disturbed form of bodily perception, I contend that the “in” in “pain in my body” has a dual spatial meaning: firstly, it signifies my internal perceptual relation to a disturbing part of my body; secondly, it denotes the external perceptual relation to my environment that the disturbance forces me to take. Once the spatiality of pain is understood in terms of such a perceptual relation, it is not restricted to localisable hurts, but pertains to all forms of pain, such as affliction and agony. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25 (4) 2006: pp. 336-349. (shrink)

Dans les Cours d'Esthétique, qu'il prononce à Berlin entre 1820 et 1829, Hegel propose une théorie de la musique et analyse le rapport de celle-ci avec les autres arts dans l'ensemble du système philosophique. Mais comment le philosophe, qui n'est pas connaisseur, peut-il penser la musique de son temps? Sur quelle base se construit la réflexion? Et comment la reconstituer scientifiquement à partir des différentes sources? Le présent ouvrage apporte une réponse à ces questions en replaçant le discours hégélien dans (...) l'arrière-plan socio-historique de la vie musicale contemporaine, et en reconstituant, pour la première fois, la théorie de Hegel à partir des manuscrits inédits des différents cours. La spéculation apparaît alors dans toute son originalité, comme le prolongement des multiples expériences faites au théâtre et au concert. La conception de la musique comme manifestation de l'esprit absolu se vérifie alors dans l'expérience la plus concrète. (shrink)

Phenomenology is an emerging field within the broader domain of African and Africana philosophy. The phenomenological method, with its various approaches to studying the meaning of lived experience, is at the core of the thought of African philosophers such as Paulin Hountondji, Dismas A. Masolo, Achille Mbembe, Mabogo More, Tsenay Serequeberhan, Noel Chabani Manganyi, and proponents of Africana Philosophy such as WEB Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, Lucius Outlaw, Lewis Gordon, George Yancy, and Linda Martin Alcoff. Technically, the term “African phenomenology” (...) is not used as widely, or introduced as systematically, as Africana phenomenology. The aim of this chapter is to introduce some of the central issues and theorists of the field of African phenomenology. As the subtitle of this chapter indicates, its scope is limited to what one may call introductory perspectives in African phenomenology. The idea is to outline for further investigation some thematically related contributions to African phenomenology with specific reference to the grounding work of Paulin Hountondji as related to works of Kwasi Wiredu and Dismas A. Masolo. Hountondji’s critical adoption of Husserl’s classic phenomenological approach offers a broad, foundational scope, which makes it particularly suitable for a basic introduction to African phenomenology. (shrink)

In African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought (2023), Bruce B. Janz introduces what he calls an enactivist African philosophy. The book makes a significant contribution to African philosophy as no other work has yet made the connection between African philosophy and enactivism. This article’s aim is to give a critical response to the book. It starts with some background by connecting Enactivist Cognition with Janz’s earlier Philosophy in an African Place (2009). This is followed by a brief (...) discussion of his introduction to enactivist African philosophy and its connection to texts in African philosophy. The article closes with a discussion of some issues that Enactivist Cognition raises. (shrink)

« L’idée même d’opéra populaire est paradoxale tant l’opéra relève, en France, aujourd’hui, de la musique classique, de la musique savante, et paraît éloigné des genres de la “musique populaire” comme des publics populaires, des masses ou tout simplement du plus grand nombre. Cela l’est encore plus si l’on considère les choses du point de vue de la philosophie et de l’esthétique. Theodor W. Adorno déclare déjà, dans les années soixante, que l’opéra, en Allemagne, est un genre essentiellement “bourgeois”, produit (...) par la bourgeoisie et destiné à la bourgeoisie. La question se pose alors d’une forme d’alternative, au-delà de la critique, soit la possibilité d’une affirmation. Car l’opéra populaire existe sous diverses formes. Il faut plutôt mettre en évidence, dans ces conditions, quels obstacles épistémologiques font que l’esthétique ou que la philosophie se heurtent à un tel objet. Cet article revient ainsi sur la conception de la musique populaire et sur la thèse de la bourgeoisité formulée par Adorno en donnant trois contre-exemples d’œuvres musicales (I), avant de considérer la définition de l’opéra populaire proposée par Jean Vilar, qui est à l’origine du projet et de la construction de l’Opéra Bastille (II). ». (shrink)

In Why pains are not mental objects Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of experiencebecome (...) a mental object. I shall finally argue that, thoughextreme pains cannot serve as paradigm cases, they do showthe general importance of taking pain states to be objects. (shrink)

« L’une des manifestations principales de l’emprise du néolibéralisme autoritaire sur la vie des individus consiste dans la destruction des systèmes publics d’éducation ayant pour fonction de former le citoyen et d’émanciper l’homme. s’agit-il seulement d’un échec des politiques d’éducation? Ou ne s’agit-il pas plutôt de projets de non-éducation? La philosophie de Theodor W. Adorno permet de penser les conditions de ce que nous appelons ici la non-éducation, en suivant une approche critique, négative et dialectique. Nous en actualisons, dans cet (...) article, plusieurs thèmes, permettant d’éclairer la situation présente : 1) la pensée mythique, 2) l’industrie culturelle, 3) les pratiques autoritaires. À cela s’ajoute une condition portant sur 4) les tabous liés à la sexualité. certes, lorsqu’Adorno traite de l’éducation et de l’émancipation, la question de la sexualité – ou de sa répression – n’apparaît pas au premier plan. permet-elle de mettre au jour des limites du projet critique lui-même? Ou d’éclairer certains tabous qui lui seraient inhérents, lesquels refléteraient aussi certains tabous du monde enseignant? ». (shrink)

Contemporary pain literature increasingly acknowledges the need of a multidimensional approach to pain, which accounts for its complex biological, psychological and social components. This is reflected in the recently revised definition of the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) and some contemporary philosophical positions. This paper addresses the need to offer a theoretical approach that integrates the biopsychosocial and qualitative multidimensionality of pain by developing the “social grounding view of pain”. My focus is on seeking a multidimensional philosophical (...) approach that accounts not only for its complex biological and psychological aspects but also and specifically does justice to its social dimension. I draw from some of the most recent multidimensional theoretical and methodological approaches that attempt to account for the social component of pain, including enactivism and interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), to propose the advancement of the social grounding view, which has a particular focus on socially shared linguistic concepts in relation to the meaning and modulation of pain. More specifically, the social grounding view is based on the argument that the meaning of the experience of pain is determined in part by socially shareable linguistic concepts habitually associated with pain. I test this view against empirical cases drawn from pain neuroscience education (PNE) and try to demonstrate how the modification of the linguistic concepts of pain could be used effectively to modulate its experience. (shrink)

Le manuscrit decouvert a la Bibliotheque de la Sorbonne est la seule source en francais du cours d'esthetique de Hegel. Le cahier ne mentionne aucun nom, mais les traces de l'ecriture de Victor Cousin atteste que celui-ci en etait le possesseur et le destinataire. La comparaison avec les autres sources manuscrites montre que se texte se rapporte au cours donne a Berlin pendant le semestre d'ete 1823, prenant la forme d'un abrege. L'accent est mis sur la structuration du discours et (...) la dimension systematique, distinguant cette version condensee de l'edition traditionnelle de l'Esthetique. Le texte constitue egalement l'exemple exceptionnel d'une traduction hegelienne realisee du vivant du philosophe. L'enseignement de Hegel, inedit en son temps, se trouve ainsi restitue pour la premiere fois au public francophone sous sa forme originale. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate the intersections between Hegel’s aesthetics lec- tures and translation theory and praxis, with reference to the French-Italian translation project Hegel Art Net. Against the background of the historical recon- struction that sees Hegel repeatedly confronted with the fruition and production of translations, we intend to examine the hermeneutic, philological and political challenges that a translator of the aesthetics Nachschriften encounters today, following the “philological turn” of the 1990s and the publication of new sources documenting Hegel’s (...) Berlin lectures on the philosophy of art. (shrink)

Most contemporary discussions about pain take place within the frame work of materialistic theories. Their general point of departure is an attempt to explain mental pain in terms of physical pain. In this article I address two major problems, which materialistic theories deal with, from within a phenomenological perspective. The first problem is to find a physiological explanation of pain that leaves space for mental pain experience. The second problem, which I focus on, consists in the attempt to offer a (...) description of the physiological basis of mental pain, which does not reduce the mental to the physical. I thereby present the thesis that pain can be understood either as the body's revolt against the mind or the mind's revolt against the body. With this thesis I want to show that pain means a rupture which in a paradoxical way mediates to us an understanding of the unity of body and mind. The purpose is to explain the meaning of pain, as a key to our understanding of our bodily existence.‘Der Schmerz selbst hat das Wort.'– Martin Heidegger. (shrink)

In times in which we ask ourselves how political cruelty and torments can be forgotten, Nietzsche's pleadoyer for pain to serve the purpose of education, surprises. What might sound like a mere provocation, rather lies at the heart of the Nietzschean philosophy. As is pointed out, Nietzsche's contention that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics, originates from his philosophy of pain as the main condition of all forms of creation. The title “educating (bilden) pain” expresses Nietsche's advocacy of (...) an education towards pain as the dynamo of creation. In this paper I explore how Nietzsche's notion of pain is linked to two concepts of Bildung. In the first part I investigate the relation between pain and “Bildung” in the sense of “creation”, and in the second part I link this to the relation between pain and “Bildung” in the sense of “education”. By these means, I try to answer the question: how far can pain, which is seen as the condition of creation, be linked to conditions of education. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.21(2) 2002: 122-132. (shrink)

Résumé Plusieurs auteurs utilisent le concept de « forme de vie », Lebensform, dans le domaine de la philosophie politique et sociale, en se référant à la philosophie de Hegel. Mais l’on ne trouve guère un tel concept dans son système. Dans cet article, nous menons une enquête sur l’origine et le sens de cette expression. Nous partons d’abord de la théorie de Rahel Jaeggi, nous faisons un détour par Eduard Spranger, avant de remonter à Hegel. Ensuite, nous discutons de (...) la question de la famille comme cas particulier de forme de vie en confrontant la conception de Jaeggi aux textes de Hegel. (shrink)

Qu’est-ce que la pratique sans la théorie? Qu’est-ce que la théorie sans la philosophie? Qu’est-ce que la philosophie sans la dialectique? Et qu’est-ce que la dialectique sans Hegel? Adorno a certes entrepris sous le nom de « dialectique négative » la critique la plus radicale de la dialectique idéaliste. Il lui a opposé, dans ses principaux écrits, la pensée de l’antisystème, du non-identique,...

Résumé La question de savoir ce qu’il en est après deux cents ans de la logique spéculative est abordée dans cet article à travers la façon dont Michael Quante se rapporte aujourd’hui à la philosophie de Hegel. La logique est interrogée à partir de la problématique de la philosophie analytique et dans le domaine spécifique de la théorie de l’action. Cette approche apparemment extérieure s’avère en réalité une façon d’actualiser les présupposés de la dialectique dans leur signification la plus spéculative. (...) On met en évidence en effet la structure commune de la science de la logique et de la philosophie de l’action qui tient dans le concept de la subjectivité, soit dans le concept de concept au sens hégélien, lequel détermine la description des actions conceptuelles en général et rend compte aussi bien de la démarche d’autonomie exégétique employée. (shrink)

In this paper Nietzsche's physiology of pain is critically related to recent theories of neurology of pain. Nietzsche offers no encompassing notion of a neurology of pain like the well-known theories of, for instance, Melzack and Wall do. But, as will be shown, Nietzsche's notion of physiology offers a productive connection with contemporary neurology, particularly with Wall's newest notion of the neurology of pain. Thus I shall not discuss Nietzsche's view on science in general, but the possible application of his (...) philosophy to a particular science. (shrink)

This paper explores links between Heidegger's notion of language and views in African philosophy. My contention is that Heidegger's daring phenomenology of language is also found and even radicalised within the framework of African philosophy, particularly the philosophy of myth. I argue that the exploration of the relation between these views of language offers the possibility not only to expand on the conventional conception of language but also to challenge the common notion of philosophical language and philosophy as such. South (...) African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 27 2008: pp. 310-324. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMost recently, debates on decolonization, transformation, and Africanization raise, again, critical questions about the continuous dominance of the Western practice of philosophy in an African place. Such debates bear particular reference to colonization; however, they are relevant to any place where displacement is an issue and transformation demanded. Yet, the concept of displacement receives surprisingly little attention in these debates or in literature on place. I argue that place and displacement are inherently related, and explore some implications of this relation (...) with regard to the practice of philosophy. My contention is that while displacement is an issue that raises specific challenges to the practice of Western philosophy in an African context, it is in fact a defining feature of philosophy as such in search of its place in the world. In conclusion, I propose what I call a distopological approach towards a philosophical practice that takes seriously its place and inherent relation to... (shrink)

Until recently, few philosophers worked on laughter, and it was typically viewed negatively. However, the last four decades have witnessed a significant increase in philosophical writings about and positive views of laughter. This introductory paper attempts to show that, in line with this development, contributions to this special issue explore various fresh theoretical, thematic, historical, and critical aspects of laughter and its relation to philosophy. These contributions can be divided roughly into two intersecting groups, with one group focused on the (...) theoretical, thematic, and historical exploration of laughter, and the other on critical social and moral issues of laughter. They demonstrate how laughter matters to philosophers as a serious philosophical subject, and they take care to distinguish objectionable types of laughter from its constructive uses as social and moral critique and facilitator. (shrink)

The first edited collection to offer a systematic introduction to African phenomenology.

Résumé : Peut-on tirer de l’œuvre de Michel Foucault une théorie de l’éducation et de l’éducation comme émancipation? et quelle place pourrait avoir dans ce cadre l’histoire de la sexualité? Nous nous attachons dans cet article aux derniers cours du philosophe qui font place à une thématique de l’autonomie, de la liberté avec les thèses sur le « souci de soi ». Nous discutons la possibilité de considérer la relation épimélétique comme une forme de relation pédagogique, et nous demandons pourquoi (...) et comment la question de la sexualité permet de réévaluer la question pédagogique, fait basculer la problématique de la répression et de la domination à celle de la formation du sujet. Nous revenons d’abord sur les discussions antérieures autour de l’hypothèse répressive (I). Puis nous envisageons la façon dont se met en place l’équation entre relation épimélétique, relation érotique et relation pédagogique dans Subjectivité et Vérité (II). Enfin, nous abordons la problématique du « souci de soi » dans L’herméneutique du sujet en relation au « souci des autres », à la question politique et aux institutions (III). Mots clé : Relation pédagogique; éducation; souci de soi; souci des autre; émancipation. Relação sexual e relação pedagógica: acerca do cuidado de si e do cuidado dos outros Resumo: Será possível extrair da obra de Michel Foucault uma teoria da educação e da educação como emancipação? E ainda: qual lugar poderia ocupar no quadro da história da sexualidade? Este artigo ater-se-á aos últimos cursos do filósofo, que deram lugar à temática da autonomia, da liberdade com as teses acerca do “cuidado de si”. Discutir-se-á a possibilidade de considerar a relação epimeléica (cuidado) como uma forma de relação pedagógica, e se indagará por que e como a questão da sexualidade permite reavaliar a questão pedagógica, tocando na problemática da repressão e da dominação concernentes à formação do sujeito. Retoma-se, antes de tudo, as discussões anteriores ao redor da hipótese repressiva (I). Em seguida, visa-se o modo pelo qual se situa a equação entre relação epimeléica, relação erótica e relação pedagógica em Subjetividade e Verdade (II). Enfim, aborda-se a problemática do “cuidado de si” em A hermenêutica do sujeito, com relação ao “cuidado dos outros” à luz da questão da política e das instituições. Palavras-chave : Relação pedagógica; educação; cuidado de si; cuidado dos outros; emancipação Sexual relationship and pedagogical relationship: about the care of the self and the care of the others Abstract: Can we draw from Michel Foucault's work a theory of education and of education as emancipation? And what place could the history of sexuality have in this framework? In this article, we focus on the philosopher's last lectures, which give way to a theme of autonomy and freedom with the theses on "concern for the self". We discuss the possibility of considering the epimeletic relation as a form of pedagogical relation, and we ask why and how the question of sexuality allows us to re-evaluate the pedagogical question, shifting the problematic of repression and domination to that of subject formation. We first return to the previous discussions around the repressive hypothesis (I). Then we consider how the equation between epimeletic relation, erotic relation and pedagogical relation is set up in Subjectivity and Truth (II). Finally, we address the problematic of the "concern for the self" in The Hermeneutics of the Subject in relation to the "concern for others", to the political question and to institutions (III). Keywords: Pedagogical relation; Education; care of the self; care of the others; emacinpation Data de registro: 22/07/2022 Data de aceite: 13/12/2022. (shrink)

Volume 24, Issue 2, April 2019, Page 1-1.

Volume 24, Issue 2, April 2019, Page 2-9.

In his latest book, entitled “Sweet dreams”, Daniel Dennett confirms and expands on his argument for a natural science of human consciousness. He dubs his view heterophenomenology: a third-person, scientific form of phenomenological description that can account for the most private and ineffable subjective experiences. A central part of his book consists of a reinvention of Jackson's thought experiment about color blind scientist, Mary, who tries to figure out what color experience is like. I explore another variation of this thought (...) experiment asking whether an informed but inexperienced Mary can really know what it is like to have sex. My contention is that while Dennett's third-person approach to consciousness is valid on an epistemic level, it fails ontologically. Mary does miss something if she knows all about but does not have experience of the real thing. The opposite goes for Merleau-Ponty whose first-person ontology does not account for third-person epistemology. The question is ultimately how far a science of consciousness is really possible. This paper enquires about the possibility of an approach that allows a scientific account of consciousness, specifically qualia, without dissolving the ontology of subjective experience. I suggest a possible direction that new work on the hard problem of consciousness might take. (shrink)

How far can one ascribe a spatial meaning to pain? When I have a pain, for instance, in my leg, how should one understand the “in” in the “pain in my leg”? I argue (contrary to Noordhof) that pain does have a spatial meaning, but (contrary to Tye) that the spatiality of pain is not to be understood in the standard sense of spatial enclosure. Instead, spatiality has a special meaning with regard to pain. By defining pain in phenomenological terms (...) as a disturbed form of bodily perception, I contend that the “in” in “pain in my body” has a dual spatial meaning: firstly, it signifies my internal perceptual relation to a disturbing part of my body; secondly, it denotes the external perceptual relation to my environment that the disturbance forces me to take. Once the spatiality of pain is understood in terms of such a perceptual relation, it is not restricted to localisable hurts, but pertains to all forms of pain, such as affliction and agony. (shrink)