In this article I argue that Jacques Derrida is correct in holding that the law is always an authorized force but that he is mistaken in suggesting that its ultimate font or origin (what he calls the ‘mystical foundation of authority’) is an originary or ‘foundationalional’ act of violence. I suggest that Derrida and, more recently, Jens Bartelson fall prey to a curious, one-sided narrow view of ‘foundationalism’ and contrast their overly ‘architecturalized’ image of the ‘foundation’ of authority with the (...) foundationalism of Thomas Hobbes which is, I shall argue, architectural only as and when appropriate. I also suggest that Hobbes helps us to see that the state, strictly speaking, does not ‘have’ or ‘exercise’ authority but that it is, rather, the font or source of the authority wielded by its (empirical) government. Key Words: Jens Bartelson • Jacques Derrida • Thomas Hobbes • justice • Immanuel Kant • law • Michel de Montaigne • Blaise Pascal • violence. (shrink)

In this article I argue against the view, recently espoused by several authors, that the `incommensurability of values' and `political pespectivism' offer us decisive reasons as to why we should break the link between representation and unity. I hold that it is of paramount importance to retain this essential link. Since Sir Isaiah Berlin has played a major role in linking `politics as the quest for unity and the common good' with the `totalitarian temptation', I proceed to show how it (...) is possible to have an understanding of politics as precisely such a quest, but without succumbing to the temptation to totalitarianism that Berlin alerts us to. I then take issue with Chantal Mouffe's view that the tendency to antagonism, rather than the quest for unity and rational consensus, is `the essence of the political'. (shrink)

In this article I argue against the view, recently espoused by several authors, that the `incommensurability of values' and `political pespectivism' offer us decisive reasons as to why we should break the link between representation and (the quest for) unity. I hold that it is of paramount importance to retain this essential link. Since Sir Isaiah Berlin has played a major (and in my view unfortunate) role in linking `politics as the quest for unity and the common good' with the (...) `totalitarian temptation', I proceed to show how it is possible to have an understanding of politics as precisely such a quest, but without succumbing to the temptation to totalitarianism that Berlin alerts us to. I then take issue with Chantal Mouffe's view that the tendency to antagonism, rather than the quest for unity and rational consensus, is `the essence of the political'. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay advances several interrelated arguments concerning the proper role of the state with regard to marriage and divorce but my main contention is that ‘pure’no‐fault divorce laws are unjust—or, at least, they are unjust if marriage involves a genuinely contractual element, and there seems to be very little doubt that it does. Locke, Kant and Hegel are three eminent thinkers who are alike in viewing marriage as a contract and in the first two sections of the essay I (...) consider their views on the role of contract in marriage. Whilst holding that marriage is more than a contract, I also hold that it is not less than a contract. In section three I consider the implications of this ‘not less than’, the most important one being that ‘pure’no‐fault divorce laws are unjust. I shall contend that whilst the irretrievable breakdown of marriage may be regarded as a suitable ground for divorce, it simply cannot, and certainly ought not to, be regarded as a justificatory basis for the laying aside of rights acquired by individuals as a result of their having entered into a marital contract. However minimal one might wish the role of the state to be, or however averse one might be from allowing the state any role at all in purely personal and confidential relationships, yet to allow the expression ‘the irretrievable breakdown of marriage’to be employed as a olanket to cover over the infringement of personal, contractually engendered and civilly recognised rights, is not to exercise commendable restraint but is, rather, to condone what is simply an abnegation by the state of its basic responsibility to ensure that justice prevails. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the kind of ethical-metaphysical theory of the state that we broadly associate with idealist political philosophy provides us with a theoretical account of the state that is both sound and insightful and that, far from having been consigned to the dustbin of history by the hostile criticisms to which it has been subjected in the 20th century , it still remains the most profound and powerful account of the state available to the political science (...) community today. It is extremely important, I contend, in helping us to understand the state’s vital function as the font of emancipatory political criticism. I also suggest that the ethical-metaphysical theory of the state has the distinct advantage of providing us with a genuine ‘theory of the state’, for it alone wholeheartedly subscribes to the view that the state is the inner core or substance of political life, whereas its critics generally hold that the state is a dangerous illusion. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the kind of ethical-metaphysical theory of the state that we broadly associate with idealist political philosophy provides us with a theoretical account of the state that is both sound and insightful and that, far from having been consigned to the dustbin of history by the hostile criticisms to which it has been subjected in the 20th century, it still remains the most profound and powerful account of the state available to the political science community (...) today. It is extremely important, I contend, in helping us to understand the state’s vital function as the font of emancipatory political criticism. I also suggest that the ethical-metaphysical theory of the state has the distinct advantage of providing us with a genuine ‘theory of the state’, for it alone wholeheartedly subscribes to the view that the state is the inner core or substance of political life, whereas its critics generally hold that the state is a dangerous illusion. (shrink)

In this article I consider Foucault's credentials as a postmodern `champion' of the `politics of difference'. First, however, I note that the familiar expression `the postmodern politics of difference' is in fact self-contradictory, or at least it is a contradiction in terms if we concede that the ongoing ethical/normative task confronting politics is the unifying or synthesizing of differences and if we accept, with pleasure or dismay, that postmodernism exhibits a profoundly suspicious attitude towards this ethical task and towards moral (...) principles and normative positions generally. I then ask whether or not Foucault adopted a normative position that could provide the necessary ethical support for a `politics of difference'. I argue that it is possible to find an element of genuine normativity in Foucault's work by considering his views on the role of the intellectual, on the font of legitimacy, on grand theory and on essence. I also consider the work of some well-known recent commentators on Foucault who discuss this normative/political dimension of his work. (shrink)

In this article, I speak self-consciously as a man of faith addressing both believers and non-believers, but with the latter especially in mind. I suggest that we are currently witnessing (i) a highly significant departure from the ‘old’ model of liberal society that championed a sacred-secular divide, where the state was (only) a neutral umpire with a deliberately cultivated attitude of ‘studied public indifference’ to the ‘inner life’ of the vast host of (private) associations that itwas obliged to impartially regulate, (...) and (ii) a transition to a ‘new’ post-secular model of liberal society that champions and promotes a sacred-secular distinction (a complementary unity of distinct aspects), where the state is obliged to rethink itself and become (also) the state of its society. In this respect, it resembles the state in the era of Christendom. I hold that Rawls and Habermas are handicapped in their efforts to theorise post-secular society as a result of their strong anti-metaphysical posture. (shrink)