Karl Popper versucht, das Problem zu lösen, wie erfahrungswissenschaftliche Aussagenzusammenhänge durch ein ihnen eigenes charakteristisches Merkmal von anderen Aussagenzusammenhängen, die dieses Merkmal nicht aufweisen, abgegrenzt werden können, ohne dass dabei für die Erfahrungswissenschaft wesentliche Teile mit ausgegrenzt werden. Als ein hierfür geeignetes Kriterium sieht er die Eigenschaft der empirischen Widerlegbarkeit, der Falsifizierbarkeit wissenschaftlicher Aussagen an. Sie könne als Kriterium dienen, diese von metaphysischen und pseudowissenschaftlichen Aussagen zu unterscheiden, ohne sie zugleich für sinnlos zu erklären. Genauer besehen weist das Abgrenzungskriterium jedoch (...) eine komplexere, zweidimensionale Struktur auf, die als Reformulierung und zugleich als Reform der Kantischen Unterscheidung zwischen dem Erkenntniswert von Aussagen und deren Geltungsgrundlage angesehen werden kann und es aufgrund dieser Zweidimensionalität ermöglicht, auch die Eigenart metaphysischer und pseudowissenschaftlicher Behauptungen verständlich zu machen. (shrink)

Radical Constructivism and Constructionism. Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, (...) constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. (shrink)

Radical Constructivism and Constructionism. Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, (...) constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. (shrink)

Radical Constructivism and Constructionism. Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, (...) constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. (shrink)

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

Werturteile über Musik - lassen sie sich begründen, sind sie verbindlich, welche Geltung haben sie? Das Buch untersucht philosophische, soziologische und pädagogische Aspekte. Dabei werden insbesondere die wichtigsten Urteilsformen und Argumentationsmöglichkeiten sowohl mit kulturabhängigem als auch mit universalem Geltungsanspruch dargestellt und diskutiert. Den theoretischen Erörterungen folgen mit zahlreichen Noten- und Textbeispielen Hinweise und methodische Vorschläge zur Beurteilung von Musik in unterschiedlichen kulturellen Milieus.

Summary In 1919 Nicolai Hartmann convincingly justified that there cannot exist a “general law of causation” as A. Meinong had in mind. For him Meinong’s understanding of causation was bound on the region of the physical layer of being, simultaneously postulating it as the only possible causation there. This is the starting point of the comparison between N. Hartmann‘s understanding of causation and that of the Gestalt Theory, for which neither in psychic nor in natural context linear-successive causality plays a (...) part. Therefore NH’s conception of 1919 was still completely incompatible with that of the Gestalt Theory despite the fact that he was distancing himself from the “general law of causation” sensu Meinong. 20 years later he changed this by adding the “Wechselwirkung” to the linear successive causation in the physical layer. In doing so he approached the Gestalt theoretical position but failed it insofar as for it his linear-successive understanding of causation generally has had its day with regard to natural processes, also consequently for the physical. Thus the term “causation“ had become free for a dynamic concept of causation which is equally appropriate for the physical and the psychic. NH makes this move not until 1949, shortly before his death, by writing:.... It is the opinion of the author of this work that the ingenious systematics of NH‘s Critical Ontology should make it possible to execute the necessary corrections in some details of his theory of layers without questioning the structure of his systematics, thus carrying out what NH was not able to do himself due to his death. (shrink)

Praxeology is an analytical theory of action, the intention of which is a description of fundamental action-theoretical relationships that is as conceptually parsimonious as possible. The claim corresponds to that of a descriptive metaphysics. If this claim is valid, it must be possible to find at least elementary moments of such praxeological insights even in the earliest approach to a theory of action as presented by Aristotle. The analysis first looks from the insights of praxeology to Aristotle, then vice versa (...) from Aristotle's definitions of concepts to praxeological formulations. The aim is not to trace one theory back to the other, but to illuminate both approaches in a reciprocal way. (shrink)

Analogical thinking, relations between microcosm and macrocosm, polarity and intensification, inspiration, magical, alchemistic, and magnetic/sympathetic concepts: key terms like these indicate the importance of the traditions of pansophist and holistic interpretation of the world in Goethe's literary and scientific works. Of equal significance is his engagement with 'universal wisdom' (Weltweisheit), as embodied in the philosophical and scientific tendencies of the age he lived in. The Geneva conference of the Swiss Goethe Society documented here casts light on Goethe's position in the (...) rivalries tensions between old and new in his day. (shrink)

Ce texte reprend une conférence faite par H.-J. Wirth à Washington (États-Unis) en octobre 2005. Ces réflexions pourraient facilement se transposer sur la relation entre le thérapeute et le patient ; de la même façon, elle se caractérise par des positions de pouvoir différentes. Jurg Willy, se référant à Dicks et à son concept de collusion dans le cadre de la thérapie de couple, en a élargi la formulation dans la mesure où il a placé les attentes inconscientes, réciproques et (...) le jeu inconscient des deux partenaires, au centre de sa réflexion. (shrink)

Most of the reports on synthetic biology include not only familiar topics like biosafety and biosecurity but also a chapter on ‘ethical concerns’; a variety of diffuse topics that are interrelated in some way or another. This article deals with these ‘ethical concerns’. In particular it addresses issues such as the intrinsic value of life and how to deal with ‘artificial life’, and the fear that synthetic biologists are tampering with nature or playing God. Its aim is to analyse what (...) exactly is the nature of the concerns and what rationale may lie behind them. The analysis concludes that the above-mentioned worries do not give genuine cause for serious concern. In the best possible way they are interpreted as slippery slope arguments, yet arguments of this type need to be handled with care. It is argued that although we are urged to be especially vigilant we do not have sufficiently cogent reasons to assume that synthetic biology will cause such fundamental hazards as to warrant restricting or refraining from research in this field. (shrink)

The commercialization of ‘big science’ is in full swing, leading to situations in which the ethical principles of academia are beginning to be compromised. This is exemplified by the profitable business of genetic ancestry testing. The goals of this sort of ‘big science’ are not necessarily in any way novel, however. In particular, large genotyping projects have a certain start‐up time when their design is frozen in, so that the projects often lag behind the development of genetic knowledge. On the (...) other hand, extremely provisional knowledge about potential disease markers is being rapidly turned into questionable ‘tests’, purporting to determine risk factors for complex disorders, by private companies that are eager to get their share of a profitable market of the future. The flow of money generated by such concerns looks likely to erode traditional research operations and small‐scale projects, which risk becoming pebbles on the ‘big science’ landscape. BioEssays 30:1246–1251, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The favourable social conditions Fechner met at Leipzig with its university and its book industry as well as the close ties to the citizenship of that town were of outstanding importance for G.Th. Fechner (1801–1887), his scientific achievements as natural scientist and philosopher, as the founder of psychophysics and of experimental aesthetics. Since 1825 Fechner had been integrated into its social, scientific and art life in many different ways. His political and theoretical social ideas were obviously influenced by ist bourgeois (...) liberal circles. (shrink)

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.