Radical Constructivism and Constructionism. Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, (...) constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. (shrink)

Radical Constructivism and Constructionism. Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, (...) constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. (shrink)

Karl Popper versucht, das Problem zu lösen, wie erfahrungswissenschaftliche Aussagenzusammenhänge durch ein ihnen eigenes charakteristisches Merkmal von anderen Aussagenzusammenhängen, die dieses Merkmal nicht aufweisen, abgegrenzt werden können, ohne dass dabei für die Erfahrungswissenschaft wesentliche Teile mit ausgegrenzt werden. Als ein hierfür geeignetes Kriterium sieht er die Eigenschaft der empirischen Widerlegbarkeit, der Falsifizierbarkeit wissenschaftlicher Aussagen an. Sie könne als Kriterium dienen, diese von metaphysischen und pseudowissenschaftlichen Aussagen zu unterscheiden, ohne sie zugleich für sinnlos zu erklären. Genauer besehen weist das Abgrenzungskriterium jedoch (...) eine komplexere, zweidimensionale Struktur auf, die als Reformulierung und zugleich als Reform der Kantischen Unterscheidung zwischen dem Erkenntniswert von Aussagen und deren Geltungsgrundlage angesehen werden kann und es aufgrund dieser Zweidimensionalität ermöglicht, auch die Eigenart metaphysischer und pseudowissenschaftlicher Behauptungen verständlich zu machen. (shrink)

Radical Constructivism and Constructionism. Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, (...) constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. (shrink)

Most of the reports on synthetic biology include not only familiar topics like biosafety and biosecurity but also a chapter on ‘ethical concerns’; a variety of diffuse topics that are interrelated in some way or another. This article deals with these ‘ethical concerns’. In particular it addresses issues such as the intrinsic value of life and how to deal with ‘artificial life’, and the fear that synthetic biologists are tampering with nature or playing God. Its aim is to analyse what (...) exactly is the nature of the concerns and what rationale may lie behind them. The analysis concludes that the above-mentioned worries do not give genuine cause for serious concern. In the best possible way they are interpreted as slippery slope arguments, yet arguments of this type need to be handled with care. It is argued that although we are urged to be especially vigilant we do not have sufficiently cogent reasons to assume that synthetic biology will cause such fundamental hazards as to warrant restricting or refraining from research in this field. (shrink)

A series of dialogues with the most exciting and controversial German philosopher writing today. Peter Sloterdijk first became known in this country for his late 1980s Critique of Cynical Reason, which confronted headlong the “enlightened false consciousness” of Habermasian critical theory. Two decades later, after spending seven years in India studying Eastern philosophy, he is now attracting renewed interest for his writings on politics and globalization and for his magnum opus Spheres, a three-volume archaeology of the human attempt to dwell (...) within spaces, from womb to globe: Bubbles, 1998; Globes, 1999; Foam, 2004, all forthcoming from Semiotext. In Neither Sun nor Death, Sloterdijk answers questions posed by German writer Hans-Jürgen Heinrichs, commenting on such issues as technological mutation, development media, communication technologies, and his own intellectual itinerary. Iconoclastic and provocative, alternatively sparkling and bombastic, a child of '68 and a libertarian, Sloterdijk is the most exciting and controversial German philosopher to appear on the world scene since Nietzsche and Heidegger. Like Nietzsche, Sloterdijk remains convinced that contemporary philosophers have to think dangerously and let themselves be “kidnapped” by contemporary “hypercomplexities”; they must forsake our present humanist and nationalist world for a wider horizon at once ecological and global. Neither Sun nor Death is the best introduction available to Sloterdijk's philosophical theory of globalization. It reveals a philosophe extraordinaire, encyclopedic and provocative, as much at ease with current French Theory as with Heidegger and Indian mystic Osho Rajneesh. (shrink)

In the children's book ``The Phantom Tollbooth'' by Norton Juster one can find the following passage:``Yes, please,'' said Milo. ``Can you show me the biggest number there is?''.

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

Unitary field theories and “SUPER-GUT” theories work with an universal continuum, the structured spacetime of R. Descartes, B. Spinoza, B. Riemann, and A. Einstein, or a (Machian (1–3) ) structured vacuum according the quantum theory of unitary fields (Dirac, (4,5) and Heisenberg (6–8) ). The atomistic aspect of the substantial world is represented by the fundamental constants which are invariant against “all transformations” and which “depend on nothings” (Planck (9–11) ). A satisfactory unitary theory has to involve these constants like (...) the mathematical numbers. Today, Planck's conception of the three elementary constants ħ, c, and G may be the key to general relativistic quantum field theory like unitary theory. However, the elementary constants are a question of measurement-theory, also.According to Popper's theory (12–16) of induction, such unitary theories are “universal explaining theories.” The fundamental constants involve the complementarity between the universal statements in unitary theory and the “basic statements” in the language of classical observables. (shrink)

The Galilei invariance of classical dynamics does not automatically imply the third Newtonian axiom and the center of mass theorem. For the deduction of these theorems from Galilei invariance we must have, generally, a “kinematical potential” (Helmholtz) and a “potential function” (Clausius), respectively. In celestial mechanics it is possible to have conservation of the motion of the center of gravity but not of the mass center. In this case, the active and the passive masses are different quantities.

The gauge-invariant relativistic wave mechanics corresponds to relativistic magneto-hydrodynamics according to Planck's version of the correspondence principle.

We discuss the possibility of “fifth forces” in relativistic gravitation theories of fourth order. The fifth force may be an analog to the “weak forces” in the theories of electroweak interactions.

Among the many works devoted to Copernicus's five hundredth anniversary, the article published here, by the German scientist H.-J. Treder, occupies a special place in the world literature on this subject thanks to its depth of analysis of Copernican concepts. Its author, a member of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR and Director of the Potsdam Astronomical Observatory, is known for his works on Einstein's relativity and gravitation theories. His understanding of Einstein's theory is entirely in accord with the (...) viewpoint advanced in my book The Theory of Space, Time, and Gravitation [Teoriia prostranstva, vremeni i tiagoteniia] , and he cites it repeatedly. In particular, we ascribe major and fundamental significance to the fact that Einstein's gravitation equations require for their solution certain limiting conditions which Einstein's theory, however, does not provide. In order to fill this theoretical gap, it is necessary to introduce certain supplemental hypotheses of a geometrical character concerning space as a whole. Treder very ingeniously demonstrates the similarity between these hypotheses and the ideas of Copernicus. (shrink)

The commercialization of ‘big science’ is in full swing, leading to situations in which the ethical principles of academia are beginning to be compromised. This is exemplified by the profitable business of genetic ancestry testing. The goals of this sort of ‘big science’ are not necessarily in any way novel, however. In particular, large genotyping projects have a certain start‐up time when their design is frozen in, so that the projects often lag behind the development of genetic knowledge. On the (...) other hand, extremely provisional knowledge about potential disease markers is being rapidly turned into questionable ‘tests’, purporting to determine risk factors for complex disorders, by private companies that are eager to get their share of a profitable market of the future. The flow of money generated by such concerns looks likely to erode traditional research operations and small‐scale projects, which risk becoming pebbles on the ‘big science’ landscape. BioEssays 30:1246–1251, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)