EMPIRICAL. PROBLEM. INTRODUCTION The unity of science movement was itself far from unified.1 There may have been unity on the rallying call for a unity of science but that is as far as it went. Not only was there disagreement among the ...

This volume is a serious attempt to open up the subject of European philosophy of science to real thought, and provide the structural basis for the ...

The articles in this volume deal with the main inferential methods that can be applied to different kinds of experimental evidence.

One of the key events in the relations between the Central European philosophers and those of the Nordic countries was the Second International Congress for the ...

Jan WoleĔski Kazimierz Twardowski and the Development of Philosophy of Science in Poland Kazimierz Twardowski studied with Brentano and followed his style of doing philosophy, in particular, the thesis that the method of philosophy is  ...

Ever since the first meeting of the proponents of the emerging Logical Empiricism in 1923, there existed philosophical differences as well as personal rivalries between the groups in Berlin and Vienna, headed by Hans Reichenbach and Moritz Schlick, respectively. Early theoretical tensions between Schlick and Reichenbach were caused by Reichenbach’s Kantian roots, who himself regarded the Vienna Circle as a sort of anti-realist “positivist school”—as he described it in his Experience and Prediction. One result of this divergence was Schlick’s preference (...) of Carnap over Reichenbach for a position at the University of Vienna, and his decision not to serve as a co-editor with Reichenbach for the journal Erkenntnis that they jointly established in 1930. A second split rooted in different views on induction and probability, which culminated in the Hans Reichenbach’s refusal to serve as an invited author on probability within the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science series ed. by Rudolf Carnap, Charles Morris and Otto Neurath from 1938 onwards. In this regard it is remarkable that also Richard von Mises, who was the second leading figure of Logical Empiricism in Turkish exile, criticized the theory of probability put forward by his former Berlin colleague. In this paper I analyse this controversial exchange, drawing on the relevant correspondence and asking whether these philosophical differences were a typical feature of the pluralism inherent in Logical Empiricism in general. (shrink)

Ever since the first meeting of the proponents of the emerging Logical Empiricism in 1923, there existed philosophical differences as well as personal rivalries between the groups in Berlin and Vienna, headed by Hans Reichenbach and Moritz Schlick, respectively. Early theoretical tensions between Schlick and Reichenbach were caused by Reichenbach's (neo) Kantian roots (esp. his version of the relativized a priori), who himself regarded the Vienna Circle as a sort of anti-realist "positivist school"—as he described it in his Experience and (...) Prediction (1938). One result of this divergence was Schlick's preference of Carnap over Reichenbach for a position at the University of Vienna (in 1926), and his decision not to serve as a co-editor with Reichenbach for the journal Erkenntnis that they jointly established in 1930 (which was then co-edited by Carnap and Reichenbach from 1930 to 1938). A second split rooted in different views on induction and probability, which culminated in the Hans Reichenbach's refusal to serve as an invited author on probability within the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science series ed. by Rudolf Carnap, Charles Morris and Otto Neurath from 1938 onwards. In this regard it is remarkable that also Richard von Mises, who was the second leading figure of Logical Empiricism in Turkish exile, criticized the theory of probability put forward by his former Berlin colleague. In this paper I analyse this controversial exchange, drawing on the relevant correspondence and asking whether these (meta) philosophical differences were a typical feature of the pluralism inherent in Logical Empiricism in general. (shrink)

Arne Dekke Eide Naess was born on January 27, 1912 in Oslo. After a long and successful life he passed away on January 12, 2009 in Oslo as the most renowned Norwegian philosopher, where he was honoured with a state funeral. He was one of the most important public figures in Norway and in his later years became known all over the world as a pioneer of the ecological movement. Given this publicity in recent decades his earlier life was forgotten (...) or obscured in a sense — especially his student years in Paris, Vienna and Oslo before the outbreak of World War II, when he attended the famous Vienna Circle around Moritz Schlick during a stay in Vienna 1934–36. Here he wrote his dissertation Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten which was published in Oslo by the Norwegian Academy of Science in 1936. (shrink)

Based on two previous reports (1970 and 1993), the development of philosophy of science in Austria (covering the history and sociology of the sciences) since 1991 is described and analyzed with regard to its manifestation and institutionalization at the universities (mostly placed at the departments of philosophy in Graz, Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, Linz, Salzburg, and Vienna). Some extra-university societies and institutes are included as well as related journals and book series in this research field, which has changed significantly within the last (...) two decades. A sort of disruption of the earlier strong presence of philosophy of science in the capitals of the Austrian provinces occurred and at the same time a late revival took place in Vienna after the forced migration of the Vienna Circle since the 1930s and long aftermath. One additional result of this account is the extension of the traditional core discipline (analytic) "logic and philosophy of science" to the historical and sociological domain of all sciences (including the basic natural sciences and the humanities, as well as the cultural and social sciences). A list of related and selected publications on philosophy of science in Austria is appended as complementary biographical information. A list of Austrian institutions in the philosophy of science with some mission statements complements this survey, which is certainly not complete for practical and systematic reasons. (shrink)

History and Philosophy of Science. Between Description and Construction. Taking into consideration the huge amount of programs and departments in ‘History and Philosophy of Science’ , partly including also technology and sociology of science, the rather weak theoretical conceptualization of this field seems surprising. HPS is conceived of neither as a mere addition of history of science and philosophy of science, nor as a good will parallel action. Therefore, the question arises about the genuine subject and method of this trans- (...) and interdisciplinary field of research and teaching. The recent postulate of an “integrated HPS” indicates the need of a closer and more intrinsic cooperation and interaction between history of science and philosophy of science from a theoretical and practical point of view. In addition, there should be no more privileging of any part in this joint scholarly enterprise by overcoming the context of discovery and the context of justification. Some best practices and desiderata are mentioned together with the forgotten history of the philosophy of science itself. Based on the description of the scholarly field an ideal-typical model of HPS is offered. (shrink)

Ever since Aristotle it has been accepted that there exists a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning and a sort of unified inductive-deductive methodology. If one analyzes the procedures and logic of scientific explanation and the methods of generating and justifying scientific knowledge, one recognizes the prototype of philosophy of science found in Aristotle’s inductive and deductive procedure that is described in his Posterior Analytics, Physics and Metaphysics, where heviewed scientific inquiry as a progression from observations to general principles and (...) back to observation. He maintained that the scientist should induce explanatory principles from the phenomena to be explained, and then deduce statements about the phenomena from premisses which include these principles. (shrink)

Ever since Aristotle it has been accepted that there exists a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning and a sort of unified inductive-deductive methodology. If one analyzes the procedures and logic of scientific explanation and the methods of generating and justifying scientific knowledge, one recognizes the prototype of philosophy of science found in Aristotle’s inductive and deductive procedure that is described in his Posterior Analytics, Physics and Metaphysics, where heviewed scientific inquiry as a progression from observations to general principles and (...) back to observation. He maintained that the scientist should induce explanatory principles from the phenomena to be explained, and then deduce statements about the phenomena from premisses which include these principles. (shrink)

This edited volume on the philosophy of perception is based on the papers presented at the Wittgenstein Symposium 2017 (Kirchberg, Austria). It covers a wide range of recent topics in the philosophy of perception, from realism and objectivity in perception, intentionality and content, the distinction between perception and cognition, the cognitive penetrability of perception to the epistemology of perception. The volume contains papers by Tyler Burge, Howard Robinson, Olivier Massin, Michael Schmitz, Michael Tye, Marcello Fiocco, Guillaume Frechette, Sofia Miguens, Uriah (...) Kriegel, Pierre Jacob, Mark Kalderon, Berit Brogaard, Athanassios Raftopoulos, Ophelia Deroy, Charles Travis, Johannes Roessler, Philipp Berghofer, Harald Wiltsche, Frederique de Vignemont, Romana Schuler, Ulrich Arnswald, David Stern and Hans Sluga. (shrink)

Otto Neurath experienced an adventurous as well as dangerous life. Already in his childhood, he was fascinated by his father’s huge library. He was especially impressed by images and illustrations since Ancient times and the French Encyclopédie, which inspired his lifelong dealing with picture language. This became manifest with the founding of his “Social and Economic Museum of Vienna” and the invention of his “Vienna Method of Pictorial Language,” later on renamed ISOTYPE. In the flourishing period of “Red Vienna” he (...) acquired a lot of books in several languages covering his research fields and practical activities as a social reformer, teacher and museologist, philosopher, sociologist and historian of science. With his forced migrations from Vienna and The Hague, this most valuable collection of books and brochures was partly destroyed, dispersed, and aryanized, when Austro-Fascism came into power in Austria and Hitler’s troops invaded into the Netherlands. Luckily, Otto Neurath and some members of his family and collaborators could survive and save parts of this unique collection of books which mirrors the education and intellectual background of the polymath Neurath in Dutch and British exile. Here, he again bought and published books continuing his activities for the Vienna Circle of Logical Empiricism as well as the Unity of Science and the Isotype movements covering some 3000 books in 1945. Three typical case studies from the Neurath library are provided covering economics, philosophy, and literature: Neurath’s annotations in books of Friedrich A. von Hayek, Karl Popper, and the writer Stefan Zweig. (shrink)

This edited volume features essays written in honor of Ernst Mach. It explores his life, work, and legacy. Readers will gain a better understanding of this natural scientist and scholar who made major contributions to physics, the philosophy of science, and physiological psychology. -/- The essays offer a critical inventory of Mach’s lifework in line with state-of-the-art research and historiography. It begins with physics, where he paved the way for Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. The account continues with Mach's contributions in (...) biology, psychology, and physiology pioneering with an empiricist and gestalthaft Analysis of Sensations. Readers will also discover how in the philosophy of science he served as a model for the Vienna Circle with the Ernst Mach Society as well as paved the way for an integrated history and theory of science. (shrink)

The Fifth International Congress for the Unity of Science took place at Harvard University from September 3 to September 9, 1939 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It marked the end of the scientific community’s great forum dedicated to promoting the Encyclopedia of Unified Science,with some two hundred participants and 60 speakers. In spite of the outbreak of World War II, Otto Neurath’s International Institute for the Unity of Science had been able to organize the congress with the support of the American Association (...) for the Advancement of Science,the American Philosophical Association, the Philosophy and Science Association, the History of Science Society and the Association for Symbolic Logic. The congress was opened by James B. Conant , P.W. Bridgman, Otto Neurath and Charles Morris. Due to the escalation of the war, the abstracts and contributions submitted at the beginning of the conference could not be published, as originally planned, in the ninth volume of Erkenntnis/Journal of Unified Science . Only ten of these, already published separately, were included in the reprint of the journal Erkenntnis. The remaining preprints mostly languished in Otto Neurath’s papers. We plan to print the most important of these so far unpublished contributions to the six sections of the Fifth International Congress for the Unity of Science in the coming Yearbooks. (shrink)

On 3rd October, 1991, the Institute ‘Vienna Circle’ was founded on the occasion of the first meeting organized by it, which was a symposium entitled “Wien — Berlin — Prag” to commemorate the parallel endeavors of and the relations between these three centers of scientific philosophy.

The Vienna Circle as part of the intellectual movement of Central European philosophy of science is certainly one of the most important currents for the emergence of modern philosophy of science. Independent from this uncontested historical fact there remains the question of the direct and indirect infl uence, reception and topicality of this scientifi c community in contemporary general philosophy of science as well as in the philosophy of the individual sciences, including the social sciences and humanities.

Ernst Mach was already an international successful experimental physicist and scientist, when he, after professorships for Mathematics and Physics in Graz and Experimental Physics in Prague, took over the chair for “Philosophy, particularly for the History and Theory of the Inductive Sciences”, at the University of Vienna in 1895. This turn from the natural sciences to philosophy was really an exception in the academic field.Given his strong as well as controversial history of influence in philosophy and in the sciences Mach’s (...) own pessimistic statement about the emergence of aprioristic currents at the beginning of the twentieth century is surprising and in need of an explanation.The article deals with Mach’s appointment in Vienna and Mach’s autobiographical fragments on his relation to academic philosophy from a today’s point of view. It appears that Mach can be regarded as a pioneer and predecessor of a topical “historical epistemology”, “history and philosophy of science”, and above all as a theorist and practitioner of inter- and transdisciplinarity. If he is to be regarded a philosopher, it is mainly in the context of naturalism, pragmatism and common sense philosophy – as general theory of research. (shrink)

Die im Wiener Kreis dominierenden konträren Derücer Otto Neurath und Moritz Schlick werden jeweüs mit einem historisch-genetischen Profil persönlich, wissenschaftlich-phüosophisch und politisch charakterisiert. Dabei wüd trotz verschiedener Differenzen — als Extrempositionen im pluralistisch-heterogenen Wiener Kreis — die gemeinsame Müiimalplattform eüier "wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung" und das Bekenntnis zu einer als neuartig verstandenen Forschergemeinschaft transparent. Erst vor diesem Hintergrund sind die beiden Denker- und Persönlichkeitsphysiognomien in einen adäquaten Kontext gestellt: während bei Neurath eine konsistente Entwicklung von den Modellen einer "wissenschaftlichen Philosophie", "Einheitswissenschaft" bis (...) zur "Enzyklopädie" im Zusammenhang mit einem Sozialreformerischen Programm und funktionaler Antimetaphysik zu erkennen ist, wird bei Schlick der Dualismus von Philosophie und Wissenschaft neben einem politischen Liberalismus beibehalten. Auf allgemeinster Ebene kollidieren"phüosophiefreier" RELATIVISMUS und "philosophischer" ABSOLUTISMUS. (shrink)

Die im Wiener Kreis dominierenden konträren Derücer Otto Neurath und Moritz Schlick werden jeweüs mit einem historisch-genetischen Profil persönlich, wissenschaftlich-phüosophisch und politisch charakterisiert. Dabei wüd trotz verschiedener Differenzen — als Extrempositionen im pluralistisch-heterogenen Wiener Kreis — die gemeinsame Müiimalplattform eüier "wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung" und das Bekenntnis zu einer als neuartig verstandenen Forschergemeinschaft transparent. Erst vor diesem Hintergrund sind die beiden Denker- und Persönlichkeitsphysiognomien in einen adäquaten Kontext gestellt: während bei Neurath eine konsistente Entwicklung von den Modellen einer "wissenschaftlichen Philosophie", "Einheitswissenschaft" bis (...) zur "Enzyklopädie" im Zusammenhang mit einem Sozialreformerischen Programm und funktionaler Antimetaphysik zu erkennen ist, wird bei Schlick der Dualismus von Philosophie und Wissenschaft neben einem politischen Liberalismus beibehalten. Auf allgemeinster Ebene kollidieren"phüosophiefreier" RELATIVISMUS und "philosophischer" ABSOLUTISMUS. (shrink)