I Two Traditions. Scientific inquiry, seen in a very broad perspective, may be said to present two main aspects. One is the ascertaining and discovery of ...

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This volume distinguishes between two main traditions in the philosophy of science - the aristotelian, with its stress on explanation in terms of purpose and intentionality, and the galilean, which takes causal explanation as primary. It then traces the complex history of these competing traditions as they are manifested in such movements as positivism, idealism, Marxism and contemporary linguistic analysis. Hempels's theory of scientific explanation, the claims of cybernetics the rise of an analytic philosophy of action and the revival of (...) hermenuetics are all discussed. The volume also deals with causal explanation, intentionality and teleological explanation, and explanation in history and the social sciences. The author concludes that explanation of human actions cannot be reduced to simple causality, and discusses the implications of this conclusion for the disciplines of history and sociology. (shrink)

IN 1959 and 1960 I gave the Gifford Lectures in the University of St. Andrews. The lectures were called 'Norms and Values, an Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Morals and Legislation'. The present work is substantially the same as the content of the second series of lectures, then advertised under the not very adequate title 'Values'. It is my plan to publish a revised version of the content of the first series of lectures, called 'Norms', as a separate book. (...) The two works will be independent of one another. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This article contains an overview of the author's long‐standing involvement with deontic logic, both from a technical and from a wider philosophical point of view. As far as the formal aspects of deontic logic are concerned, the author describes his intellectual development from the original discovery of the analogy between modal (and deontic) notions on the one hand, and quantifiers on the other, through the formulation of a systematic theory of dyadic deontic concepts, to the proposal of a formal logic (...) of action as a foundation for deontic logic. In a more philosophical vein, the author discusses such questions as the very possibility of deontic logic if norms have no truth‐value, the relation between the descriptive interpretation of classical deontic logic and the logic of norm‐propositions, the correct representation of conditional or hypothetical norms, the distinction between moral obligation and practical necessity, and the interdefinability of permission and obligation. (shrink)

... V The Foundations of Mathematics Braithwaite VI Logical Studies von Wright VII A Treatise on Induction and Probability von Wright VIII An Examination of ...

In this paper, the author revisits “the emotive theory of value” and argues that values are not entities but nothing other than “linguistic fictions”. Accordingly, valuations—i.e., valuing actions—can be defined as approving or disapproving attitudes of a subject to some object. In this perspective, values cannot be true or false: What we can do is just compare them with regard to strength. As a consequence, value judgments are to be understood as sentences which are used either to say that a (...) subject s values an object o positively or negatively, or to express (evince) a valuation. The author then shows some relations between normative and evaluative discourses. First, he claims that norms as well as valuations are not true or false. Second, he argues that both may be explained or justified, even if the former are usually justified teleologically whereas the latter are explained referring back to the subject's background and life‐style. Third, he notes that a legal order originates from the fact that valuations “crystallize” into norms. Finally, the author examines some further questions related to his analysis. In particular, he argues that the different realms of values, e.g., morals, aesthetics, politics, etc., do not correspond to different evaluative attitudes, but to different phenomena and diverse spheres of human life. (shrink)

A feature of the spiritual physiognomy of the twentieth century has been belief in "progress" and in the beneficial influence on human wellbeing of science and technology. Wittgenstein never shares these optimistic sentiments. Towards the end of his life he wrote that there is nothing absurd in the belief that the age of science and technology is "the beginning of the end of humanity" and that mankind steering its course towards the future relying on scientific rationality "is falling into a (...) trap. His life and also his philosophy was a protest against these trends and a search for "a changed mode of thought and life". (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This volume distinguishes between two main traditions in the philosophy of science - the aristotelian, with its stress on explanation in terms of purpose and intentionality, and the galilean, which takes causal explanation as primary. It then traces the complex history of these competing traditions as they are manifested in such movements as positivism, idealism, Marxism and contemporary linguistic analysis. Hempels's theory of scientific explanation, the claims of cybernetics the rise of an analytic philosophy of action and the revival of (...) hermenuetics are all discussed. The volume also deals with causal explanation, intentionality and teleological explanation, and explanation in history and the social sciences. The author concludes that explanation of human actions cannot be reduced to simple causality, and discusses the implications of this conclusion for the disciplines of history and sociology. (shrink)

The Unprovability of Consistency is concerned with connections between two branches of logic: proof theory and modal logic. Modal logic is the study of the principles that govern the concepts of necessity and possibility; proof theory is, in part, the study of those that govern provability and consistency. In this book, George Boolos looks at the principles of provability from the standpoint of modal logic. In doing so, he provides two perspectives on a debate in modal logic that has persisted (...) for at least thirty years between the followers of C. I. Lewis and W. V. O. Quine. The author employs semantic methods developed by Saul Kripke in his analysis of modal logical systems. The book will be of interest to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in logic, mathematics and philosophy, as well as to specialists in those fields. (shrink)

This volume distinguishes between two main traditions in the philosophy of science - the aristotelian, with its stress on explanation in terms of purpose and intentionality, and the galilean, which takes causal explanation as primary. It then traces the complex history of these competing traditions as they are manifested in such movements as positivism, idealism, Marxism and contemporary linguistic analysis. Hempels's theory of scientific explanation, the claims of cybernetics the rise of an analytic philosophy of action and the revival of (...) hermenuetics are all discussed. The volume also deals with causal explanation, intentionality and teleological explanation, and explanation in history and the social sciences. The author concludes that explanation of human actions cannot be reduced to simple causality, and discusses the implications of this conclusion for the disciplines of history and sociology. (shrink)

This volume distinguishes between two main traditions in the philosophy of science - the aristotelian, with its stress on explanation in terms of purpose and intentionality, and the galilean, which takes causal explanation as primary. It then traces the complex history of these competing traditions as they are manifested in such movements as positivism, idealism, Marxism and contemporary linguistic analysis. Hempels's theory of scientific explanation, the claims of cybernetics the rise of an analytic philosophy of action and the revival of (...) hermenuetics are all discussed. The volume also deals with causal explanation, intentionality and teleological explanation, and explanation in history and the social sciences. The author concludes that explanation of human actions cannot be reduced to simple causality, and discusses the implications of this conclusion for the disciplines of history and sociology. (shrink)

For the last 25 years, since publication of his Logical Studies, Professor Von Wright has steadily explored the field of philosophical logic. The concept of negation, logical paradoxes, the puzzles connected with evidence and probability in confirmation theory, the interrelatedness of the ideas of time and change, and the clarification of the structure of temporal and spatial orderings are among the many areas he has profitably investigated.

The typescripts from which both parts of Wittgenstein's Investigations were printed are now lost. Of the TS for Part I there exists a second copy, but not so of the TS for Part II. There is, however, a manuscript in Wittgenstein's hand which contains the whole of the printed Part II - and some additional material. A comparision of this MS with the printed text reveals some interesting discrepancies. They are noted in the paper. Moreover, a detailed comparision is made (...) in a Postscript between the printed Preface of the Investigations and another, obviously earlier, version of it. Both versions are dated "Cambridge, January 1945" - but the printed one was probably not prepared until two years later. (shrink)

Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections (...) on the nature of philosophy are highlighted by the Finnish dialogue between analytic philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, and critical theory. (shrink)

The typescripts from which both parts of Wittgenstein's Investigations were printed are now lost. Of the TS for Part I there exists a second copy, but not so of the TS for Part II. There is, however, a manuscript in Wittgenstein's hand which contains the whole of the printed Part II - and some additional material. A comparision of this MS with the printed text reveals some interesting discrepancies. They are noted in the paper. Moreover, a detailed comparision is made (...) in a Postscript between the printed Preface of the Investigations and another, obviously earlier, version of it. Both versions are dated "Cambridge, January 1945" - but the printed one was probably not prepared until two years later. (shrink)

The typescripts from which both parts of Wittgenstein's Investigations were printed are now lost. Of the TS for Part I there exists a second copy, but not so of the TS for Part II. There is, however, a manuscript in Wittgenstein's hand which contains the whole of the printed Part II - and some additional material. A comparision of this MS with the printed text reveals some interesting discrepancies. They are noted in the paper. Moreover, a detailed comparision is made (...) in a Postscript between the printed Preface of the Investigations and another, obviously earlier, version of it. Both versions are dated "Cambridge, January 1945" - but the printed one was probably not prepared until two years later. (shrink)