Descriptive Accounts of Legal Reasoning

A legal fiction is a knowingly false assumption that is given effect in a legal proceeding and that participants are not permitted to disprove. I offer a semantic pretence theory that shows how fiction-involving legal reasoning works.

While some descriptive and normative theories of legislation account for an extensive role of legal interpretation in legislation, others see its legislative role as marginal. Yet in contemporary constitutional democracies, where legislation is limited and guided by constitutional norms, as well as international and supranational law, legal interpretation must play some role in legislation—even if all or most of legislative activity may not be adequately described and evaluated as legal interpretation. In this chapter, I aim to explore some implications of (...) recognizing the role of legal interpretation in legislation—notably, for the conceptualization and significance of legal expertise in the legislative process, as well as for determining the moral duties of legislative representatives. First, I argue that the role of legal interpretation in legislation calls for institutional reforms in legislatures in order to ensure that legal expertise is adequately channeled into the legislative process, including agenda-setting. Second, I argue that interpreting legal norms through legislation implies specific moral duties for legislative representatives, both in their relations to one another and in their relations vis-à-vis their constituents. I show that giving legal interpretation its due in a descriptive and normative account of legislative activity does not imply an elitist understanding of legislation, and it does not compromise our conception of legislatures as loci of political and moral disagreement and democratic representation. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to defend a claim that a certain consideration, which I call unworkability, is universally and necessarily relevant to legal reasoning. By that I mean that it is a consideration that must carry legal weight in the justification of some judicial decisions in every legal system in which (1) all disputed matters of law can be adjudicated, and (2) all judicial decisions are to be legally justified. Unworkability's necessary relevance has important implications for a theory (...) of relevance presented by Rolf Sartorius. On this theory, nearly all considerations that are relevant to a judicial decision are supplied by legal principles embedded in the legal rules and decisions, or by extralegal principles dependent, in some way, on the legal principles. (The exceptions to the embedding thesis that Sartorius would, no doubt, recognize are elaborated in the text but can be set aside here.) But there are possible legal systems which do not contain an embedded legal principle concerning unworkability; and nonetheless, unworkability is relevant to judicial reasoning in those systems. Hence, a theory of relevance that relies on principles embedded in the content of rules is too simplistic. Some substantive considerations are relevant for other reasons. (shrink)

This article deals with the relation between a theory of law and a theory of legal reasoning. Starting from a close reading of Chapter VII of H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law, it claims that a theory of law like Hart's requires a particular theory of legal reasoning, or at least a theory of legal reasoning with some particular characteristics. It then goes on to say that any theory of legal reasoning that satisfies those requirements is highly implausible, (...) and tries to show that this is the reason why not only Hart, but also writers like Neil MacCormick and Joseph Raz have failed to offer a theory of legal reasoning that is compatible with legal positivism as a theory of law. They have faced a choice between an explanation of legal reasoning that is incompatible with the core of legal positivism or else strangely sceptical, insofar as it severs the link between general rules and particular decisions that purport to apply them. (shrink)

We intend to examine ways that emotions may be intertwined within argumentative legal discourses. From the transcript of a brief trial in a Court of Appeal in Brazil we have the opportunity to observe how the emotional and rational reasoning live together in a deliberation among magistrates. “The leg broken case” allow us to examine how judges define the value of compensation to be paid in cases of moral damage. We show that not only technical arguments are the compounds of (...) one decision; subjectivity is also important in that legal context. We would yet confirm what jurists and philosophers of the argumentation fields, such as G. Cornu, E. Feteris, A. Garapon, J. J. Robrieux, C. Perelman, C. M. Stamakis, among others, had already emphasized: judges are not cold machines in the moments of a judging. The analysis may show that a sentence is a mix of legal rules and magistrates’ personal experience, in some extent. (shrink)

This article discusses the nature of persuasive authorities in the common law, and argues that many of them are best understood in terms of their (being regarded) as having theoretical rather than practical authorities for the courts that cite them. The contrast between theoretical and practical authority is examined at length in order to support the view that the treatment of many persuasive authorities by courts is more consistent with this view. Finally, it is argued that if persuasive authorities are (...) best understood as theoretical authorities, this raises difficulties for both positivistic and interpretivist theories of law. (shrink)

Robert Alexy develops his influential theory of legal reasoning exploring the nature of legal argumentation and its relation to practical reasoning. In doing so he sheds light on fundamental questions of law and rationality, which are as crucial to practising lawyers and law students as they are to scholars of legal theory.

What makes an argument in a law case good or bad? This book examines this and other questions central to the study of jurisprudence. Care has been taken to make the legal elements of the book readily accessible to non-lawyers, and the philosophical elements to non-philosophers.

Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practise special forms of reasoning is false.

This paper contributes to our formal understanding of the common law — especially the nature of the reasoning involved, but also its point, or justification, in terms of social coordination. I present two apparently distinct models of constraint by precedent in the common law, establish their equivalence, and argue for a perspective according to which courts are best thought of, not as creating and modifying rules, but as generating a social priority ordering on reasons through a procedure that is piecemeal, (...) distributed, and responsive to particular circumstances. (shrink)

This volume explores the relation between legal reasoning and logic from both a historical and a systematic perspective. The topics addressed include, among others, conditional legal acts, disjunctions in legal acts, presumptions and conjectures, conflicts of values, Jørgensen´s Dilemma, the Rhetor´s Dilemma, the theory of legal fictions and the categorization of contracts. The unifying problematic of these contributions concerns the conditional structures and, more particularly, the relationship between legal theory and legal reasoning in the context of conditions.

This paper attempts to shed light on the dynamics of criminal adjudication. It starts by exploring some significant—and often ignored—similarities and dissimilarities between the practices and disciplines of, respectively, legal reasoning and fact finding. It then discusses the problem of defining the nature of these processes—legal reasoning, in particular—in terms of their being instances of practical or theoretical reasoning. Thus understood, the problem is shown to be distinct from two traditional questions of jurisprudence, namely whether law consists of facts and, (...) if so, whether these facts are social or moral. Two theses are proposed as solutions to the problem: 'in the majority of cases legal reasoning is theoretical', and 'when legal reasoning is practical it generally involves complex theoretical operations'. Finally, the paper shows how T1 and T2 can make sense of the phenomena presented at the outset. (shrink)

Studies the principles which govern decision making under common law.

This book seeks to examine the relations that obtain between law and a theory of law and legal reasoning and a theory of legal reasoning.

In this paper we investigate how to represent and reason about legal abrogations and annulments in Defeasible Logic. We examine some options that embed in this setting, and in similar rule-based systems, ideas from belief and base revision. In both cases, our conclusion is negative, which suggests to adopt a different logical model. This model expresses temporal aspects of legal rules, and distinguishes between two main timelines, one internal to a given temporal version of the legal system, and another relative (...) to how the legal system evolves over time. Accordingly, we propose a temporal extension of Defeasible Logic suitable to express this model and to capture abrogation and annulment. We show that the proposed framework overcomes the difficulties discussed in regard to belief and base revision, and is sufficiently flexible to represent many of the subtleties characterizing legal abrogations and annulments. (shrink)

Steven Burton's AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING, Second Edition continues to be an ideal learning tool for first-year law students in a variety of introductory courses including orientation programs, legal reasoning, lawyering skills, or first-year substantive courses. Written specifically for beginning law students, this concise paperback helps students gain an understanding of law and legal reasoning by emphasizing how they can use cases, rules, precedent, holding, and other elementary legal concepts to solve legal problems. Especially easy to use, (...) The Second Edition: offers concise, lucid text gives more attention to competing, contemporary modes of analysis including Critical Legal Studies and philosophical critiques clearly delineates the structure of law as precedents, rules, principles, and policies introduces many new examples coherently organized in nine chapters, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING covers cases and rules, analogical and deductive legal reasoning, legal reasons and conventions, purposes, judges' and lawyers' perspectives, and legitimacy. short and affordable, this book is a good fit for orientation programs, introductory courses on legal reasoning or legal method, lawyering skills courses, or as a supplementary text in any first-year substantive course. (shrink)

Featuring a new, explanatory Foreword by Justice Cardozo's premier biographer, this renowned and much-used analysis of the process of judicial decision-making includes embedded page numbers from the original 1921 edition for continuity of citations and syllabi.

. Research on an expert system regarding unemployment insurance law has pointed to the difficulties of explicitly representing temporal relations. The question has been addressed in the artificial intelligence literature with respect to planning systems and linguistic analysis. The approaches adopted do not appear to be directly transposable to legal discourse. The problem seems so far to have escaped notice amongst researchers attempting to develop legal expert systems. The paper explores in a preliminary way how lawyers use temporal concepts. It (...) is submitted that “legal time” only partly overlaps with real time. A sketch of a formalization of temporal relations in law, following J. F. Allen's approach, is presented. (shrink)

The name of the theory of legal argumentation this paper subscribes could be argumentative pluralism - an application of value pluralism to legal argumentation. Legal reasons and arguments, as well as ethical values, are plural and conflicting - their conflicts too cannot be resolved by any general lexical order. The first section of the paper provides a definition of legal argumentation and some theses on its structure and methodology; the second one analyses ten legal arguments; the third one provides three (...) pluralist theses on legal argumentation. (shrink)

In Chapters 2, 3 and 7 of his new book, Law as a Leap of Faith, John Gardner provides the elements of an account of legal reasoning. It is on the basis of this account that Gardner defends or supports some of the most important theses of his book, viz. theses pertaining to how law can be made, to the relation between law and morality, and to the legitimacy of judicial law-making. A central element of Gardner’s account is a distinction (...) (suggested originally by Joseph Raz) between two forms of legal reasoning, namely, reasoning about the law and reasoning according to law. In this paper I intend to describe and evaluate Gardner’s account. Among the critical remarks that will appear in the paper is the claim that Gardner’s concept of reasoning according to law is overly inclusive. (shrink)

«Existe-t-il une argumentation juridique?», c’est la question à laquelle tente de répondre l’ouvrage de Stefan Goltzberg, intitulé explicitement L’argumentation juridique. Si l’auteur commence son ouvrage en posant directement la question, on en cherche aussitôt, par un réflexe de «juriste», la définition. Et il faut probablement lire l’intégralité de ce petit ouvrage pour voir se profiler une définition de l’argumentation juridique. Or, au cours de cette lecture Stefan Goltzberg nous montre en quoi chercher la définition, la poser, est déjà une marque (...) argumentative (p. 25) et certainement une marque de l’argumentation juridique. Or, Stefan Goltzberg n’est pas juriste de formation. Philosophe et linguiste, il est, notamment membre du Centre Perelman de philosophie du droit au sein duquel il a écrit une thèse de philosophie intitulé Théorie et histoire de la philosophie du droit, philosophie du droit de Chaïm Perelman, de Theodor Viehweg, de Roscoe Pound.Le droit est d’abord un objet d’ .. (shrink)

Erratum to: Int J Semiot Law DOI 10.1007/s11196-014-9376-7Dans la publication originale de cet article, l’auteur n’a pas cité le titre correct de la thèse de philosophie de Stefan Goltzberg.A la dernière phrase du premier paragraphe, il ne faut pas lire «il a écrit une thèse de philosophie intitulé Théorie et histoire de la philosophie du droit, philosophie du droit de Chaïm Perelman, de Theodor Viehweg, de Roscoe Pound» mais bien «il a écrit une thèse de philosophie intitulée Théorie bidimensionnelle de (...) l’argumentation. Définition, Présomption, Argument A fortiori». (shrink)

The theory of rhetoric is recognised and widely used in a number of disciplines, particularly in the social sciences. It is therefore slightly surprising that it has not gained an important footing in jurisprudence. It is often argued that rhetoric and argumentative justification are clearly different issues. However, the present paper argues that they are in fact two aspects of argumentation and that the theory of rhetoric may be used also in the context of legal reasoning.