Progress in psychological science can be limited by a number of factors, not least of which are the starting assumptions of scientists themselves. We believe that some influential accounts of autism rest on a questionable assumption that many of its behavioral characteristics indicate a lack of social interest – an assumption that is flatly contradicted by the testimony of many autistic people themselves. In this article, we challenge this assumption by describing alternative explanations for four such behaviors: low levels of (...) eye contact, infrequent pointing, motor stereotypies, and echolalia. The assumption that autistic people's unusual behaviors indicate diminished social motivation has had profound and often negative effects on the ways they are studied and treated. We argue that understanding and supporting autistic individuals will require interrogating this assumption, taking autistic testimony seriously, considering alternative explanations for unusual behaviors, and investigating unconventional – even idiosyncratic – ways in which autistic individuals may express their social interest. These steps are crucial, we believe, for creating a more accurate, humane, and useful science of autism. (shrink)

Autistic children do not consistently show conventional signs of social engagement, which some have interpreted to mean that they are not interested in connecting with other people. If someone does not act like they are interested in connecting with you, it may make it difficult to feel connected to them. And yet, some parents report feeling strongly connected to their autistic children. We conducted phenomenological interviews with 13 mothers to understand how they experienced connection with their 5- to 14-year-old nonspeaking (...) autistic children. Mothers of nonspeaking autistic children represent a unique group in which to study connection because their children both may not seem interested in connecting with them and have limited ability to communicate effectively using speech, a common way people connect with each other. The mothers in this study interpreted a range of child behaviors—some unconventional, but many conventional—as signs that their children were interested in connecting with them, (re)framed child behaviors that could undermine connection as caused by factors unrelated to the relationship, and expressed several convictions that may help build and sustain connection in the face of uncertainty about the meaning of their children’s behavior. Even though their autistic children may not consistently act in conventional socially oriented ways, these mothers reported perceiving their children’s behavior as embedded within an emotionally reciprocal relationship. (shrink)

In response to the 32 commentaries, we clarify and extend two of the central arguments in our target article: Social motivation is a dynamic, emergent process, not a static characteristic of individuals, and autistic perspectives are essential to the study of autistic social motivation. We elaborate on how taking these two arguments seriously can contribute to a more accurate, humane, and useful science of autism.

Alexithymia is a subclinical trait involving difficulty describing and identifying emotions. It is common in a number of psychiatric conditions. Alexithymia in children is sometimes measured by parent report and sometimes by child self-report, but it is not yet known how closely related the two measures are. This is an important question both theoretically and practically, in terms of research design and clinical practice. We conducted a preliminary study to investigate this question in a sample of 6- to 11-year-old neurotypical (...) children and their parents. Parent and child reports were not correlated, and 93% of parents under-estimated their child’s level of alexithymia relative to the child’s self-report. Based on these results, we hypothesize that when asked to report on the child’s alexithymia, children and parents may not be reporting on the same phenomenon, and thus these two measures may not be interchangeable. These provocative findings, however, must be considered preliminary: our analyses were sufficiently powered to detect a strong relation between the two types of report had one existed, but our analyses were not sufficiently powered to distinguish between a small relation and no relation at all. (shrink)

In today’s rapidly merging technological realms, basic necessity and morality of the society is often overlooked. Genetic Engineering, a great leap in human understanding of life sciences with possible impacts on every facet of life, is one such advancement. A technology which tampers with the nature at the DNA level and has the prowess to shuffle genes between distantly or even non-related organisms is bound to have gravid moral implications. Tagged with ecological, economic and bio-safety issues, it is being termed (...) as an imprecise tool, which may cause irreversible damages. Apparently, it has shaken the age old, deeply entrenched ideologies of people around the globe leading to a massive uproar in the society. This synthesis is an attempt to dissect and analyze the ethical and moral repercussions of Genetic Engineering with special reference to Indian scenario. (shrink)

Jaswal & Akhtar provide several quotes ostensibly from people with autism but obtained via the discredited techniques of Facilitated Communication and the Rapid Prompting Method, and they do not acknowledge the use of these techniques. As a result, their argument is substantially less convincing than they assert, and the article lacks transparency.

Jaswal & Akhtar challenge the notion that autistic people have diminished social motivation, prompted in part by a desire to take autistic testimony seriously. We applaud their analysis and go further to suggest that future research could be enhanced by involving autistic people directly in the research process.

Jaswal & Akhtar in their target article convincingly argue that subjects with autism do not have diminished social motivation. However, they still recognize that autistic people behave socially in an unusual way. Why? Here we suggest that these behaviours are the results of a multisensory integration deficit. Viewed from this perspective, the assumption that autistic people's unusual behaviours indicate diminished social motivation has to be replaced by the one that they have diminished social prediction skills.

Jaswal & Akhtar's outstanding target article identifies the necessary social nature of the human mind, even in autism. We agree with the authors and present significant contributory origins of this autistic isolation in disruption of purposeful movement made social from infancy. Timing differences in expression can be misunderstood in embodied engagement, and social intention misread. Sensitive relations can repair this.

Jaswal and Akhtar argue that taking seriously autistic testimony will help make the science of autism more humane, accurate, and useful. In this commentary, I pose two questions about autistic testimony's role in a better science of autism and extract a general lesson about the value of autistic testimony from the authors’ arguments.

Jaswal & Akhtar offer evidence against lack of social motivation in “autistic people,” providing no further phenotypic details as to the autism spectrum disorder subgroups that they refer to. I will argue that given the extensive behavioral and neurobiological heterogeneity among people who receive the diagnosis, reference to “autistic people” is misleading. As a consequence, J&A's claims are difficult to interpret.

Three complementary points to Jaswal & Akhtar are raised: (1) As a person with autism, I desire sociality despite vulnerability to others’ antisocial behaviour; (2) Asperger's conflation of autism with psychopathy (Czech 2018) likely caused clinicians to disregard social motivation among those with autism; and (3) adverse experiences cause social-engagement diversity to develop in all people, not just those on the spectrum.

Although refreshing, Jaswal & Akhtar's critique of the reduced social motivation theory omits reference to Asperger's work and to changes in the diagnostic criteria over time. I situate the theory in the historical contexts that shaped – and eventually contradicted – it to highlight its dehumanizing aspects while emphasizing that critiques should be rooted in recognition of the diversity of the spectrum.

In light of Jaswal & Akhtar's compelling argument, we argue there should instead be more focus on deficits in socio-emotional abilities. However, current research is limited by the psychometric problems with most measures. We discuss specific problems, outlining examples for theory of mind. We conclude with recommendations for new lines of research derived from findings in the individual differences literature.

The arguments offered by Jaswal & Akhtar to counter the social motivation theory do not appear to be directly related to the SMT tenets and predictions, seem to not be empirically testable, and are inconsistent with empirical evidence. To evaluate the merits and shortcomings of the SMT and identify scientifically testable alternatives, advances are needed on the conceptualization and operationalization of social motivation across diagnostic boundaries.

We support Jaswal & Akhtar's interrogation of social motivational accounts of autism and discuss two sources of bias that contribute to how others construe autistic people's communications: an experience-based bias that limits our ability to discern the speaker's action as communicative and a prejudice against the credibility of certain speakers that limits a listener's willingness to believe their testimony.

We share Jaswal & Akhtar's concerns about the unintended repercussions of assumed social disinterest in autism. We expand consideration of these consequences with discussion of the literature and our own work on loneliness, mental ill-health, and self-representation, which is a cornerstone to social and emotional health. Further study is needed with expansive, mixed methodologies and involvement of the autistic community.

In arguing that autistic people are socially motivated, Jaswal & Akhtar miss the opportunity to puncture the notion that social motivation is a prerequisite for humanity. Instead, we contend that some autistic people may indeed find social interactions to be unmotivating and that this doesn't have to be seen as a problem.

REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; THE VIEW FROM WITHIN, Sean Spence; COMMENTARY ON HODGSON, Henry (...) Stapp. (shrink)

In challenging the assumption of autistic social uninterest, Jaswal & Akhtar have opened the door to scrutinizing similar unexamined assumptions embedded in other literatures, such as those on children's typically developing behaviors regarding others’ minds and morals. Extending skeptical analysis to other areas may reveal new approaches for evaluating competing claims regarding social interest in autistic individuals.

Pragmatic deficits constitute a central feature of autism, which is highly relevant to Jaswal & Akhtar's criticisms of the social motivation theory of autism. Recent research reveals that while certain context-based interpretations are accessible, more complex pragmatic phenomena remain challenging for people on the spectrum. Such a selective pragmatic impairment is difficult to account for in motivational terms.

Speaking as an anthropologist, I comment on three striking features of Jaswal & Akhtar's argument. I suggest that the boldness of their intervention lies in its modesty. In challenging a parsimonious explanation for autistic behavior, they invite a conversation including scholars from other disciplines, as well as autistic people themselves.

We agree that autistics’ unusual overt behaviors don't necessarily mean reduced social motivation. But Jaswal & Akhtar maintain that, while autistics may appear socially uninterested, their social interest is in fact typical and indeed must be to avoid multiple poor outcomes. This problematic idealization of social typicality deflects attention from important differences in autistic cognition and interests, which should be valued.

To understand why autistic people are misperceived in the way Jaswal & Akhtar suggest, we should embrace concepts like the “double empathy problem” and camouflaging and recognize the negative consequences these have for mental health in autism. Moreover, we need to value expertise from experience so that autistic people have a voice and indeed a stake in research into autism.

Growing evidence, as presented by Jaswal & Akhtar, indicates that social motivation is not universally reduced in autism. Here, we evaluate and extend this argument in light of recent evidence of “compensation” in autism. We thereby argue that autistic “compensators” – exhibiting neurotypical behaviour despite persistent difficulties in social cognition – indicate intact or potentially heightened social motivation in autism.