Edmund Husserl, generally regarded as the founding figure of phenomenology, exerted an enormous influence on the course of twentieth and twenty-first century philosophy. This volume collects and translates essays written by important German-speaking commentators on Husserl, ranging from his contemporaries to scholars of today, to make available in English some of the best commentary on Husserl and the phenomenological project. The essays focus on three problematics within phenomenology: the nature and method of phenomenology; intentionality, with its attendant issues of temporality (...) and subjectivity; and intersubjectivity and culture. Several essays also deal with Martin Heidegger's phenomenology, although in a manner that reveals not only Heidegger's differences with Husserl but also his reliance on and indebtedness to Husserl's phenomenology. Taken together, the book shows the continuing influence of Husserl's thought, demonstrating how such subsequent developments as existentialism, hermeneutics, and deconstruction were defined in part by how they assimilated and departed from Husserlian insights. The course of what has come to be called continental philosophy cannot be described without reference to this assimilation and departure, and among the many successor approaches phenomenology remains a viable avenue for contemporary thought. In addition, problems addressed by Husserl--most notably, intentionality, consciousness, the emotions, and ethics--are of central concern in contemporary non-phenomenological philosophy, and many contemporary thinkers have turned to Husserl for guidance. The essays demonstrate how significant Husserl remains to contemporary philosophy across several traditions and several generations. The volume includes essays by Rudolf Bernet, Klaus Held, Ludwig Landgrebe, Dieter Lohmar, Verena Mayer and Christopher Erhard, Ullrich Melle, Karl Mertens, Ernst Wolfgang Orth, Jan Patočka, Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, Karl Schuhmann, and Elisabeth Ströker. (shrink)

In both theoretical and applied modeling in behavioral sciences, it is common to choose a mathematical specification of functional form and distribution of unobservables on grounds of analytic convenience without support from explicit theoretical postulates. This article discusses the issue of deriving particular qualitative hypotheses about functional form restrictions in structural models from intuitive theoretical axioms. In particular, we focus on a family of postulates known as dimensional invariance. Subsequently, we discuss how specific qualitative postulates can be reformulated so as (...) to allow for conventional statistical hypothesis testing, and we also derive details of a particular likelihood ratio test procedure. An empirical application of the testing procedure is carried out, based on data from a Stated Preference survey. (shrink)

John Bell showed that a big class of local hidden-variable models stands in conflict with quantum mechanics and experiment. Recently, there were suggestions that empirically adequate hidden-variable models might exist which presuppose a weaker notion of local causality. We will show that a Bell-type inequality can be derived also from these weaker assumptions.

les problèmes éthiques et politiques dans la philosophie anglo-saxonne John Rawls et Robert Nozick Otfried Höffe. PRÉFACE Depuis quelque temps se manifeste un intérêt croissant des milieux philosophiques pour des questions d' éthique ...

Institute of Theoretical Physics, Exact Sciences Sidlerstrasse 5, University of Bern, CH-3012 Bern Switzerland portmann{at}itp.unibe.ch' + u + '@' + d + ''//--> awuethr{at}itp.unibe.ch' + u + '@' + d + ''//--> John Bell showed that a big class of local hidden-variable models stands in conflict with quantum mechanics and experiment. Recently, there were suggestions that empirically adequate hidden-variable models might exist which presuppose a weaker notion of local causality. We will show that a Bell-type inequality can be derived (...) also from these weaker assumptions. Introduction The EPR-Bohm experiment Local causality Bell's inequality from separate common causes 4.1 A weak screening-off principle 4.2 Perfect correlation and ‘determinism’ 4.3 A minimal theory for spins 4.4 No conspiracy Discussion. (shrink)

In Sites of Exposure, John Russon draws on the resources of phenomenology to describe how human life, while not having a “given” form specified in advance, nonetheless takes speci????ic shape through practices by which we become committed to certain ways of living. This means that our lives are simultaneously a matter of living with a speci????ic reality—what Russon calls “home”—and having to respond to an outside to which we are “exposed.” I argue here that Russon’s analysis is especially useful (...) for feminist philosophy and its attempt to grapple with the possibility of universal principles of justice across cultural contexts, developing this philosophical framework in conversation with Serene Khader’s efforts to furnish a set of core values for transnational feminist praxis that, while universal in their opposition to sexist oppression, are not imperialist, and with Saba Mahmood’s critique of the parochial character of Western conceptions of freedom. (shrink)

Die Geschichte der Fundamentalphilosophie, die man „Metaphysik“ nennt, fängt als Metaphysik-Kritik an, die Geschichte der fundamentalphilosophischen, insofern auch metaphysischen Ethik, beginnt dagegen so gut wie ohne jede Metaphysik. John Rawls’ Aufsatztitel „[…] Political, not metaphysical“ trifft schon mehr als zwei Jahrtausende vorher auf die erste als „Ethik“ betitelte Veröffentlichung zu. Paradoxerweise gilt es aber nicht für Rawls’ wichtigste Inspirationsquelle, einen Metaphysikkritiker zwar, der aber seine systematische Ethik ausdrücklich der Metaphysik zuordnet. Damit stehen zwei der bis heute maßgeblichen Muster philosophischer (...) Ethik zu Debatte, das Vorbild einer Ethik ohne Metaphysik, Aristoteles’ Nikomachische Ethik mit dem Prinzip Eudaimonie, und als Muster einer metaphysischen Ethik die Moralphilosophie Kants mit dem Prinzip Autonomie. Nun sind beide Ethiken längst bekannt, so dass es im folgenden nicht um etwas grundsätzlich Neues gehen kann, wohl aber um einige neue Facetten. Zu ihnen gehört die Frage, ob die Situation kontingent ist oder gute Gründe für sie sprechen: dass Aristoteles’ eudaimonistische Ethik metaphysikfrei, Kants autonome Ethik dagegen metaphysisch ist. (shrink)

I dette nummeret av Etikk i Praksis belyses et etisk dilemma om premiering eller sanksjoner for deltakelse/ikke-deltakelse i nasjonale screeningprogram for kreft, i artikkelen «En etisk diskussion af screening for kræftsygdomme» av John Brodersen, Peter Laurs Sørensen, Fía Lindenskov og Lonny Henriksen. Dette er belyst gjennom intervjuer hvor divergerende meninger gjenspeiler at vi har svært begrenset kunnskap om både kort- og langtidseffekt av screening for kreft. Den politiske viljen til å innføre screeningprogram har utvilsomt vært sterkere enn viljen til (...) å fremskaffe vitenskapelig bevis for eventuell nytteeffekt gjennom randomiserte studier. Randomiserte studier på screening er svært dyre og har ofte et langt tidsperspektiv før resultater kan foreligge og danne et relevant kunnskapsgrunnlag for en nasjonal screeningstrategi. Resultatene kan også være kulturavhengige. Det understreker behovet for flere randomiserte studier. Det må også poengteres at ethvert land som har råd til å vurdere innføring av et screeningprogram, har også råd til å finansiere randomiserte studier i forkant. En omfattende randomisert studie på fleksibel sigmoidoskopiscreening for tarmkreft har vist at deltakelse i screeningprogram kan føre til et redusert egenansvar for sunn livsstil og dermed økt risiko for livsstilssykdommer. Her ligger det altså en pedagogisk utfordring som kan variere fra land til land og mellom forskjellige screeningmetoder. (shrink)

I sin udmærkede kommentar til vores artikel «En etisk diskussion af screening for kræftsygdomme» beskriver Geir Hoff den udtalte mangel på evidens vedrørende nytteværdien af screeningsprogrammer for kræftsygdomme baseret på randomiserede studier. Ydermere fremhæver Geir Hoff misforholdet mellem den manglende evidens ved screening og de strenge krav, der er til evidensen i den farmaceutiske industri. Dette er en velkommen kritik, pga. en udtalt ukritisk og uvidenskabelig tilgang til anvendelse af screening for denne eller hin sygdom eller risikofaktor.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:European Network of Buddhist-Christian StudiesSalzburg, Austria, June 8–11, 2007John D’Arcy MayIs it a problem for Buddhists that what is generally regarded as religion can be profoundly different from tradition to tradition? Is it appropriate or even desirable to speak of a Buddhist “theology of religions”? Does Buddhism have its own ways, however subtle, of affirming its superiority over all else that claims the name “religion”?The European Network of Buddhist-Christian (...) Studies set out to find answers to these questions at its seventh conference, held at the splendid Catholic conference center of St. Virgil on the outskirts of Salzburg, Austria.Given the demographic realities in Europe, the network has inevitably tended to be a group of Christians discussing Buddhism, as far as possible with the participation of Buddhist guests but without really providing a platform for a thoroughgoing Buddhist discussion of religious plurality. This time, more Buddhists than ever before, including significant scholars from America and Asia as well as Europe, participated in the conference. We were thus treated to a discussion of Buddhist attitudes to the religions that broke new ground and presented a vivid picture of Buddhism’s own internal diversity.In his introductory address the president of the network, Prof. John May, paid tribute to the University of Salzburg’s newly established Centre for Intercultural Theology and the Study of Religions, whose director, Prof. Gregor Maria Hoff, welcomed participants on behalf of the university. Dr. Ulrich Winkler contributed substantially to the organization of the conference.Dr. Kristin Kiblinger (Winthrop University), author of the first systematic treatment of Buddhist “inclusivism,” opened the conference proper by distinguishing between “open” and “closed” forms of inclusivism. She suggested a parallel with George Lindbeck’s “experiential-expressive” paradigm of religious doctrine in order to make clear that Buddhists, like Christians, have ways of privileging their own positions, though these generally remain unacknowledged.“One vehicle” (ekayāna) theories of Buddhism have something in common with “common core” theories of Christian pluralism in that they presuppose a “single end” [End Page 149] inclusivism. Whether the “positionless position” derived from Buddhist “emptiness” (śūnyatā) is a better guarantee of genuine pluralism than the Christian notion of “self-emptying” (kenōsis), as suggested by Masao Abe, remains an open question. The Buddhist doctrine of “two truths,” one expressed in the “higher” language (paramārthasatya) accessible only to Buddhist practitioners and the other in the “lower” language (samvrtisatya) of discourse with others, does not hold out much promise of true mutual respect between traditions.Prof. John Makransky (Boston College), an ordained lama and meditation teacher as well as a renowned scholar of Tibetan Buddhism, took up the challenge of developing a Buddhist “theology” that avoids the claim to superiority. What matters to the Buddhist practitioner is to cut through all subconscious clinging, even to approved teachings and spiritual results. “Ultimate truth” can be known, directly but nonconceptually, yielding a “nonconceptual compassion” comparable to what Christians call “totally undivided oneness with God.” Lacking historical consciousness, however, teachers have tended to project their understanding of skillful means back on to Śākyamuni Buddha, each school assuming that other schools are merely preparations for itself. The same pattern is evident in the integration into Buddhism of indigenous religions such as Shintō, which enriched Buddhism but also assimilated it to themselves. Prompted by his contacts with Christian colleagues to venture beyond practice into Buddhist self-reflection, Makransky is now prepared to see in conceptions such as the Dharmakāya (“Dharma body” of the Buddha or ultimate reality) an equivalent of what Christians understand by God. The Body of Christ, with its implications for ecclesiology, could open up a further avenue for comparison.Existing under the conditions of late or post-modernity, Buddhism is forced to come to terms with pluralism and ecumenism. Prof. Kenneth Tanaka (Musashino University, Tokyo), an ordained Jōdo Shinshū priest, sees himself as incapable of saying to a non-Buddhist, “You’re not saved,” because the practice of prajñā and karunā (wisdom and compassion) is not restricted to Buddhists. Even within traditions, however, levels of spiritual attainment are not equivalent, nor are all religions equally valid. “Prophets can’t be pluralists,” but like... (shrink)

본 논문의 목표는, ‘칸트 윤리학의 현재와 미래’를 문제사적으로 고찰하여 오늘날 칸트 연구가들에게 현실적으로 요구되는 과제는 고대 그리스의 ‘철학적 삶의 기술론’의 주제이던 ‘좋은 삶으로서의 행복’을 칸트의 ‘자율도덕’의 틀 안에서 통합하는 ‘자율적 행복론’의 정립임을 밝히고 그 가능성을 짚어보는 데 있다. 이를 위해 먼저 저 과제에 이르게 되는 문제를 낳게 한 ― 그리고 1970년대 ‘실천철학의 복권 운동’을 일으킨 ― 존 롤즈(John Rawls)의 사회정의론에서 칸트 윤리학의 연구를 고찰하여 본다. 이에 따르면 칸트의 윤리학은 ‘의무론적 도덕의 근거지움의 프로그램’이라는 좁은 의미의 도덕철학적 반성으로 제한되며, 여기서 고대 (...) 그리스의 철학적 삶의 기술론의 중심 주제이던 좋은 삶으로서의 행복은 더 이상 철학적-윤리적 반성의 대상의 지위를 갖지 못한다. 다음으로 롤즈의 ‘사회정의론’이 바탕으로 하고 있는 칸트의 의무론에 대한 비판을 통해 고대 그리스의 좋은 삶의 문제를 윤리학의 근본주제로 복권시키려는 ― 1980년대에 본격적으로 등장한 ― 신아리스토텔레주의의 문제제기와 이에 대한 영미권의 소위 구성주의적 칸트주의자들과 독일어권의 담론윤리적 칸트주의자들의 ― 결과적으로 불충분한 ― 숙고들을 논하여 본다. 신아리스토텔레주의의 비판은 근본적으로 두 가지인데, 첫 번째는 칸트에게서 좋은 삶의 추상으로부터 가능한 정언명법을 통한 도덕의 근거지움에 대한 것이고, 두 번째는 저 좋은 삶으로서의 행복을 윤리학의 중심 주제로 다시 설정하는 것에 관한 문제이다. 이 두 번째 문제는 자율 도덕 역시 도덕의 의미와 관련하여 매우 진지하게 받아들이지 않으면 안 될 매우 중요한 윤리적 반성의 대상이다. 그리하여 여기서 자율 도덕의 틀 안에서 가능한 철학적 행복론인 자율적 행복론의 가능성은 칸트 연구가들에게 필연적인 윤리적 과제가 된다. 이에 연결하여 2000년대 들어서 저 자율적 행복론의 가능성을 매우 설득력 있게 보여준 오트프리트 회페(Otfride Höffe)에게서 칸트 윤리학의 행위론적 연구를 짧게 고찰하여 본다. 그리고 회페의 저 연구를 바탕으로 하여 칸트의 최고선에 관한 이론을, 특히 아리스토텔레스적 좋은 삶의 물음의 자율 도덕적 완성이라는 시각을 통해 자율 도덕의 틀 안에서 통합된 좋은 삶의 윤리학으로서의 ‘자율적 행복론’으로 해석하여 본다. 이 자율적 행복론에서 중심이 되는 물음은 도덕의 근거지움에 관한 것이 아니라, 도덕이 행복으로 인도하여주는지 여부와 정도에 대해 묻는 도덕적 행위의 행복론적인 의미이다. 이 경우 칸트에게서 자율 도덕은 좁은 의미의 도덕철학적 근거지움에 관한 윤리이론적 방식이 아닌 행위론적인 반성을 통해 최고선의 물음에 이르게 된다. 여기서 자율 도덕과 좋은 삶으로서의 행복은 윤리-필연적 조건관계를 갖게 되며, 그리하여 ‘도덕적 삶의 행복론적 의미’를 윤리적 물음의 대상으로 갖게 되는 ‘자율적 행복론’이 칸트에게서 정립될 가능성이 열린다. 끝으로 이 자율적 행복론의 미래적 전망과 의의를 또한 응용윤리적 물음과 관련하여 짧게 언급한다. (shrink)

Introduction: the foundation of justice -- Practical reason and justifying reasons: on the foundation of morality -- Moral autonomy and the autonomy of morality : toward a theory of normativity after Kant -- Ethics and morality -- The justification of justice: Rawls's political liberalism and Habermas's discourse theory in dialogue -- Political liberty: integrating five conceptions of autonomy -- A critical theory of multicultural toleration -- The rule of reasons: three models of deliberative democracy -- Social justice, justification, and power (...) -- The basic right to justification: toward a constructivist conception of human rights -- Constructions of transnational justice: comparing John Rawls's the law of peoples and Otfried Höffe's democracy in an age of globalisation -- Justice, morality, and power in the global context -- Toward a critical theory of transnational justice. (shrink)

Daniel Kahneman's book Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011) has had a worldwide impact. The book's insights are profound and have changed the thinking of both decision scientists and general audiences about how choices are made. Kahneman, however, claims that standard utility theory cannot explain these insights because it 1) lacks “reference points” from which gains and losses can be measured, 2) does not predict loss aversion, and 3) assumes preferences are stable (amid supposed counter evidence). These alleged failures of utility (...) theory are what led Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1991) to develop prospect theory. This brief article shows that a close reading of Thinking, Fast and Slow reveals fundamental oversights in these criticisms. Not only does loss aversion arise naturally within utility theory for rational economic agents with stable preferences, but the very measurements of gains and losses rely directly upon reference points. Rather than overturning the insights of prospect theory, proper use of utility theory and its indifference curve representations reveals these behavioral insights and places them within the sturdier, longer- established framework of neoclassical microeconomic theory. (shrink)

Supplements the background theory of indeterministic time with a standard deontic logic, representing what ought to be the case. Taken together with the formal notion of action introduced in the previous chapter, the framework now allows us to speak about what it ought to be that the agent does, and to explore the possibility that this notion should be identified with the notion of what the agent ought to do. Examples are developed to show that the two notions should not (...) be identified. (shrink)

An analogy is developed between action in an indeterministic setting and choice under uncertainty, as it is studied in decision theory. Various dominance relations among actions are explored, and used both to provide a semantic account of what agents ought to do and to formulate a notion of dominance act utilitarianism. The ideas are related to problems involving independence, conditionals, and sure‐thing reasoning.

Ethically significant consequences of artificially intelligent artifacts will stem from their effects on existing social relations. Artifacts will serve in a variety of socially important roles—as personal companions, in the service of elderly and infirm people, in commercial, educational, and other socially sensitive contexts. The inevitable disruptions that these technologies will cause to social norms, institutions, and communities warrant careful consideration. As we begin to assess these effects, reflection on degrees and kinds of social agency will be required to make (...) properly informed decisions concerning the deployment of artificially intelligent artifacts in important settings. The social agency of these systems is unlike a human social agency, and this paper provides a methodological framework that is more suited for inquiry into artificial social agents than conventional philosophical treatments of the concept of agency. Separate aspects and dimensions of agency can be studied without assuming that agency must always look like adult human agency. This revised approach to the agency of artifacts is conducive to progress in the topics studied by AI ethics. (shrink)