In this book Prof. Cheng deals with its principle doctrines, its philosophy and its influence on.

Given the centrality of the Buddhist doctrine of ‘no-self’, those instances in which the Buddha does indeed seem to advocate a self have always provided significant sites of hermeneutic inquiry within the Buddhist tradition. They have necessitated a range of sophisticated exegetical tools such as the division of the Buddha’s pronouncements into those of provisional meaning and those of ultimate meaning ; the centrality of discerning the Buddha’s real, as opposed to apparent, intention ; and of course the notion of (...) the Buddha’s utilization of his skillful means specifically to hone his teaching to cater to the different capacities of.. (shrink)

Buddhist Illogic. The 2nd Century CE Indian philosopher Nagarjuna founded the Madhyamika (Middle Way) school of Mahayana Buddhism, which strongly influenced Chinese, Korean and Japanese (Ch’an or Zen) Buddhism, as well as Tibetan Buddhism. Nagarjuna is regarded by many Buddhist writers to this day as a very important philosopher, who they claim definitively proved the futility of ordinary human cognitive means. His writings include a series of arguments purporting to show the illogic of logic, the absurdity of (...) reason. He considers this the way to verbalize and justify the Buddhist doctrine of “emptiness” (Shunyata). These arguments attack some of the basic tenets and techniques of reasoning, such as the laws of thought (identity, non-contradiction and the excluded middle), conceptualization and predication, our common assumptions of self, entities and essences, as well as our beliefs in motion and causation. The present essay demonstrates the many sophistries involved in Nagarjuna’s arguments. He uses double standards, applying or ignoring the laws of thought and other norms as convenient to his goals; he manipulates his readers, by giving seemingly logical form (like the dilemma) to his discourse, while in fact engaged in non-sequiturs or appealing to doubtful premises; he plays with words, relying on unclear terminology, misleading equivocations and unfair fixations of meaning; and he ‘steals concepts’, using them to deny the very percepts on which they are based. Although a critique of the Madhyamika philosophical interpretation and defense of “emptiness”, Buddhist Illogic is not intended to dissuade readers from Buddhism. On the contrary, its aim to enhance personal awareness of actual cognitive processes, and so improve meditation. It is also an excellent primer on phenomenological epistemology. (shrink)

Zen Buddhism often appears to be ‘anti-intellectual’, ‘illogical’ and ‘trivial’. These apparent aspects of Zen have puzzled many students of Buddhism. Why is Zen so ‘irrational’? By what Buddhist doctrines, tenets or philosophies did Zen masters develop their unconventional and dramatic teachings and practices? The aim of this paper is to show that main San-lun Mādhyamika doctrines, such as Emptiness, the Middle Way, the Twofold Truth and the refutation of erroneous views as the illumination of right views, have (...) been assimilated into Zen teachings and practices Mādhyamika philosophy seems to provide a major ‘theoretical’ foundation for as a ‘practical’; ‘anti-intellectual’, ‘irrational’, ‘unconventional’ and ‘dramatic’ religious movement. (shrink)

This is a fine exposition of the view of Mädhyamika Buddhism established by Indian pandit Nägärjuna and its subsequent transmission to China. The teaching of Emptiness, the central doctrine of the Mädhyamika, was first brought to China in detail by Kumärajiva. A number of documents written within fifteen years of Kumaräjiva's arrival in China are analyzed to determine the aspects that were and were not understood by those students. Writings of Hui-Yuan, Seng-jui, and Seng-chao serve as the basis of (...) the investigation; they are first treated individually in order to investigate their views and terminology and then are compared in a short summary chapter. The end of the book consists of fifty-eight pages of their writings, either question and answer tracts on Emptiness, introductions to Indian translations, or short treatises on Emptiness or the lack of own-being. The book is a must for those who wish to understand either the Mädhyamika or the transmission of it to China. Though it is well written and the chapters on China read easily, the subject matter of the chapter on the philosophy of Nägärjuna makes the going rougher.--P. J. H. (shrink)

Originally published in 1962. This book discusses and interprets the main themes of Buddhist thought in India and is divided into three parts: Archaic Buddhism: Tacit assumptions, the problem of "original Buddhism", the three marks and the perverted views, the five cardinal virtues, the cultivation of the social emotions, Dharma and dharmas, Skandhas, sense-fields and elements. The Sthaviras: the eighteen schools, doctrinal disputes, the unconditioned and the process of salvation, some Abhidharma problems. The Mahayana: doctrines common to all (...) Mahayanists, the Madhyamikas, the Yogacarins, Buddhist logic, the Tantras. (shrink)

This paper defends the realist representationalist version of the Buddhist-Abhidharma account of consciousness. The account explains the intentionality and the phenomenality of conscious experiences by appealing to the doctrine of self-awareness. Concerns raised by Buddhist Mādhyamika philosophers about the compatibility of reflexive awareness and externality of the objects of perception are addressed. Similarly, the Hindu critiques on the incoherence of the Buddhist doctrine of reflexive awareness with the doctrines of no-self and momentariness are also answered.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:T. S. Eliot, Dharma Bum:Buddhist Lessons in The Waste LandThomas Michael LeCarnerMany critics have argued that T. S. Eliot's The Waste Land is a poem that attempts to deal with the physical destruction and human atrocities of the First World War, or that he had somehow expressed the disillusionment of a generation. For Eliot, such a characterization was too reductive. He replied, "Nonsense, I may have expressed for them (...) their own illusion of being disillusioned, but that did not form part of my intention." He did not want to be the poet of a "lost generation" of war survivors, but rather, he wanted, like most poets, to write for all ages. To that end, Eliot sought to transcend time and space by bringing to The Waste Land scores of literary, cultural, and artistic allusions from a variety of sources including the Upanishads, Greek mythology, the Bible, Chaucer, Dante, Spenser, Shakespeare, and Leonardo Da Vinci. Ironically, within this menagerie of literary homages, Eliot has created a vast emptiness, a world of pain, suffering, desolation and despair, as if to suggest that even in the presence of all the greatest artistic and cultural achievements of mankind, we must understand that life is transitory and material things ephemeral.The idea that life is fleeting and filled with suffering is at the core of Buddhist thought and one that Eliot surely learned from his graduate studies at Harvard. Several scholars have examined the influence of Eastern philosophy, and in particular Buddhist thought, on Eliot's work, largely in the past forty years.1 My argument departs from this scholarship in two significant ways. First, I will read The Waste Land through the lens of Eliot's graduate studies, and in doing so will show how the poem functions as a didactic, artistic representation of the Buddhist doctrine of samsāra, an idea that views the world as transitory, overcome [End Page 402] with lustful desires, and forever bound to a cycle of life, death, and rebirth. From this perspective, we can see how Eliot's understanding of the original Buddhist texts, which informed much of his writing of The Waste Land, allowed him to see through the all-too-common misconceptions about Buddhism during the early part of the twentieth century. Lastly, we will see that Eliot looked at these misconceptions as a psychological projection of Europeans' discontent with their own lives in an uncertain time.Over the past three decades an increasing number of scholars have studied Eliot's graduate work. In 1985, Jeffrey Perl and Andrew Tuck published a study that examines the impact that Eliot's coursework and professors had on during his studies at Harvard.2 Perl and Tuck point out that Eliot devoted nearly one third of his graduate program to the study of Asian philosophy and philology. Eliot studied Sanskrit and Pali under C. R. Lanman, the preeminent Sanskrit specialist of the age. In his third year, Eliot took a course entitled "Schools of Religious and Philosophical Thought in Japan" with Professor Masaharu Anesaki, a course that had a profound impact on him. Eliot was exposed to several schools of Buddhism in his studies including the Kegon, Shingon, and Tendai, which are characterized as "descendants of the Madhyamika School, which was founded in the second century A.D. by Nāgārjuna, the Indian Buddhist philosopher." Nāgārjuna is widely considered the most influential Buddhist philosopher after Siddhartha Gautama himself and is the leading proponent of the Mādhyamika ("Middle Way") philosophy.The central teaching of Nāgārjuna was the doctrine of śūnyatā, or as it is often translated, "emptiness." For Mahāyāha Buddhists, all things are totally empty of any defining essence. Thus, all things are void of any fixed identity or inherent existence and remain in a constant state of impermanence, change, and flux. This is the fundamental premise of Mahāyāha Buddhism. Only through the realization of this emptiness in material things can one achieve Buddhahood. According to one standard text, "the real knowledge of Buddha nature is empty of empirical content, and it is the discovery of that emptiness or void, śūnyatā, of the true Buddha... (shrink)

Description: The main purpose of writing this book is not only to explain, but also to interpret, the three phases of development of Buddhist thought in India, and how and in what manner it spread out to countries as far away from the land of its origin as Japan. Though the subject may be vast, a conscious effort has been made of explaining the complexity of Buddhist philosophical thought in as concise terms as possible. The first five hundred years, which (...) constitute the initial phase of development, is that of consolidation. The form of Buddhism that developed during this phase is at present known as Theravada, and is prevalent in countries that lie to the south of India. On account of this geographical location of Theravada countries, it is also known as the Southern Buddhism. The second phase of Buddhism is characterised by the emergence of Mahayana. All those religious features were brought into Buddhism with the inception of Mahayana that are constitutive of folk religiosity. One of the important religious elements that crept into the Buddhist fold was the doctrine of Bodhisattva. Henceforward it would be the Bodhisattva ideal that would catch the imagination of a Buddhist believer. At the philosophical level two most important schools were established, namely, the Madhyamika and the Yogacara-Vijnanavada. Great strides, in the realm of art, were also made, particularly in architecture, sculpture and painting. The final phase of development is represented by the emergence of Tantricism. At this phase of development archaic religious elements, in the shape of magic, became part and parcel of Buddhist practice. Thus begins the process of degeneration of the ideals that the Buddha had enunciated at the time of his Enlightenment. This story of rise and fall, of development and degeneration, tells its own story, which needs to be told in terms that are understandable. (shrink)

A book of this title needs indeed to be written, but it should be done so after careful study of at least Bhävaviveka's Tarka-jvälä which is preserved in Tibetan. The historical and doctrinal relationships of the four major Buddhist schools, the Vaibhäsikas, the Sauträntikas, the Yogäcärins, and Mädhyamikas, are sufficiently complex that a book of this small size could only present a bare outline of their emergence. And even such an outline can be accurately made only after the pursuit of (...) Buddhist thought through its transformations as presented in Indian and Tibetan texts on tenets. Secondary materials simply are not adequate to take account even of how the Buddhists themselves perceived the development of these texts. Therefore, this work, which relies on the few available translations and much of the older, less adequate scholarship on Buddhism, cannot help but present a scanty picture of such a complicated topic. Such difficulties render the comparisons with Whitehead, existentialism, etc., somewhat weak.--P. J. H. (shrink)

Revisiting the author’s characteristic line of interpretation of the Madhyamaka philosophy of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, this essay responds to critiques thereof by arguing for the sense Madhyamaka makes, on the author’s interpretation, as a Buddhist position. For purposes of the argument, it is allowed that especially on the author’s characteristic interpretation, Madhyamaka appears to have affinities with the “personalist” doctrine long regarded by Indian and Tibetan Buddhist traditions as unorthodox. In particular, it is accepted that on this interpretation, Mādhyamika arguments (...) to the effect that conventional truth cannot be explained away by any “ultimate” truth are tantamount to the view that a personal level of description cannot coherently be thought superseded by the kind of impersonal analysis typical of Abhidharma literature. The main burden of the essay is to explain the sense it makes to think this supposedly unorthodox embrace of the category person counts, in fact, as elaborating the tradition’s orienting no-self doctrine. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Double Exposure: Cutting Across Buddhist and Western DiscoursesSteven HeineDouble Exposure: Cutting Across Buddhist and Western Discourses. By Bernard Faure. Translated by Janet Lloyd. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. Pp. xiv + 174. Hardcover $49.50. Paper $21.95.In some ways, Double Exposure: Cutting Across Buddhist and Western Discourses by Bernard Faure seems quite different from other publications by this author, including several books that were also translated from the French (...) such as Visions of Power and Will to Orthodoxy, which have a specific focus on the practice of Chan or on gender issues in Buddhism. Double Exposure deals with broad, wide-ranging philosophical themes concerning Buddhist thought set in comparative contexts with Western intellectual history since the Enlightenment, especially continental European philosophy. Faure is well known from previous works for his extensive explorations of poststructural theory in examining historical and doctrinal buddhological issues. Clearly, however, this book was intended primarily not for Buddhist studies scholars but for an audience of French intellectuals and cultural critics, encompassing but more diverse than the academic community, who wish to understand how the discourse of Buddhism pertains to, yet remains distinct from, their own recent history of thought. Rather than citing a particular set of poststructural thinkers to illuminate Buddhism, Faure does the converse and uses Buddhism to make key points about the development of Western thought.At the same time, Double Exposure is consistent with and an extension of Faure's earlier books in that it tracks the role of the twofold or double in its various manifestations both in Buddhist thought and in methodological approaches to interpreting Buddhism. Faure is endlessly fascinated by and delights in exposing the fact that the Buddhist tradition, nwhich claims to espouse a standpoint of nondualism, invariably and inevitably divvies reality up into an endless series of polarities and paradoxes regarding the apparent oppositions or contradictions between the realms of nirvāṇa and samsāṃra, karmic causality and transcendence of karma, ultimate and mundane reality (or two levels of truth), and sudden and gradual enlightenment. He asserts: "The history of Buddhism... seems to be governed by what Bergson, in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, suggested calling the 'law of dichotomy,' a law which apparently brings about a realization, by a mere splitting, of tendencies which began by being two views, so to speak, of one and the same tendency" (p. 124). [End Page 178]In addition to Bergson, Faure cites classical notions like the Platonic division between the ideal form and the world of concrete forms, the two-faced Roman god Janus who rules over past and future, and the Manichaean split between good and evil. Faure also emphasizes more recent French thinkers and scholars, including Emile Beneviste, Nayla Farouki, Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Henri Micheaux, among others, who in probing the "diabolical" sense of truth versus error, which are considered eternal contraries in Western thought, especially in Christianity, are useful for discussing parallels and differences with Buddhism.Double Exposure also discusses interpretive debates about whether Buddhism should be seen as epitomizing agnosticism versus mysticism, pragmatism versus supernaturalism, or rationalism versus mythology, as well as conflicts in using the method of psychology as opposed to anthropology and the impact of hidden, or not-so-hidden Orientalist and reverse Orientalist tendencies. Perhaps the best organized chapter in the book is "The Major Schools" (chapter 5), which offers a quick but insightful overview of early Buddhist realism, Yogācāra idealism, the Mādhyamika middle way, and Chan's compromise between immanence and transcendence. The most imaginative section is "External Thought" (chapter 8), which delves into a vast array of topics. These range from Tantric sexuality as a form of spiritual energy and Diderot's view of the perpetual shifting of ordinary thought to Zongmi's image of the bright pearl as a metaphor for sudden realization compared with Paul Claudel's own pearl metaphor in Conversations dans le Loir-et-Cher, which evokes a gradual path of self-understanding.I think Faure's main aim in all his many publications is to explore and expose the wedges, gaps, and inconsistencies, without making a judgment other than to underscore that what... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The 2008 Meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian StudiesPeter A. HuffThe Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies (SBCS) sponsored two sessions in conjunction with the 2008 annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion (AAR). The first session addressed the topic "Cognitive Science, Religious Practices, and Human Development: Buddhist and Christian Perspectives." The second session focused on the life and legacy of Trappist monk, spiritual writer, and interfaith pioneer Thomas Merton (...) (1915–1968).The first session, moderated by Sandra Costen Kunz (Phillips Theological Seminary), featured five papers probing the relationship between research in the natural and social sciences and lessons from the experience of Buddhist and Christian practice: "The Body and the Mind: Buddhist Bowing and Neuroscience," presented by Paula K. Arai (Louisiana State University) and coauthored with Sascha du Lac (Salk Institute for Biological Sciences); "Who Hears? A Zen Buddhist Perspective" by Robert Aitken Roshi, founder and retired Zen master of the Diamond Sangha in Honolulu (read by Ruben Habito, Southern Methodist University); "'Your Cell Will Teach You Everything': Old Wisdom, Modern Science, and the Art of Attention" by Noreen Herzfeld (St. John's University); "Verbal Imagining: Scientific Reflection on Visual Cognition in Light of Traditional Tibetan and Christian Theologies of the Image" by Thomas Cattoi (Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley); and "Cognitive Error and Contemplative Practices: The Cultivation of Discernment in Mind and Heart" by Wesley J. Wildman (Boston University). Revised versions of three of these papers with an introductory essay by Prof. Costen Kunz are included in this issue of Buddhist-Christian Studies.The theme for the society's second session, chaired by Alice Keefe (University of Wisconsin), was "Thomas Merton Forty Years after His Death: Buddhist and Christian Perspectives." Four presenters examined and evaluated Merton's distinctive contributions to Buddhist-Christian relations, theological reflection, and interreligious dialogue. In her paper "Self-Surrender in Merton's Writings and Contemplative Psychology," Daijaku Judith Kinst (California Institute of Integral Studies) concentrated on the place of subjective transformation in Merton's thought, describing his [End Page 143] "great gift" to the literature on the contemplative life as the "fearless" rejection of self-centeredness in the practice of prayer and spiritual formation. "Thomas Merton Meets Tibetan Buddhism" by Judith Simmer-Brown (Naropa University) shed new light on the impact of the dzogchen ("great completion") tradition on Merton's evolving spirituality, particularly as expressed in the letters, speeches, and private documents included in the posthumously published Asian Journal of Thomas Merton (1973). In "Non-Dual Wisdom as Feminine: Sophia and Prajnaparamita in Merton's Poem 'Hagia Sophia,'" Paula Hirschboeck (Edgewood College) explored suggestive parallels between Christian mystical experience and Buddhist madhyamika teaching in Merton's long, dreamlike Marian hymn from the early 1960s. Kristin Johnston Largen (Lutheran Theological Seminary, Gettysburg) concluded the session with an analysis of the role of Buddhism-inspired insights in Merton's approach to soteriological questions, especially as seen in his changing attitudes toward traditional Christian doctrines of hell, purgatory, eschatology, and the human person.Between sessions, members and friends of the society participated in the annual SBCS/AAR field trip to a local site significant for its relevance to interdisciplinary Buddhist-Christian studies. This year members visited the Chicago Cultural Center of Soka Gakkai International-USA (SGI-USA), the Buddhist association for peace, culture, and education based on the teachings of thirteenth-century Japanese monk and reformer Nichiren Daishonin. Located at 1455 South Wabash Avenue in downtown Chicago, the cultural center serves as the primary facility for SGI-USA activities in the Midwest. Mr. Guy McCloskey, senior vice president, publisher, and member of the board of directors for SGI-USA, organized the event. The evening's program included a tour of the center's award-winning architecture, an informal overview of the aims and initiatives of SGI-USA, and a delicious dinner served by members of the organization. [End Page 144]Peter A. HuffCentenary College of LouisianaCopyright © 2009 University of Hawai'i Press... (shrink)

For nearly two thousand years Buddhism has mystified and captivated both lay people and scholars alike. Seen alternately as a path to spiritual enlightenment, an system of ethical and moral rubrics, a cultural tradition, or simply a graceful philosophy of life, Buddhism has produced impassioned followers the world over. The Buddhist saint Nagarjuna, who lived in South India in approximately the first century CE, is undoubtedly the most important, influential, and widely studied Mahayana Buddhist philosopher. His many works (...) include texts addressed to lay audiences, letters of advice to kings, and a set of penetrating metaphysical and epistemological treatises. His greatest philosophical work, the Mulamadhyamikakarika--read and studied by philosophers in all major Buddhist schools of Tibet, China, Japan, and Korea--is one of the most influential works in the history of Indian philosophy. Now, in The Foundations of the Philosophy of the Middle Way, Jay L. Garfield provides a clear and and eminently readable translation of Nagarjuna's seminal work, offering those with little of no prior knowledge of Buddhist philosophy a view into the profound logic of the Mulamadhyamikakarika. Translated from the Tibetan, the tradition through which Nagarjuna's philosophical influence has largely been transmitted, Garfield presents a superb translation of Mulamadhyamikakarika in its entirety. Illuminating the systematic character of Nagarjuna's reasoning, as well as the works profundity, Garfield shows how Nagarjuna develops his doctrine that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence and essenceless. But, he argues, phenomena nonetheless exist conventionaly, and that indeed conventional existence and ultimate emptiness are in fact the same thing. This represents the radical understanding of the Buddhist doctrine of the two truths, or two levels of reality. Nagarjuna reinterprets all of Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology through this analytical framework--"a systematic and beautifully elegant philosophical dissection of reality." In turn, Garfield goes on to offer the only verse-by-verse commentary based upon the Indo-Tibetan Prasangika-Madhyamika reading of Nagarjuna, the school most influential in the development of Mahayana philosophy in Tibet, China, Korea, and Japan. Written specifically for the Western reader, the commentary explains Nagarjuna's positions and arguments in the language of Western metaphysics and epistemology, and connects Nagarjuna's concerns tho those of Western philosophers such as Sextus, Hume, and Wittgenstein. A fascinating and accessible translation of the foundational text for all Mahayana Buddhism text, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way will enlighten all those in search of the essence of reality. (shrink)

In trying to define the difference between conventional and ultimate truth, the Mādhyamika Buddhist author Jñānagarbha ends up in paradoxical formulations. Putnam's discussion of Nietzsche's remark that “as the circle of science grows larger it touches paradox at more places” is presented as an illustration for Jñānagarbha's case. No comparison of Putnam and Jñānagarbha is intended as regards the contents of their presentations, the focus being only on the logical form of their argumentation. The paradoxical nature of Jñānagarbha's doctrinal system (...) is explained to derive from the logical incompleteness of formal systems. The paradox is also explained to work as a direction arrow pointing to what can only be realised in a mystical experience. (shrink)

Concise explanation of the philosophical positions (sidhanta) of the Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacarya, and Madhyamika schools of Buddhism with Hinduism.

Madhyamaka Buddhism is famously centered on the doctrine of emptiness, often glossed as the view that there are no essences. This chapter addresses two interrelated questions about that doctrine. First, is the Madhyamaka doctrine of essencelessness more plausibly to be regarded as a necessary or a contingent truth? Second, is the doctrine of essencelessness in contradiction with the views of those prominent Mādhyamikas who also claim that essencelessness is the essence of all things? The chapter argues that the Madhyamaka (...) doctrine of essencelessness is most plausibly to be regarded as a necessary truth, but that a modern Mādhyamika can safely affirm without contradiction the apparently paradoxical claim that emptiness is the essence of all entities. (shrink)

Schopenhauer is widely recognized as the Western philosopher who has shown the greatest openness to Indian thought and whose own ideas approach most closely to it. This book examines his encounter with important schools of Hindu and Buddhist philosophy and subjects the principal apparent affinities to a careful analysis. Initial chapters describe Schopenhauer’s encounter with Indian thought in the context of the intellectual climate of early nineteenth-century Europe. For the first time, Indian texts and ideas were becoming available and the (...) belief that they could bring about a second Renaissance—an “Oriental Renaissance”—was widespread. Schopenhauer shared in this enthusiasm and for the rest of his life assiduously kept abreast of the new knowledge of India. Principal sections of the book consider the two main pillars of Schopenhauer’s system in relation to broadly comparable ideas found, in the case of Hindu thought, in Advaita Vedānta, and within Buddhism in the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools. Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the world as representation, or a flow of impressions appearing in the consciousness of living beings, is first considered. The convergence between this teaching and Indian idealism, especially the doctrine of illusory appearance, has long been recognized. Schopenhauer himself was aware of it, emphasizing that it was the result not of influence but of a remarkable convergence between Eastern and Western thought. This convergence is subjected to a much more detailed examination than has previously been carried out, undertaken in the light of twentieth-century Indology and recent studies of Schopenhauer. The second main pillar of Schopenhauer’s system, the doctrine of the world as will, is then examined and its relationship to Indian thought explored. This section of the work breaks new ground in the study of Schopenhauer, for although the similarity of his ethical and soteriological teaching to that of Indian religions has long been noted the underlying reasons for this have not been grasped. It is demonstrated that they are to be found in hitherto unrecognized affinities, of which Schopenhauer himself was largely unaware, between the metaphysics of the will and Indian ideas relating to karmic impressions, the store-consciousness, the causal body, and śakti as the “force” or “energy” that maintains the existence of the world. Final chapters discuss the controversial and difficult question of the relation of the will to final reality in Schopenhauer’s thought in the light of Indian conceptions, and suggest that the two central pillars of his philosophy may be seen, to a greater extent than previously supposed, as a bridge by which the Eastern and Western traditions of philosophical thought may be brought into a closer and more creative relationship. (shrink)

Schopenhauer is widely recognized as the Western philosopher who has shown the greatest openness to Indian thought and whose own ideas approach most closely to it. This book examines his encounter with important schools of Hindu and Buddhist philosophy and subjects the principal apparent affinities to a careful analysis. Initial chapters describe Schopenhauer’s encounter with Indian thought in the context of the intellectual climate of early nineteenth-century Europe. For the first time, Indian texts and ideas were becoming available and the (...) belief that they could bring about a second Renaissance—an “Oriental Renaissance”—was widespread. Schopenhauer shared in this enthusiasm and for the rest of his life assiduously kept abreast of the new knowledge of India. Principal sections of the book consider the two main pillars of Schopenhauer’s system in relation to broadly comparable ideas found, in the case of Hindu thought, in Advaita Vedānta, and within Buddhism in the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools. Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the world as representation, or a flow of impressions appearing in the consciousness of living beings, is first considered. The convergence between this teaching and Indian idealism, especially the doctrine of illusory appearance, has long been recognized. Schopenhauer himself was aware of it, emphasizing that it was the result not of influence but of a remarkable convergence between Eastern and Western thought. This convergence is subjected to a much more detailed examination than has previously been carried out, undertaken in the light of twentieth-century Indology and recent studies of Schopenhauer. The second main pillar of Schopenhauer’s system, the doctrine of the world as will, is then examined and its relationship to Indian thought explored. This section of the work breaks new ground in the study of Schopenhauer, for although the similarity of his ethical and soteriological teaching to that of Indian religions has long been noted the underlying reasons for this have not been grasped. It is demonstrated that they are to be found in hitherto unrecognized affinities, of which Schopenhauer himself was largely unaware, between the metaphysics of the will and Indian ideas relating to karmic impressions, the store-consciousness, the causal body, and śakti as the “force” or “energy” that maintains the existence of the world. Final chapters discuss the controversial and difficult question of the relation of the will to final reality in Schopenhauer’s thought in the light of Indian conceptions, and suggest that the two central pillars of his philosophy may be seen, to a greater extent than previously supposed, as a bridge by which the Eastern and Western traditions of philosophical thought may be brought into a closer and more creative relationship. (shrink)

The Madhyamaka school of Buddhism, the followers of which are called Mādhyamikas, was one of the two principal schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India, the other school being the Yogācāra. The name of the school is a reference to the claim made of Buddhism in general that it is a middle path (madhyamā pratipad) that avoids the two extremes of eternalism—the doctrine that all things exist because of an eternal essence—and annihilationism—the doctrine that things have essences while (...) they exist but that these essences are annihilated just when the things themselves go out of existence. The conviction of the Madhyamaka school, which can be called the Centrist school in English, is that this middle path is best achieved by a denial that things have any inherent natures at all. All things are, in other words, empty of inherent natures. This doctrine of universal emptiness of inherent natures (svabhāva-śūnyatā) is the hallmark of the school, which places the school solidly in the tradition associated with the Perfection of Wisdom (prajñāpāramitā) literature of Mahāyāna Buddhism. (shrink)

Leading East Asian Buddhist thinkers of the seventh century compared, analyzed, and finalized seminal epistemological and soteriological issues that had been under discussion in India and East Asia for centuries. Among the many doctrinal issues that came to the fore was the relationship between the Tathagatagarbha understanding of the human psyche and the view of basic karmic indeterminacy articulated by the new stream of Indian Yogacara introduced through the translations and writings of Xuanzang and his disciples. The great Silla scholiast (...) Wonhyo, although geographically located on the periphery in the Korean peninsula, was very much at the center of the intense discussion and debate that occurred on these topics. Through the force of his writings, he became one of the most influential figures in resolving doctrinal discrepancies for East Asian Buddhism. Although many of Wonhyo’s writings are lost, through his extant work we are able to get a solid glimpse of his profound and learned insights on the nature and function of the human mind. We can also clearly see his hermeneutical approaches and methods of argumentation, which are derived from apophatic Madhyamika analysis, the newly introduced Buddhist logic, as well as various indigenous East Asian approaches. This volume includes four of Wonhyo’s works that are especially revelatory of his treatment of the complex flow of ideas in his generation: System of the Two Hindrances, Treatise on the Ten Ways of Resolving Controversies, Commentary on the Discrimination between the Middle and the Extremes, and the Critical Discussion on Inference. (shrink)

Leading East Asian Buddhist thinkers of the seventh century compared, analyzed, and finalized seminal epistemological and soteriological issues that had been under discussion in India and East Asia for centuries. Among the many doctrinal issues that came to the fore was the relationship between the Tathagatagarbha understanding of the human psyche and the view of basic karmic indeterminacy articulated by the new stream of Indian Yogacara introduced through the translations and writings of Xuanzang and his disciples. The great Silla scholiast (...) Wonhyo, although geographically located on the periphery in the Korean peninsula, was very much at the center of the intense discussion and debate that occurred on these topics. Through the force of his writings, he became one of the most influential figures in resolving doctrinal discrepancies for East Asian Buddhism. Although many of Wonhyo’s writings are lost, through his extant work we are able to get a solid glimpse of his profound and learned insights on the nature and function of the human mind. We can also clearly see his hermeneutical approaches and methods of argumentation, which are derived from apophatic Madhyamika analysis, the newly introduced Buddhist logic, as well as various indigenous East Asian approaches. This volume includes four of Wonhyo’s works that are especially revelatory of his treatment of the complex flow of ideas in his generation: System of the Two Hindrances, Treatise on the Ten Ways of Resolving Controversies, Commentary on the Discrimination between the Middle and the Extremes, and the Critical Discussion on Inference. (shrink)

This paper is a comparative study of two texts separated by a considerable temporal-spatial gap. The methodological approach is, as we would like to define it, a-philological. Five central concepts drawn from the Dàshèng qǐxìn lùn, traditionally associated with Aśvaghoṣa, Paramārtha, and Śikṣānanda, shall be examined against the related ideas found in Ratnākaraśānti’s Prajñāpāramitopadeśa. Our observations are the following: 1) The two dimensions of the single mind advocated in the QXL are doctrinally identical to the two forms of the dependent (...) nature in the PPU. 2) The intermingling mind which is taken as ālayavijñāna in the QXL, corresponds to the imagination of the unreal in the PPU. 3) The mutual perfuming of the real and the unreal is in essence the same as the false inseparability of clear light and image in the PPU. 4) The essence of perception and its synonyms used in the QXL, its commentarial literature and other related texts, find equivalents such as prakāśamānatā, prakāśātmatā, saṃvedyatā, buddhilakṣaṇa, in the PPU. 5) The concept of activated perception in the QXL sheds light on a puzzling word in the PPU, arvāk, which can be interpreted as the opposite of “suddenly” in the QXL. Our investigation reaffirms the philosophical value as well as the religious legitimacy of the QXL, and it underscores the significance of the late mādhyamika texts for Buddhist Studies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Mahāyāna Theology of the Real Presence of Christ in the EucharistJohn P. KeenanMahāyāna theology is an approach to thinking about the Christian faith within the philosophical context of the great Mahāyāna Buddhist thinkers: philosophers of emptiness such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, and Candrakīrti in the Mādhyamika tradition; and philosophers of consciousness such as Maitreya, Asaçga,Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Paramārtha, and Hsūan-tsang in theYogācāra tradition. The advantage of employing Mahāyāna philosophy in (...) the doing of Christian theology is that this philosophical tradition developed with the dual purpose of supporting and encouraging faith and practice while eliminating absolutist claims for metaphysically fixed and unalterable ideas.Mahāyāna is deconstructive without any of the aloofness that modern French philosophers apparently feel they must adopt vis-à-vis theology and the Church. Just as Plato did for the Fathers of the early church and Aristotle did for Aquinas, Mahāyāna opens avenues of thought and questioning for contemporary theologians that will gift our cultures with the grace of new theological insight into the meaning of Christ's presence to and among human beings.And so I would like to do some theology here, demonstrating how a Mahāyāna thinker like myself might envisage the real presence of Jesus in the Eucharist.The Real Presence of ChristThe theology of the real presence of Jesus in the Eucharist has had a long and fascinating development. For the first eight centuries, the issue did not arise with any doctrinal insistence.1 Christians were content to see Christ's presence in the performance of the Eucharistic rite as a medicine of immortality that would heal their souls and embody for them the reality of the risen Christ. It was only later, in the condemnation of the theologian Ratramnus2 and the development of the doctrine of transubstantiation, that the classical formulation took shape.3 That doctrine was expressed in philosophic terms that were then current, concepts that were accepted as clear and valid frameworks for thinking.Medieval theologians, especially the great St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth [End Page 89] century, had just rediscovered Aristotle and gloried in the subtle intricacies and vast overviews that this "new" learning provided them.4 They philosophized by seeking insight into and defining the very act of existence itself, discussing the "essences," or "substances" of things as the underlying realities that we encounter in our life and in our faith. In this view, Christ "subsists"—that is, he really exists—as the substance of the bread and wine in the Eucharist. This is the philosophic view that is stressed even today in the Roman Catholic Church. Modern Catholic theologian Bernard Cooke explains the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist as follows:Christ bespeaks in the action of the Mass the presence of his own risen body beneath the appearance of food and drink. He effects this by changing the inner reality (the "substance") of the bread and wine into his risen humanity. This is the unique change that the Church has for centuries called transubstantiation—the change of the substance of the bread into the substance of Christ's risen body. Before the transubstantiation in the Mass, the inner reality (the substance) of the bread and wine is what sustains the external appearances in existence. These appearances tell us of the presence of the inner reality of bread and wine (which itself is not visible). After the transubstantiation, the risen humanity of Christ is what sustains these external appearances in existence. Consequently, they now tell us of the presence of Christ.5The disputes about the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist hinged precisely on this issue—what is the inner reality of the sacrament? Another scholar of these arguments, Francis Clarke, writes:All the Eucharistic controversies... hinge upon one question: What is the substance of the sacrament? "If we did once agree in that, the whole controversy [concerning the sacrifice] would soon be at an end," for the answer to that question decides "whether Christ's body be there offered indeed unto the heavenly Father by the... (shrink)

This paper aims at giving a brief historical survey of the growth and development of the meaning attributed by the ancient Indians to the term maya. In studying this term we must not lose sight of the fact that it is very often used in various texts without any bearing upon the great problem of the,reality' of the phenomenal world as compared with brahman. In a large number of texts originating in pre-or non-Vedantic circles the word occurs in a great (...) variety of connotations : « power, wisdom, subtle device », and, especially, « incomprehensible power enabling its possessor to create something » ascribed to mighty beings. In the Vedic period there is no basis for any conception of the unreality of the phenomenal world in the use of the term. It does not mean « chimera, illusion, fascination, delusion, fata morgana, etc. ». It refers to a reality of an artificial or misleading character, to phenomena produced by a special ability or imagination ; it can often be translated by a locution beginning with pseudo —, or by the Engl. craft in one of its connotations. It can also mean « fraud, deception ». Philosophers often referred to these common meanings of the word in discussing the,relation' of brahman and the phenomena which essentially are brahman. Svet. Up. 4, 9 and 10 nature is called maya : in this upanûad the germs from which the various views or doctrines of the generations to come were to develop had already reached the first stage of growth without differentiating in any considerable degree. Here maya does not express the unreality of the world, but the impossibility of man's understanding its character and the power of its creator. Nor does the Bhagavadgita question the reality of the world either. Deussen and other scholars were wrong in following Sahara's school of thought which interpreted these texts from its own particular point of view. In the history of Indian thought Buddhism is of outstanding importance. According to the ancient Buddhists the world and the individuals are real, but unstable, of a comparatively insignificant,metaphysical dignity'. The Madhyamika's and Nagarjima's relativistic school prepare the way for the idealistic Vijnanavadins who, founding their ontology on the psychology of yoga, hold the view that only vijnana « mere consciousness » exists. Any pretended,reality' outside this reality is to be regarded as dependent on a wrong interpretation of our inner experiences. The,causally dependent aspect', a determined,form of reality' reflects the,absolute aspect'; the lower constructed aspect' or,wrong ideation', the sphere of the concrete phenomena, however, is to be compared to a snake the presence of which we incorrectly assume when, at dusk, we find a cable.In this connection the term maya is also used : a rope may appear in the shape of a snake, or a maya in the shape of a man and other objects which do not really exist in themselves. This maya is void, non-substantial; in the same way the, wrong or constructive ideation' which appears in the, aspect of subject and object' is called non-substantial. In the process by which the reality of consciousness is transformed into the aspect of wrong ideation maya plays an important rôle : it is the power or factor producing the differentiation of the homogeneous consciousness which results in the pseudo-existence of the phenomenal world. Gaudapada, the earliest exponent of the view of pure non-duality writing at a time when the influence of these idealistic Buddhists was predominant, availed himself of the results of their speculative endeavour. On the other hand he made sure of the sanction of the traditional brahminical circles by expounding his views in the form of an expatiation on the Mandukya. Upanmd. The universum, he holds, is like a dream, like a maya ; « it is not actually so ». All phenomenal beings are dreamlike projections of the Divine Self, which is by its very maya able to make itself assume this projected form. But in his book maya also serves to indicate that any relation at all between the world and the Ultimate cannot be rationally sustained, for this,relation' is inexplicable. Maya, inherent to brahman is the condition underlying the,Origin', the pseudo-existence of this world ; but our lack of understanding is also maya. Our empirical knowledge, which makes us believe that things come into being is would-be knowledge. Maya is the hypothesis needed to express in a formula that the diversity of the phenomenal world is neither identical with atman-brahman nor existing by itself. Sawkara likewise regards the world as,pseudo' ; but in contradistinction to Gaudapada who focusses attention on the maya formula and the character of the phenomena, he emphasizes the sole reality of brahman, avoiding any suggestion as to the world's being void, non-being or unsubstantial. This formulation holds good from the higher point of view, viz. that of the supreme reality, into which empirical knowledge cannot penetrate. For practical purposes the world may be considered as really existing. The ignorance which conceals our true character from us and makes us perceive a world which from the standpoint of the Supreme does not exist is maya. Maya hides the reality and projects a pseudo-reality. It is undefinable and inexplicable ; it is neither being nor non-being. Maya is the postulate needed to account for the phenomenon called universe, for the existence of the diversity, though it is only the One which exists. Finally the maya theories of Saktas and Visnuite schools are briefly discussed. According to the former mayasakti is the power of the Supreme to veil itself without ceasing to be what it is ; they emphasize the point of view that « this all is brahman », accusing Sankara of admitting a principle beside brahman. Ramanuja who basing himself on the conviction that Brahman in the first place is God, defends the thesis that the world and the souls are real, and attacks Sankara's maya theory ; according to this great exponent of Visnuite thought maya symbolizes the wonderful and miraculous in God's creation and creative power. (shrink)

The Platform Sūtra presents a variety of concepts, but in the deeper plane all these concepts can be roughly induced as a reinterpretation of enlightenment and a description of Chan’s distinctive experience of enlightenment. Through a sophisticated display of ontological paradox, the sūtra integrates tathāgatagarbha thought with prajñā wisdom to illuminate why enlightenment is possible for ordinary people in their existential life experience. Following the claim of tathāgatagarbha and earlier Chan texts that all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature, the sūtra further (...) blurs the line between empirical mind and pure nature and endows the mind-nature unity with the transcendental implication of original enlightenment. At the same time, the sūtra points out the emptiness and nonattachment of the mind-nature with the doctrines of no-thought, no-form, and no-abiding, which are grounded in the prajñāparamita and Madhyamika literature. For the soteriological-methodological concern, the Platform Sūtra applies the Awakening of Faith’s theory of “two aspects of one-mind” to advocate seeing one’s originally enlightened mind-nature directly from the perception of true reality. This perceptional experience of enlightenment solves the dilemmatic relationship between the two key soteriological categories of ignorance and enlightenment in the Buddhist tradition. As a result, the sūtra emphasizes the approach of sudden awakening and reinterprets samādhi and prajñā as both identically, simultaneously, and inseparably representing the experience of enlightenment. Through metaphors of transmission of Dharma genealogy, ordination genealogy, platform, and even the Platform Sūtra itself, Huineng is presented as a “living Buddha” or successful enlightenment experience by an ordinary person. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?William EdelglassThe Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? Edited by Georges B. J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. Pp. viii + 398.As early as Bhāvaviveka (sixth century), Indian Buddhist doxographers situated important philosophers in schools and sub-schools characterized by adherence to distinct views, thereby providing a coherent, hierarchical presentation of the Buddha's teaching. In (...) Tibet this practice continued and gained considerable importance: the pedagogical and hermeneutical significance of ordering texts occasioned widespread doxographical literary production.1 The doxographical projects, in which the systematic understanding of unchanging 'tenets' was privileged over the singular views of individual authors, were highly contested. Much of the disagreement was due to the multiplicity of interpretations bound to arise during a millennium of intellectual exchange. Doxographical hierarchy set the parameters of intellectual discourse, and thus the classification of tenets was not simply a matter of historical interest. Traditions were constructed in such a way that one's own thought would conform to an acceptable view, to say nothing of the complex relationship between political power and religious doctrine in Tibet. Despite the contested status of Tibetan doxographical categories, the classifications and distinctions that order much contemporary Western scholarship on Mahāyāna Buddhism in India were inherited from Tibet. Until recently, even the best research often uncritically employed dominant Tibetan classifications as basic interpretive categories and was thus able to bring order to an enormous body of literature.The most philosophically significant and vigorously contested classification in Tibetan doxography is the distinction between the Rang rgyud pa and the Thal 'gyur ba (sanskritized by modern scholars as 'Svātantrika' and 'Prāsaṅgika', respectively). The original locus of the discussion is three Indian commentaries on Nāgārjuna's (second century) Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Buddhapālita (fifth-sixth centuries), in what is the oldest extant commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā by a known author, followed Nāgārjuna's reductio ad absurdam form of argumentation, leading from the opponent's premise to an untenable consequence (prasaṅga, thal 'gyur). Shortly thereafter Bhāvaviveka claimed that for every prasan.ga argument in Nāgārjuna's text there is an unstated positive argument, and he criticized Buddhapālita for not utilizing the new methods of Buddhist logic to demonstrate the validity of Madhyamaka thought. Bhāvaviveka argued that Mādhyamikas ought to present formal probative (prayoga; sbyor ba) and autonomous (svatantraprayoga; rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba) arguments and argued that inferential reasoning was necessary to establish the Madhyamaka view of emptiness. Candrakīrti (seventh century) then defended Buddhapālita, insisting that prasaṅga arguments were the only fitting method for a Mādhyamika because they do not require the affirmation of inherent nature. Roughly five centuries later, although Madhyamaka had already been divided according to a variety of classifications in India and Tibet, some Tibetan scholars retroactively characterized Bhāvaviveka as the founder of the Svātantrikas and Candrakīrti as the [End Page 415] founder of the Prāsaṅgikas. Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the most famous proponent of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, believed this debate was about more than methodological or epistemological questions: because autonomous argumentation requires inherently existing objects, even if only conventionally, he claimed that Svātantrikas were crypto-realists who deviated from Nāgārjuna's radical understanding of emptiness.Tsong kha pa's analysis of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, and therefore Madhyamaka philosophy in general, came to dominate Western scholarly research. However, in the last few decades there has been considerable exploration of the forces and influences that contributed to the emergence of conflicting Tibetan doxographical systems.2 This research program has been significantly furthered with the publication of The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? Because the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction is a Tibetan conceptual construction based on Indian commentaries, an understanding of the issues involved requires a careful analysis of the Indian sources, an investigation of the growth of the various doxographies in Tibet... (shrink)

This is one of the best studies to date on the philosophy of emptiness, established by the Buddhist scholar Nägärjuna. It not only presents an exposition of emptiness, the lack of self-existent entities, but also gives the background in India at the time of the formulation of the Mädhyamika and analyzes the structures of religious apprehension in Indian thought. Streng finds three types of religious realization: mythic, intuitive, and dialectical. He clearly sees and demonstrates that the doctrine of emptiness is (...) not a teaching of an unqualified base of phenomena, and thus classifies this system as a dialectical structure. The second part is devoted to a study of the system itself; the third, to placing that system in the context of Indian religious thought; the fourth, to relating the doctrine of emptiness to the general problem of religious knowledge as a means for ultimate transformation. Thus, the book is by no means limited to Buddhologists or Indologists. The almost constant translation of Buddhist Sanskrit terms into English makes this work available to all interested in philosophy and religious thought. The appendix contains translations of the whole of the Mülamadhyamakakärikäs and of the Vigrahavyävartanï both by Nägärjuna. Because the texts are root or fundamental texts, and thus brief, the translations are not easily comprehensible; however, those parts can be skipped over as the principle being exemplified is the same in every instance. Because this book places the concept of emptiness in its proper perspective, distinguishing emptiness from an all-pervasive base out of which phenomena are produced, and yet appreciates the spiritual value of the doctrine, it is a must for all who wish to know more of the more profound aspects of Buddhist philosophy.--P. J. H. (shrink)