Les rapports entre parti et État en Chine aujourd’hui : une clé de lecture soviétique L’architecture politique chinoise actuelle a été héritée de l’URSS ; pourtant elle est rarement appréhendée à l’aune de ce précédent historique. Cette étude analyse la relation asymétrique entre le Parti communiste chinois et la puissance publique à la lumière des formes et des pratiques du Parti communiste de l’Union soviétique post-stalinien. On relève l’homologie des structures partidaires et étatiques en (...) URSS et en Chine, ainsi que la pénétration de l’État par le Parti dans ces deux configurations. Dans le cas chinois, cependant, des mécanismes institutionnels propres – tels que les groupes du Parti ( dangzu ) – constituent des moyens de contrôle sur l’appareil étatique inconnus en URSS. Le pouvoir chinois actuel se distingue par une conception absolutiste du rôle dirigeant du Parti, à rebours d’efforts entrepris par le passé pour circonscrire son périmètre d’intervention et pour le rapprocher du fonctionnement alors en vigueur en Union soviétique. (shrink)

Dans un régime comme celui de la République populaire de Chine, où prévaut la suprématie d’un Parti-État unique, la politique et le politique constituent, a fortiori plus qu’ailleurs, la chasse gardée de l’élite dirigeante du pays, à savoir les cadres du Parti communiste. Cet article tente de saisir qui sont les élites politiques aux commandes de la Chine d’aujourd’hui à travers l’analyse du modus operandi de l’École des cadres du Parti de Shanghai. L’étude de cette institution, (...) qui participe à la régulation de la circulation des élites et constitue l’un des lieux privilégiés de la transmission et de l’exercice du pouvoir, permet, par-delà son propre fonctionnement, d’éclairer la nature et le devenir même du régime. S’il apparaît que les forces modernisatrices, en assimilant davantage l’École du Parti à un institut d’administration publique, œuvrent à la professionnalisation du métier de cadre, c’est également et avant tout afin de mieux perpétuer l’hégémonie du Parti-État unique.In a regime where the one Party-State rule still prevails, as is the case in the People’s Republic of China, the polity and politics constitute – here more than anywhere else – the private ground of the country’s ruling elite, i.e. the cadres of the Communist Party. This article attempts to grasp who the political elites in control of contemporary China are, by analyzing the modus operandi of the Shanghai Party School for Cadres. The study of an institution that takes part in the circulation of the elites and hence constitutes one of the privileged playing fields for the transmission and the exercise of power, allows, beyond the understanding of its own working, to shed light on the very nature and evolution of the regime. If the modernizing forces appear to work towards the professionalization of the cadres’ craft by equating the Party School to an institute of public administration, they ultimately do so in order to better perpetuate the supremacy ofthe one-Party system. (shrink)

Le concept de « civilisation écologique » a initialement été développé par des intellectuels chinois, à la fin des années 1980, comme une critique de la modernité industrielle et du système capitaliste face à la catastrophe écologique planétaire en cours. À partir du milieu des années 2000, et suite à l’accentuation des contestations environnementales dans les grandes villes du pays, le Parti Communiste Chinois (PCC) a décidé de faire de cette notion un de ses slogans politiques (...) phares, mais au prix de vider ce concept de sa dimension critique pour l’instrumentaliser au service de la propagande d’État, de la croissance verte et du contrôle numérique des écosystèmes. La Chine serait-elle en train d’inventer de nouvelles normes de gouvernance? (shrink)

La politique de « réformes et ouverture » vers l’étranger, initiée par Deng Xiaoping au sortir de la Révolution culturelle en 1978 s’est avérée, d’un point de vue économique, une véritable réussite qui a amené la Chine au rang des grandes puissances mondiales en à peine trente ans. D’un point de vue social par contre, le résultat est tout autre : transfigurée par ces réformes qui ont acté le basculement d’une économie planifiée vers une économie de marché, la société chinoise (...) s’est retrouvée bouleversée par la disparition de l’État-providence et la restructuration du secteur de production étatique, autant de dommages collatéraux qui vont brutalement vulnérabiliser et « précariser » des millions d’individus. Dès la fin des années 1980, vont se constituer de nouvelles « classes dangereuses » de paysans sans terres, de chômeurs et de pauvres, des « masses dangereuses » que l’État-parti chinois va devoir discipliner, puisque c’est sur leur exploitation que va se construire le miracle chinois. C’est donc un véritable arsenal discursif, une langue de bois élaborée et complétée sur trois décennies, que les dirigeants du Parti communiste chinois vont mettre en place pour formuler les perceptions et « corriger les consciences erronées » de ces populations vers une acceptation d’un ordre social qui leur est foncièrement défavorable.From the economic point of view, the policy for « reform and openness » to other countries initiated by Deng Xiaoping as the Cultural Revolution ended in 1978 was a genuine success that made China a top-ranking world power in the space of barely thirty years. The outcome was very different from the social point of view, however: the reforms that turned a planned economy into a market economy caused radical upheaval in Chinese society as collateral damage from the demise of the welfare state and the restructuring of the State-controlled production sector plunged millions into precariousness and insecurity. The late 1980s saw the emergence of a new « dangerous class » of landless peasants, unemployed workers and poverty-stricken individuals: the « dangerous masses » that the Chinese party-state would have to discipline so that the « Chinese miracle » could be built by exploiting their labour. Thus did China’s Communist party leadership deploy a whole arsenal of political doublespeak, developed and honed over three decades, designed to formulate perceptions and « correct » the « erroneous conceptions » of these populations to lead them to acceptance of a social order which is fundamentally opposed to their interests. (shrink)

Dans cet entretien, inédit en langue occidentale, Wang Hui aborde les rapports entre pensée politique et pratiques de la révolution. Prenant comme point de départ les Thèses sur Feuerbach de Marx, il explore la façon dont cette question a été appréhendée dans la philosophie (Platon, Kant, Deleuze, Spivak…) ainsi que, dans le contexte chinois, par Mao Zedong et le mouvement communiste. Wang approfondit également la conception gramscienne de l’intellectuel organique afin de suivre les transformations de cette figure au (...) fil du xxe siècle. Examinant un épisode décisif de l’histoire du Parti communiste chinois – la campagne de rectification de Yan’an dans les années 1940 –, il poursuit la réflexion à propos des relations entre le parti révolutionnaire et les intellectuels, et de ce qu’il en est advenu par la suite. (shrink)

Souvent considérée comme un point aveugle de son œuvre, la question du parti constitue pourtant une composante centrale de la pensée de Marx. En prenant en compte l’expérience militante qui fut la sienne tout au long de sa vie, cet article entreprend de montrer que Marx a développé non pas une mais deux théories du parti bien distinctes. La thèse décisive formulée à la fin des années 1840 dans le Manifeste du parti communiste – celle d’un (...) parti communiste conçu comme fraction éclairée d’un parti ouvrier plus large – disparaît en effet de l’horizon stratégique de Marx au cours des années 1860, cédant la place à une réflexion centrée sur la construction du parti de classe, dans laquelle l’idée même d’une distinction fonctionnelle entre parti ouvrier et parti communiste perd son sens. Opposant alors de façon systématique le parti à la secte, Marx cherche à penser les conditions de possibilité d’une activité politique autonome de la classe ouvrière plutôt qu’une organisation fondée sur une doctrine pré-constituée. (shrink)

Romain Ducoulombier, author ofCamarades!, a study of the origins of the French Communist Party, belongs to a different ideological context to earlier authors on the subject, such as Kriegel, Wohl or Robrieux. But though Ducoulombier claims originality for his work, there is little genuinely new here. He fails to grasp the impact of the Russian Revolution on the French working class and has little understanding of the dynamics of the Communist International. He stresses the ‘asceticism’ and ‘messianism’ of the early (...) Communist Party without giving a precise meaning to these terms. Worst of all, Ducoulombier concentrates on archival material while saying remarkably little about the French Communist Party’s actual activities, notably work in the trade unions, anti-militarism and anti-colonialism. (shrink)

Together, China and India account for almost two fifths of mankind. In purchase power parity terms the Chinese economy is the second largest in the world ahead of Japan, and the Indian economy is the fourth largest ahead of Germany. In less than two decades these two big Asian economies together might account for a quarter of the global product. Currently, however, both countries are still poor.Both countries might outgrow poverty, because potential advantages of backwardness as well as fairly strong (...) domestic investment favor growth. Concerning human capital formation China and India differ. China is much better than India in primary school education. Eradication of analphabetism is in sight in China, but far in the future in India. India, however, is much stronger in tertiary education than China. Another major difference between China and India is their degree of integration in the global economy. China benefits much more from the global division of labor than India does. China attracts much more foreign direct investment, too.In the past fifty years, Chinese economic performance was superior to the Indian performance. Nevertheless I reject the interpretation that either China’s autocracy or China’s communist ideology is responsible for China’s better performance. China started to grow faster than the global economy only after Deng Xiaoping liberalized and opened up the economy. Under Mao Zedong and during the great leap forward more than 30 million Chinese starved to death. Similar disasters did not happen in poorer India. If China and India teach a lesson about the impact of regime characteristics on growth, it is the following: Democracy promotes performance quite similar to the global average, autocracy as a constitution of arbitrariness permits much better performance or much worse performance.In the long run, the growth prospects of both China and India depend not only on their own economic policies, but also on Western readiness to take their exports. Open Western markets together with sensible policies in China and India may promote global prosperity and peace.A eux deux, la Chine et l’Inde représentent deux cinquièmes de l’humanité. En termes de capacité de pouvoir d’achat comparé, l’économie chinoise est la deuxième plus grande au monde, devant le Japon, et l’économie indienne est la quatrième plus grande, devançant l’Allemagne. Dans moins de deux décennies, ces deux gigantesques économies asiatiques pourraient représenter conjointement un quart du produit global. Aujourd’hui cependant, ces deux pays sont toujours pauvres.Les deux pays pourraient surmonter la pauvreté car les potentialités que recèle un retard économiq- ue ajoutées à un investissement intérieur relativement soutenu favorisent la croissance. En ce qui concerne la formation du capital humain, des différences existent entre la Chine et l’Inde. La Chine est meilleure que l’Inde dans le domaine de l’éducation primaire. L’éradication de l’analphabétisme semble être en vue en Chine mais est loin d’être une partie gagnée en Inde. A l’inverse, l’Inde devance la Chine dans le domaine de l’éducation tertiaire. Une autre différence majeure entre la Chine et l’Inde concerne leur degré d’intégration dans l’économie globale. La Chine bénéficie davantage de la division globale du travail que l’Inde. De plus, la Chine attire plus d’investissements directs de l’étranger. Durant les cinquante dernières années, la performance de l’économie chinoise a été supérieure à celle de l’Inde. Néanmoins, l’auteur rejette l’interprétation suivant laquelle ce serait ou l’autocratie chinoise ou l’idéologie communiste qui serait à l’origine de cette supériorité. La Chine commença à croître plus rapidement que l’économie globale seulement après que Deng Xiao Ping a libéralisé l’économie chinoise et ouvert ses frontières. Sous le règne de Mao Tsé Tung, et durant le “grand bond en avant”, plus de 30 millions de chinois sont morts de famine. De tels désastres n’ont pas été observés en Inde qui est relativement plus pauvre. Si une leçon peut être tirée des expériences chinoise et indienne à propos de l’impact des caractéristiques des régimes sur la croissance économique, c’est la suivante : la démocratie promeut des performances assez identiques à la moyenne globale, et l’autocratie en tant que constitution de l’arbitraire donne lieu à des performances bien meilleures ou bien pires. A long terme, les perspectives de croissance de la Chine et de l’Inde dépendent non seulement de leurs propres politiques, mais aussi de la volonté des pays occidentaux de digérer leurs exportations. Des marchés occidentaux ouverts et des politiques intelligentes en Chine et en Inde peuvent promouvoir la prospérité et la paix au niveau global. (shrink)

Dessin publié dans la revue Život strany en 1964 commémorant le soulèvement national slovaque de 1944 Source : Národní Archiv, knihovna – fond Knih.A, sign. C 532 L’iconographie communiste avait vocation à incarner et encourager la rupture avec les représentations traditionnelles de genre. Ces dernières y sont pourtant progressivement réapparues, par exemple sous les traits de la travailleuse agricole et/ou de la mère de famille. Mais pour savoir dans quelle mesure et comment ces représenta...

Les réseaux sociaux numériques ont connu en Chine un engouement massif, et cela dès leur introduction en 2007. On compte aujourd’hui 210 millions d’utilisateurs de « ites d’échanges sociaux », soit exactement la moitié des 420 millions d’internautes chinois, et les autorités chinoises soulignent désormais que ce développement des réseaux sociaux numériques est « irrésistible ». Comme souvent pour la Chine, la tyrannie des nombres n’a d’égale que l’originalité des usages. C’est cette originalité bornant à la singularité des « (...) caractéristiques chinoises » − étroitesse des liens entre réseaux sociaux numériques de socialisation et de navigation, domination des plateformes nationales, « harmonisation » des contenus, prévalence des liens forts, etc. − que nous nous efforçons de mettre au jour en nous intéressant successivement aux utilisateurs, aux plateformes et au rôle particulier joué par l’État-parti chinois dans les structures sociales. Une fois encore, l’héritage communiste s’affiche comme une subtile synthèse entre contrôle des pratiques et mobilisation des individus et des organisations sociales, tout en tolérant les vertus cathartiques et correctives des émois populaires liés aux sentiments d’injustice.Social networking sites have spread like wildfire in China, ever since the first sites appeared there in 2007. There are now some 210 million people using “social exchange sites”, which is exactly half of all Internet users in China, and the Chinese authorities are saying that the development of social networking sites is “irresistible”. As is often the case in China, the weight of numbers is equalled only by the distinctiveness of their Internet uses. It is this distinctiveness, which borders on the singular − very close links between online socialisation and navigation networks, predominance of national sites, content “harmonisation”, prevalence of strong links, etc. − that we attempt to bring out here, by successively investigating users, sites and the particular role played by China’s one-party State in the country’s social structures. The legacy of Communism once again stands out as a subtle mix between control over practices and the mobilisation of individuals and social organisations and a tolerance of the cathartic and corrective virtues of popular emotion aroused by feelings of injustice. (shrink)

The author presents the changing role of women and of the attitudes towards them in the PWP and the PSP in a midsize industrial town in Central Poland in the years 1945-1948. During the war, women of the PWP were promoted to the highest positions in the party structures, however, due to the quick reaffirmation of gender roles in the post-1945 period, they were relegated to lower posts. Their political influence was thereafter limited solely to the care sector which was (...) considered their natural domain. In turn, the PSP gained importance in the post-war period only after A. Tomaszewska, a woman and an influential prewar labour organizer, took charge of it in 1946. Under her leadership, the Socialists renewed their ties with women workers of the town’s main textile factory and challenged the Communist party. (shrink)

The paper aims at tracing a collective portrait and the trajectories of a group of about forty women active in the communist movement after Poland had regained independence, and after the Second World War. I explore the relations between gender, communist activity, and the changing circumstances of the communist movement. I argue that interwar activities shaped women communists as radical, uncompromising, and questioning traditional femininity political agents, accepted as comrades at every organisational level. This image and identity, though, contributed to (...) the creation of the gender division of political work after the war, when women were assigned specific roles as guardians of revolutionary past. The post-war situation of state socialism with the communist party as the ruling party assigned women mainly to invisible, secondary positions. (shrink)

This article explores the impact of the VASKhNIL conference upon the cultural policy of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and Italian communist biology, with particular attention to the period between 1948 and 1951. News of the Moscow session did not appear in the Italian news media until October, 1948, and for the next three years party biologists struggled over whether to translate the official transcript of the proceedings, The Situation in Biological Science, into Italian. This struggle reveals the complex efforts (...) of the PCI to confirm the ideological and political connection with the Soviet Union, without completely alienating significant milieus of the democratic and antifascist culture in Italy. The apparent impossibility of doing both is indicated by the fact that the project was finally abandoned in March-April, 1951. The article is divided into three sections, each focused on different actors and their response to Lysenkoism. The first section outlines the features of the PCI's pro-Lysenko campaign, with particular regard to the intellectual militancy and organizational commitment of Emilio Sereni, head of PCI's Cultural Commission between 1948 and 1951. The second section analyzes the reaction of the three most important figures in Italian communist biology during this period, Massimiliano Aloisi, Franco Graziosi and Emanuele Padoa. The third section interprets the decision not to publish a translation of The Situation in Biological Science as a consequence of the conflicts between PCI cultural program and the editorial policy of the left-wing publishing house Giulio Einaudi Editore. (shrink)

In an effort to theorize educational logics that are oppositional to capitalism, this article explores what it means to study like a communist. I begin by drawing out the tight connection between learning and capitalism, demonstrating that education is not a subset but a motor of political-economic relations. Next, I turn to the concept of study, which is being developed as an educational alternative to learning. While studying represents an educational challenge to capitalism, I argue that there are political limitations (...) to studying for which we need to account. Specifically, studying is not in itself political, but only represents the possibility of politics. To make this claim and to address these limitations, I turn to Jodi Dean’s work on the communist Party. Dean posits the Party not as a master, director, or prophet, but as an infrastructure of affective intensity that maintains a gap in the order of things. I show that the Party is one way to organize and to defend study. Throughout the article, I illuminate the ways in which educational philosophers can contribute to political movement building by showing, developing, and refining the educational components of politics that many organizers and theorists neglect. (shrink)

This article explores the impact of the VASKhNIL conference upon the cultural policy of the Italian Communist Party and Italian communist biology, with particular attention to the period between 1948 and 1951. News of the Moscow session did not appear in the Italian news media until October, 1948, and for the next three years party biologists struggled over whether to translate the official transcript of the proceedings, The Situation in Biological Science, into Italian. This struggle reveals the complex efforts of (...) the PCI to confirm the ideological and political connection with the Soviet Union, without completely alienating significant milieus of the democratic and antifascist culture in Italy. The apparent impossibility of doing both is indicated by the fact that the project was finally abandoned in March–April, 1951. The article is divided into three sections, each focused on different actors and their response to Lysenkoism. The first section outlines the features of the PCI’s pro-Lysenko campaign, with particular regard to the intellectual militancy and organizational commitment of Emilio Sereni, head of PCI’s Cultural Commission between 1948 and 1951. The second section analyzes the reaction of the three most important figures in Italian communist biology during this period, Massimiliano Aloisi, Franco Graziosi and Emanuele Padoa. The third section interprets the decision not to publish a translation of The Situation in Biological Science as a consequence of the conflicts between PCI cultural program and the editorial policy of the left-wing publishing house Giulio Einaudi Editore. (shrink)

Based on qualitative analysis of the Soviet press and official state documents, this article argues that the Communist Party was, counter intuitively, an agent of capitalist dispositions in the Soviet Union during 1970s-1980s. Understanding the spirit of capitalism not simply as an ascetic ethos but in broader terms of the cult of individualism, I demonstrate that the Soviet party-state promoted ideas and values of individuality, self-expression, and pleasure seeking in the areas of work and consumption. By broadening our conception of (...) the spirit of capitalism, tracing the formation of capitalist dispositions as well as institutions, and showing that the culture of capitalism can come from within the old regime, I further the agenda of neoclassical sociology of studying varieties of origins, paths, and destinations of modern capitalisms. (shrink)

The history of genetics and the evolutionary theory in the USSR is multidimensional. Only in the 1920s after the October Revolution, and due in large part to that Revolution, the science of genetics arose in Soviet Russia. Genetics was limited, but not obliterated in the second half of the 1950s, and was restored in the late 1960s, after the resignation of Nikita S. Khrushchev. In the subsequent period, Soviet genetics experienced a resurgence, though one not as successful as geneticists would (...) have liked. The Communist party bodies interfered constantly, but with different consequences for the development of genetics than when the earlier periods. The main troubles for Soviet genetics occurred during the unique, well-known, most contradictory, and tragic Stalinist period. The start date for the defeat of genetics is also known—August, 1948. In the social history of science and especially in the history of evolutionary biology it is natural, necessary, and even expected to adopt an evolutionary approach. In particular, historians of science need to consider and explain the evolution and dependence of Soviet science in regards to the evolution of Soviet society, the Soviet state, and the Communist party. This evolutionary perspective reflects the standards of evolutionary biology, evolutionary macrosociology, and also the history of science. (shrink)

Dewey’s philosophy of education was heavily criticized by the Chinese Communist Party in the 1950s, which led many to believe that Dewey’s education was in complete opposition to that of the CCP. However, this study intends to prove that Dewey had a tremendous influence on the early CCP members of the 1920s. Dewey’s Chinese visit closely coincided highly with the time of the reception of Marxism in China and the eventual establishment of the CCP. Both founders of the CCP had (...) close personal relationships with Dewey, and Chen even tried to practice Dewey’s educational ideas in Southern China. As a graduate of a normal school, Mao Zedong also read and practiced Dewey’s educational philosophy. Many other CCP members read Dewey in the 1920s and then became left-wing revolutionaries. Though Dewey himself did not stand with Marxism, his idea that education is an agent of social reform paved the way for Marxism in China in theoretical and practical aspects. When an educational theory is spread abroad, it is often not accepted in a fundamentalist way, but rather in a process of collision and integration with the local tradition. (shrink)

This article examines a case study of international Communist propaganda during the Cold War. The Institute of Historical and Socio-Political Research, a historical propaganda organization affiliated to the Romanian Communist Party, succeeded in penetrating the Iron Curtain by distributing its works through a social network provided by the Italian Liberation Movement Institute, and in publishing its works in Italy, with the help of the Gramsci Institute, as well as publishers like Editori Riuniti and Nicola Teti. The ISISP established a mutually (...) beneficial partnership with various Italian actors: ISISP and the regime succeeded in publishing international propaganda; the Italian publishing houses were paid by ISISP to print and distribute their edited volumes, with the double advantage of keeping political ties with the RCP while also protecting their own limited finances. (shrink)

This article presents an analytical overview of the critical modernisation features of Socialism with Chinese characteristics doctrine in the new era, which was proposed at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The authors reconstructed and systematically represented the central philosophical and political principles of the doctrine of Socialism with Chinese characteristics in the context of the fundamental principles of Chinese Marxism. The authors also analysed and presented in a systematic form the essence and basic theoretical principles (...) of the concept of Socialism with Chinese characteristics following Xi Jinping's works and reports. The study includes a comparative analysis that concludes with the critical features of the modern concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics. These features embrace the need for constant modernisation of the very doctrine of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the state management system, as well as social and cultural practices, which are possible through the implementation of innovations and the integration of modern philosophical thought with traditional Chinese philosophy and culture. The article concludes that the main feature of the modernisation of Socialism with Chinese characteristics at the current stage reveals in the development and implementation of a system of creative practices at the level of everyday culture, high-tech sectors of social production and the practice of intercultural communication within the framework of China's Belt and Road Initiative. In the discussion, the authors argue that implementing creative practices and creative industries could become an effective tool for developing China's Belt and Road Initiative in European countries and improving mutual understanding in the intercultural communication practices between China, European countries, and Ukraine. (shrink)

The Communist Party USA's reputation for being in the forefront of the fight against African American oppression was forged in the 1930s as the result of the adoption of the Communist International's position that African Americans were an oppressed nationality. According to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, this entitled African Americans to the right to self-determination in that area of the country where they were a majority (the Black Belt South) and equal social and political rights throughout the country. The organizational internalization of (...) this position was accomplished through numerous articles in the Party's press, which were used as educational tools for the membership. The most sustained organizing work in the South occurred in Alabama with the organizing of the Share Croppers Union (SCU). A study of the Party and the SCU in Alabama during the 1930s helps demonstrate the significance of the self-determination position and its importance in shaping the work of the Party among African Americans. (shrink)

Avant même d'être condamné pour "contestation de crime contre l'humanité" au tournant du siècle, Roger Garaudy était déjà marginalisé dans les champs intellectuel et politique français. Après avoir incarné la résistance au néostalinisme dans le Parti communiste, le philosophe qui fut longtemps l'interlocuteur privilégié de Jean-Paul Sartre au sein du PCF en fut spectaculairement exclu en 1970 pour s'être opposé aux Soviétiques qui venaient d'écraser le Printemps de Prague. Celui que l'historiographie du communisme retient plus volontiers comme le (...) "stalinien modèle", qu'il fut en effet dans l'après-guerre, était pourtant devenu, malgré sa proximité avec Thorez, un critique de plus en plus affirmé du stalinisme après les révélations du XXe Congrès du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique (PCUS) en 1956 et un acteur majeur de l'aggiornamento du PCF. Son combat pour rénover le communisme français et son goût précoce pour l'écologie et le dialogue des civilisations en firent quelque temps une figure respectée du progressisme français, mais celui qui répétait que le Socialisme était condamné s'il refusait de s'ouvrir à la "transcendance" vit son étoile pâlir après 1970 au point qu'il devint un intellectuel illégitime, celui que l'on condamne sans l'avoir lu. Ce livre explique ce parcours singulier et les raisons de cette "descente aux enfers" de l'ancien philosophe du Bureau politique, avant sa condamnation ultime."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The Communist Party of Germany (KPD) first coined the united-front policy in 1921, representing a promising effort to bolster Communist influence in the workers’ movement of that country. As the first part of the article shows, the KPD recruited large numbers of new members and significantly improved its electoral returns as a result. Despite this success, however, the party only pursued the united-front policy in two phases (1921–3 and 1926). As illustrated in the second part of the article, the KPD (...) bid farewell to the united front as ‘Stalinisation’ began to set in during the Weimar Republic’s final years – with lethal consequences, as its abandonment decisively abetted the victory of German fascism. (shrink)

Exhibitions dedicated to the theme of "Red China" occupy an important place in the dissemination of "red" culture, the continuity of the "red" gene and the intensification of "red" education. They reflect the political agenda, have a distinct content and the uniqueness of the text material. Being an important element of the spread of "red" culture, exhibitions on the theme of "Red China" integrate elements of this culture into people's daily lives and play an active role in preserving and multiplying (...) the "red" gene. In this article, the systematization and generalization of knowledge in the field of narrative strategy of exhibitions on the theme of "Red China" is carried out from the point of view of ontology, structure and narrative carrier, which at the present stage is important for building a strong socialist ideology. Exhibitions on the theme of "Red China" are an important way of materialization, visualization and dissemination of "red" culture, as well as an effective means of its popularization. The study found that the "Red" exhibitions should have a "revolutionary content", have a "political character", be "mutually recognized by the authorities and the people", take on the main responsibility for providing people with common access to material and spiritual culture. From the point of view of the communication function of the "red" exhibitions, they are an important means of organizing ideological and political education by the Communist Party of China, strengthening social harmony and promoting basic values. (shrink)

This article explains the methodology behind our PhD thesis, that describes how five Southern European Communist parties2 reacted, through their party press, to the events that took place in Eastern Europe from 1989 to 1991, such as the Fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the deposition of the Romanian dictator in December 1989 or the Soviet Coup d’etat in August 1991. We describe an interdisciplinary methodology which combines elements of history of the present, historiography of Communism and communication (...) sciences. We will summarize our study, after explaining our methodology and adapting the framing party press for the purposes of this work. Finally, we’ll draw the conclusions after presenting one specific case: the interpretations provided by each party following the parliamentary elections of June 1989 in Poland. (shrink)

The title of this article sounds quite pedantic and a bit like an academic paper or even a scholarly book. Composing scholarly dissertations is, to us journalists, considered something of an arduous task. But I decided to write this article anyway because of the events surrounding the case of Han Dongfang and the developments within the evolving overseas democratic movement.

The article reveals ideological-theoretical, methodological, and politico-ideological basic principles for an adequate analysis of the specifics of modern Chinese (Sinicized) Marxism. The attributive features of modern Chinese Marxism (Marxism with Chinese specifics (the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese Context, Sinicized Marxism), as the most effective version in world history for correcting and modernizing the axiomatics of the Marxist-Leninist theoretical model of social development, as well as improving the ideology of the ruling Communist Party in order to increase the effectiveness (...) of its domestic and foreign state policies, have been characterized by means of concrete-historical and systematic comparative analysis of the ideational grounds and basic socio-philosophical postulates, political and ideological prescriptions of the program documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. Within the framework of this study, special attention has been paid to highlighting the essence and features of the Soviet and Chinese strategy of socialist construction, created to implement Marxist socialist and communist projects, as well as revealing the scientific evaluation of the differences between the political doctrines of the CPSU and the CPC in the interpretation of objective logic (the duration of stages, goals, and objectives of fundamental economic, social, political, and cultural transformations) of the process of constructing high-level development socialism ("developed socialism") and the further progressive movement of such a society to the phase of communism. (shrink)

In these pages a significant effort is undertaken to bridge the perennial gap between Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. Maria Antonietta Macciocchi is particularly suited to this task. She has been a member of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) for over twenty years. She participated in the underground during World War II and has served as a foreign correspondent for L'Unità. In 1968, eager to re-establish contact with the Italian working class, Macciocchi accepted the Party's proposal that she become a candidate (...) from parliament from Naples. Before departing from Paris where she had been serving as L'Unità's correspondent she suggested to her friend Louis Althusser that they conduct a political correspondence. (shrink)

This article considers Sartre's relations with the French Communist Party (PCF) in the years immediately following the Liberation when the PCF considered that, of all the prominent French intellectuals, it was Sartre who posed the greatest threat. This article opens by situating the PCF within the French political landscape immediately after the Liberation and addressing its attitudes towards intellectuals. It then examines the main themes of the attacks launched by the PCF, between 1944 and the staging of Les Mains sales (...) ( Dirty Hands ) in 1948, on both Sartre and existentialism and the reasons for these attacks. It concludes by noting the differences between the PCF and Sartre on three specific political issues during this period. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on the idea of communism leads to questions of organization and what Michael Hardt refers to as “the problem of leadership.” Beyond the critical assessment of the crises of contemporary capitalism, and beyond the existing social democratic solutions, a psychoanalytically-informed Žižekian notion of the party offers solutions to ultra-left theories of networked horizontalism as well as versions of the party that repeat the problems of communist modernism. If the context of climate change, economic inequality and political authoritarianism require (...) that we reconsider “what is to be done” about global neoliberal capitalism, then the idea of the political party, understood in terms of Jacques Lacan’s Discourse of the Analyst, can provisionally occupy the place of a neutral knowledge of the objective demands of history that is premised on the experiences of the emancipatory left. Like the Analyst, the party does not stand in for or represent the people. However, through the fetishistic aspect of representation, as opposed to materially or ontologically-grounded guarantees for political power, the party registers a minimal difference from a technocratic University Discourse and an ultra-left Discourse of the Hysteric. (shrink)