This article examines a case study of international Communist propaganda during the Cold War. The Institute of Historical and Socio-Political Research, a historical propaganda organization affiliated to the Romanian Communist Party, succeeded in penetrating the Iron Curtain by distributing its works through a social network provided by the Italian Liberation Movement Institute, and in publishing its works in Italy, with the help of the Gramsci Institute, as well as publishers like Editori Riuniti and Nicola Teti. The ISISP established a mutually (...) beneficial partnership with various Italian actors: ISISP and the regime succeeded in publishing international propaganda; the Italian publishing houses were paid by ISISP to print and distribute their edited volumes, with the double advantage of keeping political ties with the RCP while also protecting their own limited finances. (shrink)

_Framing effects_ concern the having of different attitudes towards logically or necessarily equivalent contents. Framing is of crucial importance for cognitive science, behavioral economics, decision theory, and the social sciences at large. We model a typical kind of framing, grounded in (i) the structural distinction between beliefs activated in working memory and beliefs left inactive in long term memory, and (ii) the topic- or subject matter-sensitivity of belief: a feature of propositional attitudes which is attracting growing research attention. We introduce (...) a class of models featuring (i) and (ii) to represent, and reason about, agents whose belief states can be subject to framing effects. We axiomatize a logic which we prove to be sound and complete with respect to the class. (shrink)

There is some consensus on the claim that imagination as suppositional thinking can have epistemic value insofar as it’s constrained by a principle of minimal alteration of how we know or believe reality to be – compatibly with the need to accommodate the supposition initiating the imaginative exercise. But in the philosophy of imagination there is no formally precise account of how exactly such minimal alteration is to work. I propose one. I focus on counterfactual imagination, arguing that this can (...) be modeled as simulated belief revision governed by Laplacian imaging. So understood, it can be rationally justified by accuracy considerations: it minimizes expected belief inaccuracy, as measured by the Brier score. (shrink)

The paper discusses some formal difficulties concerning the theory of universals of Trope-Only ontologies, from which the formal theory of predication advanced by Trope-Only theorists seems to be irremediably affected. It is impossible to lay out a successful defense of a Trope-Only theory without Russellian types, but such types are ontologically inconsistent with tropes’ nominalism. Historically, Tropists’ first way to avoid the problem is appealing to the supervenience claim, which however fails on its terms and, thus, fails as a ground (...) for a solution to the higher-order or ‘type’ problem. A later solution involves the invariance of primitive equivalence relations in order to make universals ontologically innocuous. However, I argue that this latter solution fails to meet the requirements imposed on an ontologically unbiased nominalist attitude. So, this paper discusses how Trope-Only theories alter standard formal moves in Nominalism, and also is interested in clarifying further the formal assumptions for these problems. (shrink)

Sentences \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\) are _cognitive synonyms_ for one when they play the same role in one’s cognitive life. The notion is pervasive (Sect. 1 ), but elusive: it is bound to be hyperintensional (Sect. 2 ), but excessive fine-graining would trivialize it and there are reasons for some coarse-graining (Sect. 2.1 ). Conceptual limitations stand in the way of a natural algebra (Sect. 2.2 ), and it should be sensitive to subject matters (Sect. 2.3 ). A cognitively adequate individuation (...) of content may be intransitive (Sect. 3 ) due to ‘dead parrot’ series: sequences of sentences \(\varphi _1, \ldots, \varphi _n\) where adjacent \(\varphi _i\) and \(\varphi _{i+1}\) are cognitive synonyms while \(\varphi _1\) and \(\varphi _n\) are not (Sect. 3.1 ). Finding an intransitive account is hard: Fregean equipollence won’t do (Sect. 3.2 ) and a result by Leitgeb shows that it wouldn’t satisfy a minimal compositionality principle (Sect. 3.3 )._Sed contra_, there are reasons for transitivity, too (Sect. 3.4 ). In Sect. 4, we come up with a formal semantics capturing this jumble of desiderata, thereby showing that the notion is coherent. In Sect. 5, we re-assess the desiderata in its light. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of the notational difference between Beta Existential Graphs, the graphical notation for quantificational logic invented by Charles S. Peirce at the end of the 19th century, and the ordinary notation of first-order logic. Peirce thought his graphs to be “more diagrammatic” than equivalently expressive languages for quantificational logic. The reason of this, he claimed, is that less room is afforded in Existential Graphs than in equivalently expressive languages for different ways of representing the same fact. (...) The reason of this, in turn, is that Existential Graphs are a non-linear, occurrence-referential notation. As a non-linear notation, each graph corresponds to a class of logically equivalent but syntactically distinct sentences of the ordinary notation of first-order logic that are obtained by permuting those elements that in the graphs lie in the same area. As an occurrence-referential notation, each Beta graph corresponds to a class of logically equivalent but syntactically distinct sentences of the ordinary notation of first-order logic in which the identity of reference of two or more variables is asserted. In brief, Peirce’s graphs are more diagrammatic than the linear, type-referential notation of first-order logic because the function that translates the latter to the graphs does not define isomorphism between the two notations. (shrink)

Research suggests that moral evaluations change during adulthood. Older adults (75+) tend to judge accidentally harmful acts more severely than younger adults do, and this age‐related difference is in part due to the greater negligence older adults attribute to the accidental harmdoers. Across two studies (N = 254), we find support for this claim and report the novel discovery that older adults’ increased attribution of negligence, in turn, is associated with a higher perceived likelihood that the accident would occur. We (...) propose that, because older adults perceive accidents as more likely than younger adults do, they condemn the agents and their actions more and even infer that the agents’ omission to exercise due care is intentional. These findings refine our understanding of the cognitive processes underpinning moral judgment in older adulthood and highlight the role of subjective probability judgments in negligence attribution. (shrink)

La storia medievale della teologia e della metafisica è attraversata da una rilevante discussione a proposito della predicazione della nozione di ente. I modelli più spesso evocati a tal fine sono stati, com’è noto, l’analogia e l’univocità. Rispetto a questa alternativa, la tendenza generale degli interpreti è stata quella di intendere l’univocità e l’analogia come regimi predicativi opposti o contraddittori. Questa tesi ha dato vita a una sorta di opinione comune e diffusamente condivisa. La verità di questa tesi, tuttavia, non (...) si è mai imposta in maniera definitiva: il primo dibattito sulla compatibilità dell’univocità e dell’analogia risale proprio al Medioevo. A tal proposito appare decisivo il contributo di Pietro di Tommaso (Pere Tomàs, Pietro Tomàs, Petrus Thomae): la settima delle sue Quaestiones de ente (ca. 1325) chiede infatti Utrum vera analogia et vera univocatio possint se compati in eodem conceptu. Il presente contributo cerca di riscostruire gli snodi principali dell’argomentazione che Pietro di Tommaso elabora in questo testo con la duplice finalità di valorizzare il contributo di questo autore nel quadro del dibattito teologico medievale e di giustificare l’opportunità delle ricerche che tentano oggi di ripensare il rapporto tra l’univocità e l’analogia nel pensiero scotista. The history of medieval theology and metaphysics is marked by a relevant discussion about the predication of being. The semantic devices most frequently referred to in this regard were, as is well known, analogy and univocity. With respect to this alternative, the general tendency of scholars has been to understand univocity and analogy as opposite and contradictory modes of predication. This view has led to a kind of common and widely shared opinion. This thesis, however, has never prevailed conclusively: a debate on whether univocity and analogy were compatible dates back to the Middle Ages. In this respect, the contribution of Petrus Thomae is decisive: the seventh of his Quaestiones de ente (ca. 1325) asks in fact Utrum vera analogia et vera univocatio possint se compati in eodem conceptu. This contribution tries to reconstruct the main points of Petrus Thomae’s argumentation with the twofold purpose of enhancing the contribution of this author in the framework of the medieval theological debate and of justifying the opportunity of the current research that tries to rethink the relationship between univocity and analogy in the context of Duns Scotus’ thought. (shrink)

The strict-tolerant approach to paradox promises to erect theories of naïve truth and tolerant vagueness on the firm bedrock of classical logic. We assess the extent to which this claim is founded. Building on some results by Girard we show that the usual proof-theoretic formulation of propositional ST in terms of the classical sequent calculus without primitive Cut is incomplete with respect to ST-valid metainferences, and exhibit a complete calculus for the same class of metainferences. We also argue that the (...) latter calculus, far from coinciding with classical logic, is a close kin of Priest’s LP. (shrink)

The present paper argues that substantialist metaphysics are in tension with the physicalist idea that the universe is causally closed. The argument is a rather specific one and proceeds through three steps. The first step consists in arguing that monistic substance metaphysics allow for the existence of entities that cannot belong to the intended first order domain. This result sensitively depends on the nature of substances as invariant entities. The second step concludes that, if further domains are to be admitted, (...) then they are inhabited by “higher” or (systematically) “non-standard” entities and that, in both cases if not made somehow innocuous, such entities may take part on the metaphysical construction of the world through their own distinctive properties and causal powers. However, this latter claim is in contradiction with causal closure. But closure is the principle that mainly characterizes physicalist approaches in metaphysics and as such physicalist metaphysics cannot get rid of it. Who attempted making exotic properties and causal powers innocuous usually appealed to the Supervenience Argument. Unfortunately, as the third step proves, this argument is invalid. Finally, the paper looks forward and toward alternative models for physicalist metaphysics, like process-based models. (shrink)

The paper seeks to explain in what sense pragmatism was for Peirce a doctrine of logic. It is argued that pragmatism is a doctrine of logic for Peirce because its maxim, the pragmatic maxim, is a maxim of the methodeutic of abduction, i.e., concerns the method of selecting hypotheses for experimental testing. The paper also connects this idea to Peirce’s 1913 thesis according to which pragmatism contributes to the security but not to the uberty of reasoning. The connection consists in (...) that by excluding hypotheses that cannot be tested, the maxim renders the whole process of reasoning more secure, while any explanatory hypotheses is “uberous” in Peirce’s sense as any other. (shrink)

Peirce’s claims that methodeutic “concerns abduction alone” and that “pragmatism contributes to the security of reasoning but hardly to its uberty” are explained. They match as soon as a third claim is taken into account, namely that “pragmatism is the logic of abduction,” not of deduction or induction. Since methodeutic concerns abduction and not deduction or induction, it follows that pragmatism is a maxim of methodeutic. Then, since pragmatism contributes to the security of reasoning but not to its uberty, it (...) follows that methodeutic contributes to the security of the only reasoning it is concerned with, namely abduction. We then explain two related issues of methodeutic of abduction. First, in addition to the maxim of pragmatism, which suggests how to choose among experimental hypotheses contributing to the security of reasoning, there is the maxim of simplicity, which suggests hypotheses that are preferable for investment and which contributes to uberty of reasoning. Second, a third maxim of abduction is economy, which suggests adopting hypotheses that contribute to the advantageousness of reasoning even when pragmatism and simplicity cease to apply. These three maxims—experientiality for security, simplicity for uberty, and economy for advantageousness—are the bedrocks of Peirce’s methodeutic of abduction. (shrink)

The screen is not a pre established object: it becomes a screen—and that screen—when it interacts with a group of elements and relates to a set of practices that produce it as a screen. In this process of becoming screen, a crucial step is played by the space in which the screen is located and where spectators gather. The confluence of screen and space changes our perception of both: the screen displays the situatedness of its action, and the space its (...) nature of medium. The landscape becomes a screenscape, in which individuals access images through which they negotiate with reality and others. Eventually, the insistence on becoming screen highlights the role of contingency and conjuncture in the process of mediation: screenscapes emerge according opportunities, conflicts, and potentialities. Hence a media archeology that, far from being linear and teleological, follows unpredicted paths and creates surprising links—a rhizomatic media archeology. (shrink)

In Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (I, §48), Frege introduces his rule of the fusion of horizontals, according to which if an occurrence of the horizontal stroke is followed by another occurrence of the same stroke, either in isolation or “contained” in a propositional connective, the two occurrences can be fused with each other. However, the role of this rule, and of the horizontal sign more generally, is controversial; Michael Dummett notoriously claimed, for instance, that the horizontal is “wholly superfluous” in (...) Frege's logical system. In this paper, we challenge Dummett's view by providing a comprehensive analysis of the significance of the horizontal stroke. After some preliminary remarks, we argue that even if Frege's connectives in some sense “contain” the horizontal, yet they are total functions. Then, we take up the question of the sense expressed by the horizontal, and we claim that, unlike other sentential operators, the horizontal is not sense‐compositional. Finally, we consider the semantic and pragmatic aspects of Frege's horizontal in connection to his judgment stroke and the double judgment stroke. Contra Dummett, we argue that the horizontal is a special and indispensable element of Frege's logic. (shrink)

Abstract:"Issues of Pragmaticism" (1905) contains the only published version of Peirce's doctrine of "critical common-sensism." One of the claims of that doctrine is that common sense beliefs are invariably vague. In this paper, we seek to explain this claim. We begin by providing a philological reconstruction of the drafts of "Issues of Pragmaticism" and a comparison of Peirce's several, successive expositions of critical common-sensism across those drafts. Then we examine Peirce's theory of vagueness; we show that there is both a (...) "subjectal" and a "predicative" variety of vagueness, and that Peirce construes predicative vagueness according to three distinct models. Finally, we assess in what sense, i.e., according to which of the three models, common sense beliefs may be said to be invariably vague. (shrink)

Open futurism is the indeterministic position according to which the future is ‘open’, i.e., there is now no fact of the matter as to what future contingent events will actually obtain. Many open futurists hold a branching conception of time, in which a variety of possible futures exist. This paper introduces two challenges to branching-time open futurism, which are similar in spirit to a challenge posed by Fine to tense realism. The paper argues that, to address the new challenges, open (...) futurists must adopt an objective, non-perspectival notion of actuality and subscribe to an A-theoretic, dynamic conception of reality. Moreover, given a natural understanding of “actual future”, it is perfectly sensible for open futurists to hold that a unique, objectively actual future exists, contrary to a common assumption in the current debate. The paper also contends that recognising the existence of a unique actual future helps open futurists to avoid potential misconceptions. (shrink)

We present a framework for epistemic logic, modeling the logical aspects of System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes, as per dual process theories of reasoning. The framework combines non-normal worlds semantics with the techniques of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. It models non-logically-omniscient, but moderately rational agents: their System 1 makes fast sense of incoming information by integrating it on the basis of their background knowledge and beliefs. Their System 2 allows them to slowly, step-wise unpack some of the logical consequences (...) of such knowledge and beliefs, by paying a cognitive cost. The framework is applied to three instances of limited rationality, widely discussed in cognitive psychology: Stereotypical Thinking, the Framing Effect, and the Anchoring Effect. (shrink)

First language attrition in adulthood offers new insight on neuroplasticity and the role of language experience in shaping neurocognitive responses to language. Attriters are multilinguals for whom advancing L2 proficiency comes at the cost of the L1, as they experience a shift in exposure and dominance. To date, the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying L1 attrition are largely unexplored. Using event-related potentials, we examined L1-Italian grammatical processing in 24 attriters and 30 Italian native-controls. We assessed whether attriters differed from non-attriting native speakers (...) in their online detection and re-analysis/repair of number agreement violations, and whether differences in processing were modulated by L1-proficiency. To test both local and non-local agreement violations, we manipulated agreement between three inflected constituents and examined ERP responses on two of these. Our findings revealed group differences in amplitude, scalp distribution, and duration of LAN/N400 + P600 effects. We discuss these differences as reflecting influence of attriters’ L2-English, as well as shallower online sentence repair processes than in non-attriting native speakers. ERP responses were also predicted by L1-Italian proficiency scores, with smaller N400/P600 amplitudes in lower proficiency individuals. Proficiency only modulated P600 amplitude between 650 and 900 ms, whereas the late P600 depended on group membership and amount of L1 exposure within attriters. Our study is the first to show qualitative and quantitative differences in ERP responses in attriters compared to non-attriting native speakers. Our results also emphasize that proficiency predicts language processing profiles, even in native-speakers, and that the P600 should not be considered a monolithic component. (shrink)

Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory they cannot, even if there is a uniquely best way of doing so. To solve this problem we propose an argument in favor of ‘belief-less reasoning’, a mode of inference that leads to converge on the optimal solution ignoring the beliefs of the other players. We argue that belief-less reasoning is supported by a commonsensical Principle of Relevant Information that every theory of rational decision must satisfy. We show (...) that this principle can be used to justify (some versions of) team reasoning, as well as other schemes of practical reasoning that do not involve sophisticated meta-representation. (shrink)

La science politique moderne n'est pas la science politique des modernes. La science politique moderne l'a recouverte et enfouie. La science politique des modernes ressurgit cependant là où l'on ne l'attend pas : dans la pratique des sciences sociales, pour autant qu'une vision du social s'y trouve engagée que la sociologie explicite dans sa signification et sa portée politiques. Telle est la thèse qu'avance ce livre, en revenant aux fondations que Durkheim a su donner à cette science, pour en préciser (...) le sens et en montrer la pertinence toujours actuelle. Ce que vise en propre la sociologie et qu'elle cherche à instaurer par son discours, c'est un certain rapport à l'action. Car le social qu'elle s'attache à objectiver est lui-même de cette nature : non pas un ordre réalisé, mais un processus toujours en cours dans lequel on agit, sur un plan inséparablement scientifique et politique. De quelle action s'agit-il alors? De celle conduite à l'intérieur de la division du travail, animée par un idéal d'autonomie de la personne qui demande à être sans cesse clarifié. La science politique des modernes rejoint ici sa nécessité. Elle nous aide à mesurer la distance qui sépare encore nos sociétés de leur plus profonde aspiration : devenir des sociétés démocratiques, capables de se gouverner elles-mêmes dans et par l'institution libre et juste du social. C'est à cette reformulation du projet d'autonomie qu'aboutit la sociologie, lorsqu'elle reste fidèle à la vocation critique que lui assigne son inscription dans la modernité. (shrink)

This article explores Pan-Asianism; that is, the loose set of convictions which predicate, firstly, that Asia—beyond its complex and changing geographical, cultural, and religious characteristics—c...

BackgroundIn Parkinson's disease, the side of motor symptoms onset may influence disease progression, with a faster motor symptom progression in patients with left side lateralization. Moreover, worse neuropsychological outcomes after subthalamic nucleus deep brain stimulation have been described in patients with predominantly left-sided motor symptoms. The objective of this study was to evaluate if the body side of motor symptoms onset may predict motor outcome of bilateral STN-DBS.MethodsThis retrospective study included all consecutive PD patients treated with bilateral STN-DBS at Grenoble (...) University Hospital from 1993 to 2015. Demographic, clinical and neuroimaging data were collected before and 1 year after surgery. The predictive factors of motor outcome at one-year follow-up, measured by the percentage change in the MDS-UPDRS-III score, were evaluated through univariate and multivariate linear regression analysis.ResultsA total of 233 patients were included with one-year follow-up after surgery [143 males ; 121 right body onset; 112 left body onset; mean age at surgery, 55.31 ± 8.44 years; mean disease duration, 11.61 ± 3.87]. Multivariate linear regression analysis showed that the left side of motor symptoms onset did not predict motor outcome.ConclusionsIn this retrospective study, the body side of motor symptoms onset did not significantly influence the one-year motor outcome in a large cohort of PD patients treated with bilateral STN-DBS. (shrink)

To demonstrate that courage is tempered by reason and has no need of anger, that denounces weakness of mind, Plutarch (coh. ira 458E) cites the custom of the Spartans to arouse thymos before the fight with the sound of flutes and at the same time to sacrifice to the Muses, so that in the soul of the fighters remains the reason to regulate the judgments. If this is the sense of the passage, confirmed by the comparison with the loci similes, (...) it is necessary to emend the text transmitted by the Mss. (άφαιροῠσι τὸν θυμὸν…> έπαίρουσι τὸν θυμὸν …). (shrink)

The article offers an analysis of Peirce's notion of “rhema.” It examines and explains Peirce's definition of the rhema; it identifies and solves two problems that are direct consequences of the definition. The first problem is that proper names, while classified as rhemata, do not satisfy Peirce's definition of the rhema. The second problem is that Peirce also calls “rhemata” the results of propositional analysis that however do not satisfy his own definition of the rhema. Peirce himself solves the first (...) problem by generalizing the notion of rhema into that of “seme.” I argue that we can solve the second problem if, following M. Dummett, we distinguish propositional analysis from propositional decomposition. (shrink)

Este artículo reseña: Massimo La Torre. Nostra Legge è la Libertà. Anarchismo dei Moderni. Roma : Derive Approdi, 2017.

São inúmeras as interpretações que os modernos dão à obra de Ockham. No presente artigo, o autor afirma que Ockham é o primeiro pensador a conceber a explicação filosófica não mais como uma série de explicações concatenadas, a partir de princípios aceitos, mas como uma estratégia racional, que permite aos filósofos evitar uma série de problemas linguísticos e conceituais.

New Constitutional Horizons is a solid and innovative contribution to a debate that has acquired a central position for decades in political and legal theory, but that nonetheless has left many uns...

Nietzsche’s life and thinking have been deeply influenced by the experience of illness and the related struggle to health, in a way that goes far beyond the very well-known episode of his mental breakdown. In the first part of this paper the history of the reception of the topic is reconsidered, focusing on the initial, “moral” interpretation of health and illness in Nietzsche, on the later stances of Thomas Mann and Georges Canguilhelm, the former offering a psychological perspective, the latter (...) a physiological one, and ending with an overview of newer studies on the question. The second part deals with Nietzsche’s understanding of human finitude, suffering and death, and contrasts it with post-humanist and trans-humanist assumptions. Health in Nietzsche is not standardized; it’s a result of self-cultivation, that is, of the full development of one’s potenBal. In the end an idea of health as a dynamic balance is developed, that also draws oh Gadamer’s reflections on the art of medicine and on the practical dimension of human experience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Le prime quattro Collationes Parisienses sulle tracce di Giovanni Duns ScotoFrancesco Fiorentino (bio)Come si è visto altrove, l'attribuzione delle Collationes è abbastanza dubbia, propriamente parlando: questa opera non può essere ricondotta a Giovanni Duns Scoto in quanto autore secondo i concetti moderni di proprietà intellettuale e di responsabilità privata, che non risultano pertinenti ai processi materiali di produzione del libro tardo-medievale in quanto opera collettiva, fondata sulla co-autorialità distribuita (...) tra maestro in quanto ideatore e apprendista in quanto compilatore. Questa impossibilità consegue al genere letterario delle Collationes in quanto esercitazioni baccellierali o studentesche, sotto la supervisione di un magister studentium.1 I contemporanei a Scoto non rispettavano i criteri filologici del Terzo Millennio al punto da includere, nel corpus scotiano, il primo libro del commento sentenziario di Enrico di Harclay secondo la redazione del ms. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 13687.2Tuttavia, la considerazione di questi fattori materiali non svaluta né le Collationes che attestano l'esistenza di un ambiente culturale, prossimo a Scoto, né lo stesso Scoto che ha probabilmente partecipato alle Collationes come moderatore o come interlocutore.3 Questa particolare natura delle Collationes ne condiziona l'attribuzione che non può essere associata con la ricerca dell'autore in senso stretto, ma con la considerazione di un plesso di opinioni concorrenti e risalenti all'insegnamento [End Page 115] di Scoto, non sempre in prima scena.4 Scoto, in cinque luoghi testuali dell'Ordinatio, si riferisce apertamente alle Collationes che sono incluse in un discreto numero di testimoni manoscritti del trecento e del quattrocento che tramandano opere sicuramente scotiane, e nella Tabula Scoti redatta da Giacomo d'Ascoli. Guglielmo di Alnwick si dichiara reportator di una collatio, presumibilmente di Parigi, sulla connessione delle virtù morali.5Queste evidenze consentono d'inserire le Collationes nel corpus scotiano, secondo un grado di autenticità significativo, ma non perfettamente conforme ai criteri filologici attuali. Ciò non significa de virtute sermonis che le Collationes sono di Scoto o che non sono di Scoto, ma, più precisamente, che le Collationes non possono essere attribuite a Scoto secondo i criteri filologici attuali, pur avendo avuto buona probabilità di essere attribuite a Scoto dai suoi contemporanei secondo i loro specifici criteri filologici. Infatti è la cornice che dà significato al quadro, è l'orizzonte che dà senso al paesaggio, è la forma che fa la sostanza. Queste ultime annotazioni apparentemente erudite potrebbero risultare scomode per un eventuale progetto di edizione critica che volesse sostenere una stretta autorialità scotiana delle Collationes. Sarebbe più saggio mantenere l'anonimato dell'opera nel rispetto del rigore scientifico sperimentale.A seconda del luogo in cui queste conferenze sono state svolte, ossia Parigi o Oxford, le Collationes sono state distinte in Parisienses e Oxonienses. Queste ultime sono state edite da Marina Fedeli e Guido Alliney.6 Alliney e Fedeli hanno messo in luce la natura, la tradizione, la datazione, l'attribuzione e i contenuti storico-dottrinali di tutte le Collationes, incluse quelle di Parigi.Le Collationes Parisienses sono conservate in sette testimoni manoscritti già descritti da Carlo Balic, Guido Alliney, Marina Fedeli e Franz Pelster7: [End Page 116]Cambridge, Peterhouse College, MS 241, fols. 1r–45r;London, British Library, Add MS 7696, fols. 2r–38v;Cittá Vaticana, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 876, fols. 311r–323v;Oxford, Balliol College, MS 209, fols. 114r–141v;Oxford, Magdalen College, MS 194, fols. 2v–20v;Oxford, Merton College, MS 65, fols. 90r–109v;Oxford, Merton College, MS 90, fols. 155r–199VQuesti testimoni sembrano essere distribuiti in due redazioni distinte: l'una completa e l'altra incompleta. La prima appare tramandata dai primi due testimoni, entrambi risalenti al secolo XV, mentre la seconda redazione si trova negli altri testimoni di cui solo il ms. Vat. lat. 876 data al secolo XIV. A questi testimoni occorre aggiungere altri due: il ms. Cittá Vaticana, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 890, fols. 4v–5v che contiene solo un estratto, e il ms. Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó, ms. Ripoll 95, ff. 35r–37r che custodisce solo la prima collatio di Parigi.8Le Collationes Parisienses si dividono almeno in quattro gruppi: il primo gruppo, dalla prima alla quarta collatio, verte sulle virtù morali... (shrink)