The essays in this volume blend historical and philosophical reflection with concern for contemporary political problems. They show that the causes and motivations of civil religion are a permanent fixture of the human condition, though some of its manifestations and proximate causes have shifted in an age of multiculturalism, religious toleration, and secularization.

In 1993, Professor of Jurisprudence, Ronald Dworkin of Oxford University and Professor of Law at New York University, delivered the Georgetown Law Center’s thirteenth Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: "Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion and Euthanasia." Dworkin is Professor of Philosophy and Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law at New York University. He received B.A. degrees from both Harvard College and Oxford University, and an LL.B. from Harvard Law School and clerked for Judge Learned Hand. He was (...) associated with a law firm in New York (Sullivan and Cromwell) and was a professor of law at Yale University Law School from 1962-1969. He has been Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford and Fellow of University College since 1969. He has a joint appointment at Oxford and at NYU where he is a professor both in the Law School and the Philosophy Department. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Professor Dworkin is the author of many articles in philosophical and legal journals as well as articles on legal and political topics in the New York Review of Books. He has written Taking Rights Seriously (1977), A Matter of Principle (1985), Law’s Empire (1986), Philosophical Issues in Senile Dementia (1987), A Bill of Rights for Britain (1990), Life’s Dominion (1993), and Freedom’s Law (1996). (shrink)

A humanidade vive hoje um processo de aceleração das informações, imagens, conteúdos, pesquisas, tudo em tempo célere e dinâmico, haja visto as contribuições trazidas pelo avanço das tecnologias na atualidade. Percebemos, pois, que as informações vindas por esse canal de desenvolvimento, são uma poderosa ferramenta de construção e formação da sociedade contemporânea. Partindo desse princípio, o presente artigo, tem como objetivo responder alguns questionamentos inerentes aos avanços tecnológicos, bem como seus contributos e problemas causados com a má utilização dessa ferramenta, (...) na perspectiva construcionista e construtivista, perpassando pelas interfaces entre as mídias sociais e as estratégias do ensino de filosofia, mediante seus contributos para a formação do estudante nos diversos níveis da educação; respondendo os problemas causados pela má utilização dessas interfaces no processo de formação do indivíduo, bem como as contribuições dos avanços tecnológicos para o ensino de filosofia. Visamos discutir acerca do uso dos recursos tecnológicos no processo de ensino-aprendizagem, abordando concepções, caminhos e problemas que esse processo enfrenta, nos reportando principalmente a dois princípios: a apropriação dos conhecimentos propiciado pelo uso das Tecnologias da Informação e Comunicação (TICs) por parte de professores e alunos, bem como o ensino de filosofia por meio desses recursos na formação crítica do aluno. (shrink)

Despite both positive and negative perceptions of the current state of higher education, the contemporary debate over what it is to be a university is limited. Most of all, it is limited imaginatively. The range of imagined options is narrow. The imagination has not been given anything even approaching a wide scope. As a result, our sense as to what a university could be and could become in the modern age is itself impoverished. If we are seriously to develop a (...) wide range of ideas of the university that is adequate to the challenges of the modern world, the imagination itself needs to be freed. Imagining the University seeks to address each of these sets of issues and will do so by first, identifying a very wide range of ideas of the university as it is now unfolding and could become; secondly, by evaluating those conceptions of the university with a classification of ideas of the university; and thirdly, by reflecting on the imagination itself, its current impoverishment and its possibilities. Whether studying, researching or deciding policy, this book is vital reading to all those involved in the planning and delivery of higher education. (shrink)

Résumé L’une des théories les plus répandues concernant le rapport de l’art à l’éthique s’appelle parfois la Vicarious Experience Theory. Cette approche basée sur la notion d’une expérience par procuration va toutefois avoir du mal à expliquer la valeur (morale ou autre) de tout art « abstrait », non figuratif et/ou non narratif. Il faudrait alors démontrer que l’art (abstrait ou pas) provoque également une expérience directe – et non pas uniquement une expérience par procuration – et que cette expérience (...) directe est toujours déjà « métaéthique ». Cet effet méta-éthique serait inscrit au sein d’une définition (pragmatiste, pluraliste et institutionnelle) de l’art dans son ensemble, alors que la théorie de l’expérience par procuration s’appliquerait uniquement à quelques arts. Je compte défendre cette thèse par un examen des écrits et des pratiques d’Olafur Eliasson. (shrink)

Le concept d’authenticité sert de base à la valorisation de la thématique de « l’identité » qui domine aujourd’hui. Anish Kapoor présente toutes les garanties de cette « hybridité » actuellement très à la mode. Toutefois, il résiste explicitement à toute tentative de « mise en boîte » qui le cantonnerait à l’expression d’une quelconque « indianité ». Kapoor est connu pour l’aspect sensoriel et aléatoire de son travail. Shooting into the Corner est un excellent exemple d’une œuvre qui évacue (...) l’identification culturelle ; elle trouble par ailleurs les catégories goodmaniennes habituelles d’autographique et d’allographique. Son slogan – « Je n’ai rien à dire » – semble confirmer ce rejet de l’authenticité. Je compte démontrer que même l’aléatoire et l’auto-engendré sont reliés au critère d’authenticité, si cette notion repose sur l’intentionnalité et « l’intensionnalité » de l’œuvre d’art. Redéfini ainsi, le concept d’authenticité deviendrait une « règle constitutive » de notre institution. (shrink)

Employee relations ethics, or the lack thereof, is a problem and an issue in both private and public organizations. This article is a case study in military ERE. A retired career Naval officer, I discuss problems of downsizing and retrenchment from a "military" perspective in terms of what I refer to as a "broken covenant.".

In a market place crowded with practical rhetoric books what educational value could a challenging work such as Kenneth Burke’s A Rhetoric of Motives possibly have? Burke knows but doesn’t use the terminology of the classical art and rather than analysing the persuasive rhetoric of well-known speeches to equip us with strategies, he weaves his way around literary texts, teasing out meanings that their authors something intended, sometimes did not. Yet, despite such difficulties, A Rhetoric of Motives is a practical (...) rhetoric book. It is just that its process of explication teaches us to think well. This essay tries to explain Burke’s rethinking of the purpose and contents of a traditional teaching tool—the rhetorical handbook—and defends the value of literary-rhetorical reading that aims to ‘equip’ citizens to think openly. (shrink)

This essay notes a resurgence of interest in rhetorical studies on the appeal of form, grounded in the work of rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke. The essay argues that form is not only a way to structure discourses, it is a way to structure experience. Form is foundational in creating perceptions and thus experiences. Form is also highly rhetorical, in that how we structure our world carries social and ideological implications. The essay thus argues that an understanding of form as foundational (...) and rhetorical should be central to the educational curriculum. This way of understanding form is then a way of making rhetoric central to education in ways surpassing even the efforts of the ancient Greeks and Romans. A rhetorically centered curriculum based on teaching students how to understand form in their lives is empowering and liberating for students at the same time that it instills in them a strong awareness of ethics. (shrink)

This essay takes a rhetorical pragmatist perspective on current questions concerning educational goals and pedagogical practices. It begins by considering some challenges to rhetorical approaches to education, placing those challenges in the theoretical context of their posing. The essay then describes one current rhetorical approach—based on Kenneth Burke’s dramatism and logology—and uses it to understand and redescribe another rhetorical approach—Jesuit teaching of eloquentia perfecta. Proceeding in this way, the essay presents both a general theoretical framework for discussing educational aims and (...) a specific practical example of how such aims might be achieved. (shrink)

Disturbed by these acrimonious arguments, the authors - former colleagues and university-press board members - embarked on an ambitious project to reexamine a number of major literary and philosophical works dealing with the liberal arts and education. With their discussions ranging from Plato to Rousseau, from Cicero to Vico, from Erasmus to Matthew Arnold, Sousa and Weinsheimer offer not a history of education philosophy but an examination of the present.

In this paper I explore the extent to which a perspectival understanding of scientific knowledge supports forms of “scientific pluralism.” I will not initially attempt to formulate a general characterization of either perspectivism or scientific pluralism. I assume only that both are opposed to two extreme views. The one extreme is a (monistic) metaphysical realism according to which there is in principle one true and complete theory of everything. The other extreme is a constructivist relativism according to which scientific claims (...) about any reality beyond that of ordinary experience are merely social conventions. (shrink)

The puzzle arises because propositions of law seem to be descriptive—they are about how things are in the law, not about how they should be—and yet it has proved extremely difficult to say exactly what it is that they describe. Legal positivists believe that propositions of law are indeed wholly descriptive: they are in fact pieces of history. A proposition of law in their view, is true just in case some event of a designated law-making kind has taken place, and (...) other wise not. This seems to work reasonably well in very simple cases. If the Illinois legislature enacts the words "No will shall be valid without three witnesses, "then the proposition of law, that in Illinois will needs three witnesses, seems to be true only in virtue of that historical event.But in more difficult cases the analysis fails. Consider the proposition that a particular affirmative action scheme is constitutionally valid. If that is true, it cannot be so just in virtue of the text of the Constitution and the fact of prior court decisions, because reasonable lawyers who know exactly what the constitution says and what the courts have done may yet disagree whether it is true. What are the other possibilities? One is to suppose that controversial propositions f law, like the affirmative action statement, are not descriptive at all but are rather expressions of what the speaker wants the law to be.Another is more ambitious: controversial statements are attempts to describe some pure objective or natural law, which exits in virtue of objective moral truth rather than historical decision. Both these projects take some legal statements, at least, to be purely evaluative as distinct from descriptive: they express either what the speaker prefers—his personal politics—or what he believes is objectively required b the principles of an ideal political morality. Neither of these projects is plausible because someone who says that a particular untested affirmative action plan is constitution does mean to describe the law as it is rather than as he wants it to be or thinks that, by the best moral theory, it should be. He might, indeed, say that the regrets that the plan is constitutional and thinks that, according to the best moral theory, it ought not to be.There is a better alternative: propositions of law are not simply descriptive of legal history, in a straightforward way, nor are they simply evaluative in some way divorced from legal history. They are interpretive of legal history, which combines elements of both description and evaluation but is different from both. This suggestion will be congenial, at least at first blush, to many lawyers and legal philosophers. They are used to saying that law is a matter of interpretation; but only, perhaps because they understand interpretation in a certain way. When a statute is unclear on some point, because some crucial term is vague or because a sentence is ambiguous, lawyers say that the statute must be interpreted, and they apply what they call "techniques of statutory construction." Most of the literature assumes that interpretation of a particular document is a matter of discovering what its authors meant to say in using the words they did. But lawyers recognize that on many issues the author had no intention either way and that on others his intention cannot be discovered. Some lawyers take a more skeptical position. They say that whenever judges pretend they are discovering the intention behind some piece of legislation, this is simply a smoke screen behind which the judges impose their own view of what the statute should have been.Ronald Dworkin, professor of jurisprudence at Oxford University, is the author of Taking Rights Seriously and editor of The Philosophy of Law. (shrink)

All these specialist aspects of one life are different facets of the intellectual diamond which scintillates in the huge quarry of The Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. This is the quintessential man, the bundle of contradictions passionately dedicated to intellect, at times carrying the rational argument to irrational extremes; the natural-born emotional adventurer forever hampered by orphaned youth and too-early marriage. This Russell in the round is greater than the sum of his constituent parts, a man of (...) epic proportions, struggling through a lifetime beset with frustration and near-disaster; in youth the constitutional sceptic, in old age the sometimes splendid figure with "courage never to submit or yield.". (shrink)

An extremely important Jewish writer and thinker of the first century AD, Philo of Alexandria exercised through his ideas and language a lasting influence on the development and growth of Christianity in the New Testament period and later. This book provides an introduction to the major themes and ideas in the religious and philosophical thinking of Philo and outlines the importance of his thought by means of introductory treatments and sections of freshly translated text and commentary. Dr Williamson illustrates in (...) his work the place and significance of Philo within Judaism and as part of the background to Christianity, and so provides a valuable resource for scholars and students in this area of study. (shrink)

This article addresses the implications of rapid and uncertain ecological change, and global climate change in particular, for reserve oriented and restoration oriented ecosystem management. I argue for the following conclusions: (1) rapid and uncertain ecological change undermines traditional justifications for reserve oriented and restoration oriented ecosystem management strategies; (2) it requires rethinking ecosystem management goals, not just developing novel strategies (such as assisted colonization) to accomplish traditional goals; (3) species preservation ought to be deemphasized as an ecosystem management goal; (...) (4) reserve oriented ecosystem management remains well justified, but the goals for it must be revised. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to that part of science studies known as 'the cognitive study of science'. The general goal of such studies is to understand cogni-.

Adopting the stage metaphor suggested in Brown’s review, and treating Scientific perspectivism as a play in five acts, I respond to his review as a playwright might respond to a generally favorable review. Taking the reader behind the stage door, I discuss the playwright’s intentions for each act, paying special attention to the expected audience for the play as a whole. The result, therefore, supplements the review from the standpoint of the playwright. It also provides answers to some of the (...) reviewer’s questions.Keywords: Matthew Brown; Scientific perspectivism. (shrink)

Biological type specimens are a particular kind of voucher specimen stored in natural history collections. Their special status and practical use are discussed in relation to the description and naming of taxonomic zoological diversity. Our current system, known as Linnaean nomenclature, is governed by the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature. The name of a species is fixed by its name-bearing type specimen, linking the scientific name of a species to the type specimen first designated for that species. The name-bearing type (...) specimen is not necessarily a typical example of the species, while establishment of the boundaries of a species requires empirical taxonomic studies. The International Code of Zoological Nomenclature allows for the naming of new species in the absence of preserved specimens. However, photos and DNA sequences should not function as primary type material, while new species should not be described and named without deposition of at least one type specimen in a collection. Philosophically, species are individuals, spatiotemporally restricted entities. Therefore, Linnaean species names are proper names, which do not define the taxon but serve as a label, providing an ostensive definition of a species. Paratypes have no name-bearing function but, nevertheless, are highly valued specimens in natural history collections. Paratypes should be restricted to those specimens originating from the same sample as the holotype. Diagnosis of a species taxon involves establishment of a connection between a Linnaean name and determination of the boundaries of the species. A first step in this process is the choice of an appropriate species concept. It is not the examination of holotypes and paratypes that necessarily provides the best estimate of the taxonomic boundaries of a species, but this is facilitated by a set of voucher specimens known as the hypodigm. Dissatisfaction with the present nomenclatural code led some researchers to propose emendations. Other taxonomists suggested abandoning Linnaean nomenclature and proposed the alternative PhyloCode, albeit that it relegates the naming of species taxa to the traditional nomenclatural codes. (shrink)

Does art have to be moral? The first point that might be made is that this question is not necessarily a question ›in‹ aesthetics. Indeed, the philosophy of art should be considered as research into the concepts, implications, scope, and workings of artistic practise and reception. In that sense, the moral evaluation of art would be no different from the moral evaluation of any other human activity. All of the questions raised by the focus of this issue would thus remain (...) essential, but would be beyond the scope of aesthetic theory. There is, however, a more fundamental point to be made. Contemporary philosophers give us very probing taxonomies of the various positions possible with respect to any ethical approach to art. But whether one opts for ›Autonomism‹, ›Moralism‹, or ›Immoralism‹, one could be drawn to acknowledge the operation of what I call the metaethical effect of art. This metaethical effect is not to be seen as the formulation of a specific message, moral, or value, but as the kindling and refinement of an awareness of the notion of value itself, and of the nature of evaluation, interpretation, and shared judgment. The argument would thus be that all works, be they moral, immoral, amoral, be they concrete and narrational or purely non-figurative and non-referential, provoke a reaction that teaches us the form of shared judgment. (shrink)