The paper examines and discusses Michel Serres’ idea, expressed in the eighties, of the rediscovery of the senses and his idea expressed in the nineties of the metamorphism and mimicry of the body, reading them as a hominescence.

Through a comparison between Arthur Danto’s philosophy of art and Kantian aesthetic reflection, this article identifies the place from which Danto can underestimate the aesthetic experience and its alleged irrelevance in relation to art. I argue, first, that this position of Danto is crossed by some internal contradictions in his thought. Furthermore, based on the comparison with Kant, I examine the thesis of the “end of the history of art” advanced by Danto, considering in particular two aspects. I argue: (a) (...) that Danto surreptitiously or parasitically uses in his critical activity a notion of aesthetic experience which his philosophical argument, and in particular his “aesthetic of meanings”, cannot legitimize; (b) that his thesis relating to the end of art history is symptomatic of a wider problem, which involves our forms of life, and which finds a particularly significant statement in Friedrich von Hayek’s neoliberal thought. The attempt at a neoliberal anthropology of homo œconomicus implies the tendency to absorb within it the very meaning of the experience that has long been at the center of aesthetic and artistic experience. This totalizing colonization of human forms of life appropriates some exemplary characteristics of aesthetic and artistic experience, perverting them, starting with the presumed generation of spontaneous orders, which we know are framed in an ideological horizon that is anything but obvious or natural. My thesis is that Danto’s idea of a post-historical art is one of the symptoms of this condition. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest częściowe uzasadnienie negacji tezy, którą nazywam tezą o genezie realizmu strukturalnego. Dotyczy ona postulowanych w obrębie pewnej metafilozoficznej narracji związków między współczesnymi stanowiskami zwanymi epistemicznym realizmem strukturalnym i ontycznym realizmem strukturalnym a poglądami filozofów z początku XX wieku. W artykule rekonstruuję wymienione dwa stanowiska, postulowane związki, jakie mają one mieć z dwoma filozofami, Henri Poincarém oraz Ernstem Cassirerem, a następnie przedstawiam, dlaczego te postulowane związki są nietrafnie rozpoznane. Niesie to za sobą wnioski dotyczące swoistości wymienionych stanowisk oraz (...) pojęć obiektywności i rzeczywistości w ich kontekście. (shrink)

This essay offers a general interpretation of Benedetto Croce’s aesthetics as a theory of knowledge. It takes its title from Croce’s famous work in the 1931, Le Due Scienze Mondane; l’Estetica e l’Economica, in which Croce describes the process of development of modern aesthetics as the affirmation of a logica dei sensi ; a definition developed from the “poetic logic” in Vico’s Scienza Nuova. The essay starts with a comparison with Gilles Deleuze’s logic of sense, or thought of the (...) surface, to propose the argument that Croce can be acknowledged as one of the authors of the Nietzschean reversal of Platonism. This argument is supported by the anti-metaphysical character of Croce’s thought, who has always pursued the aim of overcoming cognitive dualism to give new dignity to the sense in all of its complexity and, by consequence, to the world. Aesthetics, in Croce’s solution, possesses two philosophical meanings: because its better epistemological definition – particularly in the connection between intuition and expression – provides advantages in other fields of philosophy; in addition, aesthetics is the initial form of spiritual life. (shrink)

In this paper I deal with the process involved in understanding metaphors. My aim is to show how synaesthetic sentences moderate the conflict between the minimalist point of view and the radical contextualist standpoint. Synaesthetic sentences are constituted by a term that belongs to a perceptual domain which is defined by a term that corresponds to another perceptual domain (for example “caressing voice”, “dark sound”, or “sweet smell”). In particular, I will defend two claims: first, against radical contextualism, it is (...) possible to maintain the distinction between “what is literal” and “what is metaphorical”. Second, against the minimalist view, the literal meaning of a metaphorical utterance is not necessarily computed as a first step by default. (shrink)

The earth is the archetypal image of the origin of humanity, but throughout the history of Western culture it has given way to other, more heavenly allegories. Enlightenment as a paradigm of knowledge consolidated itself in Western philosophical thought in a very convincing way as a production of meanings. Through this rereading of the first Greek metaphysics, thought gradually distanced itself from its materiality, from its humanity, from the possibility of admiring the concrete world, getting closer and closer to the (...) need to create abstract objects, which, as ethical limits, political, aesthetic and epistemological, we end up meeting again in our lives. Visibility seems to be the basis of a Western mental habitus: recognition, officiality, legitimacy and certainty become visible signs with which we compare and validate our own experiences. The earth, as a less transparent element, with greater ability to hide, occult, encrypt represents, however, an image that is better suited to the discussion plan proposed in this text. The relationship with reality, in terms of visibility and invisibility, requires a new perception of the world: the underlying structure no longer assumes a transcendent level, but is understood as a plane of immanence, in which meaning is interior, produced by compositions; an amalgam of networks that intertwine in an imperceptible, invisible underground plane. What we propose here is not a vertical perspective, but a horizontal one like the ground. It is from this earthly thought that we want to reflect on what happens in philosophy and childhood; in philosophy with childhood and in the childhood of philosophy. In the present attempt of an ecophilosophy of education, the discussion plan requires a deviation from the guiding images with which we learn to do research. The intention of the following investigation is to look for another type of map: a kind of subterranean cartography, which pays attention not to what we can see, which has well-defined names and categories, but to what is hidden and inhabits a plane that is muddy, earthly, indistinguishable and absolutely alive. According to the Lipmanian model of Philosophy for Children, the subterranean and rhizomatic processes of the research community will be examined, comparing them to other collective movements that characterize the vegetable communities of plants that inhabit the natural world. Finally, three concepts considered relevant to escape the limits found in some contemporary pedagogical postures will be illustrated, suggesting other paths in the relationship between philosophy, childhood and education: reciprocity, passivity and invisibility. (shrink)

Da un colloquio tra una fenomenologa di chiara fama e un pedagogista emergono iconnotati dell’atteggiamento fenomenologico, inteso come disposizione intellettuale e morale capace di fondare una “conoscenza personale” nel lavoro di cura. Questa attitudine della mente e del cuore può dar forma al “modo di essere” peculiare di chi, per professione e per vocazione, si prende quotidianamente cura delle persone e della loro esistenza.From this conversation between a well-known phenomenologist and a pedagogist thephenomenological attitude arises as both intellectual and existential (...) disposition, wich is the basis of a “personal knowledge” in care professions. This cognitive and emotional attitude can mould the particular “way of being” which characterizes those professionals who, day by day, take care of people and their existence. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to emphasize the theoretical and aesthetical meanings of Plessner’s aesthesiology. His theory on the unity of the senses allows to legitimate the normative sense of sensibility and his pregnancy to understand the organization of experience. Such an aesthetical perspective has also relevant implications for Plessner’s philosophical anthropology and his theory of eccentric positionality of human being, which is mainly a theory on the body-mind philosophical conjunction.

This paper discusses some intricacies of hylomorphism in Aristotle's discussion in his Metaphysics VII.

In a manuscript published as an appendix to Ideen III, Husserl distinguishes and articulates the concepts of “phenomenology” and “ontology” by stating, quite surprisingly, that one is “kinetic” while the other is “katastematic”. By tracing the multiple senses in which Husserl understands and subdivides ontology, this paper aims at grasping the exact meaning and function of such distinction within Husserl overall philosophical project. Additionally, having identified its Epicurean origin, it also seeks to show the general strategy by means of which (...) Husserl appropriates, distorts and adapts some key concepts of the history of ontology. (shrink)

1. Il titolo si rifà a una famosa battuta – “Bête comme un peintre” – che circolava, ricorda Duchamp, negli atelier parigini, quando Parigi era la capitale dell’arte. L’equivalente filosofico dell’insulto, a dimostrazione del carattere non locale del pensiero che veicola e della serietà della questione, è rappresentato dalla «strana idea per cui un artista non pensa e un ricercatore scientifico non fa che pensare». Che la critica di John Dewey sia stata inefficace nel discorso teorico, non ne...

Egregi signore e signori, caro Maurizio Ferraris, cari amici, Sono molto onorato di poterVi parlare del “senso” e dei “sensi” oggi. Il discorso appena fatto da Maurizio Ferraris era così ricco di idee, che è rimasto poco da aggiungere. Vorrei parlare del tema con l’ausilio di alcune immagini: questo mi permette di realizzare quel tipo di avvicinamento e appropriazione, tramite un atto del pensiero, che è il mio scopo in quanto scienziato e artista. Goethe lo chiama «anschauendes Denken», che...

Riassunto: In questo lavoro intendo discutere alcune questioni metodologiche relative al dibattito sull’individuazione delle modalità sensoriali. In primo luogo, cercherò di distinguere tra un problema metafisico, che riguarda la natura dei sensi, e un problema di classificazione, che riguarda la loro tassonomia. I criteri comunemente impiegati per individuare i sensi dovrebbero essere in grado di affrontare entrambi i problemi. In secondo luogo, delineerò cinque zone grigie, ossia cinque gruppi di casi problematici, che gli autori interessati nel difendere un (...) criterio dovrebbero essere in grado di affrontare. Il fine di questo lavoro non è quello di discutere i criteri e le aree grigie per se, bensì quello di chiarire alcune premesse metodologiche sullo sfondo del dibattito che qui si sta considerando. Parole chiave: Individuazione dei sensi; Filosofia della percezione; Metafisica dei sensi; Classificazione dei sensi; Zone grigie Methodological Considerations on the Individuation of the Senses: In this paper, I discuss some methodological issues relevant to the debate on the individuation of the sensory modalities. First, I make a distinction between a metaphysical question related to the nature of the senses, and a classificatory question related to their taxonomization. The criteria commonly used to individuate the senses should be able to address both questions. Second, I articulate five grey areas, namely, five groups of problematic cases that authors interested in defending a specific criterion should be able to tackle. The aim of this paper is not to discuss these criteria and grey areas per se, but to clarify some methodological premises that frame the debate under consideration. Keywords: Individuation of the Senses; Philosophy of Perception; Metaphysics of the Senses; Classification of the Senses; Grey Areas. (shrink)

Riassunto: In questo articolo, vengono difese due tesi. La prima è che esistono ragioni per sganciare i dibattiti sull’individuazione delle modalità sensoriali e sul criterio esperienziale-ontologico dalle nozioni di “esperienza pura”, “esclusività” ed “esaustività”; piuttosto, è preferibile collocare le esperienze percettive sotto il cappello dell’unità soggettiva. La seconda è che lo sviluppo del criterio esperienziale-ontologico può essere portato avanti senza assumere che le modalità sensoriali costituiscono generi naturali. La prima tesi riguarda le esperienze percettive, la seconda riguarda le modalità sensoriali. (...) Affermare, con il criterio esperienziale-ontologico, che le realtà percettive svolgono un ruolo ontologico non implica che lo stesso valga per le classificazioni teoriche dei sensi ottenute per suo mezzo. La proposta consiste nell’inquadrare le tassonomizzazioni dei sensi in una cornice strumentalista. Parole chiave: Individuazione dei sensi; Modalità sensoriali; Esperienza percettiva; Criterio esperienziale-ontologico; Strumentalismo Towards an Instrumentalist Interpretation of the Senses: Two main theses are defended in this paper. First, I submit that the notions of “pure experience”, “exclusivity” and “exhaustivity” are far-fetched, and that a better proposal is to focus on the subjective unity of perceptual experiences. Second, I claim that the experiential-ontological criterion for the individuation of the sensory modalities doesn’t require the senses to be understood as natural kinds. The first thesis is about perceptual experiences, while the second one concerns the senses. According to the experiential-ontological criterion, perceptual realities have to be defined in ontological terms, but that doesn’t imply that the same holds true for the senses, which are theoretical notions. The proposal is to put the task of taxonomizing the senses in an instrumentalist frame. Keywords: Individuation of the Senses; Sensory Modalities; Perceptual Experiences; Experiential-ontological Criterion; Instrumentalism. (shrink)

Pojęcie sądu w sensie logicznym nie jest jednoznacznie scharakteryzowane w literaturze logicznej. Jednakże we wszystkich ważnych definicjach wskazuje się na znaczenie, sens lub konotację zdań oznajmujących. W artykule autor podaje różne definicje i charakterystyki wypracowane m. in. przez Fregego, Churcha, Ajdukiewicza i Vandervekena oraz wskazuje na główne czynniki, które należy poddać analizie przy opracowywaniu definicji sądu. Wychodząc od pojęcia sądu jako tego, co wspólne w różnych sądach w sensie psychologicznym autor formułuje własną definicję sądu w sensie logicznym tak, aby uwzględnione (...) były: 1) struktura sądu; 2) sens zdań oznajmujących; 3) możliwy świat, w którym dane zdanie jest wypowiedziane. (shrink)

Este livro apresenta a antropofagia como uma noção teórico-experiencial, uma atitude do corpo que reabilita o sensível e desperta o mundo percebido. A argumentação ressalta a dimensão sensível do corpo e do conhecimento, considerando sua sensibilidade e motricidade, corpo que não se separa da natureza e da história, atuando no mundo como presença viva, originária, em movimento, supondo um sujeito que, ao mesmo tempo em que constrói seus próprios sentidos, é dependente da experiência do outro no mundo, criando e recriando (...) a cultura, ampliando o processo de conhecer, sentir, pensar, agir, ser, transformar-se. Essa atitude anuncia um conhecimento sensível e um corpo que é capaz de sensação, mas também de expressão, de comunicação, de criação, aspectos indispensáveis para se pensar a educação como um espaço sensível, de aprendizagem e ressignificação da cultura. (shrink)