In the former socialist countries the relation of philosophy to social reality, as shaped by the political interests of the State, must be considered for each particular case with a view to the historical dynamics of its own development. The Polish case is not typical in this regard -- it was determined by the failure of forced sovietization at the institutional, cultural level and the maintenance of Poland's traditional contacts with Western European culture. In this regard Polish universities played an (...) important role since they preserved 'normal' structures of academic activity. Philosophy in Poland has been marked by three currents which managed to rebuff the advances of Marxism. Best known among them is the Lwów-Warsaw school of logic and analytic philosophy. Its contribution is especially important in the methodology of philosophical inquiry and the style of responsible philosophical discourse. Though not a bed of political opposition the school's members mounted a 'spiritual opposition' to Marxism, especially during the Solidarity period. Catholic philosophy, as represented by the Catholic University of Lublin, has been and remains a completely independent force in Eastern and Central Europe. Doctrinally, Catholic philosophy in Poland has been divided between a more traditional, dated Thomism and the more progressive circles in Cracow where Western European philosophy, especially phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutics, has been influential. The third major current, centered in Cracow, is the phenomenology of Roman Ingarden, whose influence is manifest in a style of philosophizing that has attracted professional philosophers as well as committed intellectuals from different disciplines. Against this diversified background Marxism had to prove its mettle, a requirement that explains the unique internal differentiation and pluralism within Polish Marxist philosophy. The decisive factors in its development were its rejection of Soviet Marxism-Leninism and the opening to Western Marxism. The often remarked 'revisionist' character of Polish Marxism consists in the recognition by its most talented representatives of the fundamental incompatibility between Marxism as the ideological legitimation of the Communist state and as a philosophy subject to rational criteria. In effect, Polish Marxists thought the theory through to its end, and in this sense brought to light its inherently unstable nature: to be a philosophy it would have to cease to be Marxist, to be Marxist means having to pander to ideology. The confrontation of the diverse currents in Polish philosophy contributed to an unfortunate result: for political reasons non-Marxists steered clear of social philosophical questions, while official Marxism, which suppressed the 'revisionist' trend, obfuscated the relation between philosophy and social reality. Today philosophy in Poland has the urgent task to contribute to the reconstruction of a social rationality combining a critical consciousness with moral elements of commitment and responsibility. (shrink)

In the paper I try to define some basic ideas and sketch a style of Marek Siemek’s epistemological reflection and its influence on the notion of do called “meaning of history”. I referee some elements of his interpretation of Kant and Hegel as a background to paradox of “meaning of the history”—the paradox of its necessary transcendence and immanence, the contradiction between a history as an eschatology, and history as a “project”, a dialectic of sense and non-sense. The conclusion is (...) following: the “history” for Siemek is the becoming of self-sufficiency of the “modern spirit” and therefore a tragicomedy in the Hegelian sense. It excludes any transcendent point of view or any utopia. (shrink)

Im Beitrag wird versucht, Fichtes und Hegels Konzepte der Intersubjektivität miteinander zu vergleichen, auch um die verbreitete Meinung über die Unvereinbarkeit beider zu prüfen. Die nähere Rekonstruktion beider Auffassungen will zeigen, daß Fichtes dialogisches Modell der auf gegenseitige »Aufforderung zur Freiheit« gründenden Interpersonalität dem Hegelschen Konzept des ursprünglichen »Kampfes um die Anerkennung« keinesfalls widerspricht. Es handelt sich hier vielmehr um zwei wohl verschiedene, aber komplementäre Darstellungs- und Begründungsweisen einer und derselben kommunikativen Reziprozität, die als unhintergehbare Voraussetzung für die menschliche Freiheit (...) in der modernen Welt doch von den beiden Philosophen angenommen wird. (shrink)

Im Beitrag wird versucht, Fichtes und Hegels Konzepte der Intersubjektivität miteinander zu vergleichen, auch um die verbreitete Meinung über die Unvereinbarkeit beider zu prüfen. Die nähere Rekonstruktion beider Auffassungen will zeigen, daß Fichtes dialogisches Modell der auf gegenseitige »Aufforderung zur Freiheit« gründenden Interpersonalität dem Hegelschen Konzept des ursprünglichen »Kampfes um die Anerkennung« keinesfalls widerspricht. Es handelt sich hier vielmehr um zwei wohl verschiedene, aber komplementäre Darstellungs- und Begründungsweisen einer und derselben kommunikativen Reziprozität, die als unhintergehbare Voraussetzung für die menschliche Freiheit (...) in der modernen Welt doch von den beiden Philosophen angenommen wird. (shrink)

Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural selection finds application far outside biology, for which it was originally invented. Its consequences for science proved far-going, influencing practically every field from thermodynamics to the humanities. While acting on biological systems, the Darwinian mechanism is a source of progress and the local-scale abandonment of the universe’s general tendency towards chaos. However, observations of changes taking place in selection-exposed organisms show that evolutionary success requires some essential limitations. The application of this (...) reasoning to social evolution may appear thought-provoking: stable evolution requires not only intense selection but also a conservative approach to ideas. (shrink)

In his life and work, Leszek Kołakowski traversed many paths, some more and some less well-known. The main focus here is on Kołakowski’s involvement in what one may call an anthropological variant of philosophy of culture. Anthropological philosophy of culture bases on the following assumptions:1. Human conduct is determined by culture. There is neither humanity without culture nor culture without humans.2. Human conduct is by nature referential, in other words, the factual alone is not enough for humans who tend to (...) reach beyond it in their search for the most elemental and ultimate truths.3. Culture is a dynamic phenomenon and a challenge on the path to self-awareness.4. Axiological sensitivity.5. The culture philosopher is immersed in the culture he studies and, by revealing that which it conceals, is a source of reflection on this culture. All these assumptions lie at the core of the philosophy of Leszek Kołakowski. (shrink)

In the former socialist countries the relation of philosophy to social reality, as shaped by the political interests of the State, must be considered for each particular case with a view to the historical dynamics of its own development. The Polish case is not typical in this regard — it was determined by the failure of forced sovietization at the institutional, cultural level and the maintenance of Poland''s traditional contacts with Western European culture. In this regard Polish universities played an (...) important role since they preserved normal structures of academic activity.Philosophy in Poland has been marked by three currents which managed to rebuff the advances of Marxism. Best known among them is the Lwów-Warsaw school of logic and analytic philosophy. Its contribution is especially important in the methodology of philosophical inquiry and the style of responsible philosophical discourse. Though not a bed of political opposition the school''s members mounted a spiritual opposition to Marxism, especially during the Solidarity period. Catholic philosophy, as represented by the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL), has been and remains a completely independent force in Eastern and Central Europe. Doctrinally, Catholic philosophy in Poland has been divided between a more traditional, dated Thomism and the more progressive circles in Cracow where Western European philosophy, especially phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutics, has been influential (the significance of Józef Tischner and Karol Wojtyla, now Pope Jean Paul II). The third major current, centered in Cracow, is the phenomenology of Roman Ingarden, whose influence is manifest in a style of philosophizing that has attracted professional philosophers as well as committed intellectuals from different disciplines. (shrink)

Die Beiträge dieses Bandes aus verschiedenen Disziplinen, Philosophie, Literaturgeschichte und Kunstgeschichte schließen sich zum Bild einer Epoche zusammen, die einen Höhepunkt des deutschen Geisteslebens darstellt. Dabei treten bestimmte Züge heraus, welche die Genese dieser Kultur in relativ eng umgrenzten Kommunikationszentren zeigen: Königsberg - Düsseldorf - Jena - Weimar - freilich mit Ausstrahlung auf das übrige Deutschland. So etwa: die Stilisierung der Geselligkeit über den literarischen Dialog bis zur philosophischen Interpersonalitätslehre Fichtes und einer dem entsprechenden Dialektik des Dialogs; einer Staats- und (...) Gesellschaftsauffassung, die zwar noch in der klassischen Naturrechtslehre der Aufklärung gründete, aber den Rechtsbegriff so in sich zu gliedern wußte, daß er Implikationen verbindlich auch für das politische Handeln hergeben konnte und so aus dem Rechtsbegriff erstmals die Umsetzung des Völkerfriedens politisch fordern konnte. Es zeigt sich hier ein Grundmodell, das aller pragmatisch ausmachbaren Verallgemeinerungsfähigkeit überlegen ist, da die sittliche Person auch schon im Recht eine individuelle Aufforderung erhält, soll politisches Handeln von der öffentlichen Meinung anerkannt werden. Schließlich tritt eine neue Religiosität auf, die ein Naturverständnis einbezog, das ästhetischer Herkunft war, und die vielleicht deswegen ihren überzeugendsten Ausdruck in der Malerei fand. In allen diesen Bereichen aber werden Natur und Kunst im Lichte der neuentdeckten Freiheit des autonomen Individuums wiederbelebt. (shrink)

The paper analyses relations between Marek J. Siemek’s views and Louis Althusser’s Marxism. The French philosophical tradition, especially structuralism, plays an important role in Siemek’s standpoint which overcomes the opposition between Hegelian Marxism and the so-called Structuralist Marxism.

The aim of the article is to present Marek Siemek’s interpretation of modernity, focusing on problems related to understanding of the modern subject that arose from the reading of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. Siemek seems to endorse a general drive of Habermas’ theory of intersubjective communication intended to overcome the dialectics of Enlightenment and to complete the project of modernity. However, his position is that its foundation can be traced back to the philosophies of Fichte (...) and Hegel and their mutually complementary intersubjectivity models. Siemek seeks to reconcile the idea of the philosophy of intersubjectivity underlying Fichte’s and Hegel’s philosophies with the tenets of the philosophy of consciousness. (shrink)

The paper discusses with critical intent Marek J. Siemek’s conception of transcendental philosophy. Firstly, theory of knowledge does not belong to the epistemic level of reflection but it is precisely the other way around; namely, it is due to transcendental philosophy that it was possible to distinguish metaphysical, ontological and epistemological questions. Secondly, transcendental philosophy enables us to discriminate between the ontological and epistemological questions and, as a result, to take up within its scope traditional epistemological questions such as adequacy (...) of cognition. Thirdly, Siemek’s Fichtean interpretation of transcendental philosophy is untenable. It overestimates the role of spontaneity and practical moment in the constitution of the world and underestimates the receptive moment in cognition. It seems that more plausible way of understanding transcendental philosophy can be found in the writings of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism where within the field of transcendental consciousness more objectified meanings and subject as such are being constituted. (shrink)

Marek J. Siemek’s idea of the transcendental social philosophy seems paradoxical, because it aspires to combine the allegedly “non-historical” and “timeless” transcendental sphere with the social and historical dimension. But the uniqueness of Siemek as a philosopher consists precisely in being Fichtean as well as Hegelian. Siemek’s philosophy is an undertaking to reconstruct the field of rationality in its social and historical dimension. The leading question of this philosophy is not if history is rational, but how it is possible for (...) the rationality to be historical. Siemek seems to maintain, that the noninstrumental rationality has it’s own history: it is a history of self-de-instrumentalization of the initial one-sided instrumental reason. Historical process can be seen as a vehicle of rationality, although not always and necessary rational itself. For Siemek, as well as for Hegel, the historical contradiction is a contradiction of the thing itself, not a development scheme imposed on the history by theoretician from his allegedly external position. On one side: there is no history without the rational interpretation of history. On the other side: the interpretation itself is a part of historical process. (shrink)

From the perspective of Marek J. Siemek’s theory of modernity, one of the most important problem is to include conflicts into institutional framework of the modern society. He reinterprets Hegel’s dialectics of the struggle for recognition by conceptual tools of Hobbes and Marx in order to uncover hidden assumptions and conditions of possibility of the social rationality. For Siemek, law as purely formal, autopoetic social system or social subject, which produces individual subjects, is the first of the conditions of possibility (...) of modernity. The second one is the convergence of formal and material presuppositions of law—or, speaking generally—the convergence of form and content of the social reason. Form and content, facticity and normativity, instrumentality and communicativity are aspects of the process of rationalization andof the only one reason, self-generating in the history. So for Siemek, the Hegelian model of the struggle for recognition gains its theoretical power only when it is interpreted from the perspective of economical, technical and legal rationalization of modernity. Only such perspective is able to construct “the transcendental social philosophy” which starts from critique of “the non-instrumental reason”. (shrink)

In the paper I try to define some basic ideas and sketch a style of Marek Siemek’s epistemological reflection and its influence on the notion of do called “meaning of history”. I referee some elements of his interpretation of Kant and Hegel as a background to paradox of “meaning of the history”—the paradox of its necessary transcendence and immanence, the contradiction between a history as an eschatology, and history as a “project”, a dialectic of sense and non-sense. The conclusion is (...) following: the “history” for Siemek is the becoming of self-sufficiency of the “modern spirit” and therefore a tragicomedy in the Hegelian sense. It excludes any transcendent point of view or any utopia. (shrink)

The paper examines the evolution of Marek Siemek’s “dialogical principle.” The early version of this principle, sketched in the essay “Dialogue and Its Myth”, meets several criteria of the phenomenology of dialogue and even hermeneutics. However, Siemek has continued to change his concept of dialogue over the decades. In his recent book, Freedom, Reason, Intersubjectivity, he explores transcendental preconditions of free and reasonable activism, i.e., the Fichtean “limitative synthesis” of I and Non-I and its applications in social interrelations. He no (...) longer considers the empirical, anthropological, and phenomenological aspects of dialogics and mutual recognition. He also replaces mutuality with reciprocity, asymmetry with symmetry, and phenomenology with transcendentalism. (shrink)