PurposeThe paper suggests overcoming the polarization of today's debate on peer‐to‐peer systems by defining a fair balance between the principle of precaution and the principle of openness. Threats arising from these file sharing applications‐systems should not be a pretext to limit freedom of research, speech or the right “freely to participate in the cultural life of the community”, as granted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948. The paper aims to take sides in today's debate.Design/methodology/approachThe paper adopts an (...) interdisciplinary approach, including network theory, law and ethics. The method draws on both theoretical and empirical material so as to stress the paradox of the principle of precaution applied to P2P systems and why the burden of proof should fall on the party proposing that one refrain from action.FindingsCensors and opponents of P2P systems who propose to apply the principle of precaution to this case deny the premise upon which that principle rests. “Levels of evidence” required by the precautionary principle show that – in many cases in which the outcomes of technology are ignored – another principle is needed for orienting action, namely, the principle of openness.Social implicationsAlarm about how P2P systems undermine crucial elements of the societies often led to the ban of this technology. The paper illustrates why it should not be the case: rather than shutting these networks down, they should be further developed.Originality/valueThe paper provides the comprehensive picture of a far too often fragmented debate. (shrink)

whole numbers that manages to assert that it itself is unprovable (from a given finite set F of axioms using formal logic). (Gödel's paper is included in the well-known anthology [1].) GF : ``GF cannot be proved from the finite set of axioms F.'' This assertion GF is therefore true if and only if it is unprovable, and the formal axiomatic system F in question either proves falsehoods (because it enables us to prove GF) or fails to prove a true (...) assertion (because it does not enable us to prove GF). If we assume that the former situation is impossible, we conclude that F is necessarily incomplete since it does not permit us to establish the true statement GF. (shrink)

The paper examines how technology challenges conventional borders of national legal systems, as shown by cases that scholars address as a part of their everyday work in the fields of information technology (IT)-Law, i.e., computer crimes, data protection, digital copyright, and so forth. Information on the internet has in fact a ubiquitous nature that transcends political borders and questions the notion of the law as made of commands enforced through physical sanctions. Whereas many of today’s impasses on jurisdiction, international conflicts (...) of law and diverging interpretations of statutes can be addressed by embedding legal safeguards in ICT and other kinds of technology, to overcome the ineffectiveness of state action by design entails its own risks, e.g., threats of paternalism hinging on the regulatory tools of technology. Rather than modelling people’s behaviour by design, the article suggests that design policies should respect individual and collective autonomy by decreasing the impact of harm-generating behaviour (e.g., security measures and default settings for data protection), or by widening the range of people’s choices (e.g., user friendly interfaces). (shrink)

The European Medical Information Framework project, funded through the IMI programme, has designed and implemented a federated platform to connect health data from a variety of sources across Europe, to facilitate large scale clinical and life sciences research. It enables approved users to analyse securely multiple, diverse, data via a single portal, thereby mediating research opportunities across a large quantity of research data. EMIF developed a code of practice to ensure the privacy protection of data subjects, protect the interests of (...) data sharing parties, comply with legislation and various organisational policies on data protection, uphold best practices in the protection of personal privacy and information governance, and eventually promote these best practices more widely. EMIF convened an Ethics Advisory Board, to provide feedback on its approach, platform, and the EcoP. The most important challenges the ECoP team faced were: how to define, control and monitor the purposes for which federated health data are used; the kinds of organisation that should be permitted to conduct permitted research; and how to monitor this. This manuscript explores those issues, offering the combined insights of the EAB and EMIF core ECoP team. For some issues, a consensus on how to approach them is proposed. For other issues, a singular approach may be premature but the challenges are summarised to help the community to debate the topic further. Arguably, the issues and their analyses have application beyond EMIF, to many research infrastructures connected to health data sources. (shrink)

This book explores how the design, construction, and use of robotics technology may affect today's legal systems and, more particularly, matters of responsibility and agency in criminal law, contractual obligations, and torts. By distinguishing between the behaviour of robots as tools of human interaction, and robots as proper agents in the legal arena, jurists will have to address a new generation of "hard cases." General disagreement may concern immunity in criminal law (e.g., the employment of robot soldiers in battle), personal (...) accountability for certain robots in contracts (e.g., robo-traders), much as clauses of strict liability and negligence-based responsibility in extra-contractual obligations (e.g., service robots in tort law). Since robots are here to stay, the aim of the law should be to wisely govern our mutual relationships. (shrink)

The paper focuses on concerns and legal challenges brought on by the use of algorithms. A particular class of algorithms that augment or replace analysis and decision-making by humans, i.e. data analytics and machine learning, is under scrutiny. Taking into account Balkin’s work on “the laws of an algorithmic society”, attention is drawn to obligations of transparency, matters of due process, and accountability. This US-centric analysis on drawbacks and loopholes of current legal systems is complemented with the analysis of norms (...) and principles of the EU data protection law, or “GDPR”. The aim is twofold. On the one hand, the intent is to shed light on some crucial differences between the US and EU law on the regulation of algorithmic operators, both public and private. Whereas, in the USA, scholars debate whether and to what extent new duties and responsibilities of algorithmic operators, e.g. information fiduciaries, have to amend the current framework of self-regulation and light government—as shown by the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy report from November 2016—in EU law much of the new duties and responsibilities of algorithmic operators have been passed upon them as data controllers. Whether such approaches will successfully tackle the normative challenges of the algorithmic society is, on the other hand, an open issue that will likely represent the main topic of debate over the next years. Disagreement may concern: the terms framing the legal question in e.g. statistical purposes of the data processing; how such terms are related to each other in legal reasoning ; and legal hard cases that will increasingly have to do with the principles that are at stake also but not only in data protection. By entrusting such legal hard cases to algorithms, or some sort of smart artificial agent, humans still bear full responsibility for the judgment of what is socially, ethically, and legally “plain” and “hard” in social affairs. The balance between delegation of decisions to algorithms and non-delegation will be the leitmotiv of the algorithmic society. Since the devil is in the detail, the current paper is devoted to some of them. (shrink)

No single moral theory can instruct us as to whether and to what extent we are confronted with legal loopholes, e.g. whether or not new legal rules should be added to the system in the criminal law field. This question on the primary rules of the law appears crucial for today’s debate on roboethics and still, goes beyond the expertise of robo-ethicists. On the other hand, attention should be drawn to the secondary rules of the law: The unpredictability of robotic (...) behaviour and the lack of data on the probability of events, their consequences and costs, make hard to determine the levels of risk and hence, the amount of insurance premiums and other mechanisms on which new forms of accountability for the behaviour of robots may hinge. By following Japanese thinking, the aim is to show why legally de-regulated, or special, zones for robotics, i.e. the secondary rules of the system, pave the way to understand what kind of primary rules we may want for our robots. (shrink)

In order to present a hopefully comprehensive framework of what is the stake of the growing use of robot soldiers, the paper focuses on: the different impact of robots on legal systems, e.g., contractual obligations and tort liability; how robots affect crucial notions as causality, predictability and human culpability in criminal law and, finally, specific hypotheses of robots employed in “just wars.” By using the traditional distinction between causes that make wars just and conduct admissible on the battlefield, the aim (...) is to clarify how advancement of military robotics technology is transforming a 2,000-year-old legal debate on the concept of “just war.” For the first time, legal systems will hold political authorities and military commissioners responsible for what an artificial soldier autonomously decides to do. The paper examines how the new scenario affects both principles of military conduct and notions of justice in resorting to war. (shrink)

This article reports the findings of AI4People, an Atomium—EISMD initiative designed to lay the foundations for a “Good AI Society”. We introduce the core opportunities and risks of AI for society; present a synthesis of five ethical principles that should undergird its development and adoption; and offer 20 concrete recommendations—to assess, to develop, to incentivise, and to support good AI—which in some cases may be undertaken directly by national or supranational policy makers, while in others may be led by other (...) stakeholders. If adopted, these recommendations would serve as a firm foundation for the establishment of a Good AI Society. (shrink)

The paper examines today’s debate on the new responsibilities of Internet service providers in connection with legal problems concerning jurisdiction, data processing, people’s privacy and education. The focus is foremost on the default rules and safe harbour clauses for ISPs liability, set up by the US and European legal systems. This framework is deepened in light of the different functions of the services provided on the Internet so as to highlight multiple levels of control over information and, correspondingly, different types (...) of liability. The new responsibilities of ISPs concern the original “end-to-end” architecture of the medium and policies on design rather than responsibility for user content and individual messages. (shrink)

The paper examines some aspects of today’s debate on trust and e-trust and, more specifically, issues of legal responsibility for the production and use of robots. Their impact on human-to-human interaction has produced new problems both in the fields of contractual and extra-contractual liability in that robots negotiate, enter into contracts, establish rights and obligations between humans, while reshaping matters of responsibility and risk in trust relations. Whether or not robotrust concerns human-to-robot or even robot-to-robot relations, there is a new (...) generation of cases involving human-to-human contractual and extra-contractual liability for robots’ behaviour because, for the first time, legal systems hold you responsible for what an artificial system autonomously decides to do. (shrink)

This article examines some of the most relevant issues concerning P2P systems so as to take sides in today's strongly polarized debate. The idea is to integrate a context-based perspective with an ontological representation of informational norms; thanks to a procedural outlook which is presented in terms of burden of proof More particularly, we examine three ''roads." First, the topological approach to complex social networks allows us to comprehend the laws according to which information is distributed through P2P systems and (...) how a "short route" has joined, and sometimes replaced, the traditional "long route" between creator, business, and the public. The second road is the context-based perspective elaborated by Helen Nissenbaum, and developed by Francis Grodzinsky and Herman Tavani: The goal is to determine the norms that govern such an informational flow as norms of appropriateness and distribution. The final road is the informational viewpoint on ethics proposed by Luciano Floridi with the idea that standard ethical theories cannot easily be adapted to deal with the new informational issues emerging with digital technology. While empirical evidence on the impact of P2P systems is still quite controversial, it is crucial to determine on whom the burden of proof falls in a given context, on censors or advocates, by singling out both the default norms and exceptions in the use and development of P2P software. (shrink)

El artículo examina un episodio curioso, ocurrido en las relaciones de Galileo Galilei y de su amigo Giovanfrancesco Sagredo -el destacado personaje del Diálogo sobre los dos máximos sistemas del mundo- con el filósofo aristotélico Cesare Cremonini. Estando todavía de profesor en Padua, Galilei entrega al colega y amigo Cremonini, en forma de préstamo, la cuantiosa suma de cuatrocientos ducados. Al trasladarse de Padua a Florencia, el científico confía a Sagredo la tarea de recuperar el dinero prestado. Las cartas numerosas (...) que Sagredo dirigiera a Galilei a tal propósito, nos informan que la cancelación total del préstamo tardó nueve años (1619), gracias a las reiteradas intromisiones del patricio veneciano. Es opinión común de los historiadores, que la tardanza fue causada simplemente por la morosidad y la mala conducta seguida por Cremonini. El autor, en cambio, sugiere una interpretación diferente de los hechos; al tomar en cuenta, de un lado, la presencia de factores financieros que hicieron subir el costo de la deuda; del otro, la forma agresiva con que Sagredo llevó adelante el cuidado de los intereses de Galilei, hasta el extremo de levantar en Cremonini la sospecha de ser objeto de maniobras usureras. (shrink)

The use of cyber force can be as severe and disruptive as traditional armed attacks are. Cyber attacks may neither provoke physical injuries nor cause property damages and still, they can affect essential functions of today’s societies, such as governmental services, business processes or communication systems that progressively depend on information as a vital resource. Whereas several scholars claim that an international treaty, much as new forms of international cooperation, are necessary, a further challenge should be stressed: authors of cyber (...) attacks can be non-state actors, and identifying the party responsible for such a use of force, whether non-state actors or national sovereign states, is often impossible. Accordingly, several programmes on online security and national defence have been developed by sovereign states to tackle this menace and yet, the endurance of Western democracies and their aim to protect basic rights have already been tested by such programmes over the past years. The new scenarios of cyber force do not only concern the field of international law, since they may represent the main threat in the fields of national and constitutional law as well. (shrink)

The paper examines the open problems that experts of space law shall increasingly address over the next few years, according to four different sets of legal issues. Such differentiation sheds light on what is old and what is new with today’s troubles of space law, e.g., the privatization of space, vis-à-vis the challenges that AI raises in this field. Some AI challenges depend on its unique features, e.g., autonomy and opacity, and how they affect pillars of the law, whether on (...) Earth or in space missions. The paper insists on a further class of legal issues that AI systems raise, however, only in outer space. We shall never overlook the constraints of a hazardous and hostile environment, such as on a mission between Mars and the Moon. The aim of this paper is to illustrate what is still mostly unexplored or in its infancy in this kind of research, namely, the fourfold ways in which the uniqueness of AI and that of outer space impact both ethical and legal standards. Such standards shall provide for thresholds of evaluation according to which courts and legislators evaluate the pros and cons of technology. Our claim is that a new generation of sui generis standards of space law, stricter or more flexible standards for AI systems in outer space, down to the “principle of equality” between human standards and robotic standards, will follow as a result of this twofold uniqueness of AI and of outer space. (shrink)

Se examina la defensa que de la filosofía en cuanto episteme, elaboró el aristotélico renacentista Cesare Cremonini (1550-1 631), al introducir el curso de lecciones sobre la Física de Aristóteles, según la redacci6n todavía inédita del Ms.200-2 de la Biblioteca Universitaria de Padua. Mediante un topos ya clásico, y actual, los temas en discusión son además de la falta de certitudo y la inconsistencia veritativa que afectan las conclusiones de la filosofía de la naturaleza, la inutilidad e incluso la peligrosidad (...) que, desde el punto de vista ético- político, parecen descalificar la labor del filósofo ociosamente levantar sospechas y alarma. La interpretación de la réplica cremoniniana intenta establecer conexiones entre el perfil conceptual de los argumentos esgrimidos, y algunos episodios de la biografía intelectual y académica de Crernonini sin dejar de tomar en cuenca las implicaciones políticas que pueden derivarse, en perspectiva histórica, del amplio debate que caracterizó la vida académica y cultural del estudio de Padua y de la república veneciana, durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVI.The defence of philosophy as episteme is examined, as elaborated by Renaissance Aristotelian philosopher Cesare Cremonini (1550 - 1 631) in his as yet unpublished manuscript numbered 200-2 by t he University of Padua. Which purported to be an introduction for a course on Aristotle's Physics. Following a topos both classic and contemporary, the issues arc, in addition to the lack of certitudet and the inconsistency of truth concerning the philosophy of nature. The uselessness and even the ethical-political danger arising from the work of the idle philosopher devoted to the contemplation of truth, whose presence in society may stir suspicion and unrest. The analysis of Cremonini’s arguments intends to establish the connections between the philosopher's views and his own academic and intellectual circumstances. Also the political implications are taken into account that resulted from the wide-range debate typical of academic and cultural life in the Studio of Padua and the Republic of Venice during the second half of the 16th Century. (shrink)

PurposeThe paper aims to examine the profound transformations engendered by the information revolution in order to determine aspects of what should be visible or invisible in human affairs. It seeks to explore the meaning of invisibility via an interdisciplinary approach, including computer science, law, and ethics.Design/methodology/approachThe method draws on both theoretical and empirical material so as to scrutinise the ways in which today's information revolution is recasting the boundaries between visibility and invisibility.FindingsThe degrees of exposure to public notice can be (...) understood as a matter of balance between access and control over information in a specific context, as well as a function of the ontological friction in a given region of the environment.Originality/valueThe originality of the case study on a new kind of recommender system is enhanced because of the procedural approach which is suggested to further develop the distinction between “good” and “evil” as anything that enriches, or damages, the informational complexity of the environment. (shrink)

In my research published last year, i.e. Homo homini deus. Per un'introduzione al pensiero giuridico di Francis Bacon, I have analytically presented the Aphorismi de Jure gentium maiore sive de fontibus justiciae et iuris and I have closely studied the relationship between the legal and political philosophy of the Lord Chancellor and the civil science of Thomas Hobbes1. In the present essay I will try to summarize some of the main reasons why I think that manuscript of Chatsworth House, discovered (...) to be Bacon's only in 1980, is so important. It clarifies, with its twenty aphorisms, some crucial principles of Bacon's civil philosophy that would probably remain otherwise shadowed. So, here I will take as an excellent example that concept of sovereignty which is presented in the Aphorismi. His famous silences - for which the Lord Chancellor has been often considered the worthy, English heir of Machiavelli: 'We're much beholden...'2, - will be better understood at the light of this 'new' text. However, there is not only this sort of silence that Baconian scholars have to face and to understand, also a historiographical tradition has been consolidated in the twentieth century that has almost forgotten Bacon's civil philosophy. Those Bacon's legal and political texts that have been still considered and analyzed by philosophical critique, have been generally misunderstood. So, in order to avoid as far as possible such a fate for the Aphorismi de Jure gentium maiore either, it is necessary to consider that historical context which, as we shall see, depends very much on separating Bacon as a political thinker from his younger contemporary, Thomas Hobbes. (shrink)

The paper deals with the governance of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in European law. Three different kinds of balance have been struck between multiple regulatory systems, in accordance with the sector of the governance of UAS which is taken into account. The first model regards the field of civil aviation law and its European Union ’s regulation: the model looks like a traditional mix of top-down regulation and soft law. The second model concerns the EU general data protection law, the GDPR, (...) which has set up a co-regulatory framework summed up with the principle of accountability also, but not only, in the field of drones. The third model of governance has been adopted by the EU through methods of legal experimentation and coordination mechanisms for UAS. The overall aim of the paper is to elucidate the ways in which such three models interact, insisting on differences and similarities with other technologies, and further legal systems. (shrink)

The paper examines the realignment of the legal sources in an information society, by considering first of all the differences with the previous system of sources, dubbed as the “Westphalian model”. The current system is tripartite, rather than bipartite, for the sources of transnational law should be added to the traditional dichotomy between national and international law. In addition, the system is dualistic, rather than monistic, because the tools of legal constructivism, such as codes or statutes, have to be complemented (...) with the rules of customary law and contracts. In light of the canonical version of the law as a set of commands enforced through the threat of physical sanctions, however, two further novelties must be stressed, namely the soft law-tools of governance as a source of the system and the aim to embed normative constraints into technology, in order to enforce the law through the use of filtering systems, self-enforcing technologies, etc. This latter approach impacts on functions and requirements of the system, by transferring the normative side of the law from the traditional “ought to” of legal commands to what actually is on the basis of automatic techniques, thus affecting the very notion of source. The overall aim of the paper is to show that rearrangements of the legal sources are intertwined with redistributions of power and hence, a normative standpoint is needed, so as to determine whether scholars can obtain the solution that best justifies the integrity of the law before its hard cases, or the answer is a reasonable compromise between many conflicting interests. (shrink)

This paper adopts a legal perspective to counter some exaggerations of today’s debate on the social understanding of robotics. According to a long and well-established tradition, there is in fact a relative strong consensus among lawyers about some key notions as, say, agency and liability in the current use of robots. However, dealing with a field in rapid evolution, we need to rethink some basic tenets of the contemporary legal framework. In particular, time has come for lawyers to acknowledge that (...) some acts of robots should be considered as a new source of legal responsibility for others’ behaviour. (shrink)

The paper examines the connection between online security and the protection of civil rights from a legal viewpoint, that is, considering the different types of rights and interests that are at stake in national and international law and whether, and to what extent, they concern matters of balancing. Over the past years, the purpose of several laws, and legislative drafts such as ACTA, has been to impose “zero-sum games”. In light of current statutes, such as HADOPI in France, or Digital (...) Economy Act in UK, the paper intends to illustrate how more satisfactory solutions are feasible in the field of online security, such as the new “Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive” that the European Commission presented in January 2012. At least in Western legal systems, it should be clear that either civil rights prevail over security (no balancing), or such balance has to satisfactorily protect individual rights (proportionality). (shrink)

Forcing extensions yield models of ZFC in which a long sequence of club subsets of ω 1 has the following property: every subsequence of size ℵ 1 has a finite intersection.

Quasi-Nelson logic (QNL) was recently introduced as a common generalisation of intuitionistic logic and Nelson's constructive logic with strong negation. Viewed as a substructural logic, QNL is the axiomatic extension of the Full Lambek Calculus with Exchange and Weakening by the Nelson axiom, and its algebraic counterpart is a variety of residuated lattices called quasi-Nelson algebras. Nelson's logic, in turn, may be obtained as the axiomatic extension of QNL by the double negation (or involutivity) axiom, and intuitionistic logic as the (...) extension of QNL by the contraction axiom. A recent series of papers by the author and collaborators initiated the study of fragments of QNL, which correspond to subreducts of quasi-Nelson algebras. In the present paper we focus on fragments that contain the connectives forming a residuated pair (the monoid conjunction and the so-called strong Nelson implication), these being the most interesting ones from a substructural logic perspective. We provide quasi-equational (whenever possible, equational) axiomatisations for the corresponding classes of algebras, obtain twist representations for them, study their congruence properties and take a look at a few notable subvarieties. Our results specialise to the involutive case, yielding characterisations of the corresponding fragments of Nelson's logic and their algebraic counterparts. (shrink)

Risk management is a well-known method to face technological challenges through a win–win combination of protective and proactive approaches, fostering the collaboration of operators, researchers, regulators, and industries for the exploitation of new markets. In the field of autonomous and unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, a considerable amount of work has been devoted to risk analysis, the generation of ground risk maps, and ground risk assessment by estimating the fatality rate. The paper aims to expand this approach with a tool (...) for managing data protection risks raised by drones through the design of flight maps. The tool should allow UAS operators choosing the best air corridor for their drones based on the so-called privacy by design principle pursuant to Article 25 of the EU data protection regulation, the GDPR. Among the manifold applications of this approach, the design of fly zones for drones can be tailored for public authorities in the phase of authorization of new operations, much as for national Data Protection authorities that have to control the lawfulness of personal data processing by UAS operations. The overall aim is to present the first win–win approach to data protection issues, aerospace engineering challenges, and risk management methods for the threats posed by this technology. (shrink)