Augustine's analysis and solution of the classical problem of free will and foreknowledge - as given in De libero arbitrio III 4-10 and De civitate Dei V 8-10 - stand out in their brevity and simplicity. His texts carry formulations which show an astonishing clarity not only in what they explicitly say, but also in what is implicitly said in them. Most recent discussions of Augustine's view, however, are unclear about this clarity, at least partly because they tend to a (...) deterministic position; they probably sense, unwillingly, that Augustine intends to rule that position out. In the discussions on the problem a dilemma seems to be unavoidable; one can only cling to one of its horns. Either God knows the future and then human volitions cannot be free , or the human will is free but then God cannot know its future volitions . In his analysis of this dilemma Augustine shows that both positions already presuppose an insight which cannot be taken for granted. The certainty of God's foreknowledge seems to entail that the object of his foreknowledge is necessary, but on close examination it does not. For it is sufficient to state: It is necessary that, if there is an object of God's foreknowledge, God knows it. Augustine's central sentences carefully formulate this kind of - implicative - necessity involved in prescience. Because of this 'necessity', he can consistently maintain that it is on the power of the will to sin or not to sin and yet, if a man will sin, God will know it, or if that man will not sin, God will know that. Thus the object of God's knowledge can be contingent, as in the case of future volitions, and still His foreknowledge can be certain. A deterministic interpretation of Augustine's analysis can be substantiated by the idea that God foreknows what the will itself will do, whereas his certainty is based on the supposition that the will is a natural cause of its volitions - just like the other causes in the cosmos. Although Augustine does not deal with this more specific aspect - he does not need to, because he showed that the certainty of God's knowledge can be guaranteed independent of the status of its object - we can conclude from his formulations that the will, as a cause of volitions, differs from a natural cause not only by producing them itself, but also by producing them in such a way that it can not-produce them. (shrink)

Series: Studies in Theology and Religion (STAR), Am 15. April 1799 beendete Friedrich Schleiermacher seine "Reden über die Religion". Die rhetorisch und stilistisch sehr geschickt verfasste (und anonym veröffentlichte) Erstlingsschrift des später berühmten Predigers, Universitätsprofessors und Schriftstellers hat bis heute ihre Anziehungkraft behalten. Aus Anlass der Zweihundertjahrfeier hat die Niederländische Forschungsgesellschaft für Theologie und Religionswissenschaften (NOSTER) zusammen mit der Theologischen Fakultät Tilburg einen Studientag veranstaltet. Zwei Ziele wurden dabei verfolgt: erstens die Situierung der "Reden" in ihrer Entstehungszeit und in der (...) heutigen Zeit sowie zweitens die systematisch-theologische Vertiefung zentraler Themen der "Reden", Schleiermachers Verständnis der Religion in der 2. Rede und seine Christologie in der 5. Rede. Dieser Band enthält die Beiträge zu dieser Tagung und ein Protokoll der spannungsreichen Diskussion, verfasst von Nico Schreurs (Tilburg), das auf viele Forschungsergebnisse und Forschungsdesiderate hinweist. Die Beiträge stammen von Günter Meckenstock, Herausgeber der Kritischen Schleiermacherausgabe und renommierter Kenner der historischen Lage um 1800, Ad Willems, Übersetzer der "Reden" ins Niederländische, Christian Albrecht (Tübingen, jetzt Bochum) und Claus-Dieter Osthövener (Halle an der Saale). Inhalt Die Aufnahme der "Reden" in Schleiermachers Zeitgenossenschaft Günter Meckenstock Zur Aktualität von Schleiermachers "Reden" aus dem Jahre 1799: Ein kontextueller Deutungsversuch Ad Willems Die Ermöglichung von Korrelativität: Religion als "Anschauung und Gefühl" in Schleiermachers zweiter Rede Christian Albrecht Die Christologie der "Reden" Claus-Dieter Osthövener Religion als Ausdruck des gestimmten Gefühls: Schleiermachers. Sicht der religiösen Erfahrung in den "Reden" Wessel Stoker "... etwas ausser und über der Menschheit... " Schleiermachers Religionsbegriff in den "Reden". Postmodernismus avant la lettre? Dick Boer Die Präsenz Spinozas in Schleiermachers "Reden" Rinse Reeling Brouwer Von einer romantischen hin zu einer transzendental-philosophischen Bewusstseinstheorie Jacques Laurent Das Tilburger Symposium über Schleiermachers "Reden" Protokoll der Diskussion Nico Schreurs NAMENREGISTER. (shrink)

Ist der Indeterminismus mit der Relativitatstheorie und ihrer Konzeption der Gegenwart vereinbar? Diese Frage lasst sich beantworten, indem man die fur das alte Problem der futura contingentia entwickelten Ansatze auf Aussagen uber das Raumartige ubertragt. Die dazu hier Schritt fur Schritt aufgebaute relativistische indeterministische Raumzeitlogik ist eine erste philosophische Anwendung der multidimensionalen Modallogiken. Neben den ublichen Zeitoperatoren kommen dabei die Operatoren "uberall" und "irgendwo" sowie "fur jedes Bezugssystem" und "fur manches Bezugssystem" zum Einsatz. Der aus der kombinierten Zeit- und Modallogik (...) bekannte Operator fur die historische Notwendigkeit wird in drei verschiedene Operatoren ausdifferenziert. Sie unterscheiden sich bezuglich des Gebiets, in dem mogliche Raumzeiten inhaltlich koinzidieren mussen, um als Alternativen zueinander gelten zu konnen. Die Interaktion zwischen den verschiedenen Operatoren wird umfassend untersucht. Die Ergebnisse erlauben es erstmals, die Standpunkt-gebundene Notwendigkeit konsequent auf Raumzeitpunkte zu relativieren. Dies lasst auf einen metaphysisch bedeutsamen Unterschied zwischen deiktischer und narrativer Determiniertheit aufmerksam werden. Dieses Buch erganzt das viel diskutierte Paradigma der verzweigten Raumzeit um eine neue These: Der Raum ist eine Erzahlform der Entscheidungen der Natur. (shrink)

Den Bildbegriff verwendet die unterschätzte US-amerikanische Philosophin Susanne Langer argumentativ in allen drei Phasen ihres Denkens, ohne den Begriff bildtheoretisch zu fundieren. Versucht man nun diesen Bildbegriff vergleichend mit semiotischen oder phänomenologischen Bildtheorien zu diskutieren, so erlangt ihre Philosophie des Bildes nur dann die erforderliche Stringenz, wenn man die gegenwärtigen Bildtheorien einer grundlegenden Kritik unterzieht. Mit Langer erscheint u.a. Husserls Bildkonstitutionstheorie in einem neuen, aber ursprünglicheren Licht, wodurch sich eine komplementäre Bildtheorie abzeichnet, in der semiotische und phänomenologische Aspekte konstitutiv sind.

Den Bildbegriff verwendet die unterschätzte US-amerikanische Philosophin Susanne Langer argumentativ in allen drei Phasen ihres Denkens, ohne den Begriff bildtheoretisch zu fundieren. Versucht man nun diesen Bildbegriff vergleichend mit semiotischen oder phänomenologischen Bildtheorien zu diskutieren, so erlangt ihre Philosophie des Bildes nur dann die erforderliche Stringenz, wenn man die gegenwärtigen Bildtheorien einer grundlegenden Kritik unterzieht. Mit Langer erscheint u.a. Husserls Bildkonstitutionstheorie in einem neuen, aber ursprünglicheren Licht, wodurch sich eine komplementäre Bildtheorie abzeichnet, in der semiotische und phänomenologische Aspekte konstitutiv sind.

Nicos Poulantzas Studien sind wichtige Beiträge zum materialistischen Verständnis des Staates. Sie erweisen ihre Bedeutung für die Analyse der Veränderung des Staates unter den Bedingungen der Globalisierung. Im vorliegenden Band wird die Aktualität zahlreicher Aspekte des Staatsverständnisses von Poulantzas für die gegenwärtigen Debatten untersucht.

A thoughtful addition to the growing debate over public and private morality. Looks at lying and deception in law, family, medicine, government.

Why does the world look to us as it does? As Nico Orlandi argues, it is simply because of how the world is. This answer emerges from understanding vision as situated in a structured environment, and it contrasts with the view that visual perception involves an inference.

What are 'emotions'? This book offers a balanced survey of facts and theory.

Shows how the ethical issues raised by secrets and secrecy in our careers or private lives take us to the heart of the critical questions of private and public morality.

There is a certain excitement in vision science concerning the idea of applying the tools of bayesian decision theory to explain our perceptual capacities. Bayesian models are thought to be needed to explain how the inverse problem of perception is solved, and to rescue a certain constructivist and Kantian way of understanding the perceptual process. Anticlimactically, I argue both that bayesian outlooks do not constitute good solutions to the inverse problem, and that they are not constructivist in nature. In explaining (...) how visual systems derive a single percept from underdetermined stimulation, orthodox versions of bayesian accounts encounter a problem. The problem shows that such accounts need to be grounded in Natural Scene Statistics (NSS), an approach that takes seriously the Gibsonian insight that studying perception involves studying the statistical regularities of the environment in which we are situated. Additionally, I argue that bayesian frameworks postulate structures that hardly rescue a constructivist way of understanding perception. Except for percepts, the posits of bayesian theory are not representational in nature. bayesian perceptual inferences are not genuine inferences. They are biased processes that operate over nonrepresentational states. (shrink)

This article attempts to clarify the commitments of a predictive coding approach to perception. After summarizing predictive coding theory, the article addresses two questions. Is a predictive coding perceptual system also a Bayesian system? Is it a Kantian system? The article shows that the answer to these questions is negative.

Film theory and its emphasis on political and ideological readings of films dominated much of cinema studies in the '70s and '80s. Since then, in response to what some view as the shortcomings of theoretical approaches, a variety of other methods have emerged or reemerged. In many ways, as Nico Baumbach argues, "Anti-Grand Theory" has won the day but its victory is, in part, based on misreadings or simplifications of '70s film theory. In particular, Baumbach views contemporary critical approaches (...) to film as abandoning the crucial and productive ways in which theory understands the relationship between cinema, politics, and art. Baumbach does not advocate a return to the orthodoxies of the seventies but rather reads the work of Ranciere, Badiou, and Agamben as providing new ways of thinking about the history of film theory and how film creates its own way of thinking about politics. Moreover, at a time when digital technologies are asking us to think of film and the film image in new ways, the work of these thinkers once again asks, "What is Cinema?" but in a more expansive sense that can help us account for transformations in how moving images are produced, distributed, and exhibited in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Can we reconcile the idea that we are free and responsible agents with the idea that what we do is determined according to natural laws? For centuries, philosophers have tried in different ways to show that we can. Hilary Bok takes a fresh approach here, as she seeks to show that the two ideas are compatible by drawing on the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning.Bok argues that when we engage in practical reasoning--the kind that involves asking "what should I (...) do?" and sifting through alternatives to find the most justifiable course of action--we have reason to hold ourselves responsible for what we do. But when we engage in theoretical reasoning--searching for causal explanations of events--we have no reason to apply concepts like freedom and responsibility. Bok contends that libertarians' arguments against "compatibilist" justifications of moral responsibility fail because they describe human actions only from the standpoint of theoretical reasoning. To establish this claim, she examines which conceptions of freedom of the will and moral responsibility are relevant to practical reasoning and shows that these conceptions are not vulnerable to many objections that libertarians have directed against compatibilists. Bok concludes that the truth or falsity of the claim that we are free and responsible agents in the sense those conceptions spell out is ultimately independent of deterministic accounts of the causes of human actions.Clearly written and powerfully argued, Freedom and Responsibility is a major addition to current debate about some of philosophy's oldest and deepest questions. (shrink)

In Common Values, Sissela Bok asks what moral values, if any, might be capable of being shared across national, ethnic, religious, and other boundaries, under what circumstances, and with what qualifications.

Can we reconcile the idea that we are free and responsible agents with the idea that what we do is determined according to natural laws? For centuries, philosophers have tried in different ways to show that we can. This text seeks to show that the two ideas are compatible by drawing on the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning.