The subject matter of the article is the concept of “the real use of reason” alluded to by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason A299/b355 and in A305/b362. After comparing it with the “real use of understanding” examined in De mundi sensibilis and in the Critique of Pure Reason, the real use of reason is presented as a legitimate and useful performance that should be distinguished from the deceiving illusion induced by an appearance generated by reason itself. The real use (...) of reason proves itself as an unavoidable condition for the regulative use of ideas as well as a condition for the production of a critical metaphysics. (shrink)

Článek nabízí kritickou reflexi způsobů, jimiž se filozofie snaží zajistit a zprostředkovat vědění o sobě samé, svých dějinách a klíčových problémech. Podrobně se věnuje procesům redukce a explikace, které jsou nedílnou součástí tohoto úsilí. S pomocí mnoha konkrétních příkladů ukazuje jejich úskalí a vzájemnou provázanost.

In the present article I attribute to the common topic in the Rhetoric a two-fold suggestive function and a guarantee function. These three functions are possible because this type of topic, while often quite abstract, nevertheless contains thought-steering, substantial terms, and formulates a generally empirical or normative endoxon. Assuming that according to Aristotle an enthymeme has at least two premises, it would appear that a common topic is the abstract principle behind the often implicit major premise. This means that the (...) topic may be regarded as the – generalizing – if-then statement in a modern argumentation scheme. Therefore it should be possible to see the enthymemes of Rhetoric 2.23 as a combination of a logical argument form (which can usually be reconstructed as modus ponens) and an argumentation scheme – even though we may not attribute this idea to Aristotle himself. (shrink)

The concept of the axial age, initially proposed by the philosopher Karl Jaspers to refer to a period in the first millennium BCE that saw the rise of major religious and philosophical figures and ideas throughout Eurasia, has gained an established position in a number of fields, including historical sociology, cultural sociology, and the sociology of religion. We explore whether the notion of an “axial age” has historical and intellectual cogency, or whether the authors who use the label of a (...) more free-floating “axiality” to connote varied “breakthroughs” in human experience may have a more compelling case. Throughout, we draw attention to ways in which uses of the axial age concept in contemporary social science vary in these and other respects. In the conclusion, we reflect on the value of the concept and its current uses and their utility in making sense of human experience. (shrink)

In this article an attempt is made to localize epistemological violence and to unravel and unmask power structures, including points of friction between the migrating individual and the local community. In addition, a new type of subject is presented, which, on the one hand, reveals the power structures inherent in the individual and in the society containing it, and on the other hand, through the extended model of existence, offers opportunities for a coexistence, which would be marked by solidarity and (...) fairness and would occur by way of interpersonal connections. Using examples of power structures in language courses, in universities, and in the loss of cultural values through migration, epistemic violence is tracked and presented not only theoretically, but also factually. (shrink)

Während Nietzsche in der Debatte um Anerkennung bisher vorwiegend in Bezug zur Verkennungslinie interpretiert wird, geht es in dem Beitrag dagegen um die Abgrenzung Nietzsches zu dieser vorwiegend französisch geprägten Verkennungslinie. Dies soll an der sozialen Praktik der Scham als distinktes Beispiel für eine konkrete Situation von Anerkennungsbeziehungen im Lebenszusammenhang gezeigt werden. Für die Verkennungslinie wird exemplarisch Jean Paul-Sartres Verständnis von Scham aus Das Sein und das Nichts als Anerkennungsbeziehung herangezogen. Dazu kontrastierend soll auf Nietzsches Beschreibung des „Scham-Ersparens“ als konkrete (...) Form von Anerkennungsverhältnissen eingegangen werden. Hierbei geht es Nietzsche um eine grundsätzliche Fragilität, durch die das Anerkennungsgeschehen stets in eine Form von Verletzung und Verkennung umzuschlagen droht. Dabei soll gezeigt werden, dass Nietzsche nicht Sartres Weg einschlägt, in dem der Andere sein Gegenüber immer schon durch seinen Blick verdinglicht und dadurch die Freiheit des Anderen verunmöglicht. Wie schwierig die Umsetzung im konkreten Fall bei Nietzsche auch sein mag, so gesteht Nietzsche ihr dennoch grundlegend eine gelingende Möglichkeit im ‚Scham-Ersparen’ zu, oder anders gewendet: Es geht Nietzsche um ein Anerkennen im Angesicht der wechselseitigen Verletzlichkeit. (shrink)

The present discussion contribution argues that O. Müller not only suppresses Goethe’s declared intentions with regard to the latter’s Theory of Colors and ignores his place in what in any case is a different scientific culture than his own or Newton’s, namely a premodern culture of “narrative knowledge” in the sense specified by Lyotard. Moreover, Müller entangles himself in the paradox of wanting on the one hand to back up Goethe on the level of fact when the latter opposes the (...) militant selfrighteousness of the Newtonian school, but doing so on the other hand by constructing an epic-heroic narrative of Newtonian militance, not to say eristic belligerence contradictory to Goethe’s own “tolerant enlightenment” in Lakatos’ sense. Thus, we are confronted with one of those cases where, as Paul de Man puts it, a multidimensional critical reading on the semiological as well as rhetorical levels shows “that the text does not practice what it preaches”. (shrink)

An examination of the history of the development of the philosophical issues in the West indicates that since the Demiurge (Demiourgos) of Plato in_ the Timaeus_ created the sensible world in imitation of the intelligible archetypes, failing at the same time, to overcome some necessities, until the beginning of the seventeenth century and the emergence of the Cartesian anthropocentric conception of reality, the common question most often raised by modern philosophers, in their discussions about the nature of God, man and (...) universes in this: What is Justice? Is God just? Was man created in the best form? Is the existing world, the best among all the possible worlds? The answer to these questions among the Christian thinkers before Leibniz (1646- 1716) was mostly based on the principles of dogmatic theology. Even in the fifteenth century the question as to how God's providence and foreknowledge could be reconciled with the human free choice was the pivot and axis of most philosophical and theological problems. In addition, the progress of natural sciences and the emergence of necessary causal laws in the domain of the various sciences impaired the human freedom of choice.Spinoza and Leibniz, each in his own peculiar way, endeavored to prove that the human free choice is compatible with the causal determinism required. By science. In Leibniz, God wills the most harmonious and compossible worlds. In the present article, prior to Leibniz's rational justifications of the principle of "the best possible World", his conception of the world as based on the principle of the pre-established harmony (in the framework of the monads ), along with some other related issues are analyzed. (shrink)

Obgleich die Ausdrücke ‚moralische Pflicht’ und ‚moralische Verantwortung’ auf den ersten Blick nahezu austauschbar scheinen, ist in einigen Debatten dennoch fast ausschließlich von moralischer Verantwortung die Rede. Dies gilt insbesondere für die moralische Beurteilung von individuellen Handlungen in kollektiven Kontexten. Hier scheint die Rede von einer ‚kollektiven Verantwortung‘ besonders attraktiv zu sein. In diesem Aufsatz setze ich mich diesem Trend entgegen und argumentiere dafür, dem Pflichtbegriff in kollektiven Kontexten gegenüber dem Begriff der Verantwortung den Vorrang zu geben. Mein Fokus liegt (...) hierbei auf einer bestimmten Art von Handlungen in kollektiven Kontexten, nämlich auf Handlungen in sogenannten Aggregatkollektiven. Von Aggregatkollektiven verursachte Schäden sind häufig kumulative Schäden, bei denen die Handlungen der Mitglieder eines Aggregatkollektivs einzeln betrachtet keinen merklichen Unterschied für das Auftreten des Schadens machen. Die Rede von Verantwortung legt ein Haftbarkeitsmodell moralischer Verantwortung nahe, welches sich in Bezug auf Handlungen in Aggregatkollektiven als problematisch erweist. Ich zeige, dass Kants Konzeption unvollkommener Pflichten eine vielversprechende Alternative zu dem kausal gefärbten Begriff der moralischen Verantwortung darstellt. Durch den Spielraum, den unvollkommene Pflichten Akteuren lassen, bieten sie eine ähnliche Offenheit wie der Begriff der moralischen Verantwortung. Anders als die Zuschreibung von Verantwortung vermeidet die Rede von unvollkommenen Pflichten jedoch die in kollektiven Kontexten oft inadäquate und kontraproduktive Assoziation von Haftung und Schuld. (shrink)

In 1597 Francisco Suárez published a comprehensive treatise on beings of reason (entia rationis) as part of his Disputationes metaphysicae. Subsequent scholastic philosophers vigorously debated various aspects of Suárez’s theory. The aim of this paper is to identify some of the most controversial points of these debates, as they developed in the first half of the seventeenth century. In particular, I focus on the intension and the extension of ‘ens rationis’, its division (into negations, privations and relations of reason) and (...) its causes. Additionally, I will discuss how Suárez’s views sparked a number of debates within the classical view, debates which ultimately led to the emergence of various alternative theories, especially among the Jesuits. These non-classical views radically revise the previous classical conception of beings of reason. (shrink)

There is a widespread agreement that Nietzsche has developed a kind of position or doctrine called ‘perspectivism’. Scholars go on and develop metaphysical, semantic, epistemic, and psychobiological interpretations of the supposed Nietzschean perspectivism or even ‘perspectivisms’. They engage in debates about whether this perspectivism is relativistic, realistic, or anti-realistic and what the tenets of perspectivism are. In this paper, I suggest putting an end to this practice. I examine Nietzsche’s explicit mentions of the term ‘perspectivism’, the problems associated with the (...) misunderstanding of this term as a label, attempts to reconstruct perspectivism based on explicit mentions of ‘perspective’ and related vocabulary, and doctrinal assumptions scholars try to connect with this terminology. (shrink)

Die Geschichte Europas wird spätestens seit der Aufklärung dominiert vom „Mythos des Fortschreitens“ (Sting). Fortschreiten bedeutet zunächst in einem formalen Sinne, die Dinge in einer spezifischen Weise wahrzunehmen, d.h. eine bestimmte Interpretation von Veränderungen vorzunehmen, dabei eine spezifische Richtung einzuschlagen, eine spezifische Betonung der Zukunft herauszustellen und letztlich ein spezifisches Ziel in der Zukunft zu realisieren zu suchen, wobei der Fortschritt nicht identisch mit der Erreichung des Ziels ist (Spaemann). Mit der Idee des Fortschritts gelingt eine Sicherung der Unvergeblichkeit jedes (...) Schrittes, wobei er jede seiner Phasen zur bloßen Vorstufe der ihr folgenden herunterstuft (Blumenberg). Mit ihm lässt sich die beste aller Welten noch vervollkommnen, weil das Ziel der Vollendung in die Optimierung integriert wird: Der Fortschritt kennt nur eigene Grenzen bzw. kennt er keine mehr, weil er die Bewegung der Grenzverschiebung ist. Daher kommt er auch nie ans Ziel. Und das gilt nicht nur für Wissenschaft und Technik, sondern auch für die Bildung und den Menschen: Dieser wird zu einem sich stetig selbst überbietenden und optimierbaren Wesen ernannt. Erst die Selbstermächtigung des Menschen als homo faber, eine nicht auf Transzendenz teleologisierte Geschichte und die Depotenzierung Gottes durch den Deismus machen den modernen Fortschritt möglich. Doch mittlerweile droht der Fortschritt „das Ziel zunichte zu machen, das er verwirklichen soll – die Idee des Menschen“ (Horkheimer). (shrink)

The article discusses the concepts of communicative practical philosophy as a component of hermeneutic-linguistic-pragmatic-semiotic turn in philosophy, associated with the transition from the paradigm of subjectivity to the paradigm of intersubjectivity. In particular, the concept of “I” is considered as a factor in the internalization of intersubjectivity, because it is from the very beginning woven into the context of speech practice with the pronoun “I”, which is marked by the reflective “I am I”. The transcendental “I” is the internalization of (...) the transcendental communicative community; the classic concept of “adulthood”, associated with “the courage to be guided by one’s own mind”, is an internal manifestation of communicative competence, which in an internalized form is part of the structure of identity. The mind appears in such definitions as “discourse”, “argumentation”, “consensus”. In turn, discourse differs from other speech practices, such as conversation, talk, debate, dialogue, which also have their own internalizations, forming a complex identity structure. The article deals with the internal “maintenance of discourse” both in the process of substantiation of human knowledge and in the process of justification (legitimation) of the correctness of moral duty. In particular, this is manifested in the formulation of the categorical imperative of moral practice, which is considered in the light of the transition from the monologue dimension to the transcendental-pragmatic one. The article also shows the need to move from a monologue concept of responsibility to a communicative concept of shared responsibility. It is emphasized that such a transition is an urgent need of modern times, a sign of which is the desire to overcome the crisis civilization of “risks and threats” and the formation of a civilization of dialogue based on the argumentative understanding, for which the guiding idea is the “transcendental consensus”. (shrink)

Obwohl in der Forschung es nicht selten ist, Heideggers Gedanken im Lichte des Verhältnisses zwischen Theorie und Praxis zu betrachten, benimmt Heidegger sich selbst gegen diese Dichotomie. Um die Kritik Heideggers an dieser Dichotomie und seine Konzeption der ursprünglichen Einheit zwischen Theorie und Praxis zu verstehen, muss auf Heideggers Lektüre der aristotelischen praktischen Philosophie zurückgeführt werden. Es wird zu zeigen versucht, dass Heideggers Ontologisierung der Praxis darauf abzielt, den vortheoretischen Praxisbegriff, der im Unterschied zur Einheit von Theorie und Poiesis ist, (...) herauszuarbeiten. Die Ontologisierung kommt durch die Methode der formalen Anzeige zustande, die in diesem Sinne im Mittelpunkt Heideggers Philosophie steht. (shrink)

This article examines the notion of the `scientist as a moral person' in the light of the early stages of the commodification of science and the transformation of research into a big enterprise, operating on the principle of the division of labour. These processes were set in train at the end of the 19th century. The article focuses on the concomitant changes in the public persona and the habitus of scientific entrepreneurs. I begin by showing the significance of the professional (...) networks that were built up and maintained to further a group's research ideas and the careers of its members, thus demonstrating one condition on which depended their practice of science and their ability to earn a living. This leads to a characterization of the changing styles of work, thought and life, and to a consideration of public perceptions and of the ways in which a new self-image of scholarship and science was fashioned. A critical discussion of the public role of these mandarin scientists follows in order to highlight the strains created by the commodification of science at a time of international tensions and conflicts, when shared beliefs in scholarly cosmopolitanism were subverted by appeals to science and scholarship to work in the service of one's own nation as its `courtiers'. Various considerations of peculiar analogies between national styles of research and the style of social organization are then noted. In the final section, the article queries the long-term impact of these developments on the ideal of the scientist as a `moral person'. Taking a cue from Max Weber and pursuing reflections by Zygmunt Bauman on `science moralized', I argue that the emergence of a type of `specialists without spirit' was an unintended but fatal consequence of the changes in research practices promoted by scientific entrepreneurs such as Du Bois-Reymond. I conclude that the temptation to sever the ties to a general ethos of civil virtues lay in the rationalization, specialization and potential de-humanization of the objectifying scientific outlook once advocated for its efficiency. (shrink)

It is by now well known that Gödel first advocated the philosophy of Leibniz and then, since 1959, that of Husserl. This raises three questions:1.How is this turn to Husserl to be interpreted? Is it a dismissal of the Leibnizian philosophy, or a different way to achieve similar goals?2.Why did Gödel turn specifically to the later Husserl's transcendental idealism?3.Is there any detectable influence from Husserl on Gödel's writings?Regarding the first question, Wang [96, p.165] reports that Gödel ‘[saw] in Husserl's work (...) a method of refining and consolidating Leibniz' monadology’. But what does this mean? In what for Gödel relevant sense is Husserl's work a refinement and consolidation of Leibniz' monadology?The second question is particularly pressing, given that Gödel was, by his own admission, a realist in mathematics since 1925. Wouldn't the uncompromising realism of the early Husserl's Logical investigations have been a more obvious choice for a Platonist like Gödel?The third question can only be approached when an answer to the second has been given, and we want to suggest that the answer to the first question follows from the answer to the second. We begin, therefore, with a closer look at the actual turn towards phenomenology.Some 30 years before his serious study of Husserl began, Gödel was well aware of the existence of phenomenology. Apart from its likely appearance in the philosophy courses that Gödel took, it reached him from various directions. (shrink)

The last few years have seen increasing research interest in moods and atmospheres. While this trend has been accompanied by growing interest in the history of the wordStimmungin other disciplines, this has not yet been the case within philosophy. Against this background, this paper offers a conceptual history of the wordStimmung, focusing on the period from Kant to Heidegger, as this period is, presumably, less known to researchers working with notions like mood, attunement or atmosphere today. Thus, considering this period (...) might provide conceptual resources not yet considered in current debate.Stimmunghas the remarkable feature of encompassing the entire semantic field of mood and atmosphere, insofar as both subjects and objects can literally be inStimmung.Stimmungmight refer to the state or condition of being attuned, which is understood as a dispositional state, as well as the process or act of attuning, which includes self-activating and foreign-determined forms of attuning. The word was first used for the tuning of musical instruments, but was quickly transferred to the fields of aesthetics, psychology, and physiology. This paper will focus on the contrast between the psychological canonization ofStimmungas a type of mental state, and the use ofStimmungas an untranslatable, irreducible metaphor with unique semantic force allowing for original theorizing. (shrink)

In common-sense usage, violence is usually conceptualized as intentional physical harm. This makes violence identifiable, locatable, and it facilitates the governing of those identified as committing infractions upon the non-violent community. In this article it is illustrated how this conception of violence legitimates the state by blocking the state’s own foundational violence from critical scrutiny. It argues that the liberal state rests on the differentiation between active and reactive violence, whereby the latter is seen as the legitimate violence of the (...) people against violent infractions committed by private individuals. The concept of a ‘regime of violence’ describes the relation between various forms of violence, i.e. their selective and differential articulation and negation. Regimes of violence constitute a way of governing conduct in the medium of violence. The current regime of violence consists of what is called a trias violentiae, which is a specific conception of the relations and translations between private violence, state violence and structural violence. (shrink)

Grammar as a discipline devoted to the study of language was greatly advanced by the Alexandrian philologists, and especially by Aristarchus, as demonstrated by Stephanos Matthaios. In order to edit Homer and other literary authors, whose texts were often written in archaic Greek and presented many linguistic problems, the Alexandrians had to recognize linguistic grammatical categories and declensional patterns. In particular, to determine the correct orthography or accentuation of debated morphological forms they often employed analogy, which is generally defined as (...) the doctrine that grammatical forms must follow strict rules of declension. Modern scholars have often opposed the Alexandrian doctrine of analogy to the Pergamene doctrine of ‘anomaly’, which favoured spoken usage to determine debated forms. Detlev Fehling and David Blank, however, have shown that this strong opposition never really existed and it is mostly due to Varro. More correctly, ancient grammarians identified inflectional rules as well as forms derived from spoken usage or otherwise aberrant forms—however, respect for spoken usage in the latter case was not labelled ‘anomaly’, which was never a technical term of ancient grammar. Rather, and especially in the Roman period, grammarians used the term ‘pathology’ to account for and explain irregular forms. (shrink)

In this article we pose three questions: 1) What are the questions that gave rise to the introduction of the concept and subdiscipline of meta-ethics? 2) What characterises the view of meta-ethics as a subdiscipline of moral philosophy? And 3) is it in fact possible to uphold a systematic distinction between normative moral philosophy and meta-ethics in a way that allows us to see these two aspects of moral philosophy as independent subdisciplines? In trying to answer these questions, we trace (...) two different roads in the shaping of the current understanding of meta-ethics: the introduction of the word in analytical moral philosophy and the characterisation of meta-ethics in the formative period of meta-ethics and in contemporary introductions. Among the characteristics ascribed to meta-ethics, we identify a special focus on normative neutrality, and we furthermore show that this idea of neutrality as the defining characteristic of meta-ethics cannot be upheld. Our aim is to show that meta-ethics cannot be characterised or construed in a way that is normatively neutral and independent of other work done in normative ethics. We therefore challenge the claim that meta-ethics makes up a subdiscipline that is independent of other work done in moral philosophy. Instead, we suggest a reflective view of the relationship between meta-ethics and normative ethics, according to which we should acknowledge that meta-ethics is inherently normative, and that meta-ethical questions are interwoven with normative questions in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Christian Thomasius claims for himself the label of ‘eclectic philosopher.’ This claim first regards the emancipation of reason from any other authority, which not only allows him to claim new juridical rights but also to determine philosophy as awisdom-for-the-world. This claim is, however, narrowed by both the limits of scholastic knowledge and the undue generalizations Thomasius finds in it. The claim is intended to make room for belief, and for a faith purified of all philosophical-theological confusion, i.e., for awisdom-outside-the-world.Despite being (...) an anti-dogmatist and anti-syncretist, Thomasius’ eclectic claim never proved to be—contrary to a common statement—anti-systematic nor anti-religious. (shrink)

In contrast to Christian theology that has ignored science, this essay suggests that a credible doctrine of God as creator must take into account scientific understandings of the world. The introduction of the principle of inertia into seventeenth‐century science and philosophy helped change the traditional idea of God as creator (which included divine conservation and governance) into a deist concept of God. To recapture the idea that God continually creates, it is important to affirm the contingency of the world as (...) a whole and of all events in the world. Reflecting on the interrelationship of contingency and natural law provides a framework for relating scientific theories of a universal field, the concept of emergent evolution, and the theological concept of eternal divine spirit active in all creation. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that a genius's creation consists of a special unity of free human activity and nature, whereby ‘nature’ signifies not just another aspect of, but rather something that transcends, creative subjectivity. This interpretation of a genius's creative process throws a new light on a special normative status of a genius's rule, i.e. its originality and exemplarity. With respect to the former, I demonstrate that because the organizing principle of the works of genius remains inscrutable to our (...) limited human understanding, a work of genius appears to the observer's limited cognitive capacities as undetermined and, hence, as contingent and original. With respect to the latter, I show how a genius must evolve within the context of her own tradition and how this ‘humbleness’ of a genius still allows for a multiplicity of co-existent schools or genres with their own distinct standards of excellence. -/- http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1369415411000343. (shrink)

A Constructivist Foundation of the Objects of Scientific Empirical Theories. The following considerations are guided by the assumption that the objects of any scientific empirical theory are constructs as well as the theories themselves, the construction of these object-constructs being fundamentally dependent on the theories' functioning in the provision of practically relevant empirical explanations. The relevance of these explanations consists in their contribution to the improvement of at least one practical capacity through enabling the invention of at least one improving (...) kind of practical actions. In an excursus on the origination and the development of the notion of theory within human history the view is held, in contrast to Aristotle, that theorization has always aimed at practical relevance, however in a broader sense of "practical" than that in which Aristotle uses the term "πρακτικός", and that only the practical functions of theory-construction have changed over the times, and their object-constructs correspondingly. The latest form of theory with the above-mentioned function in the development of social practice is the scientific explanatory empirical theory with the descriptive empirical theory now no longer fulfilling a practical function of its own, but only a service-function of data acquisition for the explanatory theory. The object-constructs of strictly scientific empirical theories in the sense of explanatory theories for the improvement of practical capacities are here considered to be empirical quasi-actions, those of the dependent descriptive empirical theories either quasi-instruments or quasi-products or quasi-materials of the respective kind of quasi-actions of the explanatory theory. The empirical quasi-action is here conceived as the latest in a sequence of developing object-constructs that have resulted from different and successively more effective attempts at better survival of human beings and even from prehuman stages of evolution. The author envisages a differentiation of empirical quasi-actions into further sub-categories to provide the conceptual bases for the construction of objects of new kinds of scientific explanatory empirical theories that might become practically relevant for the improvement of new kinds of practical capacities to be preferably improved for the advancement of social practice: Beside the already relevant category of empirical processes (as I named it) are here proposed the further categories of empirical originations of meaning and of empirical originations of practical actions as conceptual bases for object-constructs of future scientific empirical theories. (shrink)

This article examines the ideal of Bildung within the philosophy of nature and the natural sciences by investigating the methodological and scientific writings of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. It arg...

: Few texts summarize and at the same time compound the challenges of their author's philosophy so sharply as Hermann Cohen's Das Prinzip der Infinitesimalmethode und seine Geschichte (1883). The book's meaning and style are greatly illuminated by placing it in the scientific, political, and academic context of late-nineteenth century Germany. As this context changed, so did both the reception of the philosophy of the infinitesimal and of the Marburg school more generally. A study of this transformation casts significant light (...) on the political relevance of the philosophy of science in theWilhelmine era. As a means of following this development across time, Cohen's text is read through its changing reception in the philosophy of his closest disciple, Ernst Cassirer. (shrink)

The ArgumentBiology, understood in turn-of-the-century Germany to include psychology, held a central but enigmatic place in the philosopher Ernst Cassirer's work. From his earliest studies with Hermann Cohen through his long engagement with the theoretical biology of Jakob von Uexküll and Adolf Meyer-Abich, Cassirer consistently used the history and practice of biology to examine and delineate a set of characteristic tensions between the natural and cultural sciences. This paper examines Cassirer's treatment of this theme by addressing two contrasting interpretations he (...) gave — in hisPhilosophy of Symbolic Forms and in hisEssay on Man — to the benchmark case from empirical psychology of the “talking” horse “Clever Hans.” The original case involved the horse's ability to signal answers to remarkably complex questions by stamping its hooves, an ability that ultimately appeared to rest on a capacity to detect extremely minute unintentional movement cues in its auditors as it reached the appropriate answer. Due to both Cassirer's shifting description of the case within his philosophy and the case's inherent polyvalence, Cassirer's remarks provide a useful window onto the social, epistemological, and stylistic meaning of his “unified” philosophy of human culture and science. (shrink)

Throughout his career, Husserl identifies naturalism as the greatest threat to both the sciences and philosophy. In this paper, I explicate Husserl’s overall diagnosis and critique of naturalism and then examine the specific transcendental aspect of his critique. Husserl agreed with the Neo-Kantians in rejecting naturalism. He has three major critiques of naturalism: First, it (like psychologism and for the same reasons) is ‘countersensical’ in that it denies the very ideal laws that it needs for its own justification. Second, naturalism (...) essentially misconstrues consciousness by treating it as a part of the world. Third, naturalism is the inevitable consequence of a certain rigidification of the ‘natural attitude’ into what Husserl calls the ‘naturalistic attitude’. This naturalistic attitude ‘reifies’ and it ‘absolutizes’ the world such that it is treated as taken-for-granted and ‘obvious’. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological analysis, however, discloses that the natural attitude is, despite its omnipresence in everyday life, not primary, but in fact is relative to the ‘absolute’ transcendental attitude. The mature Husserl’s critique of naturalism is therefore based on his acceptance of the absolute priority of the transcendental attitude . The paradox remains that we must start from and, in a sense, return to the natural attitude, while, at the same time, restricting this attitude through the on-going transcendental vigilance of the universal epoché. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s favourable comments about science and the senses have recently been taken as evidence of naturalism. Others focus on his falsification thesis: our beliefs are falsifying interpretations of reality. Clark argues that Nietzsche eventually rejects this thesis. This article utilizes the multiple ways of being science friendly in Nietzsche’s context by focussing on Mach’s neutral monism. Mach’s positivism is a natural development of neo-Kantian positions Nietzsche was reacting to. Section 15 of Beyond Good and Evil is crucial to Clark’s interpretation. (...) The presented interpretation makes better sense of this passage and shows that Nietzsche can accept both falsification and empiricism. (shrink)

The position of intellectuals in democracies is intrinsically problematic. They have to claim that what they say and do is true and reasonable. But within the democratic process their opinions have the same status as those of any other citizen. However, they can find a legitimate way to influence political decision-making as experts and interpreters of cultural contexts. Therefore, they have an important responsibility in defending open debate and open societies.

Adorno considera que el injusto dolor físico e individual producido por el sistema de dominio ha sido ocultado y silenciado por la filosofía de la identidad hegeliana, por una parte, y por la industria cultural, por otra. Al contrario, Adorno cree que es necesario darle voz, porque esa conciencia, como resistencia que es, es la única esperanza utópica de salvación que tiene la humanidad. Esto es politizar el dolor. Hacerlo es la tarea que asigna al arte auténtico y a la (...) dialéctica negativa. (shrink)

: This paper investigates the way in which Rudolf Carnap drew on Gestalt psychological notions when defining the basic elements of his constitutional system. I argue that while Carnap's conceptualization of basic experience was compatible with ideas articulated by members of the Berlin/Frankfurt school of Gestalt psychology, his formal analysis of the relationship between two basic experiences ("recollection of similarity") was not. This is consistent, given that Carnap's aim was to provide a unified reconstruction of scientific knowledge, as opposed to (...) the mental processes by which we gain knowledge about the world. It is this last point that put him in marked contrast to some of the older epistemological literature, which he cited when pointing to the complex character of basic experience. While this literature had the explicit goal of overcoming metaphysical presuppositions by means of an analysis of consciousness, Carnap viewed these attempts as still carrying metaphysical baggage. By choosing the autopsychological basis, he expressed his intellectual depth to their antimetaphysical impetus. By insisting on the metaphysical neutrality of his system, he emphasized that he was carrying out a project in which they had not succeeded. (shrink)

Terms for consciousness, used with a cognitive meaning, emerged as count nouns in the 17th century. This transformation repeats an evolution that had taken place in late antiquity, when related vocabulary, used in the sense of conscience, went from being mass nouns designating states to count nouns designating faculties possessed by every individual. The reified concept of consciousness resulted from the rejection of the Scholastic-Aristotelian theory of mind according to which the mind is not a countable thing, but a pure (...) potentiality. This rejection was motivated by an acute sense of the mind’s fallible subjectivity. While conditioned by recent historical events, the 17th century’s pervasive sense of subjectivity also reveals a heavy debt to Hellenistic philosophy, which had been recently rediscovered. But whereas Hellenistic thought, mistrustful of theoria, only reifies conscience, early modern thinking, more mistrustful of praxis and seeking its grounding in theoria, goes a step further and reifies consciousness. Partly modeled on theological ideas, the resulting concept of consciousness is plagued by paradoxes that have becomes notorious for their intractability. But essentially the same model of consciousness underwrites contemporary theory, embroiling contemporary debates in the same controversies that dominated the 17th century. Sidestepping these difficulties by returning to the Scholastic-Aristotelian theory of mind would be a tall order, but it is not impossible. Alfred North Whitehead's theory of consciousness offers an example. His novel theory of time enables Whitehead to rehabilitate the Aristotelian concept of passive mind in a wholly naturalistic way. (shrink)

This thesis wrestles with the normativity of language, its usage and its practices while questioning the signifié-signifiant reality. A structural reading of language designs its translational practices within the source-target framework, thereby essentialising its relationship en passant: everything has meaning as long as we accept the hidden framework of a universal language. Therefore, language outlined as a system of signs is a product of transcendental considerations and consequently it renders practice into a hermeticrealm in which the distinction between eidos and (...) eidolon, right and wrong, familiar and unfamiliar, grammar and gibberish makes perfect sense and in which the translation from A to B is simply a matter of transferring identities. Linguistic power neutralises through its transcendental conditioning ephemera in life and world. We will discover that a phenomenological reading of language is open to layers which questions the dialectic setting of linguistic knowledge production. Phenomenology proposes to study life-world relationships by reducing the power of dialectical denomination to the power of gazing or to the lenses of ambiguity. Theorising language and translational practices within the phenomenological realm follows the concept of being oriented towards body-life-world while laying bare the phenomenon language. This revealing method supersedes empirical considerations since phenomenological methodology questions permanently our very own positioning. Hence, the transfer from A to B will be challenged by possibilities which are temporary: it is about a transfer zone featuring A as A’ to B or A’ in B / C. However, the phenomenological possibility reveals that the price for ephemera is tamed by the condition of its possibilities: indeed, the aporia of linguistic identity in polyvalence requires not only phenomenological brackets but also a transcendental backup. Chapter I and II study the translational practice of language and phenomenology by explaining its analysis via dynamised transcendental conditions. The disillusion of the phenomenological inquiry will be yield by radicalising phenomenological reading of language towards a phenomenographical practice of language. Chapter III goes to the extremes in exposing a language without content. The introduction of the trickster figure Narcissistgrotesque Face will be the anti-metaphor in which the grotesque line up forces us to learn bearing A with B and in which the non-content materiality of linguistic practices resemble le bas matérialisme. Not explanation, understanding and rendering things plausible is the movens for language but it is all about the spur of its enactment, its style and its story telling that renders translational practice visible. Chapter III is a performative practice in which we turn the text into texture. Translation happens then when your are perplex and the translational void enacts you and me. (shrink)