Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):681-698 (2011)
|Abstract||In this study, we investigated the relationships between judgments of intentionality and moral evaluation in individuals with High Functioning Autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS). HFA or AS are neurodevelopmental disorders characterised by severe deficits in communication and social functioning. Impairments in Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and to others, are thought to be the core features of autism. Of all mental states, the concept of ‘intentional action’ is particularly important. People normally distinguish between actions that are performed intentionally and those that are performed unintentionally and this distinction plays a crucial role in social understanding and moral judgment. Recently, Knobe (Analysis 63: 190–193, 2003a ), (Philosophical Psychology 16: 309–324, 2003b ) showed that people’s moral evaluations might serve as input to the process by which people intuitively arrive at the intentionality judgments. Here, by using two pairs of vignettes, the Knobe’s Harm/Help cases and Murder/Bull’s-eye cases, we showed that, as already observed in typical population, in individuals with HFA/AS judgment of intentional action is informed by the moral appreciation of the action outcome. However, the two groups differed on praise judgments and moral justifications, suggesting that these processes were poorly influenced by the agent’s psychological states. We concluded that, although under certain circumstances, individuals with HFA/AS and people with typical development have similar intuitive judgments of intentionality, over-assignment of praise judgments and the reduced use of folk-psychological concepts in moral judgment likely reflect difficulties using intentionality information for moral reasoning|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Tiziana Zalla, Luca Barlassina, Marine Buon & Marion Leboyer (2011). Moral Judgment in Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders. Cognition 121 (1):115-126.
Steve Guglielmo & Bertram Malle (2010). Enough Skill to Kill: Intentionality Judgments and the Moral Valence of Action. Cognition 117:139-150.
Sandra Pellizzoni, Vittorio Girotto & Luca Surian (2010). Beliefs and Moral Valence Affect Intentionality Attributions: The Case of Side Effects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):201-209.
Bertram F. Malle (2006). Intentionality, Morality, and Their Relationship in Human Judgment. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:61-86.
Steve Guglielmo & Bertram F. Malle (2010). Can Unintended Side Effects Be Intentional? Resolving a Controversy Over Intentionality and Morality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36:1635-1647.
Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle (2009). At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology. Inquiry 52 (5):449-466.
Steven Sverdlik (2004). Intentionality and Moral Judgments in Commonsense Thought About Action. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):224-236.
Joshua Knobe (2008). Folk Psychology: Science and Morals. In Daniel Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Reassessed. Springer Press.
Jennifer Nado (2008). Effects of Moral Cognition on Judgments of Intentionality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):709-731.
Fiery Cushman (2008). Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
Florian Cova & Hichem Naar (2012). Side-Effect Effect Without Side Effects: The Pervasive Impact of Moral Considerations on Judgments of Intentionality. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):837-854.
Kate Falkenstien (forthcoming). Explaining the Effect of Morality on Intentionality: The Role of Underlying Questions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Joshua Knobe & Ben Fraser (2008). Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment: Two Experiments. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology. MIT Press.
Kate Falkenstien (2013). Explaining the Effect of Morality on Intentionality of Lucky Actions: The Role of Underlying Questions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):293-308.
Alessandro Lanteri (2009). Judgements of Intentionality and Moral Worth: Experimental Challenges to Hindriks. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):713-720.
Added to index2011-03-27
Total downloads32 ( #43,414 of 722,916 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,916 )
How can I increase my downloads?