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Profile: Hichem Naar (Université de Montréal)
  1. Hichem Naar (2015). Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love. Ratio 29 (1):n/a-n/a.
    Can love be an appropriate response to a person? In this paper, I argue that it can. First, I discuss the reasons why we might think this question should be answered in the negative. This will help us clarify the question itself. Then I argue that, even though extant accounts of reasons for love are inadequate, there remains the suspicion that there must be something about people which make our love for them appropriate. Being lovable, I contend, is what makes (...)
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    Hichem Naar (2016). Real‐World Love Drugs: Reply to Nyholm. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (2):197-201.
    In a recent article, Sven Nyholm argues that the use of biomedical enhancements in our romantic relationships would fail to secure the final value we attribute to love. On Nyholm's view, one thing we desire for its own sake is to be at the origin of the love others have for us. The satisfaction of this desire, he argues, is incompatible with the use of BE insofar as they are responsible for the attachment characteristic of love. In particular, the use (...)
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  3. Florian Cova & Hichem Naar (2012). Side-Effect Effect Without Side Effects: The Pervasive Impact of Moral Considerations on Judgments of Intentionality. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):837-854.
    Studying the folk concept of intentional action, Knobe (2003a) discovered a puzzling asymmetry: most people consider some bad side effects as intentional while they consider some good side effects as unintentional. In this study, we extend these findings with new experiments. The first experiment shows that the very same effect can be found in ascriptions of intentionality in the case of means for action. The second and third experiments show that means are nevertheless generally judged more intentional than side effects, (...)
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  4.  44
    Hichem Naar (2015). Review: On Romantic Love, Berit Brogaard. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 9.
  5. Florian Cova & Hichem Naar (2012). Testing Sripada's Deep Self Model. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):647 - 659.
    Sripada has recently advanced a new account for asymmetries that have been uncovered in folk judgments of intentionality: the ?Deep Self model,? according to which an action is more likely to be judged as intentional if it matches the agent's central and stable attitudes and values (i.e., the agent's Deep Self). In this paper, we present new experiments that challenge this model in two ways: first, we show that the Deep Self model makes predictions that are falsified, then we present (...)
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  6. Hichem Naar (2013). A Dispositional Theory of Love. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):342-357.
    On a naive reading of the major accounts of love, love is a kind of mental event. A recent trend in the philosophical literature on love is to reject these accounts on the basis that they do not do justice to the historical dimension of love, as love essentially involves a distinctive kind of temporally extended pattern. Although the historicist account has advantages over the positions that it opposes, its appeal to the notion of a pattern is problematic. I will (...)
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  7.  41
    François Jaquet & Hichem Naar (2016). Moral Beliefs for the Error Theorist? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19:193-207.
    The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by this view. Until recently, this question had received two main answers. The abolitionist proposed that we should get rid of moral thought altogether. The fictionalist, though he agreed we should eliminate moral beliefs, enjoined us to (...)
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  8.  4
    Hichem Naar (2016). Le caractère personnel des émotions. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141 (2):197-214.
    Cet article explore la viabilité de la conjonction de trois thèses : (1) qu’il existe des valeurs objectives ; (2) que certaines émotions ont pour fonction de les représenter ; (3) que de telles émotions représentent ces valeurs de manière fiable. Nous cherchons plus particulièrement à réconcilier la troisième thèse avec l’observation que les émotions ont un aspect subjectif ou personnel qu’il n’est pas possible d’éliminer. -/- This article explores the viability of the conjunction of three claims: (1) that there (...)
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  9.  58
    Hichem Naar (2013). Art and Emotion. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A survey of some of the major issues surrounding our emotional responses to artworks. Topics discussed include the paradox of fiction, the paradox of tragedy, and the nature of emotion in response to music.
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  10.  10
    Hichem Naar, A Defence of Sentiments: Emotions, Dispositions, and Character.
    Contemporary emotion research typically takes the phenomenon of emotion to be exhausted by a class of mental events that are intentional, conscious, and related to certain sorts of behaviour. Moreover, other affective phenomena, such as moods, are also considered to be relatively short-term, episodic, or occurrent states of the subject undergoing them. Emotions, and other putative emotional phenomena that common-sense takes as long-lasting, non-episodic, or dispositional are things that both philosophers and scientists sometimes recognise, but that are relatively neglected in (...)
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  11.  39
    Hichem Naar (2011). Review: The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Daniel Haybron. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):307 - 310.
  12. Hichem Naar (2009). The Good Life as Conceptual Art. Asage 2:17-23.
    If we take conceptual art seriously, that is, if we consider that art does not have clear-cut boundaries and that it is not limited to the production of aesthetic objects, then a whole spectrum of possible artworks is open to us. Not only can random objects be conceived as artistic, but cognitive states and behaviors can also be meaningfully conceived as pieces of art by their producer and by any sensitive observer. If one is to take one’s life as a (...)
     
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  13.  15
    Hichem Naar (2011). Review: Emotional Truth, Ronald de Sousa. [REVIEW] Metapsychology Online Reviews.
    Emotional Truth is de Sousa's second book on emotion. The Rationality of Emotion (1987) is to be counted among the classics in the now thriving field of the philosophy of emotion. Emotional Truth is a natural sequel; it not only expands on some of the ideas presented in de Sousa's older book, but presents new highly stimulating and often intriguing ideas as well. De Sousa's writing, although at times a bit hard to follow and unnecessarily technical, is insightful, witty and (...)
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  14.  8
    Hichem Naar (2011). Le Nativisme Moral. In Masala & Ravat (ed.), La morale humaine et les sciences. Editions Matériologiques
    Dans cet essai, je me concentre sur le débat entre nativistes et empiristes au sujet des origines de la morale : la morale serait-elle innée, là depuis la naissance, ou serait-elle un produit de la culture, acquise par le biais d’un conditionnement social ? Nous verrons que cette question soulève d’importants problèmes conceptuels, notamment celui de savoir ce que l’on entend ici par ‘morale’. Des considérations méthodologiques seront également soulevées : quels types de données peuvent montrer que le nativisme (ou (...)
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  15.  3
    Hichem Naar (2012). The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):307-310.
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  16. Hichem Naar & Fabrice Teroni (eds.) (forthcoming). The Ontology of Emotion. Cambridge University Press.
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