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Summary The psychology of ethics concerns what psychology can tell us about ethics. Many issues in moral philosophy turn on empirical assumptions about the mind. Questions include: Do experiments on human behavior cast doubt on the existence of global character traits (apparently posted by virtue ethicists)? Are we all ultimately egoistic? Are moral intuitions good heuristics or unreliable biases? Do some moral judgments (e.g. deontological ones) turn on moral differences that are clearly morally irrelevant? What are the role of reason versus emotion in moral judgment and motivation? Is the Humean tradition right that reason is a slave to the passions? Is there a necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation? How do moral capacities develop and are any innate? Some of these questions are directly informed by other sciences (e.g. neuroscience); thus there is some overlap (e.g. with the neuroscience of ethics).   
Key works On character and altruism: Doris 2002Batson 2011. On moral judgment: Greene 2008; Haidt 2001; Nichols 2004; Prinz 2007; Mikhail 2011. On moral motivation: Kennett 2002; Roskies 2003. On moral development: Kohlberg 1981; Bloom 2013; Joyce 2006.
Introductions Key introductions include: Doris & Stich 2008, May 2012, and Doris 2010. A brief introduction to some topics in moral psychology is in Slote 1998. Rosati's (2006) entry introduces one cluster of key issues in moral motivation. 
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  1. Linda Abarbanell & Marc D. Hauser (2010). Mayan Morality: An Exploration of Permissible Harms. Cognition 115 (2):207-224.
    Anthropologists have provided rich field descriptions of the norms and conventions governing behavior and interactions in small-scale societies. Here, we add a further dimension to this work by presenting hypothetical moral dilemmas involving harm, to a small-scale, agrarian Mayan population, with the specific goal of exploring the hypothesis that certain moral principles apply universally. We presented Mayan participants with moral dilemmas translated into their native language, Tseltal. Paralleling several studies carried out with educated subjects living in large-scale, developed nations, the (...)
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  2. Mark Alfano (2013). Character as Moral Fiction. Cambridge University Press.
    Everyone wants to be virtuous, but recent psychological investigations suggest that this may not be possible. Mark Alfano challenges this theory and asks, not whether character is empirically adequate, but what characters human beings could have and develop. Although psychology suggests that most people do not have robust character traits such as courage, honesty and open-mindedness, Alfano argues that we have reason to attribute these virtues to people because such attributions function as self-fulfilling prophecies – children become more studious if (...)
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  3. Marcus Arvan (2013). “A Lot More Bad News for Conservatives, and a Little Bit of Bad News for Liberals? Moral Judgments and the Dark Triad Personality Traits: A Follow-Up Study”. Neuroethics 6 (1):51-64.
    In a recent study appearing in Neuroethics, I reported observing 11 significant correlations between the “Dark Triad” personality traits – Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy – and “conservative” judgments on a 17-item Moral Intuition Survey. Surprisingly, I observed no significant correlations between the Dark Triad and “liberal” judgments. In order to determine whether these results were an artifact of the particular issues I selected, I ran a follow-up study testing the Dark Triad against conservative and liberal judgments on 15 additional moral (...)
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  4. Susan Babbitt (2001). Book Review: Jerilyn Fisher and Ellen S. Silber. Analyzing the Different Voice: Feminist Psychological Theory and Literary Texts. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998. [REVIEW] Hypatia 16 (1):91-94.
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  5. Peter Brian Barry (2012). Evil and Moral Psychology. Routledge.
    Preliminary matters -- Appendix to chapter 1: evil and experimental philosophy -- Taxonomies of wickedness -- The structure of evil character -- The content of evil character -- Appendix to chapter 4: evil and social psychology -- Evil and moral responsibility -- Evil and abnormal psychology -- Evil and capital punishment.
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  6. Selim Berker (2009). The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience. Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):293-329.
    It has been claimed that the recent wave of neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about cases. In this paper I demur. I argue that such attempts to extract normative conclusions from neuroscientific research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, (...)
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  7. Paul Bloom (2013). Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil. Crown.
    A leading cognitive scientist argues that a deep sense of good and evil is bred in the bone. From John Locke to Sigmund Freud, philosophers and psychologists have long believed that we begin life as blank moral slates. Many of us take for granted that babies are born selfish and that it is the role of society—and especially parents—to transform them from little sociopaths into civilized beings. In Just Babies, Paul Bloom argues that humans are in fact hardwired with a (...)
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  8. Emmanuel Chemla, Paul Egré & Philippe Schlenker (2015). Predicting Moral Judgments From Causal Judgments. Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):21-48.
    Several factors have been put forward to explain the variability of moral judgments for superficially analogous moral dilemmas, in particular in the paradigm of trolley cases. In this paper we elaborate on Mikhail's view that (i) causal analysis is at the core of moral judgments and that (ii) causal judgments can be quantified by linguistic methods. According to this model, our moral judgments depend both on utilitarian considerations (whether positive effects outweigh negative effects) and on a representation of the causal (...)
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  9. Michelle Ciurria (2014). The Case of Jojo and Our Pretheoretical Intuitions: An Externalist Interpretation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):265-276.
    In their contribution to the Review of philosophy and psychology (19 March 2010), David Faraci and David Shoemaker object to Susan Wolf’s sane deep self view of moral responsibility, which is supposed to accord with our pretheoretical intuitions about deprived childhood victims better than the plain deep-self view. Wolf’s account hinges on the intuitiveness of a particular example, which asks us to consider JoJo, the son of an evil dictator of a small, undeveloped country who grows up to adopt his (...)
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  10. Andy Clark (2000). Word and Action: Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (sup1):267-289.
    Recent work in cognitive science highlights the importance of exem- plar-based know-how in supporting human expertise. Influenced by this model, certain accounts of moral knowledge now stress exemplar- based, non-sentential know-how at the expense of rule-and-principle based accounts. I shall argue, however, that moral thought and reason cannot be understood by reference to either of these roles alone. Moral cognition – like other forms of ‘advanced’ cognition – depends crucially on the subtle interplay and interaction of multiple factors and forces (...)
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  11. Patrick Clipsham (2014). Does Empirical Moral Psychology Rest on a Mistake? Philosophical Studies 170 (2):215-233.
    Many philosophers assume that philosophical theories about the psychological nature of moral judgment can be confirmed or disconfirmed by the kind of evidence gathered by natural and social scientists (especially experimental psychologists and neuroscientists). I argue that this assumption is mistaken. For the most part, empirical evidence can do no work in these philosophical debates, as the metaphorical heavy-lifting is done by the pre-experimental assumptions that make it possible to apply empirical data to these philosophical debates. For the purpose of (...)
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  12. Adam B. Cohen & Paul Rozin (2001). Religion and the Morality of Mentality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (4):697-710.
    Christian doctrine considers mental states important in judging a person's moral status, whereas Jewish doctrine considers them less important. The authors provide evidence from 4 studies that American Jews and Protestants differ in the moral import they attribute to mental states (honoring one's parents, thinking about having a sexual affair, and thinking about harming an animal). Although Protestants and Jews rated the moral status of the actions equally. Protestants rated a target person with inappropriate mental states more negatively than did (...)
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  13. Florian Cova, Maxime Bertoux, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Bruno Dubois (2012). Judgments About Moral Responsibility and Determinism in Patients with Behavioural Variant of Frontotemporal Dementia: Still Compatibilists. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):851-864.
    Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a ‘performance error model’ according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, we (...)
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  14. Adam M. Croom (2014). Vindicating Virtue: A Critical Analysis of the Situationist Challenge Against Aristotelian Moral Psychology. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science 48:18-47.
    This article provides a critical analysis of the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology. It first outlines the details and results from 4 paradigmatic studies in psychology that situationists have heavily drawn upon in their critique of the Aristotelian conception of virtuous characteristics, including studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Darley and Batson (1973), Isen and Levin (1972), and Milgram (1963). It then presents 10 problems with the way situationists have used these studies to challenge Aristotelian moral psychology. After (...)
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  15. Felipe De Brigard & William Brady (2013). The Effect of What We Think May Happen on Our Judgments of Responsibility. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):259-269.
    Recent evidence suggests that if a deterministic description of the events leading up to a morally questionable action is couched in mechanistic, reductionistic, concrete and/or emotionally salient terms, people are more inclined toward compatibilism than when those descriptions use non-mechanistic, non-reductionistic, abstract and/or emotionally neutral terms. To explain these results, it has been suggested that descriptions of the first kind are processed by a concrete cognitive system, while those of the second kind are processed by an abstract cognitive system. The (...)
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  16. Dan Demetriou (forthcoming). Fighting Fair: The Ecology of Honor in Humans and Animals. In Jonathan Crane (ed.), Beastly Morality. Columbia University Press.
    This essay distinguishes between honor-typical and authoritarian behavior in humans and animals. Whereas authoritarianism concerns hierarchies coordinated by control and obedience, honor concerns rankings of prestige determined by fair contests. Honor-typical behavior is identifiable in non-human species, and is to be expected in polygynous species with non-resource-based mating systems. This picture lends further support to an increasingly popular psychological theory that sees morality as constituted by a variety of moral systems. If moral cognition is pluralistic in this way, then the (...)
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  17. Dan Demetriou (2014). What Should Realists Say About Honor Cultures? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):893-911.
    Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s (1996) influential account of “cultures of honor” speculates that honor norms are a socially-adaptive deterrence strategy. This theory has been appealed to by multiple empirically-minded philosophers, and plays an important role in John Doris and Alexandra Plakias’ (2008) antirealist argument from disagreement. In this essay, I raise four objections to the Nisbett-Cohen deterrence thesis, and offer another theory of honor in its place that sees honor as an agonistic normative system regulating prestige competitions. Since my (...)
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  18. Dan Demetriou (2013). There’s Some Fetish in Your Ethics: A Limited Defense of Purity Reasoning in Moral Discourse. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:377-404.
    Call the ethos understanding rightness in terms of spiritual purity and piety, and wrongness in terms of corruption and sacrilege, the “fetish ethic.” Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues suggest that this ethos is particularly salient to political conservatives and non-liberal cultures around the globe. In this essay, I point to numerous examples of moral fetishism in mainstream academic ethics. Once we see how deeply “infected” our ethical reasoning is by fetishistic intuitions, we can respond by 1) repudiating the fetishistic impulse, (...)
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  19. Brendan Dill & Stephen Darwall (2014). Moral Psychology as Accountability. In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson (ed.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Oxford University Press. 40-83.
    Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal accountability in the analysis of moral concepts such as moral right and wrong, moral obligation and duty, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b). Extending this framework to the field of moral psychology, we hypothesize that our moral attitudes, emotions, and motives are also best understood as based in accountability. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, we argue that the implicit aim of the central (...)
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  20. Karl Duncker (1939). Ethical Relativity? (An Enquiry Into the Psychology of Ethics.). Mind 48 (189):39-57.
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  21. Susan Dwyer, Bryce Huebner & Marc D. Hauser (2010). The Linguistic Analogy: Motivations, Results, and Speculations. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):486-510.
    Inspired by the success of generative linguistics and transformational grammar, proponents of the linguistic analogy (LA) in moral psychology hypothesize that careful attention to folk-moral judgments is likely to reveal a small set of implicit rules and structures responsible for the ubiquitous and apparently unbounded capacity for making moral judgments. As a theoretical hypothesis, LA thus requires a rich description of the computational structures that underlie mature moral judgments, an account of the acquisition and development of these structures, and an (...)
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  22. Bo Earle (2000). From Ecological to Moral Psychology: Morality and the Psychology of Egon Brunswik. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):196-207.
    Moral judgment and behavior are uniquely resistant to psychological analysis because morality generally is defined in terms that do not admit of psychological predication. Principal among these is the idea of freedom. An agent can act morally only on the condition that it is also free to do otherwise. The respective theoretical premises of C. Sunstein and E. Brunswik are contrasted in order to suggest that Brunswikian theory constitutes a distinct and highly promising new approach to the psychology of moral (...)
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  23. Jay Elliott (2011). Stag Hunts and Committee Work: Cooperation and the Mutualistic Paradigm. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):245-260.
    Contemporary philosophers and psychologists seek the roots of ethically sound forms of behavior, including altruism and a sense of fairness, in the basic structure of cooperative action. I argue that recent work on cooperation in both philosophy and psychology has been hampered by what I call “the mutualistic paradigm.” The mutualistic paradigm treats one kind of cooperative situation—what I call a “mutualistic situation”—as paradigmatic of cooperation in general. In mutualistic situations, such as the primeval stag hunt described by Brian Skyrms, (...)
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  24. Kate Falkenstien (forthcoming). Explaining the Effect of Morality on Intentionality: The Role of Underlying Questions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    People's moral judgments affect their judgments of intentionality for actions that succeeded by luck. This article aimed to explain that phenomenon by suggesting that people's judgments of intentionality are driven by the underlying questions they have considered. We examined two types of questions: questions about why people act, and questions about how they succeed in acting. In a series of experiments, we found that people prefer different questions for neutral and immoral actions (Studies 1 and 2) and that asking them (...)
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  25. Simon Fitzpatrick (2014). Moral Realism, Moral Disagreement, and Moral Psychology. Philosophical Papers 43 (2):161-190.
    This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and (...)
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  26. Simon Fitzpatrick (2014). Distinguishing Between Three Versions of the Doctrine of Double Effect Hypothesis in Moral Psychology. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):505-525.
    Based on the results of empirical studies of folk moral judgment, several researchers have claimed that something like the famous Doctrine of Double Effect may be a fundamental, albeit unconscious, component of human moral psychology. Proponents of this psychological DDE hypothesis have, however, said surprisingly little about how the distinction at the heart of standard formulations of the principle—the distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences—might be cognised when we make moral judgments about people’s actions. I first highlight the problem (...)
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  27. Owen J. Flanagan Jr (1982). Virtue, Sex, and Gender: Some Philosophical Reflections on the Moral Psychology Debate. Ethics 92 (3):499-512.
  28. Owen J. Flanagan (1991). Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism. Harvard University Press.
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  29. Erich Fromm (1947/1990). Man for Himself: An Inquiry Into the Psychology of Ethics. H. Holt.
    In Man for Himself , Erich Fromm examines the confusion of modern women and men who, because they lack faith in any principle by which life ought to be guided, become the helpless prey forces both within and without. From the broad, interdisciplinary perspective that marks Fromm’s distinguished oeuvre, he shows that psychology cannot divorce itself from the problems of philosophy and ethics, and that human nature cannot be understood without understanding the values and moral conflicts that confront us all. (...)
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  30. Abraham D. Graber (forthcoming). Towards a Cognitive Scientific Vindication of Moral Realism: The Semantic Argument. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-11.
    In a methodological milieu characterized by efforts to bring the methods of philosophy closer to the methods of the sciences, one can find, with increasing regularity, meta-ethical arguments relying on scientific theory or data. The received view appears to be that, not only is it implausible to think that a scientific vindication of a non-mentalist moral semantics will be forthcoming but that evidence from a variety of sciences threatens to undermine non-mentalist views. My aim is to push back against this (...)
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  31. Joshua Greene (2008). The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3. MIT Press.
    In this essay, I draw on Haidt’s and Baron’s respective insights in the service of a bit of philosophical psychoanalysis. I will argue that deontological judgments tend to be driven by emotional responses, and that deontological philosophy, rather than being grounded in moral reasoning, is to a large extent3 an exercise in moral rationalization. This is in contrast to consequentialism, which, I will argue, arises from rather different psychological processes, ones that are more “cognitive,” and more likely to involve genuine (...)
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  32. Joshua D. Greene (2014). Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics. Ethics 124 (4):695-726.
    In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I (...)
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  33. Roberto Gutierrez, Roger Giner-Sorolla & Milica Vasiljevic (2012). Just an Anger Synonym? Moral Context Influences Predictors of Disgust Word Use. Cognition and Emotion 26 (1):53-64.
    Are verbal reports of disgust in moral situations specific indicators of the concept of disgust, or are they used metaphorically to refer to anger? In this experiment, participants read scenarios describing a violation of a norm either about the use of the body (bodily moral) or about harm and rights (socio-moral). They then expressed disgust and anger on verbal scales, and through facial expression endorsement measures. The use of disgust words in the socio-moral condition was largely predicted by anger words (...)
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  34. Jonathan Haidt (2009). Moral Psychology and the Misunderstanding of Religion. In . Oxford Univ Pr. 278-291.
    Accession Number: ATLA0001788507; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 278-291.; Language(s): English; General Note: Revised from an essay first published at .; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay.
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  35. Jonathan Haidt (2001). The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail. Psychological Review 108 (4):Psychological Review.
    Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done (...)
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  36. Jonathan Haidt & Fredrik Bjorklund (2008). Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About Morality. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology Vol. 2. MIT Press.
    We review the state of the art in moral psychology to answer 6 questions: 1) Where do moral beliefs and motivations come from? 2) How does moral judgment work? 3) What is the evidence for the social intuitionist model? 4) What exactly are the moral intuitions? 5) How does morality develop? And 6) Why do people vary in their morality? We describe the intuitionist approach to moral psychology. The mind makes rapid affective evaluations of everything it encounters, and these evaluations (...)
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  37. Jonathan Haidt, Silvia Helena Koller & Maria G. Dias (1993). Affect, Culture, and Morality, Or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (4):613-28.
    Are disgusting or disrespectful actions judged to be moral violations, even when they are harmless? Stories about victimless yet offensive actions (such as cleaning one's toilet with a flag) were presented to Brazilian and U.S. adults and children of high and low socioeconomic status (N = 360). Results show that college students at elite universities judged these stories to be matters of social convention or of personal preference. Most other Ss, especially in Brazil, took a moralizing stance toward these actions. (...)
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  38. Gilbert Harman, Kelby Mason & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2010). Moral Reasoning. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
    What is moral reasoning? For that matter, what is any sort of reasoning? Let me begin by making a few distinctions. First, there is a distinction between reasoning as something that that people do and the abstract structures of proof or “argument” that are the subject matter of formal logic. I will be mainly concerned with reasoning in the first sense, reasoning that people do. Second, there is a distinction between moral reasoning with other people and moral reasoning by and (...)
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  39. J. Hartland-Swann (1949). Man For Himself: An Enquiry Into the Psychology of Ethics. By Erich Fromm. (Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1949. Pp. Xi + 254. Price 12s. 6d.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 24 (91):359-.
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  40. Joseph Heath (2012). Letting the World In: Empirical Approaches to Ethics. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 7 (3):93-107.
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  41. Susan J. Hekman (1995). Moral Voices, Moral Selves: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theory. Pennsylvania State University Press.
    Using the work of Wittgenstein and Foucault, she outlines the parameters of a discursive morality and its implications for feminism and moral theory.
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  42. Zachary Horne, Derek Powell & Joseph Spino (2013). Belief Updating in Moral Dilemmas. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):705-714.
    Moral psychologists have shown that people’s past moral experiences can affect their subsequent moral decisions. One prominent finding in this line of research is that when people make a judgment about the Trolley dilemma after considering the Footbridge dilemma, they are significantly less likely to decide it is acceptable to redirect a train to save five people. Additionally, this ordering effect is asymmetrical, as making a judgment about the Trolley dilemma has little to no effect on people’s judgments about the (...)
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  43. Bryce Huebner (2011). Critiquing Empirical Moral Psychology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):50-83.
    Thought experimental methods play a central role in empirical moral psychology. Against the increasingly common interpretation of recent experimental data, I argue that such methods cannot demonstrate that moral intuitions are produced by reflexive computations that are implicit, fast, and largely automatic. I demonstrate, in contrast, that evaluating thought experiments occurs at a near-glacial pace relative to the speed at which reflexive information processing occurs in a human brain. So, these methods allow for more reflective and deliberative processing than has (...)
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  44. Bryce Huebner (2009). Troubles with Stereotypes for Spinozan Minds. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):63-92.
    Some people succeed in adopting feminist ideals in spite of the prevalence of asymmetric power relations. However, those who adopt such ideals face a number of psychological difficulties in inhibiting stereotype-based judgments. I argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers a more complete understanding of the mechanisms that underwrite our intuitive stereotype-based judgments. I also argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers resources for avoiding stereotype-based judgments where they are antecedently recognized to be pernicious and insidious. (...)
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  45. Anthony I. Jack & Philip Robbins (2012). The Phenomenal Stance Revisited. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):383-403.
    In this article, we present evidence of a bidirectional coupling between moral concern and the attribution of properties and states that are associated with experience (e.g., conscious awareness, feelings). This coupling is also shown to be stronger with experience than for the attribution of properties and states more closely associated with agency (e.g., free will, thoughts). We report the results of four studies. In the first two studies, we vary the description of the mental capacities of a creature, and assess (...)
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  46. Guy Kahane (2012). On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology. Mind and Language 27 (5):519-545.
    According to Joshua Greene’s influential dual process model of moral judgment, different modes of processing are associated with distinct moral outputs: automatic processing with deontological judgment, and controlled processing with utilitarian judgment. This paper aims to clarify and assess Greene’s model. I argue that the proposed tie between process and content is based on a misinterpretation of the evidence, and that the supposed evidence for controlled processing in utilitarian judgment is actually likely to reflect generic deliberation which, ironically, is incompatible (...)
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  47. Guy Kahane & Nicholas Shackel (2010). Methodological Issues in the Neuroscience of Moral Judgement. Mind and Language 25 (5):561-582.
    Neuroscience and psychology have recently turned their attention to the study of the subpersonal underpinnings of moral judgment. In this article we critically examine an influential strand of research originating in Greene's neuroimaging studies of ‘utilitarian’ and ‘non-utilitarian’ moral judgement. We argue that given that the explananda of this research are specific personal-level states—moral judgments with certain propositional contents—its methodology has to be sensitive to criteria for ascribing states with such contents to subjects. We argue that current research has often (...)
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  48. Guy Kahane, Katja Wiech, Nicholas Shackel, Miguel Farias, Julian Savulescu & Irene Tracey (2012). The Neural Basis of Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgement. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 7 (4):393-402.
    Neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did not control for two distinct dimensions of moral judgment: whether or not it is intuitive (immediately compelling to most people) and whether it is utilitarian or deontological in content. By contrasting dilemmas where utilitarian judgments are counterintuitive with dilemmas in which they are intuitive, we (...)
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  49. Antti Kauppinen (2013). Ethics and Empirical Psychology. In Markus Christen (ed.), Empirically Informed Ethics. Springer. 279-305.
    In this paper, I examine six arguments concerning or making use of empirical psychological evidence in metaethics and normative ethics. Generally speaking, I find that the ambitious ones fail and the more modest ones ought to moderate their conclusions further.
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  50. Daniel Kelly, Edouard Machery & Ron Mallon (2010). Race and Racial Cognition. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
    A core question of contemporary social morality concerns how we ought to handle racial categorization. By this we mean, for instance, classifying or thinking of a person as Black, Korean, Latino, White, etc.² While it is widely FN:2 agreed that racial categorization played a crucial role in past racial oppression, there remains disagreement among philosophers and social theorists about the ideal role for racial categorization in future endeavors. At one extreme of this disagreement are short-term eliminativists who want to do (...)
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