The Federalist, justifying the Electoral College to elect the president, claimed that a small group of more informed individuals would make a better decision than the general mass. But the Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us that the more independent, better-than-random voters there are, the more likely it will be that the majority among them will be correct. The question thus arises as to how much better, on average, members of the smaller group would have to be to compensate for the (...) epistemic costs of making decisions on the basis of that many fewer votes. This question is explored in the contexts of referendum democracy, delegate-style representative democracy, and trustee-style representative democracy. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between the critique of civilization, anti-imperialism, gender and representative government in the political thought of the neglected communist, environmentalist, and gay liberationist Edward Carpenter (1844–1929). In recent years, there has been a dramatic growth in the historical literatures on anti-imperialism and representative government, yet these two topics are rarely connected. Meanwhile, a voluminous literature on the concept of civilization and its role in British imperialism has largely ignored its role in justifying (...) social and political domination in Britain itself. Carpenter's writings on these topics are important because he offers a defense of the value of representative government that is grounded in his anti-imperialism. Furthermore, his critique of civilization led him to connect problems of social domination in India to the struggles of women, homosexuals, and the working class. These groups ought in turn to be enfranchised and given roles in the functioning of the state. (shrink)

This article reconsiders the way political representation was understood in the early modern Netherlands by focusing on the contemporary contribution of Simon van Slingelandt. His views of the representative nature of the government of the Dutch Republic were deeply polemical when he developed them, but went on to have a profound influence on the later literature and are notably sustained in modern histories of the subject. The best way to nuance the view of political representation our historiography has (...) inherited from Van Slingelandt is by returning to the earlier views he set out to discredit. By examining both views, I thus hope to shed some new light on the representative nature of early modern Dutch government. (shrink)

An article on the aspect of the League which most concerns the present study is Larsen, "Representative Government in the Panhellenic Leagues," CP 20..

The defects of any form of government may be either negative or positive. It is negatively defective if it does not concentrate in the hands of the authorities power sufficient to fulfil the necessary offices of a government; or if it does not sufficiently develop by exercise the active capacities and social feelings of the individual citizens. On neither of these points is it necessary that much should be said at this stage of our inquiry.

"A list of the works of John Stuart Mill": p. xxx.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was a British philosopher, political economist, civil servant, and Member of Parliament.

A survey of democratic institutions and republics reveals the aristocratic origins of democracy.

It is an odd thing that after two and a half centuries' experience of representative government—if we take the 1688 Revolution as ourstarting point—we have still no very certain or coherent theory of what it represents. The easy-going eighteenth-century idea that their own sense of political responsibility and the ties of political sympathy uniting them to the people at large enabled representatives chosen from among the “natural” leaders of the nation adequately to fulfil their representative role, despite (...) the meagre measure of choice exercised in their denomination; and the rather later notion that the function of a representative system was to reflect the class structure and dominant interests of the nation, have both failed to survive criticism at the hustings, and the spread of political consciousness associated with the rise of democracy. Modern ideas identify representative government with self-government, and insist on applying to it Colonel Rainboro's dictum that “the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the richest he.” On the subject of what representative government represents there may nowadays be distinguished two views; what may be called the popular, or hustings view, and the academic theory, which, while different in form, preserves the same general character as the hustings view. The hustings view is unqualified majoritarianism. Representative government is government by the will of the majority. Certain ideas underlying, or associated with this view may profitably be distinguished. The most important is that of individual right. Majoritarianism is no respecter of tradition, or birth, or inborn talents, or acquired experience; it is no respecter of persons at all, only a counter of them. In its view there is no species of authority that gives one person or class of persons the right to push others around; everyone, indeed, has a presumptive right not to be pushed around. (shrink)

SUMMARYThis paper examines the formal filters of the public's political will defended by JS Mill as consistent with the best form of representative government. Holding that institutions must adjust to democratic society, and that democratic society must be improved to achieve wise rule, Mill rejects secret ballots and electoral pledges, and advocates a constitutional council and graduated enfranchisement. He also recommends but does not require the indirect election of the President and a unicameral legislature. Mill's historically sensitive approach (...) puts pressure on interpreters to be sensitive to their own political and social context when applying Mill's ideas. In particular, obviously undemocratic measures such as plural voting should be adjusted to reflect Mill's view that the ratio between legitimacy and competence is constantly changing. The continual readjustment between the powers of masses and elites is the way that Mill's Considerations on Representative Government manage to avoid the now-traditional charge of expertocracy. (shrink)

This article discusses the work of Cornelius Castoriadis, an important political thinker and theorist of democracy. Castoriadis developed not one but two theories of democracy based on two distinct understandings of autonomy. The first is compatible with the key features of representative government; the second is not. Unfortunately, Castoriadis models his interpretation of the idea of popular sovereignty on the second view, thereby concluding, like Rousseau before him, that it is incompatible with representative government. This article (...) discusses both approaches and presents a reinterpretation of political representation and of the idea of popular sovereignty in order to show how they can be made compatible. I argue that the discourse of popular sovereignty and the modern principles of representative government entail one another. (shrink)

Part of the Everyman series which has been re-set with wide margins for notes and easy-to-read type. Each title includes a themed introduction by leading authorities on the subject, life-and-times chronology of the author, text summaries, annotated reading lists and selected criticism and notes.

Past interpretations of the debate between Confucian meritocrats and Confucian democrats tend to center around abstract discussions of meritocratic versus democratic values. Yet, given the difficulties involved in settling on a common definition of “democracy” or “meritocracy,” such abstract discussions often end up talking past each other. In this article, I seek to offer a more precise framing of the debate by surveying the preferred institutional arrangement of one Confucian democrat, Sungmoon Kim, and that of two Confucian meritocrats, Daniel Bell (...) and Tongdong Bai. What I find is that contrary to the claim made by Kim’s theory of pragmatic Confucian democracy, the electoral representative government he favors does not enjoy a legitimacy premium over the kind of hybrid regime envisioned by Bell or Bai under pluralistic societal circumstances. I further demonstrate that it is also difficult for Confucian democrats to justify electoral representative government through either the Confucian ideal of political relationship marked by the public’s willing endorsement of their rulers, or a notion of political equality reconstructed from Mencius’s inclusionary ideal of sagehood. (shrink)

Several authors have recently stressed the constitutive and ubiquitous nature of representation, which, as a result, can no longer be conceived as a relation between pre-existing entities. This has important consequences for democratic representation, traditionally thought in terms of authorization, accountability or representativity. This article argues that Jacques Rancière’s political philosophy makes a fruitful contribution to the necessary rethinking of democratic representation. Although Rancière never systematically developed a theory of representation, this concept is shown to constitute a red thread throughout (...) his political writings. His main contribution consists in shifting the focus from the relation between representative and represented to the relation between the distribution of the sensible as a space of representability and its disruption or contestation. This makes it possible to recast a critique of representative government, and to reconceive of democratic representation, which is about making the contingent equality underlying each order visible. (shrink)

Redirecting attention to Mill as a political thinker, Nadia Urbinati argues that this claim misrepresents Mill's thinking.

The basic theoretical premise of this article is that representation does not necessarily imply a break with democratic principles. Its goal is to challenge the traditional liberal-elitist approach to representative government according to which this system is a mixed regime that is not identifiable with democracy since its main institution, election, is a mechanism that is inherently aristocratic, although it can be implemented in a democratic way. I question this powerful argument by questioning its main assumption: the idea (...) that representative government, since its 18th-century inception, has had a linear and univocal history which was essentially undemocratic.I go back to the age of the French Revolution and analyse Condorcet’s plan of constitution in order to prove my case. Condorcet devised institutional mechanisms and procedures that were able to make representative government democratic by overcoming the polarization between representation and participation and making them related forms of political action constituting the continuum of decision-making and opinion formation in modern democratic society. (shrink)

In nineteenth‐century Europe, democracy was not embraced with the same enthusiasm it now enjoys. Conservative critics questioned central democratic normative principles, while liberals tried to correct the limitations of actual democratic practice. While accepting the inevitability of democracy, nineteenth‐century liberals often resisted the idea that universal suffrage guaranteed the wisdom of the people's choices. Nothing better illustrates this difficult apprenticeship of democracy than the writings of François Guizot, whose political thought focuses on the relationship between liberalism and democracy.

1. Understanding.--2. Purpose.--3. Conciliation.--4. Justice.--5. Justice, science and religion as contributions to civilization.--6. Uniformitarian process under supreme law.

The Restoration (1814–1830) was a golden age for liberal philosophy in France, especially in the field of politics. The political thought of Benjamin Constant and François Guizot, two of the most well-known theorists of the representative regime, is today regarded as particularly useful for understanding the meaning of many of the institutions which post-revolutionary democracies inherited. However, this paper reveals the existence of another great theory of the representative regime in circulation during the French Restoration: that popularized in (...) the pages of Le Censeur (1814–1815), a major liberal newspaper of the time. Its editors, Charles Comte (1782–1837) and Charles Dunoyer (1786–1862), are today known for their important contribution to the rise of liberal political economy in France. Their earliest journalistic writings contrast with the rest of their work and predate their discovery of the Treatise on Political Economy by Jean-Baptiste Say. During the first Bourbon Restoration (1814), Comte and Dunoyer were concerned almost exclusively with political philosophy. Before adopting the doctrine of ‘industrialism’, they attempted to make a synthesis of the political thought of Rousseau and Montesquieu, in order to give a liberal form to the idea of popular sovereignty compatible with monarchical government. (shrink)

The contrast between the normative functions of political parties in representative democracies and their empirical working is stark and rapidly increasing. This article starts from a sober, realist account of the empirical state of affairs and from structural problems of democracy and participations – in terms of limits of time, information, qualification and relevant expertise – that have to be acknowledged by any realist–utopian proposal of alternatives beyond the exclusive alternative of ‘thin, realist democracy’ or emphatic ‘strong, participatory, direct, (...) or mass democracy’. We can do better. My search for institutional alternatives looks not for the replacement of political parties but for their relief. Many, not all, of their normative tasks can be shared with other functional networks, associations and organizations. In exploring such a new division of political labour I draw on older debates and designs of associative democracy and on recent discussions to democratize expertise and to expertise democracy in order to address urgent societal problems of high-risk decisions under conditions of extreme complexity, contingency, unpredictability and uncertainty and deep contestedness of our knowledge, problems that turn out to be unmanagable by party politics and representative democracy. (shrink)

Ian Shapiro proposes a representative government that bases its understanding of truth on mature enlightenment philosophy. He examines various enlightenment and anti-enlightenment theories to substantiate his arguments in favour of verifiability as the criterion for defining truth. Contending such a concept of truth he specifies that it is possible only within a representative democracy as it can systematically undermine socially built readymade systems. To examine Shapiro’s fallibilist approach to truth, this paper critically analyses his concept of truth-telling (...) for legitimizing a government and contrasts it with Plato’s explanation of truth-telling. It argues that Shapiro’s procedural mechanisms that override social background presuppose uniform rationality backed by power systems. (shrink)

There are two ways to approach political representation. We can view each type of representation or each site of representation – namely a representative actor or institution – on an individual basis and study its internal dynamics. Alternatively, we can look at how different forms of representation and representative actors and institutions interact in a system of representation. In this article, I develop the second view. I make three contributions to the theory of representation from systemic thinking. Methodologically, (...) I explain the contours of a systemic approach to political representation. Descriptively, I propose a definition of a system of representation that captures representative pluralism, distribution of representative work and different levels of representation. Normatively, I set criteria for judging the system of representation and its individual components with systemic criteria. (shrink)

Introduction. The article examines the dynamics of electoral competition over four electoral cycles from 2005 to 2019 as exemplified by forming representative bodies of local self-government in the city of Chelyabinsk. Particular attention is paid to the impact that the transition of Chelyabinsk to a twotier model of forming local self-government bodies in 2014 had on the electoral competition. The purpose of the paper is to study the dynamics of electoral competition in municipal elections in Chelyabinsk before (...) and after the 2014 reform. Methods. The empirical basis of the study is the database “Electoral competition in the elections of municipal deputies of Chelyabinsk (2005—2019)”, which includes 414 observation units. The analysis of the empirical material is carried out according to the method of G.V. Golosov’s triangle of relative sizes, proposed for classifying party systems and adapted for analyzing elections in single-mandate constituencies. Scientific novelty. The author suggests a methodology for analyzing electoral competition in singlemandate constituencies. For the first time, the phenomenon of “controlled competition” is analyzed on the basis of 4 municipal elections cycles. Results. The analysis makes it possible to speak about fluctuations in electoral competition, its decline in 2009 and 2014 compared to the 2005 elections and increasing by the 2019 elections Conclusions. The “controlled competition” was formed in Chelyabinsk in the period preceding the reform of 2014. The reform introduced a level of local self-government, the effectiveness and necessity of which is not obvious with the existing design of the electoral system. In the course of the reform, the principal-agent model of relations between local self-government bodies and state authorities was finally consolidated. The reform contributed to conserving the “controlled competition”. (shrink)