The paper puts forward that the basic principle of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (4.0312) transforms “the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments a priori” in Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” (A158/B197) from a level of reason to the level of language. Both philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein, put forward a transcendental principle and both hold a formal identity true, Kant an identity between the form of experience and the form of the object of experience, Wittgenstein an identity between the form of a (...) sentence and the form of a fact. Both transform the identity of thinking and being first formulated by Parmenides “... to gar auto noein estin te kai einai“ (D/K.B3) . (shrink)

The paper puts forward that the basic principle of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (4.0312) transforms the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments a priori in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (A158/B197) from a level of reason to the level of language. Both philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein, put forward a transcendental principle and both hold a formal identity true, Kant an identity between the form of experience and the form of the object of experience, Wittgenstein an identity between the form of a (...) sentence and the form of a fact. (shrink)

The paper puts forward that the basic principle of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (4.0312) transforms “the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments a priori” in Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” (A158/B197) from a level of reason to the level of language. Both philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein, put forward a transcendental principle and both hold a formal identity true, Kant an identity between the form of experience and the form of the object of experience, Wittgenstein an identity between the form of a (...) sentence and the form of a fact. Both transform the identity of thinking and being first formulated by Parmenides “... to gar auto noein estin te kai einai“ (D/K.B3). (shrink)

La pensée fondamentale de Wittgenstein affirme que les constantes logiques ne représentent pas, ne fonctionnent pas sémantiquement comme des noms. En apparence triviale, cette pensée, nous le montrerons, à des ramifications étonnantes dans la philosophie du premier Wittgenstein, en particulier en ce qui concerne sa conception de la logique. Notre but est d'interpréter l'aphorisme en question en montrant comment il se rapporte aux thèses et théories les plus importantes du Tractatus, et comment il permet de les faire tenir ensemble (...) d'une façon cohérente, justifiant par là son caractère "fondamental". Nous tentons également d'apporter une réponse aux questions suivantes : les propositions complexes sont-elles encore - comme les propositions atomiques - des "images" de la réalité? et quelle est cette "logique des faits" dont parle Wittgenstein dans l'aphorisme sous examen? (shrink)

La pensée fondamentale de Wittgenstein affirme que les constantes logiques ne représentent pas, ne fonctionnent pas sémantiquement comme des noms. En apparence truiviale, cette pensée, nous le montrerons, à des ramifications étonnantes dans la philosophie du premier wittgenstein, en ce qui concerne partmulzer sa conception de la logique. Notre but est d'interpréter l'aphorisme en question (T 4.0312) en montrant comment il se rapporte aux thèses et théories les plus importantes du Tractatus, et comment il permet de les faire tenir (...) ensemble d'une façon cohérente, justifiant par là son caractère "fondamental". Nous tentons également d'apporter une réponse aux questions suivantes: les propositions complexes sont-elles encore — comme les propositions atomiques — des "images" de la réalité? et quelle est cette "logique des faits" dont parle Wittgenstein dans l'aphorisme sous examen? (shrink)

Ethics and Logic in the Tractatus. Exploring an Analogy I explore an analogy between logic and ethics, as Wittgenstein understands them in the Tractatus. In the first section, I argue that Wittgenstein regards logic as a condition of the possibility of meaning, in the sense that logic makes meaningful language and thought possible. In section two, I ask why Wittgenstein calls both logic and ethics ‘transcendental’. I suggest that, while logic is a condition of the possibility of semantic (...) meaning, ethics is a condition of the possibility of existential meaning. Without ethics, life could not be meaningful. In section three, I show that harmony and agreement play a crucial role in Wittgenstein’s accounts of logic and ethics. A meaningful proposition can be true or false, a meaningful life can be happy or unhappy, and both truth and happiness consist in some kind of harmony or agreement with reality. (shrink)

The book includes an Index of Subjects and a detailed Index of Biblical References as well as an Introduction by Brad Gregory, which sets Spinoza squarely in ...

En el presente artículo, me centraré únicamente en la ontología del Tractatus porque, a pesar de ser uno de los temas que abandona después de 1930, tiene dos aspectos que quisiera resaltar de manera especial: su carácter relacional, y su afirmación de la contingencia del mundo. Considero que ambos son de interés en sí mismos por su carácter inédito, pero creo, además, que es posible establecer sugerentes relaciones entre ellos y algunas posiciones contemporáneas, tanto de las ciencias naturales como (...) de las ciencias sociales. En el primer caso, haré referencia al libro recientemente publicado de Friedrich Hülster, Introduction to Wittgenstein´s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Para el segundo, tomaré como punto de partida Radical Uncertainty, publicado el año pasado por John Kay y Marvyn King. (shrink)

As a celebration of theTractatus100th anniversary it might be worth revisiting its relation to the later writings. From the former to the latter, David Pears recalls that “everyone is aware of the holistic character of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, but it is not so well known that it was already beginning to establish itself in theTractatus” (The False Prison, 1987). From the latter to the former, Stephen Hilmy’s (The Later Wittgenstein, 1987) extensive study of theNachlasshas helped removing classical misconceptions such as (...) Hintikka’s claim that “Wittgenstein in thePhilosophical Investigationsalmost completely gave up the calculus analogy.” Hilmy points out that even in theInvestigationsone finds the use of the calculus/game paradigm to the understanding of language, such as “in operating with the word” (Part I, §559) and “it plays a different part in the calculus”. Hilmy also quotes from a late (1946) unpublished manuscript (MS 130) “this sentence has use in the calculus of language”, which seems to be compatible with “asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking ‘How do you mean?’” Central in this back and forth there is an aspect which seems to deserve attention in the discussion of a semantics for the language of mathematics which might be based on (normalisation of) proofs and/or Hintikka/Lorenzen game-dialogue: the explication of consequences. Such a discussion is substantially supported by the use of the open and searchableThe Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. These findings are framed within the discussion of the meaning of logical constants in the context of natural deduction style rules of inference. (shrink)

This paper is divided in four parts. In the first part we introduce the method of internal critique of philosophical theories by examination of their external consistency with scientific theories. In the second part two metaphysical and one epistemological postulate of Wittgenstein's Tractatus are made explicit and formally expressed. In the third part we examine whether Tractarian metaphysical and epistemological postulates (the independence of simple states of affairs, the unique mode of their composition, possibility of complete empirical knowledge) are (...) externally consistent with the theory of quantum mechanics. The result of the inquiry is negative: Tractarian postulates ought to be be revised. Relying on the result we approach the question of the empirical character of logic in the fourth part. The description of theoretical transformations of the notion of disjunction, in its ontological, epistemological, and logical sense, is a common element of in all parts of the text. The conjecture on the existence of different types of disjunctive connectives in the language of quantum mechanics concludes the paper. (shrink)

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

My aim in this chapter is to explore an analogy between logic and ethics, as Wittgenstein understands them in the Tractatus. First, I argue that Wittgenstein regards logic as a condition of the possibility of meaning, in the sense that logic makes meaningful language and thought possible. Second, I ask why Wittgenstein calls both logic and ethics ‘transcendental’. I suggest that, while logic is a condition of the possibility of semantic meaning, ethics is a condition of the possibility of (...) existential meaning. Without ethics, life could not be meaningful. Third, I show that harmony and agreement play a crucial role in Wittgenstein’s accounts of logic and ethics. A meaningful proposition can be true or false, a meaningful life can be happy or unhappy, and both truth and happiness consist in some kind of harmony or agreement with reality. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION BRAD S. GREGORY Until now those interested in Spinoza have lacked an adequate English translation of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. ...

The aim of this article is to consider, in the first place, the characteristic traits of ciceronian conception about “conservatio sui” in the context of ciceronian practical philosophy, differentiating between the components of stoic tradition and the position that Cicero proposes as its own. The article makes its center in the ciceronian exposition of De finibus III and IV and passages of other works that allow us to elaborate the links between natura, ratio and lex established by Cicero. In second (...) place, the article proposes a comparison of the ciceronian elaboration of “conservatio sui” with passages of the corpus of Thomas Aquinas, specially with Tractatus de legibus of Summa Theologiae. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo analisar o modo como a linguagem religiosa é tratada por Wittgenstein, recorrendo, para isso, a alguns dos seus escritos que tangenciam esse tema. Inicialmente, será feita a exposição de alguns aspectos importantes de sua filosofia, em especial aqueles que abordam as relações entre linguagem e realidade, seja nos seus escritos iniciais, como no _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_, seja em sua filosofia tardia, que tem as _Investigações Filosóficas_ como sua obra mais emblemática. Após a exposição e a análise (...) do modo como a linguagem religiosa é tratada nos diferentes momentos de sua filosofia, será feita uma avaliação crítica de suas propostas. (shrink)

The main objective of this article is to analyze the conceptual connection between the Doctrine of Children’s Education, briefly mentioned in Spinoza’s Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, and the concept of emendation present at the very center of this Treatise’s title. A close textual exegesis of the opening paragraphs of TIE reveals why such a doctrine cannot be the ascetic renunciation of the content of ordinary life. We shall see instead that a new institution of life shall be possible only (...) through a deep plunge into the understanding of ordinary confused life. A Spinozan Doctrine of Children’s Education shall then be conceived as a pedagogy guided by an error mapping principle, i.e., a pedagogy capable of amending the mistaken beliefs of students through their understanding of the way these are produced as real events in the world. This would be an immanent pedagogy, which could be relevant to any form of contemporary thought that seeks a truly liberating education. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's examination of Private Language Argument and Solipsism in the Philosophical Investigations implies no critics to his earlier theory maintained in the Tractatus. On the contrary, both are inspired by the same idea, namely, the impossibility of finding a thinking subject merely on the ground of thought itself.

Por tradición, cuando hablamos de Wittgenstein, es casi inevitable especificar a cuál Wittgenstein nos estamos refiriendo. Así, pareciera menester aclarar si estamos hablando del Wittgenstein del Tractatus,1 que tradicionalmente ha sido llamado el primer Wittgenstein, quien se esforzó por diferenciar entre lo que se puede decir con lógica y sentido y lo que no se puede decir porque son sinsentidos (más no carentes de sentido) donde encajan los juicios éticos, estéticos y religiosos, o del segundo Wittgenstein, el de las (...) Investigaciones Filosóficas,2 donde intenta dar una explicación de que el lenguaje y la razón no serían más que juegos lingüísticos con unas reglas que se han construido a medida que se ha ido jugando con ellas y las cuales hemos aprendido a manejar en la medida en que hemos conocido el lenguaje. Sin embargo, en los últimos años, hay una tesis que cobra cada vez más fuerza: solo hay una filosofía de Wittgenstein. Este trabajo es un intento de mostrar el hilo conductor entre sus dos períodos visto a través de su concepción de la religión. (shrink)

The following pages offer, for the first time in English, a translation of Spinoza's Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione which aims to render Spinoza's views as literally as possible; the aim is accuracy rather than elegance. In addition to this new translation itself, I have prepared an extensive commentary on textual problems posed, e.g., by discrepancies (all of which have been indicated) between the original Latin and the original Dutch editions of the treatise, or by the difficulties of rendering certain (...) of Spinoza's phrases into English. There is also a relatively brief introduction, and a detailed index (which no previous English translation of this treatise has included). (shrink)

The objective of this work is to present Ludwig Wittgenstein's perspective on the impossibility of the existence of philosophical problems, to then reflect on the implications of such a perspective based on Popper's thought. For that, Wittgenstein's perspective, as exposed in his work Tractatus logico-philosophicus, is contrasted with Karl Popper's perspective presented in “The nature of philosophical problems and their scientific roots” (in Conjectures and refutations). The example of the problem faced by Kant in his work Critique of pure (...) reason will also be considered for the analysis of Wittgenstein's argument. According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems are pseudo-problems because they have no solution. However, despite admitting the existence of pseudo-problems, Popper argues that factual, logical, or hybrid problems, under certain circumstances, can be philosophical. Thus, the aim is to contrast these two perspectives in order to emphasize how not all philosophical problems are pseudo-problems. (shrink)

1. Bd. Tractatus theologico-politicus. Theologisch-politischer Traktat, hrsg. von Günter Gawlick und Friedrich Niewöhner.--2. Bd. Tractatus de intellectus emendatione. Ethica. Abhandlung über die Berichtigung des Verstandes. Ethik.

ONE OF THE intriguing features of Spinoza's well-known work, the Ethics, is its "geometrical method." Even today, there is fundamental disagreement among interpreters concerning practically every aspect of this method. Spinoza's own explicit thoughts about philosophical method are almost exclusively to be found in a short, unfinished work, the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, in which Spinoza does not seem to talk about a geometrical method at all.

ONE OF THE intriguing features of Spinoza's well-known work, the Ethics, is its "geometrical method." Even today, there is fundamental disagreement among interpreters concerning practically every aspect of this method. Spinoza's own explicit thoughts about philosophical method are almost exclusively to be found in a short, unfinished work, the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, in which Spinoza does not seem to talk about a geometrical method at all.

Based on the text Spinoza's Short treatise on God, man and his well-being, translated by Dr. A. Wolf from the Dutch [version of the author's Tractatus de Deo et homine].

The purpose of this article is to explore the concept of Philosophy within the works written by Wittgenstein if we take into account the ambivalent sense of the term phármakon. Thus, it will be outlined a contest of paradoxes between, on the one hand, healthiness, sanity, and the adaptable confidence produced by western rationality materialized into objective science, and, on the other hand, sickness, insanity, the world of perplexities, and the realm of desire and death, essential to philosophical thought. Bearing (...) in mind last Wittgenstein’s approaches, we will understand the Tractatus both critical to the deficiencies of western Reason and imprisoned within them. But the “enchanting” power of western Reason, conducting to identify rationality and scientificity in that work, will be conjured in the last Wittgenstein through the opening of plural realms of rationality and of discourses. In this way, philosophical questions will be rescued from silence and absurdity. (shrink)