Abstract: I address the issue of how pretence emerged in evolution by reviewing the (mostly negative) evidence about pretend behaviour in non-human primates, and proposing a model of the type of information processing abilities that humans had to evolve in order to be able to pretend. Non-human primates do not typically pretend: there are just a few examples of potential pretend actions mostly produced by apes. The best, but still rare, examples are produced by so-called 'enculturated' apes (reared by humans) (...) and among them specially those that have been systematically trained to use symbols (so-called 'linguistic' apes). A hypothesis that would explain the lack of pretence in apes is that they lack the mentalistic ability of theory of mind. However, in the last years apes have been demonstrated to possess relatively sophisticated social cognitive skills, some of them ontogenetically appearing in humans alongside with or even after pretend play. As a solution to the paradox, I discuss a model according to which pretence is supported by a mechanism capable of computing intentional relations with non-existing objects or properties (Intentional non-existence), as opposed to mechanisms computing intentional relations with existing, although not necessarily currently perceived, objects (Intentional availability). Apes possess the latter, which allows them to solve a variety of theory of mind tasks, but not the former, which typically prevents them from developing pretence. (shrink)

This paper reports a longitudinal study on the ontogeny of triadic cooperative interactions in a hand-reared lowland gorilla from 6 months to 36 months of age. Using the behavioural categories developed by Hubley and Trevarthen to characterize the origins of “secondary intersubjectivity” in human babies between 8–12 months of age, I chart the emergence of comparable coordinations of gestures and actions with objects and acts of dyadic communication. The findings show that the categories and concepts of secondary intersubjectivity are applicable (...) to the gorilla, who engages with people in cooperative actions with objects. The ontogeny of triadic interaction in the gorilla was very similar to that described in human infants, but more extended in time and with some peculiarities, such as the absence of pointing and showing gestures, some of whose functions might be taken over by contact gestures which in human infants may appear later in development. The results do not support claims of human uniqueness in the development of cooperative action, but suggest a heterochrony in some aspects of the ontogeny of triadic interactions leading to a divergence between gorilla and human infants within secondary intersubjectivity. Keywords: Triadic communication; secondary intersubjectivity; shared intentionality; cooperation; gorilla. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to highlight the need to address the conceptual problem of “implicit knowledge” or “implicit cognition” —a notion especially important in the study of the nonverbal minds of animals and infants. We review some uses of the term ‘implicit’ in psychology and allied disciplines,and conclude that conceptual clarification of this notion is not only lacking, but largely avoided and reduced to a methodological problem. We propose that this elusive notion is central in the study (...) not only of animal and infant minds, but also the human adult mind. Some promising approaches in developmental and evolutionary psychology towards innovative conceptualisation of implicit knowledge remain conceptually underdeveloped and in need of reconsideration and re-elaboration. We conclude by suggesting that the challenge of implicit cognition and nonverbal minds will only be solved through a concerted interdisciplinary approach between psychology and other disciplines. (shrink)

This paper reports a longitudinal study on the ontogeny of triadic cooperative interactions in a hand-reared lowland gorilla from 6 months to 36 months of age. Using the behavioural categories developed by Hubley and Trevarthen to characterize the origins of “secondary intersubjectivity” in human babies between 8-12 months of age, I chart the emergence of comparable coordinations of gestures and actions with objects and acts of dyadic communication. The findings show that the categories and concepts of secondary intersubjectivity are applicable (...) to the gorilla, who engages with people in cooperative actions with objects. The ontogeny of triadic interaction in the gorilla was very similar to that described in human infants, but more extended in time and with some peculiarities, such as the absence of pointing and showing gestures, some of whose functions might be taken over by contact gestures which in human infants may appear later in development. The results do not support claims of human uniqueness in the development of cooperative action, but suggest a heterochrony in some aspects of the ontogeny of triadic interactions leading to a divergence between gorilla and human infants within secondary intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Second person intentional relations, involving intentional activities directed at the perceptor, are qualitatively different from first and third person relations. They generate a peculiar, bidirectional kind of intentionality, especially in the realm of visual perception. Systems specialized in dealing with this have been selected by evolution. These systems can be considered to be the evolutionary precursors to the human theory of mind.

El artículo busca caracterizar la noción y práctica de la filosofía de un grupo de profesores colombianos del siglo XX. Se parte de la revisión historiográfica del relato “normalizador” en la historia de la filosofía local. El análisis cualitativo de textos escritos entre 1940 y 1960 propone una lectura ambivalente sobre algunas características del oficio de la filosofía, al exponer las tensiones entre una vocación filosófica y las modestas condiciones del oficio. Otras tensiones mostrarán los dos ejes desde donde aquellos (...) profesores pretendieron hacer filosofía: el técnico y el cultural. En 1950, el relato del proceso normalizador de la filosofía fue reforzado por Francisco Romero desde unos referentes ejemplarizantes, “adánicos”, e incluso épicos. Luego, el relato sobre las décadas comprendidas entre 1940 y 1960 se cristalizó bajo el lente retrospectivo de 1980, pero desde una mirada unilateral de la categoría de “normalización”, enfocada solo en aspectos técnicos y disciplinares de la filosofía. Para recuperar el eje cultural, se perfila la figura del “intelectual” de mediados de siglo XX a partir de lo que Renán Silva ha caracterizado como el “pastor de almas”, como aquel que podía interpretar la cultura popular y dictarle un derrotero. Una segunda entrega, ocupada del análisis de distintos registros textuales de la escritura filosófica de mitad de siglo XX, más centrados en el eje de la interpretación y orientación cultural. (shrink)

Ofrecemos dos cartas inéditas entre los filósofos Manuel García Morente y Xavier Zubiri. La primera carta, escrita por el pensador giennense, viene a iluminar el itinerario de su conversión religiosa que le llevó a ordenarse sacerdote en la Iglesia católica. Dicho proceso espiritual había empezado a fraguarse el año anterior en París, durante el exilio que ambos pensadores habían compartido en la capital francesa, tras el estallido de la guerra civil española. En la segunda carta, fechada casi dos años y (...) medio después de la anterior, Zubiri dirige al pensador andaluz unas palabras entrañables en respuesta a la invitación recibida de asistir a su primera misa; una carta en la que el filósofo vasco desvela la inquebrantable amistad entre ambos pensadores, intensificada en los últimos años por la fe cristiana. (shrink)

En 1996 se encendió la mecha de una pequeña revolución en la psicología y filosofía de la cognición social: como reacción crítica a un intento de explicar el desarrollo del conocimiento social en el niño como una integración paulatina de perspectivas de primera y tercera persona (Barresi & Moore), algunos psicólogos propusieron la idea de la perspectiva de segunda persona como enfoque alternativo para entender la cognición social y resolver algunos de sus problemas tradicionales. En esta nota reviso el libro (...) de Pérez y Gomila, una de las más detalladas y mejor desarrolladas exposiciones de las implicaciones interdisciplinares del enfoque de segunda persona, y propongo algunos temas de discusión inspirados por el libro, tales como la inextricable interacción entre las distintas perspectivas personales desde el principio del desarrollo y la dificultad de separar con claridad las propiedades distintivas de la segunda y tercera persona con las conceptualizaciones actuales. (shrink)

This paper looks into two Scottish Philosophical Societies of the Eighteenth century: The Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, and the Select Society of Edinburgh. I intend to show that they were planned, constructed, and carried out according to the experimental method of natural philosophy, and that it was this factor that enhanced the influence they had in the development of the country. An examination of the minute books, discourses, abstracts and question lists of these societies will provide enough evidence to support (...) the claim that experimental philosophy and its method were the decisive factors for the developing and huge success of these societies. (shrink)

I will center the discussion of the Hart-Fuller debate on the five claims Hart mentions might be understood as legal positivisms main tenets: (1) the command theory; (2) the no necessary connection thesis; (3) the methodological claim; (4) the charge of positivism as formalism and the problem of interpretation; and (5) the meta-ethical confusion. In light of these five claims, I will explore whether the exchange of views between Hart and Fuller in 1957 truly amounted to a debate. Sorting out (...) this issue is the aim of this article. (shrink)

Reseña del libro: Nadie nace en un cuerpo equivocado. Éxito y miseria de la identidad de género. Errasti José y Pérez Álvarez Mariano. Ed. Ediciones Deusto, Barcelona, 2022. ISBN: 9788423433322.

This commentary criticizes nonverbal methods of assessing theory-of-mind on the basis of prior training of the critical response because they would encourage simple, nonmentalistic, associative solutions even in subjects with mentalistic capacities. I propose instead a new experimental paradigm based upon the use of spontaneous responses in less artificial situations. This method has already provided positive evidence of some level of ToM understanding in nonhuman primates.

El psicoanálisis existencial es una de esas críticas constructivas derivadas del psicoanálisis empírico que intenta abrirse camino como alternativa, renovación y modelo de terapia psicoanalítica. Ha encontrado una fundamentación óntico-ontológica desde la cual mostrar al ser descrito tal como se manifiesta en tres estadios concretos: el para-sí, en-sí y para-otro, para llegar a ver que las relaciones con los otros son las que nos provocan esos desequilibrios psíquicos. Nuestro psicoanálisis se plantea como una superación al psicoanálisis empírico en el rechazo (...) al postulado del inconsciente y en la elección que renuncia a suponer una acción mecánica del medio sobre el sujeto considerado a abandonar la simbología utilizada hasta entonces. El psicoanálisis existencial deberá ser enteramente flexible y amoldable a los menores cambios observables en el sujeto, ya que se trata de descubrir una elección no un estado. Como el psicoanálisis existencial tiene como objeto descubrir una elección, deberá tener siempre presente que su objeto no es algo hundido en las tinieblas del inconsciente, sino una determinación consciente y libre. Finalmente, la propuesta es una terapia psicoanalítica ya que la persona es una constante proyección en el mundo, el método existencial, se orienta desde el principio hacia una comprensión del ser y no debe asignarse otro objetivo que encontrar el ser y la manera de ser del ser frente a ese ser.Existential Psychoanalysis is one of the most constructive critics based on empirical psychoanalysis which attempts to open up new paths as an alternative, renovation and model of psychoanalytical therapy. An ontic-ontological foundation has been discovered from which it can be described in 3 different concrete states: for someone, in someone or for someone else, to be able to see that our relationships with others are those which cause psychic unbalance. Our psychoanalysis overcomes empirical psychoanalysis in rejection to postulate from the unconscious and in the election which renounces to suppose a mechanical action from the medium on the subject considered to abandon the symbology used until then. Existential psychoanalysis should be completely flexible and changeable to the minor changes which can be observed in the subject, now that it is a case of discovering an election not a state. Due to the fact that the psychoanalysis has as objective to discover an election, it should always have present that its objective is not something united in the darkness of the unconscious, but more of a conscious and free determination. Lastly, the proposition is a psychoanalytical therapy now that the person is a constant projection in the world, the existential method, which is oriented from the beginning towards an understanding of the being and another objective should not be assigned other than find ways of being and the way of being against that being. (shrink)

Exposición de algunas teorías de la auto-organización en el paradigma de la orden a través del desorden. Se analizan las crisis y las catastrofes por su valor auto-organizador en la formación de comportamientos colectivos.