Those, like the present writer, for whom the late Samuel Alexander unlocked doors to new realms of wisdom and delight, or who basked in the sunshine of encouragement and kindly advice he gave so readily to younger men, will understand with what alacrity this opportunity was seized of paying a small tribute to the memory of so unusual and attractive a personality. To resurrect the mind that has built of its own fabric a mansion so vast that its chambers have (...) room for every fact of experience and every theory of science will always provide a happy and appropriate memorial to one whose main business in life was the disinterested speculation idolized by the Greeks as the worthiest employment to which the human spirit can devote its powers. My own share in this labour of love is small and limited in scope; I want to fill in one corner of the picture of Alexander's philosophical system, drawn by Professor Muirhead in the last number of Philosophy , by describing in some detail what he thought about Art and Beauty in their most important aspects and relations. (shrink)

Errol Lord offers a new account of the nature of rationality: what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to the normative reasons one possesses. Lord defends novel views about what it is to possess reasons and what it is to correctly respond to reasons, and dispels doubts about whether we ought to be rational.

Criticising judges : fair game or off-limits? -- Academics and judges -- Are the judges too powerful? -- Magna Carta and compensation culture -- Does judicial review undermine democracy? -- Liability of public authorities in negligence -- The shifting sands of statutory interpretation -- Time to call it a day : some reflections on finality and the law -- The globalisation of law -- Recent developments in commercial law conference -- The contribution of construction cases to the development of the (...) common law -- What is wrong with human rights? -- Human rights in an age of terrorism -- Religion and the law : some current problems -- The extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights : now on a firmer footing, but is it a sound one? -- Magna Carta--liberties, customs, and the free flow of trade -- Delay too often defeats justice -- Magna Carta and religion -- Runnymede -- Advocates as protectors of the rule of law -- Litigators--survive and thrive -- The Jackson reforms and civil justice -- Sharpening the public gaze : advances in open justice in England and Wales -- Threats to justice in the twenty-first century -- Halsey 10 years on---the decision revisited -- Arbitration versus litigation -- Arbitration after Brussels I reform -- School speech day -- How my classical education has affected my life -- Valedictory -- Changes in the law in the last 50 years. (shrink)

My dissertation is a systematic defense of the claim that what it is to be rational is to correctly respond to the reasons you possess. The dissertation is split into two parts, each consisting of three chapters. In Part I--Coherence, Possession, and Correctly Responding--I argue that my view has important advantages over popular views in metaethics that tie rationality to coherence (ch. 2), defend a novel view of what it is to possess a reason (ch. 3), and defend a novel (...) view about what it is to act and hold attitudes for normative reasons (ch. 4). In Part II--Foundationalism, Deception, and The Importance of Being Rational--I argue that foundationalists about epistemic rationality should think that the foundational beliefs are held for sufficient reasons (ch. 5), argue that my view solves the New Evil Demon problem for externalism (and solves a related and underapprieciated problem) (ch. 6), and argue that my view can vindicate the thought that we ought to be rational (ch. 7). (shrink)

Free speech is a great value and forms the life blood of a civilised society. It is however, one of several values and may sometimes come into conflict with them. In those cases it may need to be restricted. Hate speech is one such case and the author argues that it can and should be prohibited.

Burd se ha propuesto redimir nuestra tradicional inferioridad en los estudios maquiavélicos, y creo que quedará patente que ha dado una explicación mucho más satisfactoria de El príncipe que la que cualquier país poseyera con anterioridad. Su edición comentada proporciona todas las respuestas a un conocido problema de la historia de Italia y de la literatura política. En realidad, el antiguo problema ha dejado de existir, y ningún lector de este volumen continuará preguntándose cómo un hombre tan inteligente y razonable (...) llegó a proponer consejos tan execrables. (shrink)

Probably the most useful survey of modern aesthetics published in recent years.

First published in 1933. The purpose of this work was to bridge a gap in English philosophical literature by completing the elaborate history of Bosanquet and to stimulate and enrich the whole study of aesthetics by means of his personal destructive and constructive criticism. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy.

The traditional business of Aesthetics has been the study of the aesthetic experience and activity of mankind, in order to show what it is and how it can be distinguished from other experiences and activities. The assumption commonly made is that we ourselves, like others before us, have had a specifically aesthetic experience in the enjoyment of art or the beauty of nature, or have been engaged in the making of something unquestionably artistic. This basic assumption has been challenged recently (...) by I. A. Richards, who calls aesthetic experience “a phantom.” His view is shared by other contemporary philosophers, who also maintain that there is no appreciable difference between an aesthetic reaction and any other frame of mind, or between artistic behaviour and other forms of creative work. We can certainly appeal to experience for the support of a postulate usually taken for granted and say that most artists, authors, and ordinary people in fact regard their aesthetic experience as something entirely distinct from what they do or feel at other times. Analysis will show whether this common-sense opinion is illusory. (shrink)

Errol Lord explores the boundaries of epistemic normativity. He argues that we can understand these better by thinking about which mental states are competitors in rationality’s competition. He argues that belief, disbelief, and two kinds of suspension of judgment are competitors. Lord shows that there are non-evidential reasons for suspension of judgment. One upshot is an independent motivation for a certain sort of pragmatist view of epistemic rationality.