El multiculturalismo, junto con ser una categoría indicativa de un determinado estado de “diversidad” característico de sociedades complejas en donde orden social y subjetividad se manifiestan como realidades escindidas, constituye a su vez una forma de asumir la configuración de lo público y de la ciudadanía de manera distinta a los principios liberal-individualistas clásicos. En este sentido, la política multiculturalista se constituye como una apuesta por superar la “ficción liberal” de la homogeneidad que destaca la diferencia de patrones culturales como (...) un elemento fundamental en la configuración de un espacio público democrático abierto a la diversidad. Este trabajo intenta concentrarse justamente en los alcances y límites de esta relación entre publicidad y diferencia sostenida por la política multiculturalista. (shrink)

En el marco de la discusión sobre los fines de la pena y el resurgimiento de las teorías absolutas, el presente artículo desarrolla el origen y los fundamentos de tales teorías. Examina, además, los principales postulados de la Teoría de la Retribución Moral de Inmanuel Kant para, por último, desarrollar las principales críticas a la teoría de Kant y al neo-retribucionismo. Within the realm of the discussion about the aims of the sanction and the reappearance of the absolute theories, the (...) present article develops the origin and the foundations of Such theories. It also examines the main postulates of Immanuel Kant's Theory of Moral Retribution, so as to finally develop the most important criticism to Kant´s Theory and to the neo retributism. (shrink)

The paper argues against the growing tendency to interpret Brentano’s conception of inner consciousness in self-representational terms. This trend has received support from the tendency to see Brentano as a forerunner of contemporary same-order theories of consciousness and from the view that Brentano models intransitive consciousness on transitive consciousness, such that a mental state is conscious insofar as it is aware of itself as an object. However, this reading fails to take into account the Brentanian concept of object, which is (...) ultimately derived from ancient and medieval philosophy, as well as the secondary, elusive character that Brentano attributes to inner perception. According to Brentano, we have an aspectual but transparent consciousness of transcendent objects, whereas our awareness of our own mental acts is always complete but incidental, and ultimately opaque. Reversing the relationship between intentionality and consciousness faces difficulties at the textual interpretative level, but also raises theoretical problems, for it risks treating Brentano’s theory of mind as a form of subjectivism and idealism. (shrink)

This article aims to reconstruct the uses given to the metaphor of the “backhoe” in the political discourse opposed to the second government of Michelle Bachelet in Chile. Along with exposing the way in which the original meaning of this metaphor was efficiently resignified and connoted as an expression of a “destructive” and “undemocratic” political project, this article aims to account for the relevance of rhetorical devices as a tool for political-discursive interaction.

The time of half-sleep : Merleau-Ponty between Husserl and Proust -- Ad limina philosophiae : Merleau-Ponty and the "introduction" to Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit -- Nature : variations on the theme -- The thinking of the sensible.

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...) of emotions. (shrink)

This book covers the basic guidelines of Vittorio Benussi’s research during the period at Graz and at Padua. It does so in the light of a thorough study of his Nachlass. The book re-evaluates Benussi’s work as a historical piece, and shows how his work is still relevant today, especially in the areas of cognitive psychology and cognitive science. The volume deals with this original and ingenious - though largely ignored - scholar and discusses his work as a leading experimental (...) psychologist. Benussi’s contributions as discussed in this book were particularly relevant in the fields of visual and tactile perception, time perception, forensic psychology, hypnosis and suggestion, unconscious, and emotions. His classical papers are impressive in their originality, energy, range of approaches, experimental skill, the wealth of findings, and the quality of theoretical discussions. This book demonstrates that Benussi was ahead of his time and that his themes, experiments and research programmes are highly relevant to contemporary cognitive psychology. (shrink)

La thèse de l’« inexistence intentionnelle » formulée par Brentano a été traditionnellement interprétée comme une théorie de la « relation intentionnelle », autrement dit de la relation entre l’acte mental et son « objet immanent » ou « intentionnel », c’est-à-dire interne à la conscience. Se fondant sur la lecture du fameux passage sur l’intentionnalité de la Psychologie du point de vue empirique , le présent article démontre que l’interprétation ontologique de la théorie de l’intentionnalité du premier Brentano est (...) insoutenable, toute dominante qu’elle est. Pour ce faire, nous partirons des sources de la pensée de Brentano, en particulier de la théorie de la perception et des relatifs d’Aristote, pour rejeter la conception de l’objet immanent ou intentionnel comme entité immanente à la conscience et mettre en évidence la continuité qui existe entre la première conception de Brentano de l’intentionnalité et la seconde, consécutive à ce qu’on définit comme le tournant réiste de sa pensée.Brentano’s thesis of “intentional inexistence” has been traditionally interpreted as a theory of “intentional relationships”, i.e., of the relation between a mental act and its “immanent” or “intentional object”, within consciousness. Starting from the famous passage on intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint , the present paper shows that the dominant ontological interpretation of Brentano’s former theory of intentionality is untenable. Proceeding from the sources of Brentano’s thought, in particular from Aristotle’s theory of perception and of relatives, the conception of the immanent or intentional object as an immanent entity to consciousness is rejected. Instead, the continuity between Brentano’s former conception of intentionality and the subsequent one, following the so-called reistic turning-point in his thought, is highlighted. (shrink)

Mechanisms are a way of explaining how biological phenomena work rather than why single elements of biological systems are there. However, mechanisms are usually described as physiological entities, and little or no attention is paid to malfunction as an independent theoretical concept. On the other hand, malfunction is the main focus of interest of applied sciences such as medicine. In this paper I argue that malfunctions are parts of pathological mechanisms, which should be considered separate theoretical entities, conceptually having a (...) priority over physiological sequences. While pathological mechanisms can be described in terms of a Cummins-like mechanistic explanation, they show some unnoticed peculiarities when compared to physiological ones. Some features of pathological mechanisms are considered, such as outcome variability, ambivalence and dependence on a range. (shrink)

In line with earlier works, this article argues for a “continuist” interpretation of Brentano’s conception of intentionality. It maintains that Brentano’s conception of intentionality rests on a complex set of notions, which are reduced to a minimal core or applied more fully depending on the complexity of the mental phenomenon under consideration and perspective from which it is analyzed. The article positions this conceptual structure in relation to theories of objects developed within the framework of late- and Neo-Scholastic philosophy where, (...) since the psychic act can relate to its object in different ways, the different types and roles of objects must be distinguished. This theory of objects enables Brentano to reinterpret Aristoteles’s idea of the intentionality of mental phenomena in light of the commentaries and interpretations of Thomas Aquinas while also giving space to other medieval texts. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...) a plausible explanation of all the main features of moods. I conclude by addressing some objections against my account. (shrink)

I aim to present a solution to the apparent paradox of the Tractatus by means of a minimalist reading grounded in the idea that the correct logical symbolism alone “finally solves” in essentials the philosophical problems. I argue that although the sentences of the Tractatus are nonsensical, rules presented in its symbolism are not. The symbolism itself expresses only a priori rules of logic through schematic variables that do not say anything. I argue that this reading correctly expresses the ladder (...) structure of the book, and that it can account for Wittgenstein's critique of the Tractatus in Some Remarks on Logical Form. (shrink)

Highlights Merleau-Ponty’s interest in film and connects it to his aesthetic theory.

In the preface of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says that his “most fruitful ideas” are due to the stimulus of Sraffa's criticism, but Sraffa is not mentioned anywhere else in the book. It remains a puzzle in the literature how and why Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein. This paper presents a solution to this puzzle. Sraffa's criticism led Wittgenstein away from the calculus conception of language of the Big Typescript (arguably, an adaptation of the calculus of the Tractatus), and towards the “anthropological (...) view,” which structures both the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations and Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Franz Brentano was a leading philosopher and psychologist of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the impact of his scholarship was so great that he became synonymous with a school of thought and a new approach in scientific philosophy. The Brentano School stood against the Idealistic and post-Kantian German tradition and Brentano played a crucial role in the founding of Austrian philosophy. He had an enormous impact on the work of Husserl and Heidegger, as well as on Moore’s _Ethics_ and Stout and (...) Russell’s analysis of mind. In particular, situated between the phenomenology movement and the analytic tradition, the concept of intentionality was redefined by Brentano and has been—and remains—a key concept of twentieth- and twentieth-first century philosophy of mind. But Brentano not only reshaped philosophy of mind; he was also a remarkable and innovative thinker in several other fields of philosophy, and recent debate in metaethics, metaphysics, and the history of analytic philosophy shows a strong resurgence of interest in Brentano’s thought. Published to coincide with the centenary of Brentano’s death, this four-volume collection, a new title from Routledge Major Works, provides an essential intellectual tool for the exegetical evaluation of all aspects of Brentano’s work. Bringing together early reviews and reactions from his contemporaries—many of which have never before been translated into English—as well as the best critical assessments of Brentano’s work, this ‘mini library’ provides Brentano scholars, historians of philosophy and psychology, and phenomenologists, with a rigorous historical appraisal of Brentano’s thought and influence. Brentano’s relationships with Husserl, Heidegger, and the phenomenological tradition are examined in depth, alongside investigations of key themes from his work on Aristotle, medieval and modern philosophy, philosophy of mind, logic, ontology, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of history. (shrink)

The first comprehensive account of Platonism in Antiquity, from the foundation of Plato's Academy in the fourth century BC to Late Antiquity. Written in a clear language, the book shows that Platonism is philosophically engaging and very influential in the history of philosophy. Useful for both students and scholars.

Summary The paper celebrates the person and work of Vittorio Benussi, a forgotten genius of psychology. In particular, it addresses the two most important scientific projects that Benussi developed during his time in Graz and Padua, respectively: the psychology of perception and the psychology of emotions and the unconscious. It highlights the originality and topicality of Benussi’s work and emphasizes its proximity to the latest trends in these research fields.

I argue that Wittgenstein’s engagement with Russell’s The Analysis of Mind was crucial for the development of his new method. First, I show that Wittgenstein’s criticism of the causal theory of meaning (namely: that it generates an infinite regress and that it does not determine the depiction of a fact) is motivated by its incompatibility with the pictorial conception of language. Second, I show that in reacting against that theory he comes to invent the calculus conception of language. Third, I (...) argue that the calculus conception is vulnerable to critiques that parallel those presented against Russell’s theory (a rule-following regression and the indeterminacy of depicted facts). Fourth, the striking similarity between the problems present in Russell’s theory and in Wittgenstein’s own views makes him realize that both were working under misleading trains of thought and false analogies. It is this realization that brings Wittgenstein to the view that his task is to investigate the genesis of philosophical puzzlement in order to stop philosophical theorizing right from the beginning. Thus, in explaining the invention of Wittgenstein’s new method I show its relation to Russell’s philosophy and indicate the origins of the rule-following problem. (shrink)

Ausgehend von Franz Brentanos berühmter Intentionalitätspassage aus der Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt wird dargelegt, daß die vorherrschende ontologische Deutung seines sogenannten frühen Intentionalitätsgedankens unhaltbar ist. Unter Berücksichtigung von Brentanos Quellen, vor allem Aristoteles' Wahmehmungslehre und Theorie der Relativa, wird die Auffassung des sogenannten intentionalen bzw. immanenten Objektes als bewußtseinsimmanenter Entität abgelehnt und die Kontinuität hervorgehoben, die zwischen Brentanos früher und späterer, sogenannter reistischer Intentionalitätsauffassung besteht.

Using an original approach, Mauro Dardo recounts the major achievements of twentieth-century physics--including relativity, quantum mechanics, atomic and nuclear physics, the invention of the transistor and the laser, superconductivity, binary pulsars, and the Bose-Einstein condensate--as each emerged. His year-by-year chronicle, biographies and revealing personal anecdotes help bring to life the main events since the first Nobel Prize was awarded in 1901. The work of the most famous physicists of the twentieth century--including the Curies, Bohr, Heisenberg, Einstein, Fermi, Feynman, Gell-Mann, (...) Rutherford, and Schrödinger--is presented, often in the words and imagery of the prize-winners themselves. Mauro Dardo is Professor of Experimental Physics at Amedeo Avogadro University. He has served as Dean of the new Faculty of Sciences at the University of Turin in Alessandria, Piedmont, and has also served as Director of the university's new department of Sciences and Advanced Technologies. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFrancis Bacon’s works are pervaded by the firm belief that he was living in a new epoch. He thought of this epoch as based on knowledge and mechanical arts, which would permit dominion over nature. This dominion arises from mankind’s taking concrete action to improve the living conditions of humanity. Defining the nature of this action leads to individuate a plural historical subjectivity in Bacon’s thought. The different kinds of agency, and different kinds of technologies, define peoples in ethnological and (...) spatial terms. Imperiality, that is human dominion over nature, implies the necessity of improving the conditions of the whole mankind, in a manner that opens the way of thinking in which ‘backward’ peoples are subject to this action of improvement. Colonialism is strictly related to imperiality. The idea of colonialism, in the New World in particular, rests on the assumption that human race can improve its living conditions, exercising power over nature. Therefore, imperiality and colonialism are not simply a tool of a British dominion, but elements of the new epoch that Bacon is theorising. In this sense, imperiality and colonialism are part of the philosophical structure of Bacon’s modernity. (shrink)

In this paper, I pursue two main goals. The first is to raise three objections against Tom Roberts and Joel Krueger’s recent account of loneliness (2021). The second is to sketch an alternative, receptive account. Roberts and Krueger focus on loneliness conceived of as an occurrent emotion. According to their account, loneliness involves two components: (1) a pro-attitude (e.g., a desire) towards certain social goods and (2) an awareness that such goods “are missing and out of reach, either temporarily or (...) permanently” (p. 186). My first objection is that having a pair of pro-attitudes and cognitive states of the sort that Roberts and Krueger have in mind is neither sufficient nor necessary for an individual to experience loneliness. The second is that Roberts and Krueger’s account has trouble accounting for the unpleasant phenomenology of loneliness. The third is that their account has trouble demarcating loneliness from other negative emotions that one may experience within romantic, friendship or social relationships. Next, I sketch my own account of loneliness. According to the receptive theory (Tappolet 2022) to which I adhere, emotions are receptive experiences that non-conceptually represent their intentional objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. Accordingly, I argue that loneliness consists in a receptive experience that represents the absence of certain relational goods as bad in a particular way. I draw a distinction between the intentional object and the intentional locus of loneliness, and clarify the role that some of the individual’s pro-attitudes play in loneliness. I also show how a receptive account can explain the phenomenology of loneliness and demarcate it from other emotion types, and offer an account of degrees of loneliness, which distinguishes between the intensity and the centrality of episodes of loneliness. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn is mostly known for his contributions to the philosophy of science. However, it was chiefly to investigations in philosophy of language that he dedicated the last part of his career. The aim of this paper is to present a systematic view of Kuhn’s main ideas on this subject. I start by describing his theory of concept, in particular what he says about kind terms. Such terms, acquired in blocks that form contrast sets or “taxonomies,” are learned through ostensible (...) definitions. Next, I analyze Kuhn’s concepts of “meaning” and “truth.” Finally, I discuss a second type of kinds terms, not fully investigated by him, which is learned together with scientific laws. Resumo Thomas Kuhn é conhecido principalmente por suas contribuições para a filosofia da ciência. No entanto, foi em grande medida à filosofia da linguagem que ele dedicou a última parte de sua carreira. O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma visão sistemática das principais ideias de Kuhn sobre esse assunto. Começo descrevendo sua teoria do conceito, em particular o que ele diz sobre termos para espécie. Tais termos, aprendidos em blocos que formam conjuntos de contraste ou “taxonomias”, são aprendidos através de definições ostensivas. Em seguida, analiso as concepções de Kuhn de “significado” e “verdade”. Finalmente, discuto um segundo tipo de termo para espécies, não totalmente investigado por ele, que é aprendido junto com as leis científicas. (shrink)

RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que as interpretações "tradicional" e "resoluta" não livraram o "Tractatus" da aparente autoderrota paradoxal. Argumento que essas leituras apresentam apenas uma nova roupagem ao paradoxo. A leitura "tradicional" de Hacker acaba atribuindo uma conspiração metafísica ao "Tractatus", o que é incompatível com os objetivos do livro. A leitura "resoluta" de Diamond e Conant atribui a Wittgenstein uma conspiração autoral, o que contradiz suas opiniões sobre autoria e método. Com base nas dificuldades encontradas em (...) ambos os lados do debate atual, concluo este artigo propondo vários requisitos que a correta interpretação do "Tractatus" deve preencher. (shrink)

This article presents the incidence of the symbol through Latin-American philosophical reflection. It is possible to think of a philosophical activity through the symbol, as a place of a multiplicity of meanings and senses. A new understanding of the symbol lead to re-discover it from the experience of the indigenous Andean communities and Latin American baroque art. The incidence of the symbol in the educational process is performed through an ethical perspective and hermeneutics that focuses on new alternatives for teaching (...) philosophy in the classroom. (shrink)