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  1. Luca Barlassina & Albert Newen (2013). The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1).
    In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's (2004) pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural (...)
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  2. Kathy Behrendt (2010). A Special Way of Being Afraid. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):669-682.
    I am interested in fear of non-existence, which is often discussed in terms of fear one’s own death, or as it is sometimes called, fear of death as such. This form of fear has been denied by some philosophers. Cognitive theories of the emotions have particular trouble in dealing with it, granting it a status that is simultaneously paradigmatic yet anomalous with respect to fear in general. My paper documents these matters, and considers a number of responses. I provide examples (...)
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  3. Matt Bower & Shaun Gallagher (2013). Bodily Affects as Prenoetic Elements in Enactive Perception. Phenomenology and Mind 4 (1):78-93.
    In this paper we attempt to advance the enactive discourse on perception by highlighting the role of bodily affects as prenoetic constraints on perceptual experience. Enactivists argue for an essential connection between perception and action, where action primarily means skillful bodily intervention in one’s surroundings. Analyses of sensory-motor contingencies (as in Noë 2004) are important contributions to the enactive account. Yet this is an incomplete story since sensory-motor contingencies are of no avail to the perceiving agent without motivational pull in (...)
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  4. Michael S. Brady (2010). Virtue, Emotion, and Attention. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):115-131.
    The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that (...)
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  5. Louis C. Charland (1997). Reconciling Cognitive and Perceptual Theories of Emotion: A Representational Proposal. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579.
    The distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is entrenched in the literature on emotion and is openly used by individual emotion theorists when classifying their own theories and those of others. In this paper, I argue that the distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is more pernicious than it is helpful, while at the same time insisting that there are nonetheless important perceptual and cognitive factors in emotion that need to be distinguished. A general representational metatheoretical (...)
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  6. Louis C. Charland (1995). Feeling and Representing: Computational Theory and the Modularity of Affect. Synthese 105 (3):273-301.
    In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind.
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  7. Justin D'Arms (2008). Prinz's Theory of Emotion. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.
  8. Ronald B. de Sousa (2002). Emotional Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (76):247-63.
    The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, troth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...)
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  9. Craig DeLancey (2005). Review of Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
  10. J. A. Deonna (2006). Emotion, Perception and Perspective. Dialectica 60 (1):29-46.
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  11. Julien A. Deonna (2006). Emotion, Perception and Perspective. Dialectica 60 (1):29–46.
    Abstract The content of an emotion, unlike the content of a perception, is directly dependent on the motivational set of the subject experiencing the emotion. Given the instability of this motivational set, it might be thought that there is no sense in which emotions can be said to pick up information about the environment in the same way that perception does. Whereas it is admitted that perception tracks for us what is the case in the environment, no such tracking relation, (...)
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  12. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Emotions and Well-Being. Philosophical Topics.
    It is striking that for each major theory of well-being, there exists a companion theory of the emotions. Thus, to classical hedonic views of well-being, there corresponds no less classical pure feeling views of the emotions; to desire views that conceive of well-being in terms of desire satisfaction, there corresponds a variety of theories approaching the emotions in terms of the satisfaction/frustration of desires; and finally, to so called objective list theories of well-being, there corresponds a variety of theories that (...)
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  13. Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (2007). Introduction: Modularity and the Nature of Emotions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (5S).
    In this introduction, we give a brief overview of the main concepts of modularity that have been offered in recent literature. After this, we turn to a summary of the papers collected in this volume. Our primary aim is to explain how the modularity of emotion question relates to traditional debates in emotion theory.
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  14. P. Goldie (2006). Review: Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (458):453-457.
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  15. Peter Goldie (2004). Emotion, Feeling, and Knowledge of the World. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    There is a view of the emotions (I might tendentiously call it ‘cognitivism’) that has at present a certain currency. This view is of the emotions as playing an essential role in our gaining evaluative knowledge of the world. When we are angry at an insult, or afraid of the burglar, our emotions involve evaluative perceptions and thoughts, which are directed towards the way something is in the world that impinges on our well-being, or on the well-being of those that (...)
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  16. Paul E. Griffiths (2008). Jesse Prinz Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):559-567.
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  17. Gary Hatfield (2007). The Passions of the Soul and Descartes's Machine Psychology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):1-35.
    Descartes developed an elaborate theory of animal physiology that he used to explain function- ally organized, situationally adapted behavior in both human and nonhuman animals. Although he restricted true mentality to the human soul, I argue that he developed a purely mechanistic (or mate- rial) ‘psychology’ of sensory, motor, and low-level cognitive functions. In effect, he sought to mech- anize the offices of the Aristotelian sensitive soul. He described the basic mechanisms in the Treatise on man, which he summarized in (...)
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  18. Michael Lacewing (2004). Book Review of Roberts, R., "Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology&Quot;. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 1:105-8.
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  19. Olivier Massin (2013). The Intentionality of Pleasures. In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi.
    This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and (...)
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  20. María G. Navarro (2011). Review of 'Reasoning. Studies of Human Inference and Its Foundations' by Jonathan E. Adler and Lance J. Rips. [REVIEW] Anuario Filosófico 44 (3):629-632.
    Reasoning es una obra monumental de más de mil páginas editada en estrecha colaboración por el filósofo Jonathan E. Adler y el psicólogo Lance J. Rips para esclarecer el intrincado campo de investigación relacionado con los fundamentos de la inferencia y, en general, del razonamiento humano. En la actualidad, en pocos casos va unido el trabajo de compilar y editar textos científicos con el afán enciclopédico: un proyecto editorial que sobrepasa con razón los objetivos de la mayor parte de los (...)
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  21. Jesse Prinz, Emotion and Aesthetic Value.
    Aesthetics is a normative domain. We evaluate artworks as better or worse, good or bad, great or grim. I will refer to a positive appraisal of an artwork as an aesthetic appreciation of that work, and I refer to a negative appraisal as aesthetic depreciation. (I will often drop the word “aesthetic.”) There has been considerable amount of work on what makes an artwork worthy of appreciation, and less, it seems, on the nature of appreciation itself. These two topics are (...)
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  22. Jesse Prinz (2008). Précis of Gut Reactions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):707–711.
  23. Jesse Prinz (2004). Emotions Embodied. In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a (...)
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  24. Jesse J. Prinz (2008). Is Emotion a Form of Perception? In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. 137-160.
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  25. Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
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  26. Rainer Reisenzein (2009). Emotional Experience in the Computational Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion. Emotion Review 1 (3):214-222.
    Based on the belief that computational modeling (thinking in terms of representation and computations) can help to clarify controversial issues in emotion theory, this article examines emotional experience from the perspective of the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion (CBDTE), a computational explication of the belief–desire theory of emotion. It is argued that CBDTE provides plausible answers to central explanatory challenges posed by emotional experience, including: the phenomenal quality,intensity and object-directedness of emotional experience, the function of emotional experience and its relation (...)
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  27. Mikko Salmela (2011). Can Emotion Be Modelled on Perception? Dialectica 65 (1):1-29.
    Perceptual theories of emotion purport to avoid the problems of traditional cognitivism and noncognitivism by modelling emotion on perception, which shares the most conspicuous dimensions of emotion, intentionality and phenomenality. In this paper, I shall reconstrue and discuss four key arguments that perceptual theorists have presented in order to show that emotion is a kind of perception, or that there are close analogies between emotion and perception. These arguments are, from stronger to weaker claims: the perceptual system argument; the argument (...)
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  28. Anastasia Philippa Scrutton (2012). Do Compassion and Other Emotions Make Us More Intelligent? Think 30 (1):47 - 57.
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  29. Andrew Sneddon (2008). Two Views of Emotional Perception. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.
    One stream in contemporary philosophical and psychological study of the emotions argues that they are perceptual capacities. The present project is to compare and contrast two possible models of emotional perception. The central difference between these models is the notion of modularity, and the corresponding overall view of the nature of the mind, that they use. One model uses classic, Fodorian modules, which S.L. Hurley characterizes as “vertical”. The other model uses “horizontal” modules. I suggest some empirical tests that might (...)
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  30. Robert C. Solomon (ed.) (2004). Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers since Aristotle have explored emotion, and the study of emotion has always been essential to the love of wisdom. In recent years Anglo-American philosophers have rediscovered and placed new emphasis on this very old discipline. The view that emotions are ripe for philosophical analysis has been supported by a considerable number of excellent publications. In this volume, Robert Solomon brings together some of the best Anglo-American philosophers now writing on the philosophy of emotion, with chapters from philosophers who have (...)
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  31. Christine Tappolet (2012). Emotions, Perceptions, and Emotional Illusions. In Calabi Clotilde (ed.), Perceptual Illusions. Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. (...)
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  32. Christine Tappolet (2005). Ambivalent Emotions and the Perceptual Account of Emotions. Analysis 65 (287):229-233.
    This paper replies to an argument due to Greenspan (1980) and to Morton (2002) against the view that emotions are perceptions of values. The argument holds that this view cannot make room for ambivalent emotions both of which are appropriate, such as when it is appropriate to feel fear and attraction towards something. This would make for a contradiction, for appropriate emotions are supposed to present things as they are. The problem, I argue, is that this line of thoughts forgets (...)
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  33. Christine Tappolet & Bruce Maxwell (2012). Gloomy Duck or Cheerful Rabbit? Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 19 (1):21-23.
    Reply to Ronald de Sousa and Douglas W. Heinrichs.
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  34. Christine Tappolet & Bruce Maxwell (2012). Rethinking Cognitive Mediation: Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and the Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 19 (1):1-12.
    Empirical assessments of Cognitive Behavioral Theory and theoretical considerations raise questions about the fundamental theoretical tenet that psychological disturbances are mediated by consciously accessible cognitive structures. This paper considers this situation in light of emotion theory in philosophy. We argue that the “perceptual theory” of emotions, which underlines the parallels between emotions and sensory perceptions, suggests a conception of cognitive mediation that can accommodate the observed empirical anomalies and one that is consistent with the dual-processing models dominant in cognitive psychology.
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  35. Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Getting a Grip on Emotional Modes. In Alix Cohen & Robert Stern (eds.), Thinking About The Emotions: A Philosophical History. Oxford.
  36. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (forthcoming). In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations? In Cain Todd & Sabine Roeser (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford.
    In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue (...)
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  37. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (2009). L'intentionnalité des Émotions: Du Corps aux Valeurs. Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales 47 (144):25-41.
  38. Irving Thalberg (1964). Emotion and Thought. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (January):45-55.
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  39. Demian Whiting (2012). Are Emotions Perceptual Experiences of Value? Ratio 25 (1):93-107.
    A number of emotion theorists hold that emotions are perceptions of value. In this paper I say why they are wrong. I claim that in the case of emotion there is nothing that can provide the perceptual modality that is needed if the perceptual theory is to succeed (where by ‘perceptual modality’ I mean the particular manner in which something is perceived). I argue that the five sensory modalities are not possible candidates for providing us with ‘emotional perception’. But I (...)
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  40. Bill Wringe (2014). The Contents of Perception and the Contents of Emotion. Noûs 48 (1).
    Several philosophers think there are important analogies between emotions and perceptual states. Furthermore, considerations about the rational assessibility of emotions have led philosophers—in some cases, the very same philosophers—to think that the content of emotions must be propositional content. If one finds it plausible that perceptual states have propositional contents, then there is no obvious tension between these views. However, this view of perception has recently been attacked by philosophers who hold that the content of perception is object-like. I shall (...)
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