v. 1. Reflection & mystery -- v. 2. Faith & reality.

Can we be realists about a general category but pluralists about concepts relating to that category? I argue that paleobiological methods of delineating species are not affected by differing species concepts, and that this underwrites an argument that species concept pluralists should be species category realists. First, the criteria by which paleobiologists delineate species are ‘indifferent’ to the species category. That is, their method for identifying species applies equally to any species concept. To identify a new species, paleobiologists show that (...) interspecies processes, such as phenotypic plasticity, sexual dimorphism, or ontogenetic diversity, are a worse explanation of the variance between specimens than intraspecies processes. As opposed to operating under a single or plurality of species concepts, then, paleobiologists use abductive inferences, which would be required regardless of any particular species concept. Second, paleobiologists are frequently interested in large-scale, long-term morphological patterns in the fossil record, and resolving the fine-grained differences which result from different species concepts is irrelevant at those scales. I argue that this claim about paleobiological practice supports what I call ‘indifference realism’ about the species category. The indifference realist argues that when legitimate investigation is indifferent to a plurality of concepts, we should be realists about the category those concepts pertain to. (shrink)

This study of axiology explores the axiocentricity of being human. Human beings dwell in the realm of value. Values are not simply what persons have; values in large part are what persons are. The mystique of values is analyzed here in terms of their cultural, phenomenological, and ontological status. The relationship between science and values is debated. Values should not be submitted to reductionism. Postmodernism raises new problems for the future of a philosophy of values. Yet, we may direct (...) our hopes toward happiness, universalism, and humanism as inseparable from value-life. (shrink)

The proper theological response to the problem of reconciling human suffering with the Christian belief in a God of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness is not to try to solve the unsolvable, but to preserve the mystery of God. The concept ‘mystery’ as attributed to God signifies intelligibility — inexhaustible intelligibility — not contradiction. Mystery suggests the range and limits of a human being's knowledge of God. We cannot know why God permits suffering in this particular (...) instance or the character of God's response to someone in the throes of suffering. We can know in a general way the necessary conditions of the possibility for the realization of God's purpose because we know the purpose of God's activity through revelation. This paper argues that if God created the universe so that creatures could share in the fullness of God's life, God could not have achieved God's purpose without any human suffering. This argument upholds the inexhaustible intelligibility of God's activity and thus preserves the mystery of God, for if God could have achieved God's purpose without any suffering, yet willed the suffering of creatures, then the eternal plan of providence and the actual unfolding of salvation history would be arbitrary and irrational. (shrink)

In this collection of new essays scientists, psychologists, theoretical physicists and other experts in the mind-body connection explore the nature of consciousness and its future as a new paradigm in science. This volume clarifies the meaning of consciousness and establishes a model for further exploration of a burgeoning realm of scientific study.

Marcel is concerned with human existence or, better, with the quality of human life which we usually recognize more or less clearly under the concepts of freedom and responsibility. Such humanity is a de jure rather than a strictly de facto notion. We are always in danger of losing, caricaturing, or forfeiting our humanity and thus the adjective subhuman assumes a genuine significance, at least as indicating a limiting concept that stands as a warning before those "techniques of degradation," the (...) modern systems of mass propaganda and thought control. (shrink)

A study of the strain and striving in the heart of human finitude, Brian Treanor’s case for melancholic joy uses the resources of hermeneutic philosophy and the arts to galvanize a hopeful counterweight to despair. Though evil and suffering are tragically ingrained in the tissue of lived experience, and entropy and loss buffet our projects and aspirations, there remains in the landscape of being a durable mystery of goodness, beauty, and grace. Treanor pits such mystery against our (...) calcified pessimisms and arid theodicies by drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s vision for a “second naiveté” of faith, gratitude, and moral responsibility that is worthy of living in – and up to – an order of things which is dark yet shining. Melancholic joy is neither resignation nor optimism, but an attuning praxis that can be realized through responsive modes of vitality, love, attention, and tragic wisdom. (shrink)

It has long been one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy, and it is now, John Searle writes, "the most important problem in the biological sciences": What is consciousness? Is my inner awareness of myself something separate from my body? In what began as a series of essays in The New York Review of Books, John Searle evaluates the positions on consciousness of such well-known scientists and philosophers as Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, Roger Penrose, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers, and (...) Israel Rosenfield. He challenges claims that the mind works like a computer, and that brain functions can be reproduced by computer programs. With a sharp eye for confusion and contradiction, he points out which avenues of current research are most likely to come up with a biological examination of how conscious states are caused by the brain. Only when we understand how the brain works will we solve the mystery of consciousness, and only then will we begin to understand issues ranging from artificial intelligence to our very nature as human beings. (shrink)

Research in experimental epistemology has revealed a great, yet unsolved mystery: why do ordinary evaluations of knowledge ascribing sentences involving stakes and error appear to diverge so systematically from the predictions professional epistemologists make about them? Two recent solutions to this mystery by Keith DeRose (2011) and N. Ángel Pinillos (2012) argue that these differences arise due to specific problems with the designs of past experimental studies. This paper presents two new experiments to directly test these responses. Results (...) vindicate previous findings by suggesting that (i) the solution to the mystery is not likely to be based on the empirical features these theorists identify, and (ii) that the salience of ascriber error continues to make the difference in folk ratings of third-person knowledge ascribing sentences. (shrink)

Upshot: Are narratives systems on their own, or rather structures supporting and, if need be, subverting the reproduction of systems? Bruce Clarke inquires into the ability of social systems theory to help understand narratives - and comes across some “mysteries of cognition” concerning the questions of how systems emerge and which of them might be considered self-referential and autopoietic.

New C. elegans studies imply that lipases and lipid desaturases can mediate signaling effects on aging. But why might fat homeostasis be critical to aging? Could problems with fat handling compromise health in nematodes as they do in mammals? The study of signaling pathways that control longevity could provide the key to one of the great unsolved mysteries of biology: the mechanism of aging. But as our view of the regulatory pathways that control aging grows ever clearer, the nature of (...) aging itself has, if anything, grown more obscure. In particular, focused investigations of the oxidative damage theory have raised questions about an old assumption: that a fundamental cause of aging is accumulation of molecular damage. Could fat dyshomeostasis instead be critical? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.4 (2000) 635-655 [Access article in PDF] The Mystery of Truth: Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin's Enlightened Mysticism David Bates "... what truth! and what error!" --Goethe on Saint-Martin 1It is hardly surprising that Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin (1743-1803), the philosophe inconnu of late Enlightenment Europe, remains almost completely unknown outside of the marginalized and exotic disciplines of esoterism, theosophy, and mysticism. Although influential in (...) certain circles, Saint-Martin failed to penetrate the mainstream of Enlightenment thought, and what influence he did have in philosophy was largely felt outside of this period altogether, revealing itself in figures such as Maistre, 2 Lamartine, 3 and German Romantics like Franz von Baader. 4 In his own lifetime Saint-Martin was met with incredulity by the forces of rationalism. Voltaire was given a copy of Saint-Martin's 1775 text Des erreurs et de la vérité by a friend of d'Alembert. Voltaire later commented to the mathematician, "I don't believe anyone has ever printed anything more absurd, [End Page 635] more obscure, more crazy, and more stupid." 5 In the Tableau de Paris, Mercier described Saint-Martin and his martinist followers as a sect which turned its back on the paths opened up by sound physics, chemistry, and all natural history in order "to run headlong into an invisible world only they perceived." Saint-Martin taught that the objects we see around us are only "fantastic and deceptive images" and that the truth lies precisely where we cannot see it, Mercier explained. "Physical experiences," the cornerstone of the dominant sensationalist doctrine, were for the martinists only "errors," an "eternal source of folly and deception," wrote Mercier. 6 One review of Saint-Martin's works described their effect as analogous to that of a "pyramid covered in hieroglyphs, erected by an unknown man in a public square," in other words, completely mystifying. 7 The revolutionary Barnave would link martinism with all the other "metaphysical follies," which were, he believed, the result of an overly speculative tendency in eighteenth-century thought. 8For his part Saint-Martin rejected what he considered to be the anti-spiritual tendency of Enlightenment thought. Responding (as a mature student) to the professor Garat, one of the idéologue followers of Condillac, at the École normale in 1795, Saint-Martin wrote: I always admire how you protect youself from materialism by endorsing... the teachings of Condillac. Although I read little, I have just gone through (very quickly, it is true) his Essai sur les origines des connaissances humaines and his Traité des sensations. Whether I have poorly grasped it, or I haven't your secret, I have come across almost no passages which do not repel me; and, I can say, have not encountered one which attracts me. His statue, for example... seems to be a mockery of nature... For me, each of the author's ideas appears to be an attack against man, a veritable homicide. 9Mystic thought, it seems, must oppose Enlightenment. At best, mysticism during the period of Enlightenment will be seen as its "underside" 10 or as the [End Page 636] preparation for coming anti-Enlightenment Romantic doctrines. 11 Indeed, the end of the Enlightenment in France saw a marked interest in esoteric thought and a mystic sensibility. 12 However, the attempt to link mysticism and Enlightenment has almost always been a critical attempt to discover the "superstitious" core of eighteenth-century rationalist thought. In this perspective the study of mystic thought in its own terms can only have antiquarian value, for the mystic approach to truth is, it is claimed, always in the form of a secret, revealed knowledge that can never withstand disciplined analysis. Saint-Martin finds his way into history as either a footnote in large books on Romantic thinking, or as the protaganist in largely incomprehensible ones examining esoteric thought. 13Here, I do not want to claim that Saint-Martin should be "included" in the Enlightenment, but a sympathetic reading of this complex... (shrink)

A clear restatement of the essentials of the Maritain approach to Christian Wisdom, the work is concerned with the nature and hierarchy of the kinds of knowledge. This hierarchizing is accomplished from that standpoint of the philosophizing Christian in which the scientific is subordinated to the philosophic and especially the metaphysical, and in which the human is subordinate to the theological and especially mystical. In such a world view the ultimate value term is the contemplative, and the possibility and actuality (...) of a "Christian Humanism" is affirmed through a relating of natural human knowledge and divine contemplation. The Christian philosopher is a finite intelligence confronting "Being" which is ultimately trans-conceptualizable and so mysterious; but God is Being Itself and so the finite intelligence tends toward God by a native and internal dynamism. The author is not concerned with the esthetico-epistemological reflections of Maritain but does carefully analyze knowledge through affective connaturality. He also attempts to develop a closer relation between a metaphysical "philosophy of nature" and modern science, construed as a mathematical interpretation and organization of phenomena, in his concept of "integrated knowledge of nature." Unfortunately there is a striking disaffection for dissenting philosophical views. In defending Thomism against its critics the author not only says that the critics do not understand it, but he also suggests that this is because its opponents, when they are sceptics and agnostics, lack Grace and so are deprived of a purely natural intellectual strength which accompanies its presence and are therefore intellectually defective. Such narrowness is offensive, not necessary to the author's thesis, and seems opposed to the spirit of Aquinas himself.—J. D. C. (shrink)

In 2013, Benedict XVI became only the second pope in the history of the Catholic Church to resign from office. In this brief but illuminating study, Giorgio Agamben argues that Benedict's gesture, far from being solely a matter of internal ecclesiastical politics, is exemplary in an age when the question of legitimacy has been virtually left aside in favor of a narrow focus on legality. This reflection on the recent history of the Church opens out into an analysis of (...) one of the earliest documents of Christianity: the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, which stages a dramatic confrontation between the "man of lawlessness" and the enigmatic katechon, the power that holds back the end of days. In Agamben's hands, this infamously obscure passage reveals the theological dynamics of history that continue to inform Western culture to this day. (shrink)

We attribute to morality an inescapable authority over human actions, but the source of this authority is mysterious. It cannot come from God, nature, or reason. Morality is best understood as a technology that aids in social cooperation, while often being rationalized as something more metaphysical.

This book contributes to the developing dialogue between cognitive science and social sciences. It focuses on a central issue in both fields, i.e. the nature and the limitations of the rationality of beliefs and action. The development of cognitive science is one of the most important and fascinating intellectual advances of recent decades, and social scientists are paying increasing attention to the findings of this new branch of science that forces us to consider many classical issues related to epistemology and (...) philosophy of action in a new light. This book encourages scholars from different fields who are interested in the dialogue between cognitive science and social sciences, to develop and analyze new perspectives that allow us to elucidate the mystery of rationality. What is rationality? What are its limitations? What rationality assumptions must be used to study social and economic phenomena? The target audience primarily comprises researchers and experts in the field. Analysis of the concept of rationality is a leitmotiv in the history of the social sciences and has involved endless disputes. Since it is difficult to give a precise definition of this concept, and there is a lack of agreement about its meaning, it is possible to say that there is a ‘mystery of rationality’. What is it to be rational? Is rationality merely instrumental or does it also involve the endorsement of values, i.e. the choice of goals? Should we consider rationality to be a normative principle or a descriptive one? Can rationality be only Cartesian or can it also be argumentative? Is rationality a conscious skill or a partly tacit one? This book, which has been written by an outstanding collection of authors, including both philosophers and social scientists, tries to make a useful contribution to the debates on these problems and shed some light on the mystery of rationality. (shrink)

In order to obtain a complete description and understanding of the whole of reality and to include a true description of what a human being is and what the totality of the human experience is, one must integrate science with a particular theology. However, which theology or religion should we use? As done in science, one must choose the theology that has the highest explanatory power—namely, by applying the principle of parsimony, Occam’s razor.

We discuss a theory presented in a posthumous paper by Alfred Tarski entitled “What are logical notions?”. Although the theory of these logical notions is something outside of the main stream of logic, not presented in logic textbooks, it is a very interesting theory and can easily be understood by anybody, especially studying the simplest case of the four basic logical notions. This is what we are doing here, as well as introducing a challenging fifth logical notion. We first recall (...) the context and origin of what are here called Tarski-Lindenbaum logical notions. In the second part, we present these notions in the simple case of a binary relation. In the third part, we examine in which sense these are considered as logical notions contrasting them with an example of a nonlogical relation. In the fourth part, we discuss the formulations of the four logical notions in natural language and in first-order logic without equality, emphasizing the fact that two of the four logical notions cannot be expressed in this formal language. In the fifth part, we discuss the relations between these notions using the theory of the square of opposition. In the sixth part, we introduce the notion of variety corresponding to all non-logical notions and we argue that it can be considered as a logical notion because it is invariant, always referring to the same class of structures. In the seventh part, we present an enigma: is variety formalizable in first-order logic without equality? There follow recollections concerning Jan Woleński. This paper is dedicated to his 80th birthday. We end with the bibliography, giving some precise references for those wanting to know more about the topic. (shrink)

In a comparative study of karma theodicy and atonement theodicy, as developed by some Hindu and Christian theologians, this article argues that they present teleological visions where individuals become purged, purified, and perfected in and through their worldly suffering. A karma theodicy operates with the notion that there is some form of proportionality between past evil and present suffering, even if such correlations can only be traced by an enlightened sage or are known to the omniscient God. Christian mystics too (...) seek not so much to explain suffering as to identify suffering with the agony of Christ on the cross, and they envision such suffering as part of a unitive journey where their love of Christ is purified. In these ways, both styles of theodicy use rational resources towards the goal of explanation, while reminding their adherents that the faltering intelligibility that they seek is to be seen as an integral component of their active participation in a sense of theological mystery that enfolds, and yet transcends, their finite existences. (shrink)

Common monogenic genetic diseases, ones that have unexpectedly high frequencies in certain populations, have attracted a great number of conflicting evolutionary explanations. This paper will attempt to explain the mystery of why two particularly extensively studied common genetic diseases, Tay Sachs disease and cystic fibrosis, remain evolutionary mysteries despite decades of research. I review the most commonly cited evolutionary processes used to explain common genetic diseases: reproductive compensation, random genetic drift (in the context of founder effect), and especially heterozygote (...) advantage. The latter process has drawn a particularly large amount of attention, having so successfully explained the elevated frequency of sickle cell anemia in malaria-endemic areas. However, the empirical evidence for heterozygote advantage in other common genetic diseases is quite weak. I introduce and illustrate the significance of a hierarchy of genetic disease phenomena found within the genetic disease explanations, which include the phenomena: single mutation variants of a common genetic disease, single genetic diseases, and classes of diseases with related phenotypic effects. I demonstrate that some of the confusion over the explanations of common genetic diseases can be traced back to confusions over which phenomena are being explained. I proceed to briefly evaluate the existing evidence for two common human genetic diseases: Tay Sachs disease and cystic fibrosis. The above considerations will ultimately shed light on why these diseases’ evolutionary explanations remain so deeply unresolved after so such a great volume of research. (shrink)

The extent to which the scientific method has yielded to analysis in recent years serves only to emphasize by contrast the presence within that method of an irrational element. For it is becoming increasingly evident that whatever one may say of the logical and psychological character of the pre-inductive operations, of the formal processes involved in deducing the consequences of a given theory, of the technique of experimental corroboration, and of certain other aspects of the scientific method, there is one (...) phase of the movement which remains a surd. This is the act of the creative imagination through which hypotheses and theories are called into being. Its mysterious character is exhibited in the terminology which is employed in describing it, in the variety and inconstancy of the conditions which give rise to it, in the apparent impossibility of controlling it, and in the impossibility of recognizing completely the adequacy of its results when it does occur. It is variously described as an act of intuition, mystic revelation, divine insight, a flash of understanding; it arises out of the greatest variety of conditions: acute and prolonged attention to the data in the confinement of the laboratory, or the complete relaxation of a walk in the country, or the intense mental effort upon a problem in a wholly unrelated field; it forbids direction, in fact it seems to arise most readily when the element of effort and control is conspicuously absent; it cannot even be certainly identified, for many supposed acts of discovery prove later to have produced only groundless fancies and absurd creations of the unguided imagination. (shrink)

Mimicry of appearance or of facial, vocal, or gestural expressions emerges frequently among members of different species. When such mimicry directly relates to affective aspects of an interaction, researchers talk about “emotional mimicry”. Emotional mimicry has been amply documented but its functionality is still debated. Why and when do people mimic the expressions of others, who benefits, the mimicker or the mimicked, and how do they benefit? Which processes underlie emotional mimicry? Is it completely automatic and unconscious or can it (...) be deliberate and conscious? The current Theory Section addresses these questions from different theoretical perspectives. The invited article by Hess and Fischer focused on the role of mimicry in social regulation and social bonding. The invited comment by Krets and Akyüz highlights information gathering and prediction in social interaction. The invited comment by Bernhold and Giles emphasizes vocal communication and its role in interpersonal accommodation. In this editorial, I propose the different theoretical perspectives may be integrated by assuming a multilevel appraisal and response generation mechanism. I also suggest that emotional mimicry research may be broadened by including social learning, vocal imitation, interspecies comparisons, and affective computing approaches. (shrink)

''The authors' style is clear, making the book accessible to newcomers, and the illustrations are excellent. There can be no doubt that this book will remain the standard work in the subject, and it will appeal to readers of all types.'' -Sir Patrick Moore in the Times Higher Education Supplement ''It will surely be the standard work on the subject for many years to come and we await with interest the outcome of further research into this fascinating subject.'' -Society for (...) the History of AstronomyFor thousands of years, one scientific puzzle has fascinated and perplexed the greatest philosophers, mathematicians, physicists, and psychologists - why do the moon and sun appear so much larger on the horizon than when high up in the sky? Now, two leading psychologists have provided a compelling account of this fascinating illusion. Taking us through the history, the characters involved, the attempts made to explain the illusion, through to modern day studies of visual perception, the book is the most comprehensive account of this puzzle so far. This is a work which will remain, for some time to come, the definitive book on a mystery that has fascinated and tested the greatest minds throughout the ages. Accessibly written, it will appeal to readers of popular science, along with those within the disciplines of psychology, mathematics, astronomy, and philosophy, from undergraduate upwards. (shrink)