There is a tension between the idea of popular sovereignty and our understanding that basic constitutional rights and liberties have a normative authority which is independent from the results of democratic decision‐making procedures. On the one hand there is the claim that the content of political justice, at least as far as the basic liberties are concerned, is to be fixed solely by substantive moral and political argument, while on the other there is the claim that it is the people (...) who determine the specific scheme of basic liberties that they live under. The apparent tension between the two claims can be resolved by introducing, firstly, a distinction between the concept of justice and the concept of legitimacy and, secondly, between proto‐rights and constitutional rights. Unlike constitutional rights, proto‐rights are moral, not legal, rights, and they are less specific than constitutional rights: one set of proto‐rights allows for various schemes of legal constitutional rights. Proto‐rights are part of the principles of justice and can be established only by substantive argument while constitutional rights have to be established by the procedures of democratic legitimization, and, therefore, they are a result of the exercise of popular sovereignty. The correlated distinctions between justice and legitimacy, and between proto‐rights and constitutional rights, allow us to specify the scope of the two claims and, hence, to affirm both simultaneously. The philosophical and legal relevance of the distinctions made is elucidated by a brief discussion of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech in the US and Germany. (shrink)

The paper discusses the problem of global distributive justice. It proposes to distinguish between principles for the domestic and for the global or intersocietal distribution of wealth. It is argued that there may be a plurality of partly diverging domestic conceptions of distributive justice, not all of which need to be liberal egalitarian conceptions. It is maintained, however, that principles regulating the intersocietal distribution of wealth have to be egalitarian principles. This claim is defended against Rawls's argument in The Law (...) of Peoples that egalitarian principles of distributive justice should not be applied globally. Moreover, it is explained in detail, why Rawls's “duty of assistance to burdened societies” cannot be an appropriate substitute for a global principle of distributive justice. (shrink)

Demokratische Systeme sind auch dann, wenn sie den grundrechtlichen Forderungen politischer Gerechtigkeit genügen, kritikwürdig und reformbedürftig, solange es ihnen nicht gelingt, allen Bürgern gerechte Anteile an den gesellschaftlich produzierten Reichtümern zu sichern. Bei den Auseinandersetzungen um Arbeitsmarktpolitik, Steuerpolitik, Erziehungspolitik, Meinungs- und Willensfreiheit steht auch Grundsätzlicheres zur Debatte: Was verstehen wir unter sozialer Gerechtigkeit? In Gerechtfertigte Ungleichheiten werden die Grundzüge einer Theorie sozialer Gerechtigkeit entwickelt. Es handelt sich um eine egalitäre Theorie, die soziale Ungleichheit ausdrücklich zulässt, diese aber an das Vorliegen (...) bestimmter öffentlicher Rechtfertigungsgründe bindet. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band untersucht, welchen Einfluss wissenschaftliche Innovationen wie die Künstliche Intelligenz auf den Alltag haben. So wird die Beziehung von Wissenschaft und Öffentlichkeit unter den Aspekten der Verantwortung der Wissenschaftler/-innen, der Anwendung von Innovationen im öffentlichen Leben und der Wahrnehmung dieser Innovationen in der Öffentlichkeit beleuchtet.

This chapter contains section titled: Human Rights in Rawls's The Law of Peoples Human Rights as Universal Claim Rights Human Rights Minimalism and the Problem of Justification Acknowledgments Notes.

Es gibt keine Gesellschaft, die nicht von der modernen Wissenschaft und ihren Folgen betroffen wäre. Es besteht auch keine ernsthafte Hoffnung, dass sich die weltweiten Herausforderungen wie Klima, Ungleichheit oder Migration ohne wissenschaftliche Forschung und Reflexion bewältigen ließen. Jede Gesellschaft und jede Regierung sind daher auf die Wissenschaft angewiesen. Für Demokratien stellt sich die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Politik und Wissenschaft allerdings noch einmal in besonderer Weise, erscheint die Wissenschaft dort doch als etwas, das alle angeht und über das (...) deswegen öffentlich verhandelt werden muss. Der Band 'Öffentliche Vernunft? Die Wissenschaft in der Demokratie' widmet sich der Frage, mit welchen Schwierigkeiten sich die Idealvorstellung eines öffentlichen und vernunftgeleiteten Diskurses über die Relevanz wissenschaftlicher Ergebnisse in modernen Demokratien konfrontiert sieht. Anhand so unterschiedlicher Fragestellungen wie den Problemen wissenschaftlicher Politikberatung, dem Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und medialer Öffentlichkeit, den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer citizen science und der Rolle von Ethik und Politik in der Universität eröffnen die versammelten Beiträge neue Perspektiven auf das komplexe Verhältnis von Wissenschaft, Politik und medialer und nicht-medialer Öffentlichkeit. (shrink)

In The Idea of Justice Amartya Sen criticises ‘transcendental institutionalism’ for entertaining notions of ‘ideal justice’ that, are neither necessary nor sufficient for the advancement of justice in the real world. Sen argues in favor of a ‘realization- focused’ and ‘comparative’ understanding of justice that he associates with the names of Adam Smith, Marx, and J. S. Mill. Conceptions of ideal justice. Sen believes, are useless since in practice we do not need them to advance justice. And they are ‘infeasible’ (...) because all conceptions of ideal justice can be reasonably rejected for one reason or other. I shall address both complaints in turn and maintain that Sen’s rigid contra-position of ideal and comparative justice is overstated. It will also be discussed how the institutional focus of ‘transcendental institutionalism’ links up with the need for an ideal conception of justice. Finally, some implications of rational dissent about justice and two common strategies to deal with it will be discussed. (shrink)

Natural deduction (for short: nd-) calculi have not been used systematically as a basis for automated theorem proving in classical logic. To remove objective obstacles to their use we describe (1) a method that allows to give semantic proofs of normal form theorems for nd-calculi and (2) a framework that allows to search directly for normal nd-proofs. Thus, one can try to answer the question: How do we bridge the gap between claims and assumptions in heuristically motivated ways? This informal (...) question motivates the formulation of intercalation calculi. Ic-calculi are the technical underpinnings for (1) and (2), and our paper focuses on their detailed presentation and meta-mathematical investigation in the case of classical predicate logic. As a central theme emerges the connection between restricted forms of nd-proofs and (strategies for) proof search: normal forms are not obtained by removing local "detours", but rather by constructing proofs that directly reflect proof-strategic considerations. That theme warrants further investigation. (shrink)

Since their inception, the Perspectives in Logic and Lecture Notes in Logic series have published seminal works by leading logicians. Many of the original books in the series have been unavailable for years, but they are now in print once again. This volume, the fifteenth publication in the Lecture Notes in Logic series, collects papers presented at the symposium 'Reflections on the Foundations of Mathematics' held in celebration of Solomon Feferman's 70th birthday (The 'Feferfest') at Stanford University, California in 1988. (...) Feferman has shaped the field of foundational research for nearly half a century. These papers reflect his broad interests as well as his approach to foundational research, which emphasizes the solution of mathematical and philosophical problems. There are four sections, covering proof theoretic analysis, logic and computation, applicative and self-applicative theories, and philosophy of modern mathematical and logic thought. (shrink)

In his classic paper On Computable Numbers Turing analyzed what can be done by a human computor in a routine, “mechanical” way. He argued that mechanical op-erations obey locality conditions and are carried out on configurations satisfying boundedness conditions. Processes meeting these restrictive conditions can be shown to be computable by a Turing machine. Turing viewed memory limitations of computors as the ultimate reason for the restrictive conditions. In contrast, Gandy analyzed in his paper Church’s Thesis and Principles for Mechanisms (...) what can be done by “discrete deterministic mechanical devices” and appealed to physical considerations to motivate restrictive principles. These devices include, crucially, ones that carry out parallel processes, e.g., cellular automata. Following Turing’s methodological ways and guided by Conway’s “Game of Life” as a paradigm, Gandy formulated four restrictive principles and proved that devices satisfying them are computationally equivalent to Turing machines. (shrink)

In this article we give a unifying approach to the theory of fundamental sequences and their related Hardy hierarchies of number-theoretic functions and we show the equivalence of the new approach with the classical one.

[1] Textteil : Grundlagen, Prozeduren, Evaluation -- [2] Anhang : Interviewleitfaden, Tonbandtranskript und Auswertungsbeispiele.

Thema der vorliegenden Arbeit ist der dialektische Gehalt der wichtigsten bildungstheoretischen Abhandlungen des padagogischen Theoretikers Josef Derbolav. Ergebnis der zum grossten Teil immanent durchgefuhrten Analyse ist der Aufweis, dass Derbolav die dialektische Fassung didaktischer, anthropologischer und handlungstheoretischer Prinzipien aufgrund metaphysischer Denkstrukturen nicht oder nur teilweise gelingt. Inwieweit einige dieser Prinzipien dialektisches Potential enthalten konnten, zeigt der Verfasser anhand der Entwicklung eines eigenen, an der hermeneutischen Philosophie orientierten dialektischen Standpunktes.".