The theory of relations presented in this article consists of the general and the special theory of relations. The formulae of the former are meaningful and its laws valid for relations of any type. The meaningfulness of expressions and the validity of laws of the latter are restricted to relations of a certain special type. The special theory of relations is distinguished from the applied theory of relations. The applied theory of relations is the general theory applied to relations of (...) a special type, the difference between the general and the applied being in the form of the variables. The special theory of relations and the applied theory, when concerned with relations of the same special type, may differ with respect to the form of constants without differing with respect to variables. (shrink)

The author attempts to verify whether defining totalitarianism in terms of a state striving to obtain total control over the life of individuals and collectives is a proper approach. Does totalitarianism genuinely imply a society completely subordinated to a state? And, in dealing with the political realities of a totalitarian regime, can we consider a totality other than that created by the state? The author reaches for Carl Schmitt’s reflections on political totality and its subjects. It is thanks to this (...) approach that we are able to look at a totalitarian structure more primal than a state, the structure that is a total society. The author presents a historical and philosophical description of the process of forming a total society, which begins with the discontinuation of the distance between that which falls to the state and that which falls to society. (shrink)

The idea of a law-governed state, which is referred to so commonly, exists as a synonym of the principle of the supreme meaning and standing of the constitution in the state system. The law-governed state in its pure form is one where the law provides not only the framework and barriers for the state and the actions of the authorities, but a state wherein its beginning and foundations are rooted in the law. The concept of the law-governed state has many (...) highly detailed elements ; its essence, however, is the recognition of the law as a particular means and a yardstick with which both the state’s system and the recognition of the legal standards vested with the power to shape social relationships, the regulatory power, are moulded. It is the prestige of the law – nomos basileus – which should be the source of state order. The supremacy of the law provides the premise on which the introduction of every detailed solution which turns the idea of the law-governed state into specifics, is based. If the rule of law, rather than that of the authorities is to exist, this must be a law wherein each citizen may contribute to its shape; ideally it will be one established directly by the citizens rather than by the established authorities, democratic in an indirect way. This must be a law binding upon everyone equally, observed by everyone, operating effectively and surely. It must also be a law made for society’s sake rather than for that of an idea, and it must be fitting to those realities, standards and common practices that exist in that society. It must also be a law not too rigorous and imposing neither excessive requirements nor strange measures. (shrink)

This article contains a summary of selected theses of the theory of the state developed by Hermann Heller, who was one of the leading representatives of the so-called Weimar Theory of the State. State theorists of the Weimar era formed an independent, formally unrelated group of scientists who had often opposing views, but were united by a common effort to conduct even philosophical investigation of the nature of the state, the European, continental state, as well as its internal ratio and (...) mission. In addition to Hermann Heller, this group included Carl Schmitt, Rudolf Smend, Erich Kaufmann and Heinrich Triepel. They asked questions which are absent in today’s science, such as: “What is a state?”, “What kind of being is it and what is its nature?”. The answers determine many issues, including our perception of the durability and strength of the state, our understanding of its structure and development, the relation between the state and the individual and the relation between politics and history, etc. No settlement of this basic issue is not only simple negligence, but – as can be judged – it stems from today’s tacit assumption that the state is not a being, but only an artificial human construct, a combination of elements and a set of institutions. Heller perceives the state substantially: as particular organization of social affairs; organization of specific areas of public life: economy, law and public opinion. These were created in the modern era and have been specific to Europe from the sixteenth century to modern times. The matter of these areas is transformed into a state order by sovereign authorities. Therefore, their policies and their law have their concrete object whose reality they face, and they need to demonstrate that they are capable of organizing this reality. The ethos of the state and at the same time the legitimacy of its power require that elementary principles of justice are ensured, or at least injustice is eliminated from social life. (shrink)

The author presents defi nitions of the concepts ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’, which were formed in the modern era on the grounds of the European philosophy of politics, and reads them in the context of the Polish historical and political experience. He posits that the two concepts make up an inseparable whole belonging to the European tradition of statehood, in which sovereignty is the fundamental feature of a state and of a political structure, a feature which such a structure, if it (...) constitutes a state must, in a way, by definition, possess. Sovereignty is a unique feature of a state because it stands apart from state’s other traits; it also stands apart from the state itself. It is distinct among other features, because the latter assume its existence, as it is only a sovereign state which can have the real, authentic and lasting features which determine its identity and character. (shrink)

Ocherk 1. Voprosy ontologii -- Ocherk 2. Voprosy ėtiki i ėstetiki -- Ocherk 3. Voprosy gnoseologii i aksiologii.

According to Carl Schmitt, the phenomenon of the political has different forms. These forms can be distinguished based on different possible relationships between political action and the state. This article presents the history of what Schmitt refers to as the phenomenon of partisanship. Partisanship is a specific form of politics, established in the early ninetieth century, which has gradually expanded its presence. Partisan activity is characterized by totality, which has evolved to become the dominant component of political action over time, (...) particularly in the twentieth century. This totality affects not only the size and range of political activity, but it is also – and perhaps first of all – ruthless in its use of terror and violence, which is considered entirely justified by total partisans/terrorists. (shrink)

The author describes the moment of the emergence of the concept of sovereignty, its causes, historical significance, as well as the issues raised in the debate over this concept since the seventeenth century. Sovereignty refers to the state and points to its essential feature, which defines the state as the result of occidental rationalism (Max Weber). According to this definition, the state is different from other, earlier and parallel political forms, such as republics and empires. However, changes in the history (...) of the state also affect the way in which sovereignty is understood. Consequently, the concept of sovereignty is often difficult to justify or is even – as some authors claim – anachronistic. The author outlines different approaches in the discussion about the validity of this concept and their premises. He also describes the relationship between the principle of sovereignty and the democratic rule of law. (shrink)

The main issue is: what is the State? An article presents what the concept of State entails, the essential elements of its structure, and the basic stages of its development. The State is a historical creation. It has a specific existential cause and purpose, and a set organizational framework within which its entire ethical and political substance must be inscribed. The framework and the substance of the State are distinct spheres, and the awareness of the distinction between these two spheres (...) is important. At the same time, they can only be distinguished in the abstract. In reality one cannot separate them or glimpse them functioning separately, as if on different levels. In reality both dimensions interpenetrate and are mixed together. The organizational dimension only exists as a condition for the axiological, albeit a necessary condition. The other, axiological dimension is also necessary, but in a different way. The first is necessary because of the realities of life, the real situation. The second is necessary in the moral sense. Necessity in the moral sense is immutable, whereas the necessity of an organizational framework depends on the historical-social situation and can therefore change. Thus, if the conditions, circumstances or the factual situation should change, then the organizational framework could actually turn out to be useless, whereas the values and ideals remained necessary. (shrink)

Prologue, invitation to thinking about God In the Hebrew Bible? -- Part I, questions about God? -- Why does God in the Bible have a body? -- What do God's body parts in the Bible mean? -- Why is God angry in the Bible? -- Does God in the Bible have gender or sexuality? -- Part II, questions about God in the world? -- What can creation tell us about God? -- Who-or what-is the Satan? -- Why do people suffer (...) according to the Hebrew Bible? -- Epilogue, God in the Bible and beyond. (shrink)

Many books explain what is known about the universe. This book investigates what cannot be known. Rather than exploring the amazing facts that science, mathematics, and reason have revealed to us, this work studies what science, mathematics, and reason tell us cannot be revealed. In The Outer Limits of Reason, Noson Yanofsky considers what cannot be predicted, described, or known, and what will never be understood. He discusses the limitations of computers, physics, logic, and our own thought processes. Yanofsky describes (...) simple tasks that would take computers trillions of centuries to complete and other problems that computers can never solve; perfectly formed English sentences that make no sense; different levels of infinity; the bizarre world of the quantum; the relevance of relativity theory; the causes of chaos theory; math problems that cannot be solved by normal means; and statements that are true but cannot be proven. He explains the limitations of our intuitions about the world -- our ideas about space, time, and motion, and the complex relationship between the knower and the known. Moving from the concrete to the abstract, from problems of everyday language to straightforward philosophical questions to the formalities of physics and mathematics, Yanofsky demonstrates a myriad of unsolvable problems and paradoxes. Exploring the various limitations of our knowledge, he shows that many of these limitations have a similar pattern and that by investigating these patterns, we can better understand the structure and limitations of reason itself. Yanofsky even attempts to look beyond the borders of reason to see what, if anything, is out there. (shrink)

This chapter develops a perceptual solution to the epistemological problem of other minds, relying on central ideas from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. The Merleau-Pontian account is contrasted with another attempted perceptual solution to the other minds problem, and it is argued that only the former meets the phenomenologists' desideratum of providing an alternative to inferential solutions. The chapter also provides responses to various objections to the perceptual solution, including a pair of objections recently put forward by Alec Hyslop.

Richard Janko's acclaimed translation of Aristotle's _Poetics_ is accompanied by the most comprehensive commentary available in English that does not presume knowledge of the original Greek. Two other unique features are Janko's translations with notes of both the _Tractatus Coislinianus_, which is argued to be a summary of the lost second book of the Poetics, and fragments of Aristotle’s dialogue On Poets, including recently discovered texts about catharsis, which appear in English for the first time.

Study of Hans-Georg Gadamer's and Julius Stenzel's interpretations of Plato.

"Williams's masterful translation satisfies (at last!) a long-standing need. There are lots of good translations of Augustine's great work, but until now we have been forced to choose between those that strive to replicate in English something of the majesty and beauty of Augustine's Latin style and those that opt instead to convey the careful precision of his philosophical terminology and argumentation. Finally, Williams has succeeded in capturing both sides of Augustine's mind in a richly evocative, impeccably reliable, elegantly readable (...) presentation of one of the most impressive achievements in Western thought--Augustine's Confessions." --Scott MacDonald, Professor of Philosophy and Norma K. Regan Professor in Christian Studies, Cornell University. (shrink)