In this paper, we outline a theory of the nature of self-directed agents. What is distinctive about self-directed agents is their ability to anticipate interaction processes and to evaluate their performance, and thus their sensitivity to context. They can improve performance relative to goals, and can, in certain instances, construct new goals. We contrast self-directedness with reactive action processes that are not modifiable by the agent, though they may be modified by supra-agent processes such as populational adaptation or external design.Self-directedness (...) lies at the nexus of issues concerning the evolution and nature of intentionality, intelligence, and agency. It provides some insight into the evolution of intelligence because it helps explain how organisms are able to manage variable interaction processes, e.g., a hunting strategy that varies with prey type, ground condition, and hunger level. Simple self-directed organisms like bumblebees manage variability in one or a few dimensions. (shrink)

vol. I. Logic: Categoriae. De interpretatione. Analytica priora. Analytica posteriora.--vol. II. Natural philosophy: Physica. De caelo. De generatione et corruptione.--vol. III. Psychology: De anima. Parva Naturalia.--vol. IV. Metaphysics: Metaphysica.--vol. V. Ethics: Ethica Nicomachea.--vol. VI. Politics and poetics: Politica. De poetica.

D W Hamlyn; The Concept of Development, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 9, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 26–39, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.197.

D W Hamlyn; Education and Wittgenstein's Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 213–222, https://doi.org/10.1111.

It is through our actions that we affect the way the world goes. Whenever we face a choice of what to do, we also face a choice of which of various possible worlds to actualize. Moreover, whenever we act intentionally, we act with the aim of making the world go a certain way. It is only natural, then, to suppose that an agent's reasons for action are a function of her reasons for preferring some of these possible worlds to others, (...) such that what she has most reason to do is to bring about the possible world which, of all those available to her, is the one that she has most reason to want to obtain. This is what is known as the `teleological conception of practical reasons'. Whether this is the correct conception of practical reasons is important not only in its own right, but also in virtue of its potential implications for what sort of moral theory we should accept. Below, I argue that the teleological conception is indeed the correct conception of practical reasons. (shrink)

D W Hamlyn; Need Philosophy of Education be so Dreary?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 159–165, https://doi.org/10.1.

D W Hamlyn; Knowledge and the Beginnings of Understanding: a reply to R. K. Elliott, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages.

Central to Elements is an assay of the attributional union properties and relations have with their subjects, a topic historically left metaphorical. The work critiques eight Aristotelian assumptions concerning attribute dependence and ‘inherence’, per se subjects, attributes as agent-organizers, and unity-by-a-shared-one. Groups of these assumptions are seen to yield contradiction, vicious regress, or other problems. This analysis, joined with insights from an assay of ubiquitous structure, motivate ten theses explicating attribution and its primary ontic status. The theses detail: attributes proper (...) as individuated instances, structure as instance-generated facts and their two forms of composition, the conditioning role and universal nature of instances’ component intensions, the primacy of attribute instances for generating all forms of composition and complex entities, and identity and indiscernibility criteria for the latter. Principal is the insight that attribution is intension-determined combinatorial agency. It is its systematizing implications that provide solutions to classic problems, e.g., Composition, Individuation, and Universals, and in net generate a comprehensive one-category structuralist ontology. (shrink)

A model of spontaneous collapse of fermionic degrees of freedom in a quantum field is presented which has the advantages that it explicitly maintains energy conservation and gives results in agreement with an existing numerical method for calculating quantum state evolution, namely the quantum trajectories model.

D. W. Peetz; III—Falsification in Science, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 69, Issue 1, 1 June 1969, Pages 17–31, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristo.

D W Hamlyn; How Does Knowledge Start? A Reply to Pamela Moore, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 137, https://doi.org/1.

D W Hamlyn; Reply to David E. Cooper, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 105–108, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.19.

D. W. Hamlyn; X—The Obligation to Keep a Promise, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 179–194, https://doi.org/10.10.

Originally published in 1957, the primary aim of this study was to shed light upon the logical character of the psychology of perception. D.W. Hamlyn begins by delimiting the field of psychological inquiry into perception, then gives a detailed account of the types of explanation appropriate in the field. He maintains that these explanations have certain important peculiarities which distinguish them from other scientific inquiries. In view of the central importance of Gestalt Theory in this field an account is given (...) of its origins, and its main features are critically discussed. The work should still be of considerable interest to both philosophers and psychologists, as well as to all those interested in the relations between the two subjects. (shrink)

D. W. Mertz provides a "new" competitor in the universals debate by reviving, developing, and defending the medieval doctrine of Moderate Realism. This book is a substantial contribution to ontology and logic, combining interesting new arguments for polyadic relations and unit attributes, careful and thorough historical studies, and a logic that could solve many old problems.