Merleau-Ponty's reversibility thesis argues that self, other and world are inherently relational, interdependent at the level of ontology. What is at stake in the reversibility thesis is whether it overcomes skeptical objections in both assuring real communication and avoiding solipsism in assuring real difference; the Other must be a genuine, irreducible Other. It is objected that across the domains of reversibility, symmetry and reciprocity are not guaranteed. I argue that this is a non-problem; rather the potentialities for asymmetry and (...) non reciprocity in fact guarantee the irreducibility of the Other; reversibility needs to be appreciated as dialectical or aesthetic, not as a literal or ‘mechanistic’ reversal. A further criticism targets the viability of ontology itself, whether alterity is ever compatible with ontology. This paper considers these objections from two of Merleau-Ponty's contemporaries—Claude Lefort and Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas developed a philosophy which while intersecting with Merleau-Ponty's at important junctures, nonetheless arrived at an entirely different destination. I argue alongside Martin Dillon against the objections of Lefort, and alongside Dan Zahavi against the objections of Levinas. Both of these interpreters, I propose remain faithful to the core directions and spirit of Merleau-Ponty's endeavours without becoming diverted by the less significant inconsistencies. (shrink)

Although their work in the philosophy of biology is not well known, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Ruyer all offer interesting and heterodox accounts of the life and environmental sciences and the organism in particular. In this chapter, we discuss their respective views, with a focus on their shared criticisms of Neo- Darwinism and the way this tradition grasped the structural coupling between organism and environment. We also outline some significant differences between each of them concerning how to conceive of that (...) holistic relation and the extent of “captivation” of the animal to its environment. Given that there are indications that the twenty-first century might be post-genomic/epigenetic, we argue that it is worth revisiting these neglected organicist trajectories that sought to navigate between mechanism and vitalism. (shrink)

Philosophical speech is required to reach the core of the things themselves, often at the risk of subsuming the individual thing under the law of a general concept and ruining its singularity. Is another approach available to philosophy at all? The question of the violence of the discourse has been raised by many thinkers in the 20th century. Just as Wittgenstein, Husserl demanded for a replacement of deduction by description which would let the things appear in their own light. (...) class='Hi'>Merleau-Ponty has rephrased the task of a maieutic phenomenology in terms of”letting see through words” (faire voir par les mots), whereas the direct, exhaustive thematization is given up for an indirect speech, letting the world speak in its own “prose”. While the “indirect ontology” in Merleau-Ponty’s last works has received wide attention these last years, little case has been made of the linguistic implications of the figure of its philosophical operator, the “indirect speech”. What is the status of the “ logos” in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomeno-”logy”? By relating Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the language of philosophy (rather than on philosophy of language) to the linguistic discussion on free indirect speech (Tobler, Kalepky, Bakhtin) as well as to its use in literature, from Dostoyevsky to Claude Simon, a new perspective opens up of an “indirect ethics”, which implies that whoever speaks in the name of the Other is already spoken by him or by her. (shrink)

O pensamento de Merleau-Ponty e ainsistência da ambiguidade.

It is my contention that there is a significant relationship between “Phenomenology of Perception” (Merleau-Ponty) and “The Second Sex” (de Beauvoir). The two authors give great importancc to the lived body (Leib), either from a neutral perspective, either from a perspective feminine. This key concept of the phenomenology allows us to understand the lived experience of women and their possible relationship with feminism. From this corporeal sense we analyze the Merleau-Pontinian redefinition of subjectivity and reason. We emphasize his (...) criticism of reductionism, both epistemological as ontological. We refute certain feminists accusations against Merleau-Ponty. To do this, we study all his work in search of traces of women, we place them in context, while we study his own hermeneutics of psychoanalysis in order to highlight the contribution of it to the deconstruction of stereotypes about femininity. We conclude by showing the main keys of this phenomenology for· the current feminist Philosophy. (shrink)

Much work has been done, recently, on the harms and benefits of shaming. One may argue, for example, that feeling shamed inherently alienates and forecloses, and thus quite harmful to a compulsorily social and futurally oriented creature. This does not, however, preclude the argument that shame is ethically useful, providing, at a very basic, felt level, the absolute prohibitions such a social, futural, creature requires. This paper does not claim to finally evaluate shame itself. Instead I look to Merleau-Ponty, (...) seeking the fleshly and felt structures of the social world – of our innate proximity and intimacy, as well as our isolation and alienation – within the embodied phenomenon of being ashamed. From the contours of this spontaneous, yet admittedly dangerous, corporeo-social phenomenon, there is comes an intimation of an ethics of the flesh: one which compels us to at least attempt to heed the often opaque, even mysterious powers of our bodies, not only for the good of our intimate others, but for the good of entire peoples. (shrink)

Hoje, chega ainda até mim a pergunta que Merleau-Ponty, em 1935, na École Normale Supérieure, fazia insistentemente a Desanti - 'Que é que tu te propões esclarecer com isso?' Como se a pergunta me fosse dirigida, tenho a impressão de responder que, nesta dissertação, pretendo tão só um pouco de luz sobre o mistério da morte. Tal como a percepção é um mistério, e cada um de nós vive no mundo no interior da fé perceptiva, assim o mistério da (...) vida, que nos permite a existência, envolve a si a esperança de que a morte seja aparência da dimensão do visível. (shrink)

Objectivo deste artigo é, antes de mais, propor uma introdução à leitura das Notes de Cours du Collège de France (1956-1960) dedicadas por Maurice Merleau-Ponty ao conceito de Natureza. O artigo parte da constatação de que na meditação merleau-pontyana a Natureza assume o lugar de uma importante ramificação do questionamento ontológico. Mostra-se, dessa forma, por que razão devemos ver na Natureza uma folha de Ser ou o próprio Sensível, já visível no animal e inscrito no corpo como espaço-tempo (...) vivido, eco esteseológico, pensamento selvagem ou experiência de uma universalidade que, para aquém de qualquer esforço noético, se desvela nas dobras de uma continuidade ontológica sem quebras. /// Aim of this paper is to shed light on some of the central themes that Merleau-Ponty pursued throughout his Notes de Cours du Collàge de France, 1956-1960, thus presenting what might be considered the main features of Merleau-Ponty's meditation on the concept of Nature. The paper starts by underlining how much Nature is part of the ontological quest of Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy. According to Merleau-Ponty, nature needs to be seen as a leaf of Being or the Sensible itself present in any living being and in its environment, but also as inscribed in the body of the painter, beyond any noetic effort, as lived space-time, estheseological echo, savage thinking or an experience of the universal sensed as an ontological continuity without losses. (shrink)

The flesh of Merleau-Ponty how is that to be understood within the context of Husserl's phenomenology? The answer provided in the book: Historicity - by the use of the method of phenomenological reduction in its unity with constitution such as Husserl's phenomenology exhibits it. Thus the reversibility as the ultimate truth - time and time-consciousness, the coexisting and interweaving of sedimentations and original formations of meaning - experiencing evidences, history and the historicity - finally: Life-world, Body and Flesh.