One use of the noun ‘pain’ is exemplified in sentences like ‘There is a pain in my foot’. According to the Experiential Theory, ‘pain’ in this context refers to an experience located in the mind or brain. According to the Bodily Theory, it refers to an extra-cranial bodily occurrence located in a body part. In this paper, I defend the Bodily Theory. Specifically, I argue that pains are proximal activations of nociceptors that cause experiences of pain. This view is preferable (...) to the Experiential Theory, because it accords better with common sense and offers a better interpretation or semantics of ordinary pain reports. (shrink)

It is common in cognitive science to ascribe psychological predicates to the brain, i.e. to assert that the brain sees, feels, thinks, etc. This has prompted philosophical debate. According to the Nonsense View, the relevant locutions of cognitive scientists are nonsensical or false (Bennett and Hacker 2003, 2007). According to the Literal View, they are literal truths and report the psychological properties of brains (Dennett 2007; Crane 2015; Figdor 2018). In this paper, I propose the Synecdoche View, according to which (...) cognitive scientists’ locutions are figurative, with ‘brain’ referring to the human being, such that ‘the brain thinks’ reports the thinking of the human being, not the thinking of the brain. I compare this view to the dominant views in the literature and argue that it is a plausible alternative. One consequence of this is that there is no reason to believe that the locutions of cognitive scientists indicate empirical support for the claim that brains possess psychological properties. (shrink)

This paper clarifies Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore in _On Certainty,_ and argues that this critique is largely misunderstood, for two reasons. Firstly, Wittgenstein partly misrepresents Moore. Secondly, Wittgenstein is wrongly taken to be an internalist regarding justification for knowledge. Once we realize these two points, we can understand Wittgenstein’s critique properly as a grammatical argument in that Moore fails to see how the concepts of knowledge and certainty relate to those of justification and evidence. On this reading, we can also (...) understand that Moore and Wittgenstein were in more agreement than many people have thought, even though Moore was not able to exploit and express his philosophical insights properly. (shrink)

According to Kant, all events in nature are subject to the principle of causality. Nevertheless, free actions are possible, because freedom and the universal law of causality are compatible without contradiction. Quantum mechanics is indeterministic, i.e. it implies a violation of causality. It is shown that: 1) this indeterminism can be understood by means of a continuation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, as it is, like determinism, just a special type of universal causality, occurring when objects are not completely determined, 2) (...) quantum mechanical indeterminacy must not be identified with freedom, because it occurs only within the realm of sensible appearances existing in space and time, whereas freedom belongs to an intelligible substratum that is not part of the sensuous world. (shrink)

Summary The question underlying this article is whether the Kantian transcendental philosophy is wide enough to constitute the objects of quantum physics as objects of possible experience and consequently to found the objectivity of quantum physical knowledge. It is shown that the Kantian determinations of the categories (quality, substance, causality) can be interpreted and elaborated in such a way that the quantum physical concept of an object characterized by nonobjectivity of properties is conceived. Therefore the categories are valid in quantum (...) mechanics and warrant the objectivity of quantum physical experience. By the interpretation of the Kantian infinite judgement as an indefinite proposition it is possible to define the non-objectivity of properties categorially as indefiniteness of qualities. In particular by the indefiniteness of the position-quality the non-permanent localizability of quantum mechanical objects can be understood a priori. However the object of possible experience, especially the quantum mechanical object is underdetermined by the categories of substance and causality: If the object is determined to be a substance it is not yet conceived to be an individual; its characterization by means of probability laws is categorially indeterminate. In so far the significance of transcendental philosophy for the foundation of quantum physics is limited. (shrink)

This article theorizes the connection between political distrust and conspiracy theories through a post-political framework. Following Luc Boltanski’s focus on the critical capacities of ordinary actors, it builds on interviews with participants of the Yellow Vest Movement in France who hold conspiratorial views of Covid-19 and the vaccine. The article explores how the interviewees’ critique mirrors that of post-political theorists. In particular, I use Rancière’s notion of subjectification and politics to theorize how conspiracy theories function as a means of dissent (...) in the interviewees’ understanding of their experiences as well as in their own critique of and disillusionment with politics in France. As such, this article explores how political trust affected reactions to the pandemic, how political trust is interconnected with conspiracy theories and finally how such conspiracy theories can be viewed as biproducts of the post-political order. (shrink)

We trained a computational model (the Chunk-Based Learner; CBL) on a longitudinal corpus of child–caregiver interactions in English to test whether one proposed statistical learning mechanism—backward transitional probability—is able to predict children's speech productions with stable accuracy throughout the first few years of development. We predicted that the model less accurately reconstructs children's speech productions as they grow older because children gradually begin to generate speech using abstracted forms rather than specific “chunks” from their speech environment. To test this idea, (...) we trained the model on both recently encountered and cumulative speech input from a longitudinal child language corpus. We then assessed whether the model could accurately reconstruct children's speech. Controlling for utterance length and the presence of duplicate chunks, we found no evidence that the CBL becomes less accurate in its ability to reconstruct children's speech with age. (shrink)

By way of introduction, this paper points out inherent problems in attempting a comprehensive social history of the Reformation, due to the complex dynamics at work in sixteenth century European society.Contemporary pamphlet literature, a resource as yet not intensively explored, reflects in a unique manner the rich variety of the Reformation experience in all walks of life, from both sides of the schism. By examining a representative sampling of such tracts, the essay strives to establish some immediacy to that experience. (...) The nearly 300 pamphlets held by the Ambrose Swasey Library at the Colgate Rochester Divinity School in Rochester, NY, served as source material to help straddle the 500 year gap. The abbreviation ASL is used to identify pamphlets in the text. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt und Karl Jaspers – zwei herausragende Persönlichkeiten der Philosophiegeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, die eine vor allem politische Denkerin, der andere ursprünglich Mediziner und Psychologe, die beide mit den Erschütterungen der Welt und ihres persönlichen Lebens durch Nationalsozialismus und Zweiten Weltkrieg zurechtkommen mussten und dabei doch der Welt immer zugewandt blieben. Sie haben viele bedeutende Schriften hinterlassen, Denkansätze, deren Relevanz bis heute nicht nachgelassen hat.über beide ist viel geschrieben und geforscht worden – allein ihre sehr tiefe und besondere, fast (...) lebenslange Freundschaft, beginnend mit Arendts Studium bei Jaspers ab 1926, ist bislang seltsam unerforscht. Zwar ist der umfangreiche Briefwechsel ediert, es existiert jedoch keine einzige Monographie zum Thema. Diesem Umstand will das vorliegende Buch abhelfen. Ingeborg Gleichauf, Philosophin und Schriftstellerin, nähert sich der Beziehung von Arendt und Jaspers über die Beschäftigung mit den großen Fragen und Themen, die die beiden zeit ihres Lebens umtrieben und legt den Focus auf das über lange Zeiträume und große Distanzen nie versiegende Gespräch zwischen ihnen, ob persönlich oder in Briefen – auf den fruchtbaren, auch manchmal streitbaren, immer vertrauensvollen, von Neugier, Offenheit und Redlichkeit geprägten Austausch. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Beiträge zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1781-1981" verfügbar.

In this article, we investigate the political theology of populism and look at the case of the Front National. Considering the writings of Carl Schmitt and Ernesto Laclau, we trace the logical core of Schmitt’s political theology and show how it is integrated into theories of the political and Laclau’s theory of populism. We argue that the theologico-political core of populism is the simultaneous disavowal and imposition of mediation and that this stance leads to an increasing formalism. Looking at the (...) discourse of the FN on the notion of laïcité, we find that this theologico-political structure explains how the party is able to link traditionally left- and right-wing motives in its discourse. Finally, we show how in FN’s discourse, the formalist tendency of populism, which Laclau has theoretically explicated, has become overt and must be understood as part of politics, not as a universal and tran-historical logic of the political. This suggests, we argue pace Laclau, that we ought to consider both t... (shrink)

Em conformidade com a questão do "sentido" ou da "abertura do ser", Heidegger reconheceu que a consciência moral abre ao Dasein o seu próprio ser, a "existência". Ela é um fenómeno "existencial", pois pertence às estruturas constitutivas da abertura ekstática do Dasein ao seu próprio ser. Fazendo irrupção no Dasein perdido no "ser impróprio (uneigentliches Sein)" da "gente", o apelo da consciência abre ao Dasein o seu próprio poder ser-no-mundo (a sua existência) como investido, também ele, de facticidade. Por outras (...) palavras, a dimensão da "gente" abre ao ser humano a partir da impotência do seu ser-lançado – o qual constitui o seu "estar-em-falta (Schuldigsein)" fundamental – o inevitável estar-em-falta do projecto do seu poder-estar-no-mundo. É aí que aparece o conceito existencial do ser-em-falta do Dasein, que ultrapassa todo o conceito ôntico-metafísico de "falta (Schuld)", reduzindo esta ao agir carente de realizar um valor. Na medida em que o Dasein está à escuta deste apelo e, libertando-se da esfera da "gente", projecta-se sobre o seu próprio poder-ser, a "abertura (Erschlossenheit)" do ser do Dasein modaliza-se em "resolução (Entschlossenheit)". E na medida em que ele se projecta mesmo até ao seu poder ser mais próprio (a morte), esta modaliza-se em "resolução anticipante (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit)". Esta última é então a abertura ou a "verdade (alétheia)" mais original do ser do Dasein. Deste modo, para a autora do artigo, a interpretação existencial do apelo da consciência constitui um prelúdio ao pensamento do ser como Ereignis do Heidegger tardio, segundo a qual a linguagem é constitutiva da abertura ou da "verdade (aletheia)" do próprio ser. /// In accordance with his question about the "sense," or "openness," of being, Heidegger acknowledged that moral conscience opens Dasein to its own being, i.e., "existence." Moral conscience is an "existential" phenomenon, belonging to the constitutive structures of Dasein's ecstatic openness to its very being. Breaking into Dasein, lost in "improper being-in-the-word (uneigenliches Sein)" of the neutral "one," the appeal, or call, of the conscience opens Dasein to what is indeed proper to it (eigenliches being-in-the-world)". It comes about from what Dasein has factually always been; it opens to its very power to be-in-the-world as also invested with facticity. Otherwise said, its openness stems from the non-power of its being-thrown, constituting its "being-in-fault (Schuldigsein)." It is precisely in this existential concept of Dasein's "being-in-fault" that surpasses all ontico-metaphysical concepts of "fault (Schuld)" which is finally reduced to an action incapable of realizing a value. To the extent that Dasein is attentively hearing this appeal, it frees itself from the "one," projecting itself onto its power-to-be, i.e., its openness to being (Erschlossenheit). Thus, Dasein adopts the mode of "resolution (Entschlossenheit)," which coincides with its most proper powerto-be, or death. The latter in turn adopts the mode of anticipatory resolution (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit). This last is then the openness, or truth (aletheia), the most original of Dasein's being. So, the existential interpretation of the appeal of the conscience constitutes a prelude to the thought of being as Ereignis of the latter Heidegger, according to whom language is constitutive of the very opening, or truth, of being. (shrink)

Background:The global COVID-19 pandemic has imposed challenges on healthcare systems and professionals worldwide and introduced a ´maelstrom´ of ethical dilemmas. How ethically demanding situations are handled affects employees’ moral stress and job satisfaction.Aim:Describe priority-setting dilemmas, moral distress and support experienced by nurses and physicians across medical specialties in the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in Western Norway.Research design:A cross-sectional hospital-based survey was conducted from 23 April to 11 May 2020.Ethical considerations:Ethical approval granted by the Regional Research Ethics Committee in (...) Western Norway (131421).Findings:Among the 1606 respondents, 67% had experienced priority-setting dilemmas the previous two weeks. Healthcare workers who were directly involved in COVID-19 care, were redeployed or worked in psychiatry/addiction medicine experienced it more often. Although 59% of the respondents had seen adverse consequences due to resource scarcity, severe consequences were rare. Moral distress levels were generally low (2.9 on a 0–10 scale), but higher in selected groups (redeployed, managers and working in psychiatry/addiction medicine). Backing from existing collegial and managerial structures and routines, such as discussions with colleagues and receiving updates and information from managers that listened and acted upon feedback, were found more helpful than external support mechanisms. Priority-setting guidelines were also helpful.Discussion:By including all medical specialties, nurses and physicians, and various institutions, the study provides information on how the COVID-19 mitigation also influenced those not directly involved in the COVID-19 treatment of patients. In the next stages of the pandemic response, support for healthcare professionals directly involved in outbreak-affected patients, those redeployed or those most impacted by mitigation strategies must be a priority.Conclusion:Empirical research of healthcare workers experiences under a pandemic are important to identify groups at risks and useful support mechanisms. (shrink)

It is common to characterise phenomenal consciousness as _what it is like_ to be in a mental state. This paper argues that the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in this context has a technical meaning, i.e. a meaning for which the association to the relevant expression is peculiar to a theoretical community. The relevant theoretical community is philosophy and some parts of cognitive science, so on this view, only philosophers and cognitive scientists use the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in the way that is characteristic in the literature (...) on phenomenal consciousness. This claim has important consequences. Firstly, I argue that the phrase says nothing informative about phenomenal consciousness. Secondly, I argue that the fact that non-philosophers use the phrase is not compelling evidence that they believe in phenomenal consciousness. These claims have further consequences for debates about phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)