Islamic law; interpretation and construction; Shiites.

Critical and comparative analysis on the philosophical thoughts of ʻAlī Sharīʻatī and Sir Muhammad Iqbal, 19th and 20th centuries Muslim philosophers.

We study the different solution strategy for solving epidemic model in different imprecise environment, that is, a Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible model in imprecise environment. The imprecise parameter is also taken as fuzzy and interval environment. Three different solution procedures for solving governing fuzzy differential equation, that is, fuzzy differential inclusion method, extension principle method, and fuzzy derivative approaches, are considered. The interval differential equation is also solved. The numerical results are discussed for all approaches in different imprecise environment.

States in northern Nigeria are the latest in a list of political entities around the world formalizing religious law, or institutionalizing Shari'ah, into their public law system. Shari'ah applies in many Muslim-majority countries in the realm of personal law. However, when it is expanded and made to apply as part of public law, it carries enormous constitutional implications. This article examines the institutionalization of Shari'ah in twelve northern states of Nigeria in year 2000 and the likely implications on the constitutionally (...) guaranteed rights of non-Muslim minorities in those states. Muslims' objection to the methodology of human rights discourse stems mostly from the need to maintain integrity of the family, safeguard the interests of the community in addition to those of the individual, and preserve religious belief as manifested in ritual and in daily life. The author argues that the core issue in preserving Muslim values without trampling on the rights of the minorities lies in finding a synergy for simultaneous application of Shari'ah and human rights. A synergy is imperative because neither has proved to be satisfactorily workable at the public law level for contemporary Muslims—neither Shari'ah as represented by fiqh literature, nor the secular oriented human rights. It concludes that it is the goal of justice that should be immutable rather than the means for achieving the goal. Therefore, reconciling Islam with protection of non-Muslim rights in a Muslim-majority constitutional democracy should present less conceptual difficulties and social tension than is presently the case. (shrink)

Deferred sale, in the Islamic Banking and Financeworld widely known as Bai’ bi thaman ajil, is used as an extension toProfit-sale ; both sales complement each other. The Profitsalesells the commodity with profit over the cost price, and BBA plays the roleof receiving that payment on deferred or instalment basis. BBA has becomethe “premier consumer financing facility” for the Islamic financial institutions. This paper deals with deferred sale precisely. It looks into its origin andits transition from void to valid sale. (...) Its application as trade contract and itsmodern application as financing tool is analysed in the light of the maqāṣidSharīʿah. (shrink)

Politics is among the most important concepts of al-Fārābī’s philosophy. For him, real happiness can only be achieved in a virtuous society and a virtuous society appears only in a regime led by the first chief. The most important feature of the first chief is that he communicates with the Active Mind. Religion is considered by al-Fārābī as the regime and life style implemented by the first chief in a virtuous society. This study tries to present how al-Fārābī perceives religion (...) philosophically and what is the need for religion in terms of making the laws required in the social life. From this point of view, we tried to reach the aspects of the relationship between religion and law. Furthermore, metaphysical foundation of laws and the role of the philosopher and prophet at the point of law-making were the other issues addressed. The features of the laws which will lead to this supreme goal and by whom they should be made as well as how they can be implemented and changed within the historical process were addressed. The place of Islamic law (fiqh) in the virtuous society was another aspect of the subject that was investigated. (shrink)

Arabic translation Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī'l letter on logic translated by the recipient, his son, Ibn al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī.

In recent years, feminist and queer theory have effectively disavowed both “the human” and revolutionary politics. In the face of massive geopolitical crisis, posthumanists have called for us to reconsider fundamentally the superiority and centrality of mankind and “the human,” and question how Man can presume to change the world by revolutionary action, particularly when Marx’s dreams seem to have been swept into the dustbin of history. This provocative book reaffirms what is most basic in feminism – the attack on (...) the “universality” and sovereignty of Man – but contends that the only way this can mean anything other than pessimistic rhetoric is to embrace human agency and the struggle against colonialism and capitalism. In a series of “creolized” readings – Foucault with Ali Shari’ati, Lacan with Fanon, and Spinoza with Sylvia Wynter – the authors demonstrate what is at stake in the ongoing debate between humanism and posthumanism, putting this debate in the context of contemporary global crises and the possibilities of revolution. In its defense of “political spirituality,” this book pushes for a new trajectory in response to the gross inequalities of today, one that offers us a very different view of revolution and its present-day potential. (shrink)

One of the most important issues that distinguishes the Baghdādī branch of the Muʿtazila from the Baṣran branch is their view on ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661). Basra branch accepts the order of virtue of the first four caliphs as their order of coming to office, while the Baghdad branch considers the first three caliphs legitimate, but considers Ali more virtuous than them. The Baghdādī Muʿtazilīs who outspokenly defended this idea were Abū Jaʿfar al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854), Abū al-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī (...) (d. 319/931) and Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258). Among them, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd was renowned as “the greatest scholar of the Muʿtazila” and was considered one of the last representatives of this school. He ardently defended ʿAlī's superiority in his commentary on Nahj al-Balāgha, the famous collection of Ali’s sermons, letters and wisdom sayings. In his defense, he rebutted some criticisms about ʿAlī’s political decisions from his school’s point of view. Many items of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s rebuttal are worthy of analysis in terms of their content, style and approach. This article aims to present a detailed account of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s aforementioned refutations. In addition to the descriptive method, the interpretative method was also employed in the article. Although Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd did not consider Ali's infallibility necessary (wājib), unlike Imamiyya, he accepted it. Therefore, he responded to the criticisms directed at Ali, starting from the point of Ali's innocence. According to Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd: (a) After the death of the Prophet, ʿAlī insisted on becoming the new leader of the Muslim community. He did not act hastily to assume the caliphate because he was not expecting any opposition to that. However, when the events took a different turn, he did not escalate the situation, rather accepted the status quo. (b) ʿAlī also did the right thing by participating in ʿUmar b. Al-Khaṭṭāb’s (d. 23/644) electoral shūrā. This was an opportunity for him to become the next caliph, and reinstitute a system in accordance with the Qurʿānic principles and sunna of the Prophet. (c) It was also not an error when ʿAlī decided to stay in Medina during the events of ʿUthmān’s murder (d. 35/656). He played an active role in dissuading the rebels from their attempt to kill ʿUthmān, but he was in no position to know that his activity would be used against him later by the Umayyads who accused ʿAlī of being complicit in ʿUthmāns’s murder. (d) ʿAlī took the caliphate after ʿUthmān because of his popularity among the people. In this way, he managed to prevent an unqualified person to occupy the seat of the caliphate. (e) When the Battle of Camel broke out, those who demanded justice and opposed ʿAlī were in error. (f) When ʿAlī became the new caliph, his decision to remove Muʿāwīya (d. 60/680) from the governorship of Syria was correct. This is because Muʿāwīya would have refused to accept ʿAlī’s leadership even had he stayed in office as a governor. ʿAlī understood that the conflict would end only through fighting, so he did not lose time in marching against Muʿāwīya. (g) During the battle he abided by the sharīʿa and allowed the Syrian army to access water. (h) It was not ʿAlī, but those defectors in his army who obliged him to end the fighting through arbitration. (i) When ʿAlī agreed to sign the Ṣiffīn ceasefire agreement and did not use his title amīr al-muʾminīn, he followed the Prophet's example since the latter also refrained from using his title during the Ḥudaybiyya agreement. (j) ʿAlī also cannot be blamed for those among his supporters, such as the poet al-Najāshī, who defected and joined the ranks of Muʿāwīya. The motivations for the defectors were either to attain worldly gains or to escape from punishment for the crimes which they had committed. (k) When Muʿāwīya managed to conquer Egypt, ʿAlī’s governors of the province, Qays b. Saʿd (d. 60/680) or Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr (d. 38/658), did nothing for which they could be blamed. (l) And finally, ʿAlī never had guards to protect him because he was never afraid of being assassinated. Although Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd took Ali's innocence as a basis while presenting these views, he did not make inconsistent comments in general and did not say things contrary to historical facts. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge historical value of his views in question. (shrink)

Luck (2009) argues that gamers face a dilemma when it comes to performing certain virtual acts. Most gamers regularly commit acts of virtual murder, and take these acts to be morally permissible. They are permissible because unlike real murder, no one is harmed in performing them; their only victims are computer-controlled characters, and such characters are not moral patients. What Luck points out is that this justification equally applies to virtual pedophelia, but gamers intuitively think that such acts are not (...) morally permissible. The result is a dilemma: either gamers must reject the intuition that virtual pedophelic acts are impermissible and so accept partaking in such acts, or they must reject the intuition that virtual murder acts are permissible, and so abstain from many (if not most) extant games. While the prevailing solution to this dilemma has been to try and find a morally relevant feature to distinguish the two cases, I argue that a different route should be pursued. It is neither the case that all acts of virtual murder are morally permissible, nor are all acts of virtual pedophelia impermissible. Our intuitions falter and produce this dilemma because they are not sensitive to the different contexts in which games present virtual acts. (shrink)

The gamer’s dilemma offers three plausible but jointly inconsistent premises: (1) Virtual murder in video games is morally permissible. (2) Virtual paedophelia in video games is not morally permissible. (3) There is no morally relevant difference between virtual murder and virtual paedophelia in video games. In this paper I argue that the gamer’s dilemma can be understood as one of three distinct dilemmas, depending on how we understand two key ideas in Morgan Luck’s (2009) original formulation. The two ideas are (...) those of (1) occurring in a video game and (2) being a virtual instance of murder or paedophelia. Depending on the weight placed on the gaming context, the dilemma is either about in-game acts or virtual acts. And depending on the type of virtual acts we have in mind, the dilemma is either about virtual representations or virtual partial reproductions of murder and paedophelia. This gives us three dilemmas worth resolving: a gaming dilemma, a representation dilemma, and a simulation dilemma. I argue that these dilemmas are about different issues, apply to different cases, and are susceptible to different solutions. I also consider how different participants in the debate have interpreted the dilemma in one or more of these three ways. (shrink)

How do we assign values to virtual items, which include virtual objects, properties, events, subjects, worlds, environments, and experiences? In this article, I offer a framework for answering this question. After considering different value theses in the literature, I argue that whether we think these theses mutually exclusive or not turns on our view about the number of value-salient kinds virtual items belong to. Virtual monism is the view that virtual Xs belong to only one value-salient kind in relation to (...) X. Virtual pluralism is the view that they belong to more than one value-salient kind. I argue for two claims. First, virtual monism is mistaken. Minimally some virtual Xs are Xs, while others are not. Second, dualistic virtual pluralism is also mistaken because it is too coarse grained. Instead, I argue for fourfold pluralism: virtual items either represent an original's properties or reproduce essential properties and do so to lesser or greater extents. This gives us four value-salient kinds of virtual X: virtual reproductions, simulations, representations, and simulacra of X. I apply this view to various debates in the literature and conclude with a discussion of less basic hybrid kinds. (shrink)

A central debate in the philosophy of virtual reality (VR) focuses on the reality of virtual items. Broadly, there are two main disagreements. Some views accept a metaphysical orientation to VR, and disagree on the reality of virtual items. For instance, David Chalmers (Disputatio 9(46):309-352, 2017, Disputatio 11(55):453- 486, 2019, 2022) defends digitalism, the view that virtual items are real digital items. Neil McDonnell & Nathan Wildman (Disputatio 11(55):371-397, 2019), by contrast, defend fictionalism, which maintains that virtual items are unreal (...) fictions. Other views, like Grant Tavinor’s (2021), reject the metaphysical orientation, argu- ing that focusing on the reality of virtual items is a mistake. In what follows I evalu- ate these two disagreements. I argue that experiences of virtual items depend on episodes of picture perception. Recognizing this reveals that the current debates are either easily resolved in favor of one view, or are not disagreeing about the reality of virtual items, but about what virtual items are. (shrink)

In the Buddhist tradition, there is an expansive collection of texts that explore the topic of ethics, addressing moral questions concerning the right and wrong behaviors, virtues, vices, and so forth. However, when examining the main texts of this tradition, we find an absence of a structured moral philosophy that systematically and critically analyzes moral values and principles. Therefore, Buddhist scholars have responded in different ways to the perplexing situation in which Buddhism largely lacks an explicit theory in moral philosophy. (...) Some scholars argue that we should read Buddhist moral teachings as one of the contemporary ethical theories, such as consequentialism or virtue ethics. Damien Keown is one of the scholars who claims that “virtue ethics” is the best way to understand Buddhist ethics. This paper analyzes and critiques Damien Kewon’s reading of Buddhist moral teachings as Virtue ethics. I argue that such interpretation poses problems, primarily because it may overlook key aspects of Buddhist beliefs deemed inconsequential to contemporary ethical debates, and secondly, it could result in the imposition of non-authentic Buddhist ideas on Buddhist ethics. (shrink)

Aristotle (b. 322 BC) was the first philosopher in the history of thought to examine all modes and types of belief acquisition such as knowledge, supposition, error and indirectly imagination. In his _Prior Analytics_, which he wrote primarily to clarify his theory of demonstration, Aristotle examined in detail the syllogism, which he saw as the most important form of reasoning, and his analysis was subject to interpretation by different traditions of thought for centuries. Aristotle’s _Prior Analytics_ was translated into Arabic (...) in the classical period and later interpreted by many Islamic logicians. This article aims to show how Aristotle’s definition of the syllogism in the _Prior Analytics_ was taken up and interpreted in the Peripatetic Islamic logical tradition. These interpretations of the definition of the syllogism will provide us with an idea about the unique features of the commentaries on the _Prior Analytics_ in the Islamic world. Here, introductory information about the translation of the _Prior Analytics_ into Arabic and its commentators in Arabic will be given, Aristotle’s definition of the syllogism and its versions in Peripatetic Islamic logicians will be indicated, and the interpretation of the basic terms in the definition by Peripatetic Islamic logicians will be revealed. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the psychosocial implications of disabled begging. Conscious motives of these individuals may include profit, expediency, power, honesty, and public protest. Unconscious motives may include exhibitionism, anger, masochism, and rebellion. The social context, including hypocritical attitudes toward disability, is shown to contribute to the occurrence of this behavior.