‘In spite of the efforts of scholars to improve matters, the condition of Seneca's text remains in many places most uncertain or quite irrecoverable. Again and again one has to be content with conjectures which, while often giving the general sense of a passage, must not be taken as certainly Seneca's words’ . 1. praef. 5 o quam contempta res est homo, nisi supra humana surrexerit! quam diu cum affectibus colluctamur, quid magnifici facimus, etiam si superiores sumus? portenta vincimus: quid (...) est cur suspiciamus nosmet ipsos, quia dissimiles deterrimis sumus? Traditional punctuation: ‘… quid magnifici facimus? etiam si superiores sumus, portenta vincimus’. (shrink)

‘In spite of the efforts of scholars to improve matters, the condition of Seneca's text remains in many places most uncertain or quite irrecoverable. Again and again one has to be content with conjectures which, while often giving the general sense of a passage, must not be taken as certainly Seneca's words’. 1. praef. 5 o quam contempta res est homo, nisi supra humana surrexerit! quam diu cum affectibus colluctamur, quid magnifici facimus, etiam si superiores sumus? portenta vincimus: quid est (...) cur suspiciamus nosmet ipsos, quia dissimiles deterrimis sumus? Traditional punctuation: ‘… quid magnifici facimus? etiam si superiores sumus, portenta vincimus’. (shrink)

With this publication, Harvard University Press completes its ten-volume Loeb Classical Library edition of Seneca. Professor Corcoran has provided a complete text of the Naturales Quaestiones, Seneca’s last work; he has supplied detailed annotation of most of the classical authorities whom Seneca usually cites only by name; he has given many of the major mss variants, and made a lucid and readable translation. The first volume contains a brief introductory summary. There is a subject-index but, unfortunately, there is (...) no bibliography. He has put the fragmentary Nile-book as fourth, although both Diels and Gercke call it liber secundus and Oltramare assigns it eighth place. The five books in this volume concern: the Nile and its sources, flora and fauna, and the periodicity of its flooding; Hail and Snow; Winds; Earthquakes; and Comets. The form of these treatises is that of a series of letters or addresses to Lucilius, Rome’s procurator in Sicily about 62 A.D., and the same Lucilius to whom the more famous Epistulae are addressed. (shrink)

77, 3 uastat in quae includit.E has incidit for includit–another example, eagerly welcomed by Gercke, of free interpolation in this MS. Perhaps incutitur.

In Quaestiones naturales 4b.4.2 Seneca states that in early spring the weather drastically changes: in the warmer sky larger water droplets are formed and cause rain. The description of this ‘greater change’ is linked in the manuscript tradition to two different controversial readings, temporis and aeris, which are irregularly distributed. Most recent editors have printed the first reading, but H.M. Hine is probably right to accept aeris. A careful linguistic, stemmatic and stylistic examination shows that temporis is likely (...) to be a Medieval Latin gloss of aeris: the equivalence of both words would be difficult to justify in Classical Latin, but in Late Latin and in Medieval Latin tempus developed a climatological meaning which is explicitly found in medieval writers and glossaries and is also very widespread in Romance languages. The presence of this gloss in the hyparchetype Ψ, which is ultimately the source for most medieval copies, accounts for the irregular distribution of both readings in the manuscript tradition; this hypothesis is particularly consistent with Hine's suggestion that Ψ probably had interlinear or marginal readings. This historical investigation on the meaning of tempus is also relevant to the end of the same passage, where stylistic and linguistic evidence supports the reading tepore rather than tempore. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Before Science: The Invention of the Friars’ Natural Philosophy by Roger French, Andrew CunninghamIrven M. ResnickRoger French and Andrew Cunningham. Before Science: The Invention of the Friars’ Natural Philosophy. Hants, UK: Scolar Press, 1996. Pp. x + 298. Cloth, $68.95.This is a peculiar book that depicts thirteenth-century natural philosophy as wholly dependent on the theological interests of the mendicant orders. For the Friars, “Natural philosophy was a study (...) in which the central concerns were the detection, admiration and appreciation of God’s existence, goodness, providence, munificence, forethought and provision for His creation” (4). Although conceived as “a positive contribution to the discipline of the history of science” (3), the work begins and ends with the claim that medieval natural philosophers were not engaged in science.One difficulty is that the authors never make clear what they mean by science, although they evidently understand that it entails a repudiation of metaphysics and a doctrine of nature’s radical autonomy. Consequently, for French and Cunningham medieval “science” is a mythic construct of modern historians, since “[t]here was no scientific tradition (in the modern sense of the term ‘scientific’) of looking at nature in the thirteenth century, only a religio-political way of doing so” (273).Thus, when summarizing the accomplishments of Roger Bacon, they note that “[Bacon] has been credited, along with Grosseteste, with creating early ‘experimental science’. Bacon could not of course have been a ‘scientist’ because he lived in the wrong [End Page 623] age for this” (238). This seemingly casual conclusion is rather stunning not only in its own right, but also as a revelation of the authors’ own effort to disenfranchise medieval ‘scientists’ for having had the misfortune of living too soon.French and Cunningham propose that polemical or apologetical interests urged the Friars to study nature as a response to various heretics and especially the Cathars who, seemingly like moderns, sought to disengage the natural world from the Christian God, while using the vocabulary of Aristotle’s libri naturales. However this central argument demands better support. Since the authors can cite only one surviving Cathar text—De duobus principiis (ca. 1230)—almost everything known of this group is derived from anti-Cathar polemics. Based on this single text the authors can say no more than that it used “what looks very much like a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics or Metaphysics,” (134) but fail to identify more precisely its sources. It is clear that thirteenth-century orthodox polemics increasingly relied on Aristotelian materials, but the conclusion that natural philosophers did so only in response to heretics who beat them to the Aristotelian punch seems tendentious. The historian will likely remain unconvinced that the unparalleled translating activity of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries—the rendering into Latin of Arabic scientific knowledge (as in Constantine the African’s Pantegni or Adelard of Bath’s Quaestiones naturales), Greek medical literature (e.g. Galen’s Methodus medendi translated by Gerard of Cremona and Burgundio of Pisa) and mathematics (e.g. Euclid’s Optics, Theodosius’s Spherics, Archimedes’ On the Quadrature of the Circle, and Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos and Almagest) culminating with thirteenth-century translations of Aristotle’s biological works—should all have stemmed from a preoccupation with heresy.A further shortcoming of this book is the limited attention given to works on natural philosophy by the Friars themselves. The book’s first seven of eleven chapters explore the educational establishments in which natural philosophy arose: first monastic and cathedral schools, and then the universities. The works of individual Friars receive only the briefest summary. Among the Dominican natural philosophers Albertus Magnus—the patron saint of scientists and one of a very few scholastics to have commented on all of Aristotle’s biological works—is awarded only five pages. For his mastery of Aristotle’s libri naturales Albertus has been called “the dominant figure in Latin learning and natural science of the thirteenth century.” (Cf. Lynn Thorndike, History of Magic and Experimental Science [New York: Macmillan, 1929], 2:521) Albertus described not only the natural world but also explored the philosophical foundations for scientific knowledge. Yet curiously French and Cunningham give much more attention... (shrink)

This study aims to substantiate the general ancient ‘scientific’ interest of the natural phenomena and popular beliefs Plutarch discusses in his physical problems. Plutarch does not intend to verify these mirabilia in an empirical fashion. He is not so much looking for the ὅτι but more for the διὰ τί in nature. It remains to be seen whether he investigates and ‘believes’ these natural phenomena only for reasons of intellectual exercise, then. They at least receive Plutarch’s benefit of the doubt, (...) which ties in closely with his ‘sceptical’ stance in natural scientific affairs, mediating between unreasoned belief and disbelief of natural mirabilia. The idea that wonder remains immanent in nature is an essential aspect of Plutarch’s general world view and (natural) philosophy. This view is based on a philosophical conviction that nature has a divine teleology. In connection with Platonic ontology and epistemology Plutarch generally accepts, moreover, that no firm knowledge can be attained from natural phenomena, because they are immanently obscure and uncertain, and cannot grant any evident cognition. (shrink)

This article is devoted to Plutarch’s natural-philosophical interests and aspirations, as expressed more precisely in his collection of Quaestiones Naturales, which has been generally underestimated by scholars. In order to speculate about the actual position of this collection in the Corpus Plutarcheum, I present a case study of one particular problem, viz. Q.N. 19. In the first part of the article, the scope is primarily confined to the traditional sources on which Plutarch relies, but I also take into (...) account Plutarch’s conception of scientific innovation, as it is formulated in Quaestiones convivales. In the second part, I deal with the problematic degree of moral dynamics and literary stylistics, which are, in the main, absent from Quaestiones Naturales. I analyse a cluster of parallel passages by way of contrast to Q.N. 19. This yields insight into Plutarch’s argumentative tactics and his process of writing and rewriting, with a particular focus on his use of ὑπομνήματα. On chronological grounds, I argue that at a certain point Plutarch bears the hypomnematic material of Q.N. 19 in his topical mind, but also that there are certain indications that Q.N. 19 itself is based on other ὑπομνήματα, which in turn provides new material for speculating about the true nature of Quaestiones Naturales as a “collection of notes” and about what the actual range of this label might be. (shrink)

The most recent and by far the best edition of this work is that of H. M. Hine , to which I refer for full bibliographical information. Many passages of the text are most helpfully discussed in the same scholar's Studies in the Text of Seneca's Naturales Quaestiones . ut nubes infici possint, … sol ad hoc apte ponendus est; non enim idem facit undecumque effulsit, et ad hoc opus est radiorum idoneus ictus. Seneca is dealing with rainbows. (...) Hine shares Axelson's suspicion of ictus, but is unhappy both with Axelson's situs and with my tractus, ‘direction’ ; very tentatively he suggests angulus. Much more credible palaeographically and still yielding good sense and a good clausula would be i etus, a noun which is very common in this work of Seneca's. Hostius fuit Quadra obscenitatis in scaenam usque perductae. (shrink)

The most recent and by far the best edition of this work is that of H. M. Hine, to which I refer for full bibliographical information. Many passages of the text are most helpfully discussed in the same scholar's Studies in the Text of Seneca's Naturales Quaestiones. ut nubes infici possint, … sol ad hoc apte ponendus est; non enim idem facit undecumque effulsit, et ad hoc opus est radiorum idoneus ictus. Seneca is dealing with rainbows. Hine shares (...) Axelson's suspicion of ictus, but is unhappy both with Axelson's situs and with my tractus, ‘direction’ ; very tentatively he suggests angulus. Much more credible palaeographically and still yielding good sense and a good clausula would be i etus, a noun which is very common in this work of Seneca's. Hostius fuit Quadra obscenitatis in scaenam usque perductae. (shrink)

Reconstructs the original Greek version of the confatalia-argument that Cicero attributes to Chrysippus in De fato and misrepresent in crucial ways. Compares this argument with Seneca's discussion of determinism in the Naturales quaestiones. Clarifies that Seneca makes a different distinction from that attested in Cicero's De fato. Argues that problems with interpreting both accounts derive from disregarding terminological distinctions harder to spot in the Latin versions and, related to this, insufficient attention to the ontological distinction between bodies (such (...) as Fate) and predicates (e.g. "what is fated"), which unfortunately does not square well with the modern ontological category "event." Contains some corrections to the author's earlier discussion of the topic in Seneca und die Stoa: Der Platz des Menschen in der Welt, De Gruyter 2006, ch. 3.3.4. (shrink)

In his philosophical works Seneca often refers to the views of his predecessors, and sometimes is the sole or the earliest authority for what he says about them, which makes it important for the student of earlier thought to know whether what he says is likely to be true. This I believe can be roughly assessed–and this paper is an attempt to do it–by considering how reliable he is in places where he can be checked: that is, in places where (...) he refers to earlier writings which survive. I shall be principally concerned with his Naturales Quaestiones and with early meteorology: with considering how accurately Seneca reports Aristotle's Meteorologica , and trying to estimate therefrom the reliability of his statements about pre-Socratic meteorology; but I believe that my conclusions should also be applicable to what Seneca says on later thinkers and other subjects. (shrink)

In his philosophical works Seneca often refers to the views of his predecessors, and sometimes is the sole or the earliest authority for what he says about them, which makes it important for the student of earlier thought to know whether what he says is likely to be true. This I believe can be roughly assessed–and this paper is an attempt to do it–by considering how reliable he is in places where he can be checked: that is, in places where (...) he refers to earlier writings which survive. I shall be principally concerned with his Naturales Quaestiones and with early meteorology: with considering how accurately Seneca reports Aristotle's Meteorologica, and trying to estimate therefrom the reliability of his statements about pre-Socratic meteorology; but I believe that my conclusions should also be applicable to what Seneca says on later thinkers and other subjects. (shrink)

The philosophical writings of Seneca the Younger comprise noteworthy thoughts concerning Philosophy of History. This paper aims to prove that these thoughts form above all a coherent system. Developing the criteria as well as the definition of Philosophy of History from writings of Kant and Hegel, the following analysis identifies and systematizes relevant concepts such as reason, teleology, cultural development and providence in the writings of Seneca (mainly Epistulae, De providentia and Naturales Quaestiones). The analysis and the comparison (...) with Kant and Hegel make clear that Seneca draws up Philosophy of History as a systematic meta-discipline. Consequently, this paper shows that systematic Philosophy of History is already rooted in Antiquity and that specifically Seneca can to some extent be regarded as a forerunner of the philosophy of the Modern Period. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the idea of beatitudo in Duns Scotus. We begin with the Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum, where the Doctor Subtilis presents a conception of the act of intellective knowledge through the natural meaning of beatitude. Taking up the famous incipit of the Metaphysics, Duns Scotus develops the idea of a maximum desiderium and a maxima scientia as a way of human and natural perfection. In conceiving this desiderium naturale as form of ultimate realization, he sees (...) it as similar to the knowledge of immaterial substances in statu viae. His definition of beatitudo also disagrees with the Thomist doctrine, developing it a priori as a cognitio intuitiva, making it possible for humans to achieve happiness in statu viae. In contrast, in Ordinatio IV, dist. 49, Scotus emphasizes the value of beatitude in its ethical and theological sense, taking recourse to the Augustinian and Boethian definitions in order to understand its nature as the full expression of the intellective, volitional a... (shrink)

Igual que su maestro, John Duns Escoto, Antoni Andreu no fue un naturalista, ni siquiera para los estándares de su época. Sin embargo, reconoció la importancia de la filosofía natural en el sistema de conocimiento aristotélico, que era el fundamento de la cosmovisión premoderna. Consecuentemente, abordó los problemas relacionados con las sustancias naturales en algunas de sus obras, sobre todo en sus Quaestiones de tribus principiis naturae, pero también en los comentarios sobre la Metafísica y las Categorías de (...) Aristóteles y, ocasionalmente, en la Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis. Estos problemas incluyen la cuestión del sujeto de la física, los procesos físicos, con una atención especial a los procesos de generación y de corrupción, y las características de los cuerpos que son objeto de dichos procesos. (shrink)

In this contribution, which is part of a more comprehensive research project on the reception of the Aristotelian libri naturales in the XIIIth century, I wish to present the results of a preliminary investigation into an anonymous collection of questions on the De generatione et corruptione preserved in the MSS Erlangen, UB, 213 and Kassel, Stadt- und Landesbibl., Phys. 2° 11. Albeit still unpublished and hitherto almost completely ignored by scholars, this quaestiones commentary is not without interest for (...) historians of medieval Latin Aristotelianism. (shrink)

This edition contains quaestiones 1-5 of book III of the commentary on the Sentences, by Marsilius of Inghen (†1396), the founding rector and first doctor of theology of the University of Heidelberg. These questions are devoted to the Christology, Mariology, and Trinitology, and deal with the issue of the Incarnation of Christ, with quaestiones 1-3 considering it in relation to the individual Persons of the Trinity, and quaestiones 4-5 in relation to the Blessed Virgin Mary. In all (...) questions, Marsilius advocates the _via media_ of sound faith, even above any school traditions. (shrink)

Radulphus Brito's Quaestiones super Priora analytica Aristotelis is a major work written in the early 1300s which treated Aristotle's text devoted to the theory of the syllogism. Brito, one of the most influential of the group of medieval thinkers known as the Modistae, examines both categorical and hypothetical syllogisms. In the text offered here, based on six known manuscripts which are complete or nearly complete, Brito was critical of many of the theories of his contemporary, Simon of Faversham. Brito (...) edited his work several times; there are at least two versions which indicate Brito returned to this material during his long career at the university in Paris. This volume is the first critical text edition of Brito's Quaestiones super Priora analytica Aristotelis and will therefore be of great interest to those studying the history of logic and its development during the medieval period. (shrink)

Il saggio evidenzia come il «diritto naturale» rappresenti il cuore nevralgico della «scienza» di Giambattista Vico. Questi, nell’opporsi allo scetticismo, da un lato, e al giusnaturalismo, dall’altro, fa del «diritto naturale» il punto di incontro di molteplici questioni, dalla politica alla giurisprudenza, dall’«equità» alla «Ragion di Stato».

Given Plutarch’s fragmentary piece on Aristophanes and Menander, a piece of Table Talk on almost the same topic and various attacks on comic poets scattered through the Lives, one might believe that Plutarch is a staid, conservative and humourless author. But several other instances in his writings reveal a playful, facetious, witty and humorous Plutarch. This paper will focus on the Quaestiones Convivales, which bear ample witness to this aspect of Plutarch’s personality and authorial technique. It will examine the (...) ways in which he introduces and describes the various interlocutors, discuss certain comments with which he tries to ridicule his philosophical opponents, notably the Stoics and the Epicureans, try to distinguish the various manifestations of Plutarch’s humour and finally suggest that Plutarch’s stance and attitude towards playfulness, comic situations and laughter may ultimately be affected, at least in part, by his allegiance to Plato. (shrink)

The question of whether there exist other quaestiones disputatae attributable to St. Bonaventure, beyond those contained within the definitive Quaracchi critical edition of his Opera Omnia, is a subject which has divided scholarly opinion for nearly a century. During the mid-twentieth-century, several newly discovered sets of quaestiones disputatae were claimed as authentic Bonaventurian works. Most notably, the Quaestiones de theologia transcribed by George Tavard and the Quaestiones de cari-tate et de novissimis edited by Palémon Glorieux. This (...) is to say nothing, of the extensive and much discussed collection of draft quaestiones identified by François-Marie Henquinet in Assisi Bibl. Com. 186, which include the... (shrink)

Il presente contributo indaga la questione del fondamento della legge morale ebraica sulla scorta dell’insegnamento di Samuel David Luzzatto (1800-1865). Egli afferma che le norme etiche sono insite nell’essere umano, ma questo non basta perché vengano rispettate: la rivelazione divina sostiene quindi la morale naturale, senza insegnare nulla di diverso da quest’ultima, ma fornendo un’adeguata propedeutica e prevedendo sanzioni e premi chiari. Soltanto il monoteismo, con il suo necessario corollario cultuale, può dunque fondare una morale efficace, che si manifesta essenzialmente (...) nel praticare umanità e giustizia verso tutti gli esseri umani. This paper investigates the Jewish moral law’s foundation according with teaching of Samuel David Luzzatto (1800-1865). He affirms that ethical norms come from human being, but this is not enough for them to be respected: therefore divine revelation supports natural morality, teaching the same, but providing adequate preparation and providing penalties and rewards. Only monotheism, with its necessary worships, can therefore found an effective morality. It appears essentially in humanity and justice towards all human beings. (shrink)

Einleitung -- Quaestiones in tertium De anima : Text und Übersetzung -- Appendices. Testimonien zu Siger von Brabants Über den Intellekt und Über das Glück ; Antwort eines anonymen Averroisten an Thomas von Aquin.

Según la noción clásica el derecho es el objeto de la justicia; también clásicamente se dice que el ius es lo justo, lo debido. Según esto, el ius naturale es lo justo que se funda en la naturaleza y es lo debido por naturaleza. Frente a estas nociones clásicas Thomas Hobbes define al ius naturale como la libertad que cada hombre tiene de usar su propio poder como quiera, para la conservación de su propia naturaleza, es decir, de su vida. (...) También podemos marcar la diferencia entre la concepción clásica de la ley natural como dictamen de la razón práctica que ordena al hombre hacia el fin inscripto en su naturaleza, permitiendo reconocer el bien y el mal afin de realizar el primero y evitar el último, de la noción moderna hobbesiana que concibe la lex naturalis como norma general que obliga a realizar lo que preserve mejor su vida u omitir lo que pueda destruirla o privarle de los medios de conservarla. El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar cómo y porqué se llega a estas diferencias tan marcadas. (shrink)

Michael W. Tkacz - Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.3 392-393 Book Review Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum Walter Burley. Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum. Edited by Mary Catherine Sommers. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2000. Pp. x + 214. Cloth, $34.95. In his monumental Le Système du Monde, Pierre Duhem notes that it is difficult to link the fourteenth-century scholastic Walter Burley to any particular (...) school on account of his eclecticism. Indeed, throughout much of the twentieth century, Burley has.. (shrink)