In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein seems to appeal to the idea that thoughts manage to explain how sentences, primarily elementary sentences, can be such that their subsentential elements refer to objects. In this respect, he seems indeed to appeal to the claim that thoughts, qua endowed with not only original, but also intrinsic, intentionality, lend this intentionality to names, by transforming them into ‘names-of’, i.e., symbols endowed with intrinsic intentionality as well. Such a claim, however, entails that there must be necessary (...) superfacts. Since according to the Tractatus’ ontology there cannot be necessary facts in the world, but at most only in its logical scaffolding, the most likely chance is that such facts are facts for the limit of the world, i.e., the transcendental subject. Curiously enough, in his later critique, in the Investigations, of mentalist semantics, Wittgenstein fails to appeal to this claim, which can block the infinite regress that he there changes the mentalist position with. Since in the Investigations necessary facts seem to be allowed, this failure is even more striking. (shrink)

Insofar as the so-called new theory of reference has come to be acknowleged as the leading theoretical paradigm in semantic research, it has been widely accepted that proper names directly refer to their designation. In advancing some of the most convincing arguments in favour of this view of names, S. Kripke has however left somehow undecided what the role of context is in determining which is the direct referent for a name. According to one interpretation of his thought, context has (...) only an external task in allowing one to simultaneously select a name and a given referent for it. Although this interpretation is the most faithful to Kripke's own intentions, there is another possible interpretation of what he says, according to which context more significantly permits one to determine a given referent at a time for one and the same name1. This different interpretation of the role of context is not marginal for the purpose of semantics, since it generates two distinct theoretical conceptions of what a proper name is. According to the former, the 'idiosyncratic' conception, proper names are individuated (at least) by their form and bearer. According to the latter, the 'linguistic' conception, they are individuated by their morphology only: i.e., by their being (syntactically) unstructured strings of letters. The two conceptions prove to be substantially different when homonyms are called into play. Insofar as both the Greek philosopher and the famous shipowner are called "Aristotle", we have two distinct, albeit homonymous, names for the idiosyncratic conception but only one name (as applied to two distinct individuals) for the linguistic conception2. In what follows, I will first sketch one of the most recent attempts to support for the idiosyncratic view, namely the one which traces back to Kaplan [1990] theory of words, and recall its merits over its cognate idiosyncratic theories. I will then try to give an argument in favour of the linguistic conception, by pointing out how the latter.... (shrink)

In this paper I will undertake a review on Hans Blumenberg’s analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s works. My point is underline the peculiar position that Wittgenstein has in Blumenberg’s texts. I will consider his impolite commentaries concerning the Philosophical Investigations and Wittgenstein’s decision of becoming a teacher. I will try to characterize Blumenberg’s conception of Wittgenstein as an intellectual figure and on the most popular contributions of Wittgenstein’s thought.

In this paper I will undertake a review on Hans Blumenberg’s analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s works. My point is underline the peculiar position that Wittgenstein has in Blumenberg’s texts. I will consider his impolite commentaries concerning the Philosophical Investigations and Wittgenstein’s decision of becoming a teacher. I will try to characterize Blumenberg’s conception of Wittgenstein as an intellectual figure and on the most popular contributions of Wittgenstein’s thought.

Over and above differences in terminology and cultural background, we try to show that the quantum physicist, David Bohm, and poststructuralist philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, shared a common aim in thought: to replace the classical image of reality, which is still dominant in our time, with a metaphysics finally in agreement with the concepts and results of relativity, quantum mechanics andcontemporary biology. For these two thinkers, the world of things that are well individuated in space and time, and ordered according to (...) mechanical relations of cause and effect, are nothing but the momentary expression of an “undivided wholeness in flowing movement” that constitutes its true ontological ground. By means of this new metaphysics, the world of daily experience and classical science appears as the explicit manifestation or development of implicate order that undivided wholeness contains virtually in itself at deeper and deeper levels of envelopment and imbrication. The explicit world is the result of a process of repetition, deceleration and temporal stabilization, triggered by the interaction of our measuring instruments – technical devices, sensory organs and motors, a priori forms and categories of the understanding – with moving wholeness, the thinking and observing subject of which represents a momentary and partial reflection rather than a solitaryand autonomous fragment. By criticizing the classical image of thecorrespondence/adequation of being and thought, Bohm and Deleuzeshow that the thought seeking to grasp this wholeness in flowingmovement inevitably interacts with it – by modifying, recreating andaccomplishing it in one direction rather than another. Thought thusresembles a dance that tries to harmonize with the universal flux thatgenerates and carries it away in a single movement with matter. **************************************************************************************************** ***********************Para além das diferenças de terminologia e de background cultural, tenta-se aqui mostrar que o físico quântico David Bohm e o filósofo pós-estruturalista Gilles Deleuze tiverem um objetivo comum de pensamento: substituir a imagem clássica da realidade, ainda dominante em nossa época, por uma metafísica finalmente de acordo com os conceitos e resultados da relatividade, da mecânica quântica e da biologia contemporânea. Para estes dois pensadores, o mundo das coisas bem individuadas no espaço e no tempo, e ordenadas conforme as relações mecânicas de causa e efeito, não é nada outro que a expressão momentânea de uma “Totalidade indivisa em devir” que constitui seu verdadeiro fundamento ontológico. Pelo meio desta nova metafisica, o mundo da experiência cotidiana e da ciência clássica aparece como a manifestação explicita ou desenvolvida da ordem implícita que a totalidade indivisa contém virtualmente nela mesma em níveis de envolvimento e de imbricação sempre mais profundos. O mundo explícito é o resultado de um processo de repetição, desaceleração e estabilização temporal, desencadeado pela interação de nossos instrumentos de medição -- aparelhos técnicos, órgãos sensoriais e motores, formas “a priori” e categorias do entendimento – com uma totalidade movente no qual o sujeito pensante e observante representa um reflexo momentâneo e parcial ao invés de um fragmento solitário e autônomo. Ao criticar a imagem clássica da correspondência/adequação entre o ser e o pensamento, Bohm e Deleuze mostram finalmente que o pensamento que intenta capturar esta Totalidade em devir interage inevitavelmente com ela, modificando-a, recriando-a e realizando-a em uma direção ao invés de outra. O pensamento se aparenta assim a uma dança que tenta se harmonizar com o flux universal que o gera e o leva em um movimento só com a matéria.Palavras-chave: Bohm; Deleuze; totalidade indivisa em devir; física quântica; pós-estruturalismo; ontologia. (shrink)

This text introduces the symposium on Fredric Jameson’s Allegory and Ideology (2019), the second volume in his six-part The Poetics of Social Forms. It frames the debate with a brief exploration of some of the figures and problems of allegory that appear across Jameson’s œuvre, and surveys some of the Marxist conceptualisations of allegory that have shaped Jameson’s approach, as it straddles allegories of the commodity and allegories of utopia. The musical investigation of the nexus of allegory and affect, and (...) the presentation of political allegory as primarily concerned with the disjunction between (national and international) levels are also touched upon as salient dimensions of Jameson’s theorising. (shrink)

We prove that the maximal order type of the wqo of linear orders of finite Hausdorff rank under embeddability is φ2, the first fixed point of the ε-function. We then show that Fraïssé’s conjecture restricted to linear orders of finite Hausdorff rank is provable in +“φ2 is well-ordered” and, over , implies +“φ2 is well-ordered”.

In his highly regarded history of the rise of clinical trials in America, HarryMarks describes how their widespread adoption resulted largely fromthe efforts of ‘therapeutic reformers’ who sought to replace the individualexpertise of clinicians with the ‘science of controlled experiment’. Thetransition described by Marks resembles in many respects the transition fromthe ‘truth-to-nature’ objectivity of individual experts to a ‘mechanical’ formof objectivity portrayed by Daston and Galison. In particular,Marks details the passage from a regime of trust in expertise and experts to (...) aregime based on the mechanical generation of data, the elimination ofhuman judgement and the adoption of a ‘view from nowhere’ where individual and group idiosyncrasies are systematically suppressedthrough recourse to quantitative methods.[...]. (shrink)

August Weismann proposed that genetic changes in somatic cells cannot pass to germ cells and hence to next generations. Nevertheless, evidence is accumulating that some environmental effects can promote heritable changes in the DNA of germ cells, which implies that some somatic influence on germ line is possible. This influence is mostly detrimental and related to the presence of oxidative stress, which induces mutations and epigenetic changes. This effect should be stronger in males due to the particular characteristics of sperm. (...) Here, we propose the hypothesis that females are able to avoid males with oxidatively damaged DNA in the germ line by using oxidative‐dependent (pre‐ and post‐mating) signals. This new hypothesis may shed light on unsolved questions in evolutionary biology, such as the benefits of polyandry, the lek paradox, or the role of sexual selection on the evolution of aging. BioEssays 30:1212–1219, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

El número 54 de Isonomía presenta una clara heterogeneidad que refleja la pluralidad de los temas de investigación que definen nuestras líneas editoriales: desde estudios a la vez conceptuales, normativos y empíricos sobre la corrupción de los jueces, hasta reflexiones histórico-filosófico-jurídicas sobre aspectos centrales de las relaciones internacionales, pasando por temas, o bien clásicos como el positivismo jurídico, o bien altamente actuales y delicados como la violencia en contra de las mujeres.

The issue as to whether an atomistic or holistic viewof knowledge and meaning is correct relies on the way part/whole relationships is analysed,exactly as the issue as to whether a constructive or realistic view of knowledge and meaningis correct relies on the way internal/external relationships is analysed. Both theprinciple of compositionality and the context principle depend on how finely the constituents,the nature and the size of the context are identified; both the notion of meaning andthe notion of truth depend on (...) the resources of internalisation/externalisation. Thus thespectrum of semantic and epistemological theories varies from (global) atomismto (global) holism, and from minimal to maximal internalisation. Are compositionaltheories necessarily extensional? Does formal semantics necessarily rely on set theory?Does the domain-specific character of the notions of element, part and whole prevent anygeneral, non-trivial account? The aim of the present paper is to provide a negative answerto these questions by exploring some of the features a theory covering the phenomenologyof part and whole should have. This phenomenology will only be sketched through a fewparadigmatic examples, showing how the reference of notions of part and wholevaries and which are the constraints inherentin such variation. Categorytheory provides the tools for fashioning this framework, since it allows describing any coherentcollection of objects (with actions defined over them) and (action preserving) maps betweenthe objects, as well as the variation of such collections in terms of suitablefunctors, coding the ways parts and wholes undergo co-variation. The main thesis is thatthere are interference patterns between the two pairs Local/Global and Internal/External,only in terms of which the above phenomenology can be properly described.Se mai tu diventeraimetá di te stesso, e te l''auguro, ragazzo, capirai cose al di lá della comune intelligenza dei cervelli interi.Avrai perso metá di te e del mondo, ma la realtá rimasta sará mille volte piú profonda e preziosa. E tupure vorrai che tutto sia dimezzato e straziato a tua immagine, perchè bellezza e sapienza e giustizia ci sono soloin ció che é fatto a brani. (shrink)

Para Vico la matemática es la única ciencia de la que el hombre es capaz, ya que él mismo produce su objeto. Ni la realidad natural ni la realidad social pueden constituirse en objetos científicos. La primera porque es obra de Dios; la segunda porque el carácter azaroso de los asuntos humanos impiden que puedan ser subsumidos bajo leyes universales y necesarias. Siendo tan restringida la facultad de conocimiento, cobra relevancia la praxis social, aprehensible sólo mediante prudentia. En De ratione (...) se niega la posibilidad de una ciencia del mundo civil y, a la vez, se plantean las condiciones que la harán posible.Mathematics are for Vico the only science man can cultivate since it produces its own object. Therefore neither the natural reality nor the social one can be subtect of scientific consideration, since the first one is a divine product and the second, showing the hazardous character of human affairs, does not allow to explain them through universal scientific laws. The human faculty of knowledge being so restricted, makes social praxis became relevant and it can only grasped by means of prudentia. De Ratione denies the possibility of a scientific approach to the public and civil world, but at the same time, the conditions of posibility of such a knowledge are there posed. (shrink)

The Action-sentence Compatibility Effect is often taken as supporting the fundamental role of the motor system in understanding sentences that describe actions. This effect would be related to an internal “simulation,” i.e., the reactivation of past perceptual and motor experiences. However, it is not easy to establish whether this simulation predominantly involves spatial imagery or motor anticipation. In the classical ACE experiments, where a real motor response is required, the direction and motor representations are mixed. In order to disentangle spatial (...) and motor aspects involved in the ACE, we performed six experiments in different conditions, where the motor component was always reduced, asking participants to judge the sensibility of sentences by moving a mouse, thus requiring a purely spatial representation, compatible with nonmotor interpretations. In addition, our experiments had the purpose of taking into account the possible confusion of effects of practice and of compatibility. Also, in contrast to the usual paradigm, we included no-transfer filler sentences in the analysis. The ACE was not found in any experiment, a result that failed to support the idea that the ACE could be related to a simulation where spatial aspects rather than motor ones prevail. Strong practice effects were always found and were carved out from results. A surprising effect was that no-transfer sentences were processed much slower than others, perhaps revealing a sort of participants’ awareness of the structure of stimuli, i.e., their finding that some of them involved motion and others did not. The relevance of these outcomes for the embodiment theory is discussed. (shrink)

Tratar cuál es el carácter de la relación entre ciencia y tecnología en el complejo mundo de la Ilustración, es lo que plantea este libro. Los historiadores de la ciencia y de la tecnología han venido suponiendo en las últimas décadas que dicha relación se había producido en un único sentido. La presente obra desafía esta visión por simplificadora y replantea la cuestión para ofrecer un análisi más completo de la interacción entre ciencia e industria en este período.

In the course of his philosophical development, Jerry Fodor has indicated two sorts of non-broad (i.e., non-truthconditional) content of mental representations, namely content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) and narrow content (NC) qua mapping function from contexts (of thought) to broad contents. According to the former conceptualization, mental state tokens which are truth-conditionally identical may be such that they cannot both truthfully ascribed to one and the same subject at the same time, for they differ (...) in their respective DDC. In Fodor's own example, Oedipus' thoughts that he will marry Jocasta and that he will marry Mum are truth-conditionally identical, but different as far their DDC is concerned; one cannot indeed truthfully ascribe both thoughts to him simultaneously1. According to the latter conceptualization instead, mental state tokens of molecularly identical twins placed in different environments (such as Earth and Twin-Earth) are such that, although they differ in their truth-conditions, they share the same NC2. For instance, these twins respectively think that water quenches thirst and that twater (a liquid similar to water but its chemical composition) quenches thirst. Although these thoughts thus differ in broad content, they have the same NC: had the Twin-Earthling twin been brought up on Earth rather than on Twin-Earth where he actually lives, he would have thought that water quenches thirst rather than that twater quenches thirst3. According to Fodor's picture, both concepts are invoked for the purpose of psychology in order to account for one and the same thing, namely subjects' behavior. On the one hand, difference in behavior of a subject whose thought-tokens have the same truth-conditions may be ascribed to difference in the DDC of these tokens4. On the other hand, identity in behavior between two molecularly identical subjects whose thought-tokens have different truth-conditions is explained in terms of the NC- identity of these tokens5.. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor now holds (1990) that the content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) is determined by the 'orthographical' syntax + the computational/functional role of such states. Mental states whose tokens are both orthographically and truth-conditionally identical may be different with regard to the computational/functional role played by their respective representational cores. This make them tantamount to different contentful states, i.e. states with different DDCs, insofar as they are opaquely taxonomized. Indeed they cannot both be truthfully (...) ascribed to a single subject at the same time. Some years ago (1987), Fodor postulated a notion of mental content which also went beyond that of a mental state's truth-conditions. States whose tokens differ in their truth-conditions, or broad content, might, he claimed, still share a narrow content (NC), which was causally responsible for the shared behavior of the subjects of these states. For instance, two molecularly identical individuals, living in environments in all respects the same, except for the chemical substance of the phenomenically indistinguishable liquids filling their respective lakes and rivers, would behave similarly when having truth-conditionally different thoughts regarding those liquids. According to Fodor, this sameness of behavior was causally dependent on the sameness of the NC of the two individuals' truth-conditionally different thoughts. Now, this way of individuating mental states is still of interest for semantics. Indeed, NC allows one contextually to fix the broad content of a mental state token. Echoing Kaplan's notion of character,1 Fodor explained NC as a function that mapped contexts (of thought) onto broad contents. NC was thus invoked by Fodor mainly in order to account for sameness of intentional behavior. But DDC also plays a role in explaining intentional behavior, precisely by explaining why a subject whose thought-tokens have identical truthconditions may behave differently.. (shrink)

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