Fragments of Aristotle’s lost Protrepticus seem to offer inconsistent arguments for the value of contemplation (one argument appealing to contemplation's uselessness, the other appealing to its utility). In this paper, I argue that these arguments are mutually consistent. Further, I argue that, contrary to first appearances, Aristotle has resources in the Protrepticus for explaining how contemplation, even if it has divine objects, can nevertheless be useful in the way in which he claims, viz., for providing cognitive access to boundary markers (...) (horoi) of the human good. (shrink)

Ecrire un ouvrage intitulé La Révolution galiléenne; n'y faire l'analyse de la production d'aucun concept; n'exposer le procès de formation ni de la dynamique galiléenne, ni des rapports constitutifs de la théorie copernicienne à la mathématique ptoléméenne, ni de la géométrie analytique ou du principe d'inertie; taire l'architectonique des Principia de Newton et la récurrence qui s'y exerce sur les travaux de physique et d'astronomie mathématiques du siècle; tenir à juste raison que les sciences ont rapport à autre chose qu'elles (...) mais seulement pour parler de cet autre sans jamais penser distinctement les articulations spécifiques de ce rapport, tout en faisant néanmoins de locutions impliquant l'épistémologie un usage plus fréquent que peut être tout autre historien des sciences antérieur; tenir enfin le discours de la « culture occidentale » sur la science sans rien nous dire précisément sur celle-ci, en parlant toujours de celle-là, tel est le pari qui vient d'être en 900 pages formant deux tomes, tenu et gagne. On montrera de façon sommaire que pareille entreprise comporte des aspects moins gratuitement ludique qu'il n'y paraît ici. (shrink)

Don Cupitt's version of religious non‐realism based as it is on linguistic constructivism, radical relativism and the view that culture forms human nature has been attacked with devastating effect by realists in the last few years. I argue that there is another strand in Cupitt's thinking, his biological naturalism, that supports a different version of religious non‐realism and that he failed to see this possibility because of his global non‐realism and commitment to the strong programme in the sociology of scientific (...) knowledge. Cupitt's biological naturalism should have led smoothly into evolutionary psychology, which has an account of religious belief that supports a non‐realist interpretation. Evolutionary psychology shows that religious beliefs are natural, normal and about matters of the deepest significance to humans. They gain their character from the operation of evolved structures of the mind and cannot be reduced to other sorts of belief. I argue that the form of religious non‐realism that emerges from taking biological naturalism seriously has a future because it respects the nature of religious belief and seeks to build on its capacity as a unique source of meaning in people's lives. There is also enough common ground with religious realism for there to be genuine dialogue between the two. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall discuss some claims about selves McTaggart makes in The Nature of Existence.

A Principle of fundamental importance, if it is valid, for the interpretation of the Pentekontaetia is laid down by the authors of A. T.L. iii in its most rigorous terms: it is that Thucydides has set events ‘in proper order … without any deviation whatever’. The conclusion appears to the present writer to be founded ultimately on a false assumption about Thucydides' purpose in these chapters, namely that he set out to write an outline history of the period of fifty (...) years to which he refers in 118.2 and, in effect, in 97. An examination of these passages reveals that it is not the outline of a period as a period that is offered, but rather the account of a particular theme or process falling within the period: his purpose in presenting the theme there defined is to be seen from the setting of the excursus as a unit in Bk. I rather than from the statement in 97.2: the due significance of this last, and of the demarcation of a period in 118. 2, is to be seen only in this wider context. (shrink)

Simplicius, writing in the sixth century, distinguishes physical science from astronomy on the ground that, whereas it is the function of the physicist to “inquire into the nature of the heavens and the stars, into their potentialities, their quality, their becoming and passing away,” astronomy has no competence in questions of this primary character. Its function is “to determine the order of the heavenly bodies, their figures, magnitudes, distances from the earth, sun and moon, their eclipses, conjunctions, the quantitative and (...) qualitative properties of their motions,” etc. For this purpose it requires arithmetic and geometry, but cares not how the heavenly motions be described, whether in terms of excentrics or epicycles, so long as the appearances can thus be accounted for. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus contains a curious and inaccessible theory of the will. It is presented in no more than about half a dozen remarks scattered through the latter part of the book. At 5.1362 he writes: “The freedom of the will consists in this, that future actions cannot yet be known. We could know them only if causality were an inner necessity, like that of logical inference.—The connection between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity.” Similarly, at 6.373 (...) to 6.375 he writes: “The world is independent of my will. Even if all that we wish for happened, this would still be only a favour of fate, so to speak; for there is no logical connection between will and world, which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connection is surely not itself something we could will. Just as there is only a logical necessity, there is also only a logical impossibility.” At 6.423 to 6.43 he writes: “The will as the bearer of the ethical cannot be spoken of. And the will as phenomenon is of interest only to psychology. If good or bad willing alters the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts; not that which can be expressed through language. Briefly, the world must become through it an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole. The world of the happy man is a different one from the world of the unhappy man.” Finally, at 5.631 and 5.632 he writes: “There is no thinking, imaging, subject. If I wrote a book called “The world as I found it,” I should have to include a report on my body and say which parts were subordinate to my will and which not, etc.; this is a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.—The subject does not belong to the world, but is a limit of the world.”. (shrink)

Gavagai! or the Future History of the Animal Language Controversy By DAVID PREMACK.