I contend that in the "meditations" descartes expresses both certainty and doubt that he exists. He is certain that he exists when he views himself in terms of occurrent acts of thinking; his certainty stems from his "observing" such acts. When he views himself in terms of an "unobservable" thinking substance, The belief that acts are in a thinking substance is central. Thinking substances can be known to exist only by demonstrating that this belief is true, And the demonstration can (...) only be accomplished by showing that a good God exists. Thus prior to such proofs, Descartes can doubt that he, Qua particular thinking substance, Exists. He does exhibit self-Doubt in the third meditation. (shrink)

My aim is to call attention to two features of Descartes' presentation of his so-called criterion of truth in the third meditation. First, there is an explicit shift between "clear and distinct "perception"" and "clear and distinct "conception"." Second, in the two paragraphs which follow the presentation of the criterion, Descartes proceeds to highlight a correlative distinction. Roughly speaking, the distinction is between perceiving something and having "persuasive" conceptions of something. This distinction not only corresponds to the shift between "perceive" (...) and "conceive" but also to the claims about which Descartes is certain and doubtful, respectively, prior to the proofs about God's existence. Thus the verbal shift is not merely that; it also signals a substantive distinction central to the "Meditations". (shrink)

Arnauld charged descartes with circularity in his theological proof. I argue that descartes's system is circular. Then I discuss how descartes responds to this problem. He develops distinctions which only seem to allay the circularity charge. Ironically, It is descartes himself, By means of his insistence on the idea-Thing distinction and attendant doubts, And his insistence on 'doubting the indubitable', Who highlights the chronic difficulties of the theological proofs.

Empiricism is historically, even if not logically, connected with racism. Some of empiricism's primary proponents were racists. Rationalism provides a "modest conceptual barrier" to racism. These are the main theses of Bracken's collection of essays. One sees immediately that Bracken wishes to move a classical and allegedly purely philosophical debate into the ideological arena.