Does colonialism have long-term effects on political stability? This question is addressed in a study of India’s Naxalite insurgency, a Maoist rebellion characterized by its left-wing proponents as having roots in the colonial period. The article highlights three mechanisms linking colonialism with contemporary Naxalite violence—land inequality, discriminatory policies toward low-caste and tribal groups, and upper-caste-dominated administrative institutions. It analyzes how the degree of British influence relates to Naxalite conflict in 589 districts from 1980 to 2011. A positive association is found (...) between British influence and the strength of the Naxalite rebellion across all of India, within both the “Red Corridor” region and former princely states. The results are robust to a coarsened exact matching analysis and a wide array of robustness checks. The findings call into question whether the supposedly beneficial administrative and institutional legacies of colonialism can be evaluated without reference to their social costs. (shrink)

In their article ’Is Pregnancy a Disease? A Normative Approach’, Anna Smajdor and Joona Räsänen contend that, on several of the most prominent accounts of disease, pregnancy should be considered a disease. More specifically, of the five accounts they discuss, each renders pregnancy a disease or suffers serious conceptual problems otherwise. They take issue specifically with the dysfunction account of disease and argue that it suffers several theoretical difficulties. In this response, we focus on defending the dysfunction account against their (...) main objections and show why a version of the dysfunction account is viable on account of the indispensability of normativity in biology and medicine. After disarming their main objections to the dysfunction account, we briefly respond to their treatment of the normality of pregnancy and then draw a distinction between adverse symptoms and underlying causes to show why even though pregnancy may have ’disease-like’ features, it is not a disease. (shrink)

Classical (Bayesian) probability (CP) theory has led to an influential research tradition for modeling cognitive processes. Cognitive scientists have been trained to work with CP principles for so long that it is hard even to imagine alternative ways to formalize probabilities. However, in physics, quantum probability (QP) theory has been the dominant probabilistic approach for nearly 100 years. Could QP theory provide us with any advantages in cognitive modeling as well? Note first that both CP and QP theory share the (...) fundamental assumption that it is possible to model cognition on the basis of formal, probabilistic principles. But why consider a QP approach? The answers are that (1) there are many well-established empirical findings (e.g., from the influential Tversky, Kahneman research tradition) that are hard to reconcile with CP principles; and (2) these same findings have natural and straightforward explanations with quantum principles. In QP theory, probabilistic assessment is often strongly context- and order-dependent, individual states can be superposition states (that are impossible to associate with specific values), and composite systems can be entangled (they cannot be decomposed into their subsystems). All these characteristics appear perplexing from a classical perspective. However, our thesis is that they provide a more accurate and powerful account of certain cognitive processes. We first introduce QP theory and illustrate its application with psychological examples. We then review empirical findings that motivate the use of quantum theory in cognitive theory, but also discuss ways in which QP and CP theories converge. Finally, we consider the implications of a QP theory approach to cognition for human rationality. (shrink)

Thomas Sheehan’s attack on my book Heidegger, l’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie, addressed neither the book’s topic nor its arguments. He instead highlighted a few isolated details in a sophistic and biased fashion. Moreover, his exposition was interspersed with ad personam insults not typically found in philosophical or scientific discussions. Although I had hitherto resolved not to respond to personal attacks, I owe it to the memory of Johannes Fritsche, who was also attacked by Sheehan, to take my turn (...) to speak and to thereby pay intellectual tribute to Professor Fritsche. The article returns to the interpretation of Being and Time and analyzes the meaning and connotations of Heidegger’s use of the German term Bodenlosigkeit. The key methodological issue concerns the need to study the semantic, historical, and political context of concepts instead of hiding these issues by reducing everything to a battle between dogmatic positions. (shrink)

Thomas Sheehan’s attack on my book Heidegger, l’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie, addressed neither the book’s topic nor its arguments. He instead highlighted a few isolated details in a sophistic and biased fashion. Moreover, his exposition was interspersed with ad personam insults not typically found in philosophical or scientific discussions. Although I had hitherto resolved not to respond to personal attacks, I owe it to the memory of Johannes Fritsche, who was also attacked by Sheehan, to take my turn (...) to speak and to thereby pay intellectual tribute to Professor Fritsche. The article returns to the interpretation of Being and Time and analyzes the meaning and connotations of Heidegger’s use of the German term Bodenlosigkeit. The key methodological issue concerns the need to study the semantic, historical, and political context of concepts instead of hiding these issues by reducing everything to a battle between dogmatic positions. (shrink)

" Pourquoi demandons-nous avec tant d'empressement au cerveau d'expliquer ce qui nous arrive et ce que nous devons faire? On se dit, n'est-ce pas dans ses replis que nous devons désormais chercher notre sort? La philosophie peut-elle rester indifférente à un tel sujet? [...] Mais avons-nous éclairci notre monde et résolu nos questions de vie en les enracinant dans nos cerveaux? A-t-on rendu la conscience moins mystérieuse? Et penser? L'organe de la pensée va-t-il enfin nous en dispenser? " L'auteur s'interroge (...) avec une douce ironie sur les espoirs et les fragilités qui s'expriment dans cette nouvelle quête de fondement que nous avons entreprise. Qu'on ne s'attende pas à trouver ici une théorie du fonctionnement cérébral, mais mille interrogations, mille formulations des questions qui surgissent dès lors qu'on interpose l'idée de cerveau entre nous et le monde. L'ensemble compose une suite de méditations, ramassées en brefs chapitres, pour trouver une place au cerveau et varier notre distance à son égard. (shrink)

Everything is phenomenon, everything is gift, or everything is given. This presupposition of phenomenology, which makes giveness the starting point for phenomenality, is not altogether self-evident. It is not sufficient to look merely at the reverse of the gift, but it is a matter of questioning the impossibility of even giving. Questioning the strategies of the contemporary reappropriations of Kant—radicalization, disproportion, and inversion —this text works under a fourth possibility, seldom examined and yet still envisaged by Kant: the “Extra-Phenomenal”, or (...) in other words, the “Chaos”, the “pell-mell”, the “Cinnabar”, or the “melee of sensations”. (shrink)

We address the problem of predicting how people will spontaneously divide into groups a set of novel items. This is a process akin to perceptual organization. We therefore employ the simplicity principle from perceptual organization to propose a simplicity model of unconstrained spontaneous grouping. The simplicity model predicts that people would prefer the categories for a set of novel items that provide the simplest encoding of these items. Classification predictions are derived from the model without information either about the number (...) of categories sought or information about the distributional properties of the objects to be classified. These features of the simplicity model distinguish it from other models in unsupervised categorization (where, for example, the number of categories sought is determined via a free parameter), and we discuss how these computational differences are related to differences in modeling objectives. The predictions of the simplicity model are validated in four experiments. We also discuss the significance of simplicity in cognitive modeling more generally. (shrink)

_Achieving Our Humanity_ explores a postracial future through a philosophical analysis of the social, cultural, economic and political experiences of race in the past and what this might mean for our present and, most importantly, our future.

The distinction between rules and similarity is central to our understanding of much of cognitive psychology. Two aspects of existing research have motivated the present work. First, in different cognitive psychology areas we typically see different conceptions of rules and similarity; for example, rules in language appear to be of a different kind compared to rules in categorization. Second, rules processes are typically modeled as separate from similarity ones; for example, in a learning experiment, rules and similarity influences would be (...) described on the basis of separate models. In the present article, I assume that the rules versus similarity distinction can be understood in the same way in learning, reasoning, categorization, and language, and that a unified model for rules and similarity is appropriate. A rules process is considered to be a similarity one where only a single or a small subset of an object's properties are involved. Hence, rules and overall similarity operations are extremes in a single continuum of similarity operations. It is argued that this viewpoint allows adequate coverage of theory and empirical findings in learning, reasoning, categorization, and language, and also a reassessment of the objectives in research on rules versus similarity. Key Words: categorization; cognitive explanation; language; learning; reasoning; rules; similarity. (shrink)

The ethics of conducting research in epidemic situations have yet to account fully for differences in the proportion and acuteness of epidemics, among other factors. While epidemics most often arise from infectious diseases, not all infectious diseases are of epidemic proportions, and not all epidemics occur acutely. These and other variations constrain the generalization of ethical decision‐making and impose ethical demands on the individual researcher in a way not previously highlighted. This paper discusses a number of such constraints and impositions. (...) It applies the ethical principles enunciated by Emmanuel et al.1 to the controversial Pfizer study in Nigeria in order to highlight the particular ethical concerns of acute epidemic research, and suggest ways of meeting such challenges.The paper recommends that research during epidemics should be partly evaluated on its own merits in order to determine its ethical appropriateness to the specific situation. Snap decisions to conduct research during acute epidemics should be resisted. Community engagement, public notification and good information management are needed to promote the ethics of conducting research during acute epidemics. Individual consent is most at risk of being compromised, and every effort should be made to ensure that it is maintained and valid. Use of data safety management boards should be routine. Acute epidemics also present opportunities to enhance the social value of research and maximize its benefits to communities.Ethical research is possible in acute epidemics, if the potential challenges are thought of ahead of time and appropriate precautions taken. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay tracks Heidegger’s thought from 1919 forwards to the decisive years of his political engagement, on behalf of the Nazi movement. Part 1 tracks how the question concerning Being devolves into the implicitly identitarian question of who “we” are. Part 2 addresses the “existential” of Befindlichkeit which Heidegger in Sein und Zeit positions as prior to understanding, and examines his esoteric mode of writing as the means to cultivate a prerational Stimmung. Part 3 examines Heidegger’s response to his 1929–1930 (...) questions of “What mood must we awaken?... Who are we, then?” in the decisive years of the Gleichchaltung, showing how Heidegger’s thinking elevates to ontological primacy a discriminatory and identitarian decision concerning who “we” are as the German volk. Part 4 examines in this light the Heideggerian “end of philosophy” in what the Black Notebooks talks of in terms of a “metapolitics ‘of’ the historical people”. (shrink)

N'y a-t-il pas une contradiction dans l'oeuvre d'Arendt? On y trouve une description critique du totalitarisme national-socialiste, mais aussi l'apologie de Heidegger érigé, malgré son éloge de la "vérité interne et grandeur" du mouvement nazi, en roi secret de la pensée. L'étude des Origines du totalitarisme montre qu'Arendt développe une vision heideggérienne de la modernité. Dans Condition de l'homme moderne, la conception déshumanisée de l'humanité au travail et le discrédit jeté sur nos sociétés égalitaires procèdent également de Heidegger. En outre, (...) des lettres inédites montrent qu'Arendt a décidé de marcher sur les pas de Heidegger avant leurs retrouvailles de l'année 1950. Il s'agit d'une adhésion intellectuelle, irréductible à la seule passion amoureuse, et qui mérite d'être prise au sérieux. Certes, Arendt ne partage pas l'antisémitisme exterminateur de Heidegger confirmé par ses Cahiers noirs. Que devient cependant la pensée, instrumentalisée dans l'opposition - nouveau mythe moderne - entre Heidegger, le "penseur" retiré sur les hauteurs neigeuses de sa hutte de Todtnauberg, et Eichmann, l'exécutant sans pensée, le "clown" muré dans sa cage de verre? (shrink)

There are international and so-called “global” forces framing Africa within a larger world, a world structured predominantly by Europe and North America and their needs for raw materials and markets, power, and leisure. This paper therefore pursues questions like, “What does democracy mean for Africans today?” and, “What does freedom mean when colonial liberation has been achieved?” or, to be more precise, “What is democracy in the world today from an African perspective?”. I distinguish between freedom (as the exercise of (...) autonomy and accompanying responsibility), and liberation (as the throwing off of foreign domination). I argue that democracy should be understood as a “concern for freedoms” (religious, economic, or political), and that democratic law seeks, in principle, the most space for the exercise of freedom for everyone. This conception of democracy is quite naturally the “other” face of the independence and liberation movements throughout Africa. (shrink)

There is an actuality of medieval philosophy. The “phenomenological practice of medieval philosophy” put into practice by the author in his work “God, the flesh and the other” finds its full justification here. One does not demonstrate the fertility of a method by his theory, but by its application in practice. The crossing of authors as diverse as St. Augustine, John Scotus Erigena and Master Eckhart, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Bonaventura, and Origen, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scot, deploys for today the (...) actuality of medieval philosophy – not first understood as “up-to-date” but as implementation of their “potentialities”. (shrink)

There is the death of God, but comes also the death of man. Both are fundamentally linked, at least in Nietzsche’s thought. Christianity will also have to find its place there. Not in order to deplore the radicalism of contemporary nihilism, but to understand it from the inside and also to ensure its succession. Etsi homo non daretur — what if man (and not only God) were not given? With this questioning must arise a God of strength and resurrection, a (...) sort of “over-God” capable of rivaling Nietzsche’s superman. To think through “the main thread of the body” is not only to reverse the relationship between the soul and the body, but to consider incarnation in a different way, also with all that there is in us of passions and impulses. The “Self” (das Selbst) then takes precedence over the “It” (das Es), because it is not enough for the ego to stand like “a rider” on his horse (Freud) ; it is also necessary to recognize to any plural subject the power to be for itself and in itself “like on the back of a tiger” (Nietzsche). It is at this price, and at this price alone, that our humanity will be fully assumed so that it can create again. (shrink)

This paper states that as there is the “death of God” (Nietzsche), there is also the "death of man" (Foucault). The first will be interpreted either as the truth of the God who dies (theologies of the death of God), or as the death of the principle (Heidegger), or as the death of the living God and of his resurrection power (Nietzsche's true interpretation). The second one can certainly consecrate the human as an “fabricated problem” (Foucault), but even more this (...) way can open up the new power relationship of the Übermensch. Therefore, after the fold of the "forces of finitude" comes the fold of the "new creative infinity" (Deleuze). It is in this way, and only by thinking about “the thread of the body”, that we will perhaps move away from the death of man (Foucault) and the death of God (Nietzsche). Going down to Freud’s “es”, but also reaching Nietzsche’s “Self” will be the condition to echo the power of the Übermensch and of the " Über God". Man does not only stand on the “back of the es” like the rider on his horse (Freud), but also on the “back of the Self” like the “back of the tiger” that cannot be tamed (Nietzsche). (shrink)

“A Tempest in a Skull”. The expression comes from Victor Hugo's Les Miserables, but it says just as much about Freud's life as it does about ours. No one is probably more 'disturbed', or descends to the depths of chaos, than when he or she takes on the trappings of a 'tidy' being, or is caught up in a cosmetic life apparently made of order and beauty. Of course, “everything is fine” does not always hide “everything is bad”. But we (...) must also recognize that there is often a 'tempest' in a skull, and that it is precisely at this moment that everything changes, and everything is modified within us. Based on this phenomenon, the leitmotiv "so much exception, so much modification" thus becomes the new imperative of phenomenology - not out of attachment to the tragic or the pathetic, but on the contrary to reach that part of us which is inexpressible and which is the strongest part of our existentiality. Garcia Lorca's Duende, as the “spirit of aching Spain”, will express in its own way this force “that burns the blood”, the only one capable of touching our own depths, magnified and exorcised by the rhythm of Andalusian singers. (shrink)

El presente trabajo aborda la recepción del pensamiento de Agustín de Hipona a lo largo de la historia de la fenomenología en el siglo XX. Para ello, divide esta recepción en diversos temas o enfoques con sus respectivos autores. En primer lugar, trata los “orígenes fenomenológicos” (Husserl, Heidegger y Arendt), mostrando allí la matriz alemana de interpretación de Agustín. En segundo lugar, el autor analiza, ya en el marco de las lecturas francesas de Agustín, lo que denomina el “giro hermenéutico” (...) (Gadamer y Ricoeur). Finalmente, en tercer lugar, examina lo que define como “Descripciones fenomenológicas” (Marion y Chrétien). (shrink)

Il arrive parfois que la danse rejoigne la philosophie, car l’une et l’autre sont des mouvements et des pensées du corps. Et elles ont en commun de ne se déployer que dans et par la limite. Vivre « aux confins », c’est atteindre les limites et ne jamais les dépasser. Et quiconque voudrait s’envoler s’écrasera d’une pesanteur qu’il aura eu le tort de refuser. Ce texte, mise en scène par les élèves du conservatoire de danse contemporaine de Tours (sous la (...) direction de Valerie de Mortillet, professeur de danse) figure ce que la pensée depuis si longtemps voulait montrer. On associera ainsi l’image à la réflexion, pour voir précisément ce qu’il en est du poids de notre humanité : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s8NIvz24YBU. (shrink)

Originally published: Brussels: Editions Lessius, 2013.

In this article E. Falque offers an original reading of the Augustinian epithet “I am a weight to myself” (oneri mihi sum, conf. 10.28). The question for Falque is not to determine whether Augustine belongs to the history of metaphysics (as is J.-L. Marión’s interest), but to determine what Augustine’s “weight of life” does to phenomenology in the backlash (‘le choc en retour’), or the after theafter, of metaphysics. Specifically, foliowing M. Heidegger, Falque finds the “weight of life” particularly relevant (...) to frame the post-metaphysical experience of memory and the question of pain. Overall, the infamous Augustinian “restless heart” finquietum, conf. 1.1) ineludes, through the “weight of life”, an unquenchable dynamic which is the divine action in human beings. The “weight of life” is such in the finitude of human existence that there always remains restlessness in rest. Thus, Falque recovers the restlessness of rest through an analysis of the backlash of the “weight of life” in the after the after of metaphysics. (shrink)

Spontaneous creations often exist in nature but rarely in philosophy. Yet, theemergence of the International Network of Philosophy of Religion was such an instance. France and the United States have long been linked, not just in friendship, but in thought. Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Derrida, and, more recently, Jean-Luc Marion have been among some of the French pioneers bridging this divide. More than a matter of an affiliation to a particular school of thought, a true“bridge of friendship” has been constructed across (...) the ocean, as if these waters were not enough to separate us. (shrink)

Un essai sur les moments de crise que chacun peut rencontrer dans sa vie. Se fondant sur les leçons de la phénoménologie, l'auteur propose de penser la crise hors catégorie, pour réussir à affronter les moments de difficulté en les intégrant dans une autre perspective, celle d'un chemin de vie, chaque étape participant à la transformation de l'être.

Tout parcours est "semé d'embûches" - chacun le sait, ou à tout le moins le sent. Ce livre en est à nouveau la preuve. Non pas qu'on nous tende des pièges, mais en cela que les courses de 'sauts d'obstacles' sont toujours les plus prestigieuses, mais aussi les plus périlleuses. En réponse à Une analytique du passage (Claude-Brunier Coulin, éd.), ce volume de la plume de l'auteur reprend ainsi point par point les 'interrogations et objections' soulevées lors du colloque de (...) Chevilly-Larue (5-7 Juillet 2014), tout en proposant un véritable 'itinéraire' retraçant sa propre trajectoire. La source franciscaine, l'humanité commune, le sens de la catholicité, la racine ignacienne, l'héritage péguyste, le rapport à la finitude, le problème du surnaturel, le statut de l'apologétique, la relation au corps, le sens de la voix, la traversée du chaos, la question de la limite, le statut de l'Ecriture, le sens du style..., sont autant de thèmes et de questions abordées dans le présent essai. Faisant de la lutte de Jacob avec l'ange la figure de proue de cette grande traversée - "Je ne te lâcherai pas que tu m'aies béni" (Gn 32, 27) -, cet ouvrage accomplit le 'cycle méthodologique' initié par Passer le Rubicon (Lessius, 2013), relayé par Le combat amoureux (Hermann, 2014), et achevé par le Parcours d'embûches (Editions franciscaines, 2016). (shrink)

La philosophie, et en particulier la phénoménologie, se trouve aujourd'hui en France dans une situation pour le moins paradoxale dans son vis-à-vis avec la théologie. Alors que les uns e - accusent les phénoménologues d'un prétendu tournant théologique et que les autres s'en défendent comme si toute théologisation devait entacher leur intégrité, nul ne tente délibérément la traversée en prenant en charge les deux disciplines comme telles. En osant " passer le Rubicon " avec cette conviction que " plus on (...) théologise, mieux on philosophe ", cet ouvrage tente donc de mettre fin à la trop fréquente position de " chiens de faïence " et propose un " choc en retour " de la théologie sur la phénoménologie. Loin des philosophies du " seuil " ou du " saut ", une véritable rencontre des disciplines est ici revendiquée, dans l'assurance qu'elles seront mieux distinguées si elles acceptent d'être davantage assumées. Alea jacta est : " le sort en est jeté ", avec audace et peut-être témérité mais en sachant que nul ne pense s'il ne vient à s'exposer. (shrink)

Bien au-delà de la seule philosophie, le débat à Davos en 1929 entre Cassirer et Heidegger a marqué l'histoire des idées. Il a même donné naissance à des récits passablement légendaires qui négligeaient le contexte historique précis. Un nouveau regard s'impose, à la lumière des œuvres publiées depuis lors. Les vingt-cinq tomes de l'édition allemande de référence de Cassirer ne sont disponibles que depuis 2007.0S'y s'ajoutent les dix-sept tomes du Nachlass depuis 2017. Des 102 volumes de la Gesamtausgabe de Heidegger, (...) édition de référence mais sans garantie scientifique, moins d'une dizaine reste programmée, mais d'ores et déjà la publication des cinq premiers volumes des Cahiers noirs a permis d'engager une relecture critique de l'ensemble. C'est donc à présent seulement que l'on peut véritablement évaluer les projets contrastés des deux auteurs.0Leurs enjeux intéressent notamment le statut de la rationalité et des sciences, en particulier celles de la culture, aussi bien que le statut de la technique parmi les formes symboliques. Et tout autant, l'opposition entre la démocratie et la théologie politique ; entre la légitimité du cosmopolitisme et l'ontologie identitaire ; enfin, entre la possibilité même d'une éthique ou son rejet de principe.0Tous ces thèmes contradictoires exigent aujourd'hui une révision critique, non seulement rétrospective, mais aussi ancrée dans le présent. Car au-delà même de la philosophie, des courants de pensée et des forces politiques en Europe et dans le monde poursuivent ces deux voies qui s'opposent aujourd'hui. (shrink)