Abstract: Introspection reveals that one is frequently conscious of some form of inner speech, which may appear either in a condensed or expanded form. It has been claimed that this speech reflects the way in which language is involved in conscious thought, fulfilling a number of cognitive functions. We criticize three theories that address this issue: Bermúdez’s view of language as a generator of second-order thoughts, Prinz’s development of Jackendoff’s intermediate-level theory of consciousness, and Carruthers’s theory of inner speech as (...) a rehearsal of action-schemata. We contend they have problems to account for those cases in which inner speech is fragmentary, and for the difference with those instances in which it appears as more sentence-like. In addition, we present verbal overshadowing as a phenomenon that neither of them can easily explain. Finally, we propose an account in which inner speech is fundamentally silent outer speech and argue that it is more explanatory than the alternatives. (shrink)

Este trabajo intenta clasificar la noción de contenido no conceptual, centrándose especialmente en su pretendida autonomía respecto al contenido conceptual. Se discute críticamente el Principio de Autonomía de Bermúdez y, frente a él, se argumenta a favor de la existencia de relaciones de interdependencia entre el contenido no conceptual y el contenido conceptual.

El objetivo propuesto en el siguiente trabajo es elucidar cómo desde la finitud de la existencia puede establecerse la problemática de la temporalidad dentro del entramado de pensamiento de Martin Heidegger. Para ello realizaremos un análisis de la conferencia de 1924 Der Begriff der Zeit, uno de los textos que allanan el camino a Sein und Zeit, en lugar de centrar la investigación en la considerada obra magna de Heidegger. Una reflexión acerca de este texto previo permitirá avanzar en el (...) análisis de la existencia al mostrar cómo el tiempo está arraigado en la existencia individual, no como un solipsismo, sino como apertura de posibilidades respecto del mundo (a la postre compartido con los otros). Una descripción fenomenológica de la muerte posibilitará la apertura al mundo, definiendo una temporalidad existencial que incluye no sólo al instante presente, sino también al pasado (concebido bajo la forma del «haber-sido») y al futuro. (shrink)

El pensamiento de María Zambrano emerge, en la distancia histórica, bajo la imagen, siempre sugerente, de una Antígona contemporánea. Como ella asiste al conflicto trágico de una Guerra Civil; como ella apura el cáliz del sufrimiento y la soledad para hacer emerger una conducta ética y moral que sirva de Guía a sus contemporáneos, en un momento de crisis y confusión. Todas las grandes nociones del pensamiento zambraniano (sueño, confesión, guía, alba y aurora) se dan cita en esta máscara, pero (...) será el personaje galdoniano de la Nina de Misericordia, como aspiración pura nunca lograda, el verdadero motor que revela la personalidad de María Zambrano, tal como la vemos florecer en sus obras finales, Aurora, Claros del bosque y, sobre todo, Los bienaventurados. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 3 Seiten: 485-495.

Subjective and psychophysiological emotional responses to music from two different cultures were compared within these two cultures. Two identical experiments were conducted: the first in the Congolese rainforest with an isolated population of Mebenzélé Pygmies without any exposure to Western music and culture, the second with a group of Western music listeners, with no experience with Congolese music. Forty Pygmies and 40 Canadians listened in pairs to 19 music excerpts of 29–99 s in duration in random order (eight from the (...) Pygmy population and 11 Western instrumental excerpts). For both groups, emotion components were continuously measured: subjective feeling (using a two- dimensional valence and arousal rating interface), peripheral physiological activation, and facial expression. While Pygmy music was rated as positive and arousing by Pygmies, ratings of Western music by Westerners covered the range from arousing to calming and from positive to negative. Comparing psychophysiological responses to emotional qualities of Pygmy music across participant groups showed no similarities. However, Western stimuli, rated as high and low arousing by Canadians, created similar responses in both participant groups (with high arousal associated with increases in subjective and physiological activation). Several low-level acoustical features of the music presented (tempo, pitch, and timbre) were shown to affect subjective and physiological arousal similarly in both cultures. Results suggest that while the subjective dimension of emotional valence might be mediated by cultural learning, changes in arousal might involve a more basic, universal response to low-level acoustical characteristics of music. (shrink)

We present an experiment designed to investigate three different mechanisms to achieve impartiality in distributive justice. We consider a first-person procedure, inspired by the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, and two third-party procedures, an involved spectator and a detached observer. First-person veiled stakeholders and involved spectators are affected by an initially unfair distribution that, in the stakeholders’ case, is to be redressed. We find substantial differences in the redressing task. Detached observers propose significantly fairer redistributions than veiled stakeholders or involved spectators. (...) Risk preferences partly explain why veiled stakeholders propose less egalitarian redistributions. Surprisingly, involved spectators, who are informed about their position in society, tend to favour stakeholders holding the same position as they do after the initial distribution. (shrink)

Forsyth’s (1980) Ethics Position Questionnaire and Hunt et al.’s (1989) Corporate Ethical Value Questionnaire are used to examine the ethical ideologies of senior managers from organizations listed in the Australian Stock Exchange. The results indicate how corporate ethical values, religion, gender, and age are related to the idealism and relativism of senior Australian managers. After discussing the results, limitations of the study are offered. Finally, managerial implications are provided and recommendations for future research are given.

RESUMEN En el prólogo a la segunda edición de la Crítica de la razón pura, ¿qué ha querido decir Kant con una “revolución del modo de pensar” que se debe aplicar a la metafísica para que tome el camino de la ciencia? Cabe distinguir dos significados: uno de carácter metodológico, que asume que el conocimiento rige a los objetos y tendría alcance. Aplicada a la metafísica, supone una transformación más profunda que permite hablar, en segundo lugar, de un significado metafísico (...) específico, que implica que el conocimiento constituye aquello mismo a lo que se llama el objeto de las representaciones. ABSTRACT What is Kant referring to when, in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, he speaks of the “revolution in the way of thinking” that is needed for metaphysics to enter the path of science? Two meanings are possible. The first is a methodological one, which assumes that knowledge governs objects and would, therefore, extend to metaphysics. Applied to the latter, a more profound transformation is needed, one that would make it possible to speak of a specific metaphysical meaning entailing that knowledge constitutes the object of representations. (shrink)

En el prólogo a la segunda edición de la Crítica de la razón pura, ¿qué ha querido decir Kant con una “revolución del modo de pensar” que se debe aplicar a la meta-física para que tome el camino de la ciencia? Cabe distinguir dos significados: uno de carácter metodológico, que asume que el conocimiento rige a los objetos y ten-dría alcance. Aplicada a la metafísica, supone una transformación más profunda que permite hablar, en segundo lugar, de un significado metafísico específico, (...) que implica que el conocimiento constituye aquello mismo a lo que se llama el objeto de las representaciones. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 106 Heft: 3 Seiten: 418-429.

This paper analyses the relatively neglected topic of hierarchy in the philosophical foundation of human rights. It develops a transcendental-discursive approach. This approach develops the idea that all human rights could be derived from a small set of fundamental rights that are interconnected and that incorporate all ulterior possible specific rights. This set is then applied to an analysis of human rights as they have been formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The claim is that this prior set (...) of transcendental rights is discursively implied whenever we talk about human rights. Thinking about the hierarchy of rights pragmatically means thinking about prioritising their implementation. Some consequences for practical philosophy and politics concerning the role of states, enterprises and world citizenship are then discussed. (shrink)

Im Anhang zum zweiten Teil der Kritik der Urteilskraft, der Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, setzt sich Kant mit der Frage nach dem Zweck der Schöpfung auseinander. Seine These ist hier eindeutig: „wir [erkennen] nun den Menschen […] als moralisches Wesen für den Zweck der Schöpfung [an…]“. Warum ist jedoch der Mensch als moralisches Wesen für den Zweck der Schöpfung zu halten? Diese Frage ist keineswegs unumstritten und soll in diesem Aufsatz erörtert werden. Um sie zu beantworten, werde ich den Zusammenhang (...) von drei bestehenden Elementen der kantischen Auffassung des Menschen als Zweck der Schöpfung erläutern: Die vernünftige Natur des Menschen, die Freiheit seines Willens, und das Sittengesetz. (shrink)

Are judgments of praise for moral behavior modulated by knowledge of an agent's past suffering at the hands of others, and if so, in what direction? Drawing on multiple lines of research in experimental social psychology, we identify three hypotheses about the psychology of praise — typecasting, handicapping, and non-historicism — each of which supports a different answer to the question above. Typecasting predicts that information about past suffering will augment perceived patiency and thereby diminish perceived agency, making altruistic actions (...) seem less praiseworthy; handicapping predicts that this information will make altruistic actions seem more effortful, and hence more praiseworthy; and non-historicism predicts that judgments of praise will be insensitive to information about an agent's experiential history. We report the results of two studies suggesting that altruistic behavior tends to attract more praise when the experiential history of the agent involves coping with adversity in childhood rather than enjoying prosperity (Study 1, N = 348, p = .03, d = 0.45; Study 2, N = 400, p = .02, d = 0.39), as well as the results of a third study suggesting that altruistic behavior tends to be evaluated more favorably when the experiential history of the agent includes coping with adversity than in the absence of information about the agent's past experience (N = 226, p = .002). This pattern of results, we argue, is more consistent with handicapping than typecasting or non-historicism. (shrink)

La oposición a Hegel mediante la cual con frecuencia la tradición presenta la filosofía schopenhaueriana se ha interpretado en ocasiones como una relación de dependencia, en la medida en que aquella habría surgido como una cierta reacción frente a la de Hegel. El artículo muestra que los documentos disponibles acerca de los comienzos de la relación de Schopenhauer con Hegel hacen insostenible tal supuesto, además de ofrecer un marco y diversas claves para comprender su posterior polémica con el hegelianismo.

Resumo: Trata-se de avaliar a justiça da leitura deleuzeana de Bergson, partindo de duas problemáticas principais: o monismo da duração, que Deleuze enxerga e defende em Bergson, e a ontologização do passado, a qual ele promove em sua apreciação da filosofia bergsoniana. Como procuraremos mostrar, se o primeiro ponto parece particularmente equivocado, o segundo ponto parece encontrar guarida em alguns trechos da obra de Bergson.: In this article we evaluate Deleuze's reading of Bergson, discussing two main problems: the monism of (...) duration that Deleuze sees and defends in Bergson, and the ontologization of the past that he finds in the Bergsonian philosophy. As we shall attempt to show, if the first point seems particularly misleading, the second point seems to find a basis in some passages of Bergson's work. (shrink)

Nada hay más confortable para el hombre, ni más peligroso, que las certezas. Nuestra mejor defensa es la filosofía, que consiste engran medida en el arte de cuestionarlas, de atreverse a pensar, de interpelar las verdades establecidas y ver qué esconden. En estepaseo por la historia de la filosofía, Fernando Savater nos presenta a los grandes personajes que con sus preguntas, y en ocasiones con sus respuestas, han marcado el pensamiento occidental. Platón, Aristóteles, Hobbes, Tomás de Aquino, Nietzsche, Marx, (...) Ortega, Wittgenstein y hasta dieciocho filósofos más desfilan por estas páginas de la mano de Savater, que con su habitual estilo lúcido, ameno e inteligente explica sus ideas más importantes y resume sus trayectorias. Un canto al irrenunciable ejercicio de la libertad intelectual, este libro es en realidad una invitación a huir de los tópicos y a compartir con los grandes filósofos la maravillosa aventura de pensar. (shrink)

: In his works on ecological philosophy, Bruno Latour develops an interesting ontology. He proposes a new worldview, in which religion is reinterpreted in view of a Gaian philosophy. He extends ‘pluralism’ beyond the anthropocentrism that dominates modern humanism. In his book Facing Gaia Latour includes nonhuman beings in a larger community and works towards a larger concept of eco-humanism. In this paper, I try to reconstruct his position by showing that the philosophical foundation for his interpretation of ontology is (...) to be classified as a form of new materialism. This new interpretation of materialism has postmodernist origins (inspired by Gilles Deleuze), but it is not identical to it, because Latour explicitly distances himself from ‘postmodernism’. He wants to contribute to a ‘positive’ ontology. My point is that Latour’s materialist grounding of ontology, which he tries to elaborate in order to make a religious pluralism possible, obstructs any foundation of transcendence and, finally, congests a pluralistic ecumene, because it renounces to the idea of the ‘whole’ and a unitary principle of being. His ideas on eco-humanism and pluralistic ecumene could gain momentum if we opted for a more holistic and idealistic way of thinking. In my last section I show how this is possible: objective idealism and panentheism are conceived as models that belong together and can offer a viable alternative for modern versions of materialism. (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo analisa a composição étnico-racial dos programas de pós-graduação brasileiros da área de filosofia. O propósito é identificar as características gerais da área e analisar os dados disponíveis sobre as declarações de cor/raça em seus mestrados e doutorados. Espera-se que essas análises sejam úteis para a discussão e proposição de ações afirmativas em tais programas. O resultado obtido evidenciou que negros estão largamente sub-representados na pós-graduação em filosofia. Com efeito, a área é atualmente entre as humanidades a (...) de maior concentração de estudantes declarados brancos. Isto posto, o estudo especula possíveis causas e consequências dessa situação, procurando encontrar caminhos para o enfrentamento efetivo do racismo acadêmico. Palavras-chave: Desigualdades Raciais; Perfil Discente; Racismo Acadêmico. Black People in Philosophy Graduate Programs in Brazil Abstract: The present paper analyzes the ethnic-racial composition of Brazilian graduate programs in the field of philosophy. Its purpose is to identify the general characteristics of the field, and to analyze the available data on color/race in its master’s and doctoral programs. It is hoped that these analyzes will be useful for the discussion and proposition of affirmative actions in such programs. The result obtained showed that blacks are largely underrepresented in Brazilian philosophy graduate schools. Indeed, the field is currently the one with the highest concentration of students declared to be white among all the human sciences in Brazil. With that being said, the study speculates on possible causes and consequences of that situation, seeking to find ways to effectively confront academic racism. Keywords: Racial Inequalities; Student Profile; Academic Racism. Schwarze Menschen an Graduiertenprogrammen für Philosophie in Brasilien Zusammenfassung: Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die ethnisch-rassische Zusammensetzung brasilianischer Graduiertenprogramme im Bereich Philosophie. Sein Zweck ist es, die allgemeinen Merkmale des Fachgebiets zu identifizieren und die verfügbaren Daten zu Farbe/Rasse in seinen Master- und Doktoratsprogrammen zu analysieren. Es ist zu hoffen, dass diese Analysen für die Diskussion und den Vorschlag von Maßnahmen positiver Diskriminierung in solchen Programmen nützlich sein werden. Das hier erreichte Ergebnis zeigte, dass Schwarze in den brasilianischen Graduiertenkollegs stark unterrepräsentiert sind. In der Tat ist das Fachgebiet derzeit dasjenige unter allen Humanwissenschaften in Brasilien mit der höchsten Konzentration von Studenten, die als weiß deklariert werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund spekuliert diese Studie über mögliche Ursachen und Folgen dieser Situation und versucht, Wege zu finden, um akademischem Rassismus wirksam entgegenzutreten. Schlüsselwörter: Rassenungleichheiten; Studierendenprofil; Akademischer Rassismus. Data de registro: 16/06/2022 Data de aceite: 26/10/2022. (shrink)

Prepared with the cooperation and assistance of Sara Timby, Stanford University Libraries, this edition contains papers that were still on C. I. Lewis' desk at the time of his death. Especially noteworthy is the fragment entitled "On Probability" in which Lewis directs his attention to the subject of past experiences, which, although now beyond recall, are regarded as having played a role in the fomation of our beliefs. Also included are notes on thought regarded as action, on the Kantian postulate (...) of the existence of God, and Lewis' own notion of conscious life as "repository of value.". (shrink)

In the face of the alienating effects of the current globalization it is appropriate to assess the brutal historical experience of Spain’s conquest and colonization of America. From that confrontation were born innovative mixtures, unanticipated metamorphoses and the polymorphous reality to be seen in today’s Latin-American cultures. Utopia, in the context of the globalization we are now experiencing, is composed of interculturalism, the very many opportunities for exchange and cross-fertilization. Traditional utopian discourse must henceforth reconcile the universal values of reason (...) with passions, differences, fragmentation and the diversity of cultures. (shrink)

On 22 July, 2011, we were confronted with the horror of the actions of Anders Behring Breivik. The instant reaction, as we have seen with similar incidents in the past—such as the Oklahoma City bombings—was to attempt to explain the incident. Whether the reasons given were true or not were irrelevant: the fact that there was a reason was better than if there were none. We should not dismiss those that continue to cling on to the initial claims of a (...) wider Jihadist plot behind the actions of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols as Islamophobes (or merely lacking common sense): for, it is often easier to rely on reason—no matter how fictional—than not to have anything to cling on at all. In many ways, it is even better if the reason is fictional: for, if grounded in a certain fact, or reality, it can then go away. However, if it is in the realm of the imaginary, it is then always already metaphorical: thus, can be applied to any and every situation. And it is this, if we echo Friedrich Nietzsche, that gives us our “metaphysical comfort”; that we can know what is going on. This is why conspiracy theories are so popular: underlying them is the logic that someone—no matter how implausible—is in control of the situation. One would rather believe that all acts of terror stemmed from Osama bin Laden (and the narrative worked even better when he was in a ‘cave in Afghanistan’) than if they were the actions, and decisions, of singular individuals. For, if there is a head organizing everything, it can be cut off; there is no controlling a mass of singularities. As Jean Baudrillard continues to teach us, the term ‘mass’ is not a concept. It is a leitmotif of political demagogy, a soft, sticky, lumpen-analytical notion. A good sociology would attempt to surpass it with ‘more subtle’ categories: socio-professional ones, categories of class, cultural status, etc. This is wrong: it is by prowling around these soft and acritical notions (like ‘mana’ once was) that one can go further than intelligent critical sociology. Besides, it will be noticed retrospectively that the concepts ‘class’, ‘social relations’, ‘power’, ‘status’, ‘institution’, and ‘social’ itself—all these too-explicit concepts which are the glory of the legitimate sciences—but also only ever been muddled notions themselves, but notions upon which agreement has nevertheless been reached for mysterious ends: those of preserving a certain code of analysis. To want to specify the term ‘mass’ is a mistake—it is to provide meaning for that which has none.1 And it is this lack of meaning—this nothingness of not only the mass, but our inability to know in general—that truly scares us. For, if we are never able to legitimately make a generalizing statement, this suggests that we can never actually posit beyond a singular, situational, moment. Hence, we can never claim to know anyone: at best, we can only catch momentary glimpses. It is for this very reason that the insanity plea Breivik’s lawyer will attempt is the one that horrifies us the most. For, if Breivik is insane, this foregrounds our inability to understand, know. And as Aristotle has taught us, it is more important that something is plausible than if something were probable—in this context, we would rather have Breivik as a calculating mass murderer than someone who was completely out of his mind. This is especially ironic in the light of the fact that none of us would say that we have any similarity with Breivik. If that were so, the declaration that he was mad should be no more than a logical consequence. However, we also want Breivik to be accountable for his actions. And in order for that to be so, we need him to be of sound mind. But if that were true, we can then no longer distinguish ourselves from him. And it is precisely this that scares us. For, we are horrified not when there are abnormalities to our way of life. There are usually two different reactions to this—either oppose and destroy it; or subsume it under the dominant logic. We see this most clearly in reactions to immigration: there are either calls for immigrants to ‘pack up and leave’ or pseudo-liberal notions of ‘we are all alike’. Both of which are merely version of “all men are brothers”—the brutal translation of which is that you are my brother if you live the same way as me; otherwise not only are you not my brother, you are also potentially not part of mankind (you might as well be, to echo Giorgio Agamben, bare life ). This is played out in our age of what is commonly termed post-political bio-politics —an instance of horribly awkward theoretical jargon that Slavoj Žižek channeling Agamben unpacks rather elegantly: “ post-politics is a politics which claims to leave behind old ideological struggles and, instead, focus[es] on expert management and administration, while bio-politics designates the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives as its primary goal.”2 Žižek continues: Post-political bio-politics also has two aspects which cannot but appear to belong to two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to ‘bare life,’ to Homo sacer , that so-called sacred being who is the object of expert caretaking knowledge, but is excluded, like prisoners at Guantanamo or Holocaust victims, from all rights; and that of respect for the vulnerable Other brought to an extreme through an attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences the self as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential harassments [….] What these two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher causes, the notion that the ultimate goal of our lives is life itself. That is why there is no contradiction between the respect for the vulnerable Other and […] the extreme expression of treating individuals as Homini sacer .3 This is why the ones that are harshest towards new immigrants are the recently naturalized citizens of any country. For, if there is no longer any “ideological struggle” and all life is reduced to mere automaton-living, there is the realization that we are all the same—not in a tree-hugging hippie sense—but that the immigrant is the same as us precisely because we are all immigrants. And since all nations, and by extension peoples in a nation (especially those who believe in the notion of nationality, and national identity), have to find some manner, no matter from where or what it is, to distinguish themselves from those around them, the other (in spite, and especially in the light, of its absence) is the most crucial aspect of the discourse of nationality. More precisely, in the interests of what Baudrillard calls “preserving a certain code of analysis” (nationality in this case), what has to be maintained is the absolute otherness of the other. Very rarely is Boris Johnson right: “it is not enough to say he is mad. Anders Breivik is patently mad.”4 However, much like Breivik in his manifesto, he should have stopped whilst he was ahead. By attempting to diagnose Breivik—“the fundamental reasons for their callous behavior lie deep in their own sense of rejection and alienation. It is the ideology that gives them the ostensible cause … that gives them an excuse to dramatize the resentment … and to kill.”—Johnson falls into the same trap that he accuses others of: “to try to advance any other explanation for their actions … is simply to play their self-important game.” More crucially, and this is the point that Johnson completely misses, attempting to rationalize Breivik’s actions—to rehabilitate reason—is a desperate attempt at maintaining his otherness. In fact, we’ll end up going one step further, insist on Breivik’s sanity, put him on the stand, and hope that he will display such a difference from all of us that we can rest safe that we are unlike him and his kind. That, in itself, is a dangerous game to play. One should not forget that the turning point in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is in the central part of her novel where she lets the monster speak. At that moment, the monster moves from an ‘it’ to a fully subjectivized person; with his own stories, historicities, emotions, and so on. In Slavoj Žižek’s reading of Frankenstein , this is the moment where “the ultimate criminal is thus allowed to present himself as the ultimate victim. The monstrous murderer reveals himself to be a deeply hurt and desperate individual, yearning for company and love.”5 But, in the case of Breivik, this goes beyond just a risk of us feeling for him: for, no right-minded person should ever deny another the opportunity to put forth her or his own case. The problem lies with us trying to deny the madness of Breivik’s act by putting him back under reason. The problem is in our inability to differentiate the act from the person; the singular from the universal.6 In our desperation to preserve the notion that we are rational beings incapable of becoming monsters, we’ve had to deny the meaninglessness—in the strict sense of it lying outside of reason—of Breivik’ act; we’ve had to “provide meaning where there is none.” For, if this act were a moment of madness—a moment that comes from elsewhere—we cannot say that it will not descend upon us one day. If Breivik’s actions were that of a sane person, one who is in control of his being, his self, we can then locate the otherness in his being. More importantly, this would allow us to distinguish ourselves from that said being. Breivik’s sanity is the only thing that allows us to say that ‘this act of terror is borne out of one with an ultra-right ideology’; and ‘since I am not of that ideology, I would never do such a thing’. By doing that, we attempt to protect ourselves by claiming that people who share Breivik’s ideology are foreign to us, other to us. However, if Breivik’s act was a moment of insanity, his otherness is no longer locatable: and the notion of ‘us and them’ shifts from a geographical, physical, religious, or cultural notion, to one in the realm of ideas. And this is what truly scares us. For, if what is foreign is not phenomenological, then it cannot be seen, detected, sensed. Anders Behring Breivik, Timothy McVeigh, and Terry Nichols, terrify us not merely for the fact that they were white in a white society, but more pertinently that their skin color did not matter: we would not be able to spot them even if they were blue, even if they were right next to us, even if we had known them all our lives. Even as we are grappling with holding Breivik accountable by declaring him of sound mind, what truly terrifies us is that deep down we know that Breivik’s act is a moment of madness; beyond all comprehensibility. And this means that we would not be able to spot the idea; even if it were in our heads at this very moment. We have gone to lengths to rehabilitate Breivik, McVeigh, Nichols, and such perpetrators of massive incomprehensible violence, in order to preserve our difference from them. What we have really been trying to deny is the fact that everyone, at any given moment, could have a moment of madness. And this is the true radicality of Mary Shelley: in allowing us to momentarily enter the head of the monster, she shows us not just the fact that he is like any one of us, but that any one of us could, in the right (or wrong) circumstance, be like him. Perhaps here, there is a lesson to be learned from Wes Craven’s A Nightmare on Elm Street . The most dangerous thing that one could do on Elm Street was to mention Freddy’s name—once you had knowledge of him, you were open to the possibility of a visit during your dreams. This suggests that Freddy is a combination of externalities (after all, when you die, he survives) and your self (if you have never heard of him, he cannot come for you). In this sense, Freddy would be the manifestation par excellence of what Avital Ronell calls a “killer text”—it is one’s relationality with the text (and the ideas, notions, in the said text) that opens oneself to it, to the lessons of the text, to being changed, affected, even to the dangers of the text. After all, one should never forget Plato’s warning that ideas can corrupt, can be perilous. To compound matters, as Ronell reminds us, “the connection to the other is a reading—not an interpretation, assimilation, or even a hermeneutic understanding, but a reading.”7 Thus, in attempting to differentiate ourselves from Breivik by concocting some reason(s) why we are not like him, we have done nothing but read him, open a connection to him. *** Bang bang, he shot me down Bang bang, I hit the ground Bang bang, that awful sound Bang bang, my baby shot me down. “Bang Bang (My Baby Shot Me Down)” Sonny Bono, 1966. This is the part that we all know and remember. Whilst never quite remembering that this is a song that is not so much about violence, love, but about remembering. For, after the bridge comes the accusatory stanza: “Now he's gone, I don't know why/ And till this day, sometimes I cry/ He didn't even say goodbye/ He didn't take the time to lie.” Bang Bang is a game that the two lovers used to play; and all she has now is the memory of the game to remember him by. And the only reason she has to recall this game is: he never provided her a reason for his leaving, his death. Not that she will, can, ever get that satisfactory answer. This is precisely the game we are playing with Anders Behring Breivik. Even though he has left a 1500 page manifesto, even though we will allow him to use the court-room as his platform, we will continue screaming at him “tell me why …” For, what we want him to say is that we are not like him: what we really want him to do is, “take the time to lie …” Perhaps here, we should allow the echo of the infans to resound in baby . As Christopher Fynsk reminds us, the infans is one that is pre-language, pre-knowing, pre-understanding: it is the very finitude, and exteriority, of relationality itself.8 And thus, it is a position of openness to the fullness of possibility—and nothing else. This would be, in Ronell’s terms, a “connection to the other” that knows nothing other than the fact that it is a connection. The true horror of 22 July, 2011, is the fact that it is not Anders Behring Breivik who is mad, but the act itself that is. And this is precisely why only “my baby” that could have “shot me down.” For, it is an act that is from beyond, a sheer act of madness that—as Plato warns us—is whispered into our ears (and can so easily be mistaken for inspiration, and even wisdom), an act that can both seize, and cease, us at the same time. And what can this utter openness to an other, the other, be but a moment of love, a true ‘falling in love’. At the moment of whispering, nothing can be known as we are babies as our baby shoots us down …. Hence, all attempts at analyzing this event (including this one) are not only futile, but border on the farcical. The real tragedy is that we forget that all of us have the possibility of becoming Breivik. NOTES Jean Baudrillard. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities . Trans. Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton, & Andrew Berardini. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007. p. 37. Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p. 34 Ibid: 35-36. Boris Johnson. “ Anders Breivik: There is nothing to study in the mind of Norway’s mass killer .” The Telegraph . (25 July, 2011): Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p.39. What is killing us is the notion that Breivik’s act is beyond reason, beyond knowing, outside understanding itself. This is why Boris Johnson’s plea was for us to ignore Breivik as a madman. But to do so, Johnson conflates the notion of the act and the person; the singular and the universal. This is exactly the same gesture as insisting on his sanity: the ‘madman’ is merely the absolute other, one that we are not. Avital Ronell. The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989: 380. Christopher Fynsk. Infant Figures: The Death of the Infans and Other Scenes of Origin . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.  . (shrink)

In this essay we explain some of the problems of the Venezuelan criminal justice sub-system and, in general, the criminal law enforcement. That is to say, that which is expressed in the persecutory actions of the investigating authorities and the criminal courts, after having established in Venezuela a Carl Schmitt concept of Dual State with the purpose of eliminating “bourgeois” democracy and implanting the model of so-called Socialism of the XXI Century. In this sense, it is a question of identifying (...) the flagrant persecution and violation of human rights of those who do not have the capacity to resist the attacks emanating from the State in the abusive use of coercion and legal violence. With the Dual State want to impose an utopia by force, which leads to dystopia, due to the division and polarization of society with the dichotomous politics of friend-enemy, In a process of etiquette and "demonization" of the enemy. (shrink)

This book provides methods and practical cases and experiences with the aim of stimulating Responsible Research and Innovation through the direct engagement of researchers, Civil Society Organisations, citizens, industry stakeholders, policy and decision makers, research funders and communicators. The book furthermore aims to advance debate on Responsible Research and Innovation and also to reinforce the RRI community identity. With chapters covering governance, public engagement and inclusion in responsible R&D and innovation processes; RRI actions in science education and communication; gender and (...) ethical issues in RRI initiatives; and sustainability of RRI processes, the book is solidly part of the Europe 2020 strategy to promote a vision for a stronger collaborations between social, natural and physical scientists and the societal actors for a wider dimensions of science and innovation and the role in environmental preservation. (shrink)

Many professionals, mainly scientists have told me that a divine being is not necessary to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Theology and even metaphysics are redundant disciplines, they say. To me to reject a discipline a priori is irrational, whereas the methodology of science itself is basically rational. Why do Newton's equations say time is symmetrical, Einstein's relativity and quantum mechanics say time is an illusion and now Smolin says time is reborn - the present moment is (...) a fundamental aspect of reality. Why has matter been the carrier of reality over centuries, then matter dissolves away becoming an ephemeral quantum activity and now information is the carrier of reality? The laws of physics were presumed to be eternal, now Smolin says they are evolving like in biology - natural selection. Why do cosmologists like Brian Greene and Leonard Susskind postulate that there are nearly infinite number of replicas of each and every one of us - doppelgangers - in an infinite number of universes when the gut feeling of each and every one of us that we are unique in this universe? For Newton, gravity was an instantaneous attraction between two masses, for Einstein it was an inherent potential even with a single mass. For Einstein, gravity acts at the speed of light. Plato says that what is observed is phenomena. Reality resides in Platonic Forms. Descartes says that knowledge is acquired through perception and deduction. No reality without the mind. Kant synthesized rationalism and empiricism. Knowledge can be derived without empirical observation. Free will touches almost everything that human beings value. But many scientists postulate that free will is an illusion. Christian theology posits that God created the universe out of nothing. Cosmologists also now say the same thing, but the definition of 'nothing' is disputed. Christian theology once postulated that there is no salvation outside the Church. Now it is not so. Why these confusions? Why these contradictions? On the present methodology of acquisition of knowledge, answers may never be possible. The Theory of Everything (TOE) is more a distant dream than reaching for the stars. However, the discipline of Zygology which is introduced into the academia, a rational explanation why this is not possible has been postulated. Knowledge is holistic - a seamless web runs through all disciplines. Necessity of a new epistemology of reality and existence is inevitable....Zygology may have the answers!". (shrink)

Situations serving as worlds as well as events in linguistic semantics are formulated as strings recording observations over discrete time. This formulation is applied to a linear temporal logic, in line with L. Schubert’s distinction between described and characterized situations. The distinction is developed topologically and computationally, and linked to the opposition between truth-conditional and proof-conditional semantics. For a finitary handle on quantification, strings are associated with situations not only on the basis of observation but also through derivation and constraint (...) satisfaction. The constraints specified lead to an implementation simpler than the derivations given. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

This article is an ethical evaluation of the SENS bio-engineering program of Aubrey de Grey. After a general introduction, section 2 is a refutation of the claim that not to cure aging is immoral. It analyses the conceptual identification made by de Grey between “aging” and “disease.” This identification has important moral implications. It is argued that from a physiological standpoint the identification makes sense but from an evolutionary point of view it is highly questionable. Section 3 is a refutation (...) of the answer given by transhumanists to objections concerning the desirability of physical immortality. It is argued that the objections (which involve possible futuristic doom-scenarios questioning the desirability of physical immortality and continuous rejuvenation) have not been adequately answered. (shrink)

Notes by Dr. Robert Gahringer, who was C.I. Lewis' assistant at Harvard, Dr. Francis H. Parker, and those of the editor were used to reconstruct Lewis' lectures in Phil. 130, Kant, as those lectures were presented at Harvard in the late 40's and early 50's. The test of the reconstruction includes a detailed discussion of European epistemology in the period before Kant in addition to Lewis' interpretation of Kant's epistemology, critique of metaphysics, theology, and a brief presentation of his moral (...) philosophy. (shrink)

Notes by Dr. Robert Gahringer, who was C.I. Lewis' assistant at Harvard, Dr. Francis H. Parker, and those of the editor were used to reconstruct Lewis' lectures in Phil. 130, Kant, as those lectures were presented at Harvard in the late 40's and early 50's. The test of the reconstruction includes a detailed discussion of European epistemology in the period before Kant in addition to Lewis' interpretation of Kant's epistemology, critique of metaphysics, theology, and a brief presentation of his moral (...) philosophy. (shrink)

Notes by Dr. Robert Gahringer, who was C.I. Lewis' assistant at Harvard, Dr. Francis H. Parker, and those of the editor were used to reconstruct Lewis' lectures in Phil. 130, Kant, as those lectures were presented at Harvard in the late 40's and early 50's. The test of the reconstruction includes a detailed discussion of European epistemology in the period before Kant in addition to Lewis' interpretation of Kant's epistemology, critique of metaphysics, theology, and a brief presentation of his moral (...) philosophy. (shrink)

This edition is of a notebook prepared by C.I. Lewis during 1910-11. The text covers the "predicament" of philosophy at the time of Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, and The Metaphysic of Morals. The highly detailed discussion of the Critique was "based on" Lewis' own outlines made in the Kant course conducted by Ralph Barton Perry.