Tra le figure più importanti del dibattito filosofico italiano del Novecento, Antonio Banfi ha svolto nell'Italia del secondo dopoguerra anche un ruolo politico di rilievo come senatore del PCI. La sua interpretazione del marxismo ha presentato una forte accentuazione umanistica. Tra i suoi scolari filosofi e storici della filosofia come Giulio Preti, Enzo Paci, Remo Cantoni, Paolo Rossi. Il saggio prende in esame la prima fase della riflessione filosofica di Banfi, nella quale ha una importanza decisiva la conoscenza diretta del (...) dibattito tedesco tra le due guerre mondiali, in primo luogo della fenomenologia di Husserl e della ontologia di N. Hartmann. I Principi di una teoria della ragione - libro apparso alla fine degli anni '20 - e poi una serie di incisivi saggi degli anni '30 documentano una conoscenza approfondita e critica di un dibattito di cui mostrerà di nutrirsi in misura decisiva l'interpretazione di Banfi non solo di Hegel, ma anche di Marx. Among the leading philosophers in Italy during the 20th century, Antonio Banfi played an important role not only in the cultural debate during the 1930s and the 1940s, but also in the political scene of post-war Italy, advocating - as a representative of the Italian Communist Party in Italian Senate - a liberal, humanist view of Marxism. Among his students were influential philosophers and historians of philosophy such as Giulio Preti, Enzo Paci, Remo Cantoni and Paolo Rossi. This paper investigates the first phase of Banfi's philosophical development, an analysis of which must include a scrutiny of Banfi's deep indebtedness to German debate between the two World Wars, primarily Husserl's phenomenology and Hartmann's critical ontology. Banfi's phenomenological apprenticeship at the school of Husserl, and the sensitive and critical attitude of his presentation of the German debate in his Principi di una teoria della ragione, are of substantial importance in nourishing his later interpretation of Hegel and Marx. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the presence, in the section of the Dialektikdedicated to the issue of the Seele and the psychological paralogisms, of an "antinomic" approach regarding, in particular, the debate on the simplicity of the soul. In the examination of Mendelssohn's thesis concerning the soul's incorruptibility, Kant shows that it is possible to assume, together with the "extensive" criterion, an "intensive" criterion which leads to admitting the "decomposability" of the soul and the possibility of its annihilatio per remissionem. Thus, (...) as happens in the antinomies, we are faced with two theses on the "simplicity" of the soul which are both non-contradictory, but, at the same time, opposed to each other. These reflections, proposed in the 1787 edition of the Kritik (and which seem to refer back to and refine the considerations in the 1781 edition on the simplicity of the "thinking subject" and Ich denke), play an important role and show their full value in the context of the second mathematical antinomy. (shrink)

A major representative of the German sociological tradition, Georg Simmel (1858-1918) has influenced social thinkers ranging from the Chicago School to Walter Benjamin. His magnum opus, The Philosophy of Money, published in 1900, is nevertheless a difficult book that has daunted many would-be readers. Gianfranco Poggi makes this important work accessible to a broader range of scholars and students, offering a compact and systematically organized presentation of its main arguments. Simmel's insights about money are as valid today as they (...) were a hundred years ago. Poggi provides a sort of reader's manual to Simmel's work, deepening the reader's understanding of money while at the same time offering a new appreciation of the originality of Simmel's social theory. (shrink)

Central to the legal positivism of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century was the dogma of the Ideal Legislator. Legal materials were to be interpreted as the work of an omniscient, coherent, consistent legislator. We argue that this dogma persists in the different guise of the competent speaker model, on which legal materials are the work of a competent speaker, who follows all the pertinent semantic and pragmatic rules. We will first lay out the Ideal Legislator (...) dogma as applied in legal interpretation, arguing that this dogma does not limit interpretive discretion but rather amplifies it by hiding it under the veil of an inexistent, purely instrumental rationality. We will then turn to the competent speaker model, showing that, despite its apparent neutrality, it proves to be a reincarnation of the Ideal Legislator dogma, for it, too, amplifies interpretive discretion, only it hides it under the veil of an inexistent, purely linguistic rationality. Finally, we will inquire into the different types of rationality and their relations, arguing that there is always a choice and value judgment involved in ascribing rationality to legislators, and that these choices and judgments need to be carefully inspected and normatively justified. (shrink)

This volume is the second part of a project which hosts an interdisciplinary discussion about the relationship among law and language, legal practice and ordinary conversation, legal philosophy and the linguistics sciences. An international group of authors, from cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law question about how legal theory and pragmatics can enrich each other. In particular, the first part is devoted to the analysis of how pragmatics can solve problems related to legal theory: What can pragmatics (...) teach about the concept of law and its relationship with moral, and, in particular, about the eternal dispute between legal positivism and legal naturalism? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and/or legal disagreements? The second part is focused on legal adjudication: it aims to construct a pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal trial and/or to test the tenure of the traditional pragmatics tools in the field. The authors face questions such as: Which interesting pragmatic features emerge from legal adjudication? What pragmatic theories are better suited to account for the practice of judgment or its particular aspects? Which pragmatic and socio-linguistic problems are highlighted by this practice? (shrink)

: In the context of nineteenth-century philosophical reflection, Francesco Bonatelli set himself the following goal: to defend the pillars of Spiritualism and ontology through an careful examination of psychic contents and consciousness, while closely contesting both the psychology and the psychophysiology of Positivism and Spiritualism itself, La coscienza e il meccanesimo interiore and Percezione e pensiero Bonatelli puts forward his “critical experience-grounded philosophy” and proposes an original solution to the problem of the nature of the subject, consciousness and its unity, (...) using an analysis of “sentiments” to reveal the inseparable tangle of the cognitive and ontological dimensions of the self. Keywords : Positivism; Consciousness; Self-consciousness; Actus essendi ; Substance; Gnoseology Francesco Bonatelli: un approccio critico alla coscienza e al soggetto umano tra spiritualismo e positivismo Riassunto : Nel contesto della riflessione filosofica dell’Ottocento, Francesco Bonatelli scelse come proprio ufficio la difesa dei capisaldi dello spiritualismo e dell’ontologia, mediante un attento esame dei contenuti psichici e della coscienza stessa, in un serrato confronto con la psicologia e psicofisiologia del positivismo e con lo spiritualismo stesso. In opere come Pensiero e conoscenza, La coscienza e il meccanesimo interiore e Percezione e pensiero, Bonatelli espose la propria “filosofia critica a base sperimentale” e propose una soluzione originale al problema della natura del soggetto, della coscienza e della sua unità, mostrando come nell’analisi dei sentimenti si riveli l’inscindibile intreccio delle due dimensioni, cognitiva e ontologica, dell’io. Parole chiave : Positivismo; Coscienza; Autocoscienza; Actus essendi ; Sostanza; Gnoseologia. (shrink)

Ratio Juris, Volume 35, Issue 2, Page 191-222, June 2022.

In this highly readable and compact introduction to Durkheim's thought, Gianfranco Poggi examines all of Durkheim's central works and assesses their significance today, a century after his death. Poggi's analyses includes a study of what Durkheim meant by 'society' and an evaluation of Durkheim's contributions to both political sociology and the sociology of law. Poggi's clear and concise reappraisal of one of the most important modern thinkers will be essential reading for students of sociology and an invaluable (...) guide for anyone studying the ways modern societies function. (shrink)

This essay investigates the applicability of Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures to legal interpretation, in order to highlight some of its characteristics. After introducing the notions of language and discourse, and briefly explaining the most salient aspects of Grice’s theory, I will analyse the interpretation of two types of legal acts; authoritative legal acts and acts of private autonomy. Regarding the first class, exemplified by statutes, I will argue against the applicability of Gricean theory due to the conflictual behaviour of (...) the addressees and, above all, to the insurmountable indeterminacy of the contextual elements. As far as acts of private autonomy are concerned, exemplified by contracts, I will argue that the cooperative principle is applicable, at least in those legal systems that include the principle of bona fides among the interpretative regulations of such acts. (shrink)

The phenomenon of defeasibility has long been a central theme in legal literature. This essay aims to shed new light on that phenomenon by clarifying some fundamental conceptual issues. First, the most widespread definition of legal defeasibility is examined and criticized. The essay shows that such a definition is poorly constructed, inaccurate and generates many problems. Indeed, the definition hides the close relationship between legal defeasibility and legal interpretation. Second, this essay argues that no new definition is needed. I will (...) show that from an interpretative standpoint, there is nothing special about legal defeasibility. Contrary to what some authors maintain, no unique or privileged source of legal defeasibility exists, nor are there privileged arguments to justify it. Specifically, legal defeasibility refers to interpretative outcomes deriving from interpretative arguments that, on the one hand, are very different from one another, and, on the other, are often employed to justify different interpretative outcomes. In the legal field, the problems related to defeasibility have little in common with the problems that this label covers in other areas—such as logic or epistemology—and they are nothing but the well-known problems related to legal interpretation. In conclusion, this paper argues that as far as legal argumentation is concerned, the notion of legal defeasibility lacks explanatory power, and it should be abandoned. (shrink)

The relationship between legal interpretation and ordinary understanding has raised growing interest among legal scholars. According to the mainstream view, law is a communicative phenomenon and, therefore, the best theory of ordinary communication should also explain and guide legal interpretation. Certainly, it is very controversial which theory is the best one, but, even if there are many candidates, Grice’s conversation model has attracted a lot of attention. Some legal scholars claim that Grice’s theory of conversational maxims should be applied in (...) legal domain, while others dispute this claim. Izabela Skoczeń’s book, Implicatures within legal language provides an original contribution to this ongoing debate. Through an interdisciplinary approach that engages with the most recent advances in Pragmatics as well as with the most popular legal approaches, Skoczeń recasts Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures in order to explain the mechanisms behind court decisions. This review article provides a critical examination of Skoczeń’s book, highlighting its strengths as well as its problems. (shrink)

It was plain long before the 20th century that both the act of translation and the translator’s task were quite complex: it became clear and evident during the Enlightenment, within the République des Lettres, with the emergence and gradual affirmation of national languages. In this general framework, the French translation of John Locke’s Essay concerning Humane Understanding is one of the main protagonists of the circulation of texts and ideas: Pierre Coste’s solutions follow the strategy adopted by Jean Le Clerc (...) in his Extrait of the Essay published in the “Bibliotheque universelle et historique” in 1688 and, in primis, by Locke himself, as a theorist of communication/translation : the French translation is thus the exemplar par excellence and the embodiment of Locke’s theories of language, communication, and communicative ethics, all axed on the concepts of “agreement” and “consensual rationality.”. (shrink)

The work defines the sigh as a type of breath expressing or communicating specific physical or mental internal states. To investigate the meanings of the sigh, the paper presents analyses of written and oral corpora, finding out that it may express different emotions like boredom or frustration, but also positive meanings like self-encouragement; then it focuses on the use of sighs in political debates. Finally a perception study shows participants’ agreement on the meanings of sighs in terms of valence and (...) arousal. These results lay the bases for future studies to set a clearer distinction between sighs and other vocalisations as well as other effects on its meaning caused by the combination with other body signals like rolling eyes or shaking head. (shrink)

Non si prenda questo lavoro come un saggio specializzato di orientalistica. Anche se vi abbiamo messo in opera tutto quanto abbiamo appreso faticosamente di quel dominio. Il primo lavoro e stato tradurre integralmente il testo arabo Mungid basandoci su due edizioni. Siamo convinti che una religione non vada studiata soltanto nei suoi testi sacri, ma va osservata negli individui che la professano tant'e che l'Islam rimane un'astrazione se non si passa a studiare direttamente i Musulmani. Questo libro non e una (...) difesa del Cristianesimo nei riguardi dell'Islam, ma abbiamo voluto conoscere da vicino un'opera breve ma importante del piu famoso teologo musulmano. (shrink)

This paper presents a model of persuasion in terms of goals and beliefs. Among the various ways to influence people, that is, to raise or lower the likelihood for them to pursue some goal, ranging from threat to suggestion, persuasion is viewed as a case of communicative non-coercive goal hooking. A persuader leads a persuadee to pursue some goal out of a free choice, i.e., by convincing him/her that the proposed goal is useful for some other goal that the persuadee (...) already has. It is argued that the Aristotelian persuasive strategies of logos, ethos and pathos (rational argumentation, the speaker¿s credibility and reliability, and the appeal to emotion) are always present in every persuasive discourse, and that they are exploited to raise the value of the goal proposed and to strengthen the believability of the link between it and the persuadee¿s previous goals. The paper proposes an analysis of discourse in terms of a hierarchy of goals as a tool to single out these strategies within the discourse structure. By applying this model to different kinds of persuasive messages (political discourse, advertising, dialogues in the health domain), it shows how, in the fragments presented, this kind of analysis allows to clarify the relationships between the persuader¿s and the persuadee¿s goals and to elucidate how much and how directly the persuader appeals to logos, ethos and pathos in his/her discourse. (shrink)

This volume highlights important aspects of the complex relationship between common language and legal practice. It hosts an interdisciplinary discussion between cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law, in which an international group of authors aims to promote, enrich and refine this new debate. Philosophers of law have always shown a keen interest in cognitive science and philosophy of language in order to find tools to solve their problems: recently this interest was reciprocated and scholars from cognitive science (...) and philosophy of language now look to the law as a testing ground for their theses. Using the most sophisticated tools available to pragmatics, sociolinguistics, cognitive sciences and legal theory, an interdisciplinary, international group of authors address questions like: Does legal interpretation differ from ordinary understanding? Is the common pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal practice? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and pervasive legal phenomena such as testimony or legal disagreements? (shrink)