Peut-on aujourd'hui suivre la "voie idéale"? Les options se rattachant à l'idéalisme historique paraissent interdites à qui refuse d'être naïf et respecte la science. Pourtant, la notion d'idée, rigoureusement comprise, est au coeur du langage, reconnue comme le centre de notre monde. De même, la mathématique mobilise l'idée d'un bout à l'autre d'elle : la science mathématisée, par suite, l'emploie. Mieux, nous ne pouvons sans doute pas comprendre notre manière de supputer sur le possible, le nécessaire et le contingent sans (...) en appeler à l'idée. Cet ouvrage soutient même qu'une philosophie désirant ne pas faire silence sur ce qui est horrible (la mort, l'absurde, la violence et la guerre) a besoin de la référence de l'idée transcendante. Tout cela suggère que nous devrions reconsidérer notre "préjugé métaphysique" favorable au réel, à l'être, pour embrasser une vision du plan humain comme troué et bouleversé par l'échappée idéale. La discussion et l'argumentation proposées déploient un point de vue personnel – présentant en conclusion l'ethanalyse chère à l'auteur – tout en débattant avec des philosophes analytiques, des philosophes français contemporains, ou avec l'héritage marxiste. (shrink)

The paper offers a glimpse at the diversity of what is labelled Philosophy of Culture, and then brings out some important issues concerning culture. The first section expounds etho-analysis as a way of doing philosophy of culture, introducing the notions of solicitator, sensance and ethos. It also gives an idea of how its program has been conducted with respect to love or truth. Etho-analysis describes the ideal part of culture, interpreting it as revealed by concrete practice. The second section discusses (...) whether and how far etho-analysis embraces the cause of truth and validates the scholastic tradition which has provided tools for it. Etho-analysis claims to formulate true descriptions. It understands meaning as unfolding its complication thanks to traditional tools, and recognizes the ethical significance of the community of science. (shrink)

The paper discusses analogies between the way in which infinity is understood and dealt with in mathematics and in Jewish tradition. It begins with recalling the classical debate about infinity in the field of the foundations of mathematics. Reading an important paper by A. Robinson, we come to the conclusion that mathematicians work “as if” infinite totalities existed. They do so by following the rules of their formalized discourse which, at least if it refers to anything at all, also refers (...) to such totalities. The paper describes how, according to Jewish tradition, infinity is also not theological: instead of thinking that they own some infinite being or relate to it, observant Jews follow Jewish law. The analogy is then extended to what is called ‘epistemological infinity’. The paper shows that both in mathematics and in Judaism, we get some epistemological experience of infinity, as far as both Talmudic knowledge and contemporary mathematical encyclopedia are experienced as inexhaustible sources of new thoughts, structures, ideas, developments. (shrink)

Le thème “phénoménologie et religion” me pose doublement problème. 1) D’un côté l’orientation phénoménologique est quelque chose à quoi j’ai eu l’impression d’adhérer longtemps, par quoi je me sentais identifié même. Pourtant, je m’en sens de plus en plus séparé, par un indéfinissable écart stylistique au moins. De plus, je n’ai jamais accepté le virage à une phénoménologie de l’être-au-monde, qui me semble dominer l’espace français pour y fixer le visage et l’identité de ce que l’on tient po...

L'article propose une définition originale de la philosophie analytique et de la philosophie continentale : la philosophie analytique serait celle qui entretient un rapport privilégié avec le calcul des prédicats et la sémantique logique, la philosophie continentale serait celle qui noue avec rintuition et le problème mathématique de l'espace une relation de même poids. Il résulte de là qu'on identifie comme continentale uniquement la philosophie « phéno- transcendantale » professée de Kant à Heidegger. À partir de cette base, trois problèmes (...) sont discutés : — celui des statuts respectifs de la philosophie analytique et de la philosophie continentale vis-à-vis de la rationalité, discussion qui fait intervenir la figure de la dépossession admise par l'une et par l'autre; — celui de l'évaluation de ce qu'on appelle parfois la « philosophie française » ; — celui de savoir s'il est possible de renouer aujourd'hui, sous une forme ou une autre, avec l'ambition spécifique de systématisation qui était celle de la philosophie continentale. The paper proposes a definition of analytical and continental philosophy. The caracteristic of analytical philosophy is its fundamental relationship to lower predicate calculus and semanticlogic. In contrast, the tradition of continental philosophy is likewise based on a relationship with the intuition and the mathematical problem of space. Only the line of phenomenology and transcendantal philosophy from Kant to Heidegger can properly be considered as continental. Three problems arise out of these definitions. First how analytical and continental philosophy approach rationality.' the concept of depossession will be at the core of the discussion. Secondly, the problem of what is sometimes called French Thought and how it fits into one tradition or the other. Thirdly, whether we could now think along systematic lines as continental philosophy did. (shrink)

Ce livre pose un diagnostic sur notre epoque - presentee comme celle du crepuscule du theorique. A ce titre, il ose une grande fresque decrivant la situation actuelle des activites liees au theorique dans le contexte politique, social et d'abord economique qui est le notre aujourd'hui, en particulier en France. Il evoque des faits et des evenements concrets (la reforme de l'Universite, l'evolution des choix de filiere des etudiants, les changements d'orientation des programmes de l'enseignement secondaire, etc.) tout en degageant (...) du meme mouvement la signification profonde du theorique comme valeur (en mathematiques, en philosophie, en litterature, etc.) grace, precisement, aux outils forges dans les oeuvres anterieures de l'auteur. Une telle demarche porte celui-ci a plaider, apres Lyotard et Levinas, pour la prise en compte de la dette et de l'obligation envers quelque chose d'immemorial et de plus grand que nous et a examiner du meme mouvement la tension entre une telle dette et une politique de l'emancipation des individus. Au bout du compte, l'hypothese de depart est que nous pourrions avoir une inquietude radicale, ne portant pas sur le sort des lettres et sciences humaines, ou sur celui de la poesie, mais sur celui de l'attitude theorique elle-meme, dans sa purete et sa generalite. L'auteur veut, pour ainsi dire une derniere fois, faire entendre que la cause du theorique est, a sa maniere propre, la cause de l'humanite, une des manieres de vouloir pour les humains la vie la plus humaine. (shrink)

Qu'y a-t-il de commun entre les philosophes français subversifs des années 60-70 (Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard) et le mouvement austère de la philosophie analytique, engagé par Frege, Russell et Carnap? En première apparence, rien, mais ce livre choisit pourtant de voir les deux comme des entreprises à certains égards parallèles de cassure avec la philosophie classique. Cherchant les convergences et les dissemblances entre philosophie française et philosophie analytique, une lecture de ce qui s'est passé en France au XXe siècle est (...) alors proposée. Au final, on esquisse une sorte de "programme" : continuer la philosophie française avec ce qui fait son charme non technique, mais en jouant la carte des mathématiques plutôt que de la logique, en acceptant les leçons de la jeune tradition analytique, et en se donnant, de plus, l'ouverture lévinassienne. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida n'est pas seulement un membre de la generation subversive des annees 60-70, il a en quelque sorte regne sur ce moment philosophique. Sa maniere etait plus austere, son propos moins exaltant, mais il passait pour le plus brillant, s'averait comme le plus fecond et devancait les autres dans la reconnaissance internationale. Les adeptes de chacun des autres le connaissaient et reconnaissaient il les reunissait, en un sens. Il fut compte, d'ailleurs, comme le plus exasperant par tous ceux qui (...) sentaient dans ce moment un jeu trouble a l'egard de la rationalite. Il est encore trop proche de nos vies pour que l'on puisse pretendre rendre entierement justice aux milliers de lignes de son oeuvre. Avec le present ouvrage, on entend seulement offrir aux amateurs une introduction a une pensee difficile, accomplir un premier reperage de ce qu'elle a fait, de la maniere dont elle nous a marques et dont elle peut nous inspirer. On commence par exposer la pensee centrale de Derrida, celle dont le mot deconstruction signigie le programme. On raconte ensuite quelque chose du parcours de Derrida, du voyage de son ecriture parmi les pays et les enjeux de la culture. Puis on decrit Derrida dans l'activite chez lui fondamentale de la lecture des philosophes, en prenant l'exemple de ses discussions de Husserl, Levinas et Heidegger. Enfin, on evoque sa posterite et les prolongements que sa pensee pourraient connaitre. (shrink)

"Servi d'appui a sept conferences donnees au cours du premier semestre 2006 dans des colloques d'homage a Emmanuel Levinas, a l'occasion du centenaire de sa naissance"--P. [4] of cover.

L’article est une exploration systématique de la dualité des figures du Mind et du Geist, le premier étant entendu comme l’esprit en tant que partie de la nature scientifiquement objectivable, le second comme l’esprit en tant qu’acteur immatériel insaisissable de la pensée. De plus, cette dualité est étudiée du point de vue de l’interférence de la mathématique avec elle, dans plusieurs contextes. Sont ainsi successivement analysés : le conflit entre les deux « modèles » du Mind, le computationnaliste et le (...) dynamiciste; la définition philosophique et la définition épistémologique du Geist ; le jeu entre Mind et Geist dans les recherches cognitives contemporaines ; l’ambivalence de la logique et des mathématiques vis-à-vis de l’opposition Mind/Geist. Dans la partie finale, on propose une définition personnelle du Geist–en termes d’adresse et de sujet–dont dérive une détermination du Mind. Revenant sur ces nouvelles bases à l’interférence avec la mathématique, on conclut sur la question essentielle et délicate de la paramétrisation de la conscience. (shrink)

Dans cet article sont menées deux réflexions. La première tente de juger du rapport de la philosophie à sa textualisation d’après le rapport des mathématiques à leur textualisation, et ce à trois niveaux : 1) en essayant de tirer des manières dont le texte mathématique excède sa forme logique des enseignements quant à la pertinence et la viabilité d’une réduction du texte philosophique à sa forme logique ; 2) en posant le problème d’une étude externaliste du texte philosophique à la (...) lumière des difficultés particulières que suscite l’approche externaliste du texte mathématique ; 3) en examinant ce qu’il en est de l’hybridation du philosophique et du mathématique dans certains textes. La seconde porte sur un aspect particulier de la textualisation : sur l’intervention du marqueur du sujet de l’énonciation (« Je ») dans les textes philosophiques. (shrink)

Violence works at the same time as what we find in the world according to our best description of reality, and as what we fight and reject, hoping for a more peaceful world. It may also be what we recommend, as the only way to change things, or even what we celebrate, as the key resource of true art. Sometimes we even think that adequate theory arises from violence against given paradigms. How can it be so? Do we really understand (...) what we refer to when we speak about violence? (shrink)

L'objectivité mathématique est le point de mire de nombreux débats logiques et philosophiques. L'opposition platonisme-nominalisme héritée de la tradition a évolué vers une discussion plus technique, qui conjugue des positions fines et complexes. Logiciens, mathématiciens et philosophes décrivent dans cet ouvrage le déplacement progressif de la question de l'objet non sensible vers celle, plus ancrée dans la pensée mathématique, de l'objet infinitaire ou de l'objet structural. Les compétences multiples mises ici à contribution font apparaître que les positions "platoniciennes" sont aujourd'hui (...) non seulement possibles, mais plurielles et, pour beaucoup d'entre elles, affranchies de tout ontologisme sommaire. La discussion confronte la pensée platonicienne aux enjeux logico-mathématiques contemporains et dégage ainsi la pertinence critique du platonisme mathématique. L'ouvrage aborde eh outre la question proprement dite des fondements des mathématiques. Les thèmes majeurs sont débattus sous des angles variables et opposés : finitarisme et constructivité, la portée et la légitimité des axiomes infinitisants de la théorie des ensembles, la valeur gnoséologique de la théorie des modèles... Les résultats les plus récents dans ces domaines sont mis en perspective au sein de nouvelles antinomies et d'une problématique qui évolue. (shrink)

We seem to be abandoning the codes that told previous generations who they should love. But now that many of us are free to choose whoever we want, nothing is less certain. The proliferation of divorces and separations reveal a dynamic we would rather not see: others sometimes reject us as passionately as we are attracted to them. Our desire makes us sick. The throes of rivalry are at the heart of our attraction to one another. This is the central (...) thesis of Jean-Michel Oughourlian's _The Genesis of Desire_, where the war of the sexes is finally given a scientific explanation. The discovery of mirror neurons corroborates his ideas, clarifying the phenomena of empathy and the mechanisms of violent reciprocity. How can a couple be saved when they have declared war on one another? By helping them realize that desire originates not in the self but in the other. There are strategies that can help, which Dr. Oughourlian has prescribed successfully to his patients. This work, alternating between case studies and more theoretical statements, convincingly defends the possibility that breakups need not be permanent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Edmund Husserl’s Influence on Karl Jaspers’s Phenomenology”Jean Naudin (bio) and Jean-Michel Azorin (bio)Keywordsphenomenology, intentionality, intuition, empathy, ambiguitySchwartz and Wiggins’s paper clearly shows that Jaspers’s comprehensive psychiatry draws mainly from Husserl’s phenomenology. This thesis enters a current debate opened by Chris Walker and German Berrios about the influence of Husserlian philosophy on Jaspers’s work. This debate, which emerged at the end of the so-called decade of (...) the brain, could be considered perfectly obsolete. But its topicality relies on taking up the challenge of the scientific bases of comprehension in psychiatric experience. Wiggins and Schwartz perfectly achieve this aim by opposing a theory of seeing and a theory of thinking. Works such as Walker’s are grounded on thinking; they are works about theory. They are not works about experience, but rather epistemological or historical works. In contrast, Wiggins and Schwartz suggest to see, as Jaspers did, and not to think, following Husserl by grounding their psychopathology on intuition and presuppositionlessness. They emphasize Jaspers’s method of “making present” by doing a perfect analysis of the issues of translation of vergegenwärtigung as a co-experiencing of mental processes as if they were directly given. These main principles of direct-givenness, presuppositionlessness, and making present pull the Jaspersian concepts to the Husserlian phenomenological reduction and seem like the foremost principle in Husserlian phenomenology: the intuition of the thing in itself. Whereas Jaspers refuted the principle of eidetic reduction, Wiggins and Schwartz clearly show how much he grounded on the basis of the concept of intentionality, discovered and enlightened during Husserl’s life within the horizon of phenomenological reduction. Actually, it seems that the authors take the side of Jaspers to better support their own vision of psychiatric experience, which they more explicitly argued in Husserlian terms of the later period in some other papers (Schwartz and Wiggins 1985; Wiggins and Schwartz 1988, 1991; Wiggins, Schwartz, and Northoff 1990). However, they take care here to struggle exclusively with the epistemological field of their opponents, considering only Jaspers’s own writings and the Husserlian texts that were accessible to Jaspers when he wrote his psychopathology. There is no room for Kant in Jaspers’s main [End Page 37] principles, and this assumption must lead us to consider the horizon opened by Jaspers, that is, the horizon of a science of meaning essentially built on the lived experiences and the bracketing of any kind of a priori. In contrast to the slight influence of Kant, one idea that emerges is that of the straight impact of Dilthey on both Jaspers and Husserl. We perfectly agree with Wiggins and Schwartz that Jaspers, grounding both on Husserl and Dilthey, arrives at a methodological principle that is all his own, by considering both the connections of the life-stories and the objectivity of symptoms. In other words, we can find the originality and maybe the astonishing modernity of Jaspers in his perfect description of the balance between comprehension and observation, between empathy and its limits, that are obviously found in psychotic processes.We thus focused our comments on the following critiques to Jaspers, although they were already well argued in the brief conclusion of Wiggins and Schwartz: (a) the issue of empathy, (b) the limits of Jaspersian phenomenology, and (c) the merits of its genuine ambiguity.The Issue of Empathy. Indeed we have no reliable scientific mean to guarantee the correctness of our intuitions of the other’s mental life, and this problem might lead one to globally reject the method. The discussion of this problem, classical in the Continental literature since the twenties, led the Continental psychiatrists to unfortunately abandon their own traditions. And it is surprising for a Continental psychiatrist to see this debate coming back into the English-speaking literature. When we address the issue of empathy, we have no easy means to abandon folk psychology. Using philosophical slang weakens the attempt to enlighten its foundations instead of describing its values. The suspicion regarding empathy is partially legitimated by the prejudices of Jaspers himself. As psychiatrists, we have to carry on the Jaspersian research by progressively abandoning it and coming back... (shrink)

Jean-Michel Rabaté uses Nietzsche's image of a "pathos of distance," the notion that certain values cannot originate in a community but are created by a few gifted and lofty individuals, as the basis for a wide-ranging investigation into the ethics of the moderns. The expression of "pathos of distance" impressed would-be modernists like the American James Huneker and the Irish poet W. B. Yeats as they confronted the new in the arts. Later, it helped Deleuze and Barthes make sense (...) of modernity when they tried to tease out all the implications of "distance." Despite Benjamin criticism of Nietzsche's doctrine of the "eternal return of the same" in the Arcades Project, in his "Theses on the Philosophy of History" Benjamin envisions a redeemed history that follows Nietzsche's basic intuition about the need to make every moment count for history. By first establishing this unlikely meeting of Nietzsche and Benjamin through their ideas of history and ethics, Rabaté is able then to provide an original genealogy for the ethics of the modern, moving through figures and moments as varied as Yeats and the birth of Irish Modernism, the ethics of courage in Virginia Woolf, Rilke, Apollinaire, and others in 1910, Gide and Genet's ethical impulse to combine erotic liberation with the motivation for political revolution, and Derrida's reading of Joyce's Ulysses and a modern mode of writing that sought to get closer to the senses. The result is a fascinating critique of Nietzsche, Benjamin, affect theory, and the origins of the ethics of modernism. (shrink)

Despite its internal divisions and the uncertainty surrounding many of its foundations, there is a growing consensus that the on‐going search for an alternative model of the mind finds a minimal theoretical identity in the pursuit of an anti‐Cartesian conception of mental phenomena. Nevertheless, this anti‐Cartesianism remains more or less explicitly committed to the neo‐Brentanian idea that intentionality is an essential feature of the mental—an idea that has prevailed since the advent of modern cognitive science in the 1950s. An issue (...) of compatibility is thereby raised, as neo‐Brentanism arguably sides with cognitive Cartesianism. The main goal of the paper is to put into full light one specific aspect of this largely unperceived problem of compatibility by arguing that the neo‐Brentanian property of intentionality is an essentially representational one that runs counter to the salient anti‐representationalism of anti‐Cartesianism. And, that this representational essence confronts the search for alternative models of the mind of an anti‐Cartesian kind with the following theoretical issue: To what extent is it possible to devise a non‐Brentanian property of intentionality, particularly one that is fully dissociated from the property of representation? This issue is shown to be much deeper and more difficult than it looks once the nature of representation is properly apprehended; it seems to be still waiting for an answer in the current search for an alternative model of the mind, if only because it has not yet be set in fully adequate terms. (shrink)

_Winner of the 2010 Sigourney Award!_ How has Hanna Segal influenced psychoanalysis today? Jean-Michel Quinodoz provides the reader with a comprehensive overview of Segal's life, her clinical and theoretical work, and her contribution to psychoanalysis over the past sixty years by combining actual biographical and conceptual interviews with Hanna Segal herself or with colleagues who have listened to Segal in various contexts. _Listening to Hanna Segal_ explores both Segal's personal and professional histories, and the interaction between the two. The (...) book opens with an autobiographical account of Segal's life, from her birth in Poland to her analysis with Melanie Klein in London where she became the youngest member of the British Psychoanalytical Society. Quinodoz goes on to explain Segal's contributions in various fields of psychoanalysis including: the psychoanalytic treatment of psychotic patients the introduction of the "symbolic equation" aesthetics and the creative impulse the analysis of elderly patients introducing the work of Melanie Klein. Quinodoz concludes by examining Segal's most recent contribution to psychoanalysis - exploring nuclear terror, psychotic anxieties, and group phenomena. Throughout the interviews Segal speaks of her close relationships with prominent colleagues such as Klein, Rosenfeld, and Bion, making this book both a valuable contribution to the history of psychoanalysis and an indication of the evolution of psychoanalytic ideas over the past six decades. This clear summary of Hanna Segal's life and her contribution to psychoanalysis will be an essential guide to anyone studying Segal and her contemporaries. (shrink)

Over the past twenty years, Husserlian phenomenology has increasingly drawn the attention of the cognitive community, thereby leading to the emergence of what might be called a phenomenological trend within contemporary cognitive studies. What this phenomenological trend really amounts to is however a matter of debate. The reason is that it embodies, in fact, a multifaceted reflection about the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to the current efforts towards a scientific theory of cognition, and, to a lesser degree, about the reciprocal (...) relevance of these efforts to the fate of the Husserlian tradition. Indeed, it covers a wide array of perspectives on these questions, ranging from tentative demonstrations of the cognitively misleading character of Husserl's ideas, inasmuch as they would incarnate the same foundational errors as cognitivism (Hall and Dreyfus 1982), to diametrically opposed views arguing that the naturalist bent of contemporary cognitive science is ill-conceived, and that only the brand of transcendentalism defended by Husserl can provide it with adequate foundations (cf., for instance, Villela-Petit 1999). (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to clarify and assess Dennett’s opinion about the relevance of the phenomenological tradition to contemporary cognitive science, focussing on the very idea of a phenomenological investigation. Dennett can be credited with four major claims on this topic: (1) Two kinds of phenomenological investigations must be carefully distinguished: autophenomenology and heterophenomenology; (2) autophenomenology is wrong, because it fails to overcome what might be called the problem of phenomenological scepticism; (3) the phenomenological tradition mainly derived from Husserl (...) is based on an autophenomenological conception of phenomenology, and, consequently, can be of no help to contemporary cognitive science; (4) however, heterophenomenology is indispensable for obtaining an adequate theory of consciousness. In response to Dennett’s analysis, the paper develops two main counterclaims: (1) Although the traditional conception of phenomenology does indeed fit Dennett’s notion of autophenomenology, his sceptical arguments fail to rule out at least the possibility of a modified version of this traditional conception, such as the one defended in Roy et al. (Naturalizing Phenomenology, 1999); (2) the distinction between autophenomenology and heterophenomenology is at any rate misconceived, because, upon closer analysis, heterophenomenology proves to include the essential characteristics of autophenomenology. (shrink)

This paper praises Martin Hägglund for his general take on Derrida, while objecting to a certain rigidity in the use of the concept of survival. This concept allowed Hägglund to reject the temptation of a ‘religious’ Derrida in Radical Atheism, but in Dying for Time, it leads to a hurried reading of psychoanalysis. My objections revolve around several forms: the role of gods for Plato and Greek thought; the reductive reading of Diotima's speech in the Sympoisum, and an all too (...) rapid rejection of the idea of the Todestrieb in Freud and Lacan. I go back to Derrida's reading of Freud in The Postcard to point out that he too had misread Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Finally, I argue that there can be something like a non-proper or improper immortality. (shrink)

Over the past twenty years, Husserlian phenomenology has increasingly drawn the attention of the cognitive community, thereby leading to the emergence of what might be called a phenomenological trend within contemporary cognitive studies. What this phenomenological trend really amounts to is however a matter of debate. The reason is that it embodies, in fact, a multifaceted reflection about the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to the current efforts towards a scientific theory of cognition, and, to a lesser degree, about the reciprocal (...) relevance of these efforts to the fate of the Husserlian tradition. Indeed, it covers a wide array of perspectives on these questions, ranging from tentative demonstrations of the cognitively misleading character of Husserl's ideas, inasmuch as they would incarnate the same foundational errors as cognitivism, to diametrically opposed views arguing that the naturalist bent of contemporary cognitive science is ill-conceived, and that only the brand of transcendentalism defended by Husserl can provide it with adequate foundations. (shrink)

Malebranche's psychology of error and psychology of moral choice are the core of what Locke kept on admiring, even when criticizing the metaphysics and the theory of ideas underlying them. So to understand why Locke rejects Malebranche's "idea" and Malebranche rejects Locke's "idea", it is useful to see where they agree and disagree in the theory of moral choice: pleasure, supreme good, suspense, uneasiness, desire are themas debated around them (Arnauld, Bayle) and between them.

My first goal is to question a received view about the development of Analytical Philosophy. According to this received view Analytical Philosophy is born out of a Linguistic Turn establishing the study of language as the foundation of the discipline; this primacy of language is then overthrown by the return of the study of mind as philosophia prima through a second Cognitive Turn taken in the mid-sixties. My contention is that this picture is a gross oversimplification and that the Cognitive (...) Turn should better be seen as an extension of the Linguistic one. Indeed, if the Cognitive Turn gives explicit logical priority to the study of mind over the study of language, one of its central features is to see the mind as a representational system offering no substantial difference with a linguistic one. However, no justification is offered for the fundamental assimilation of the nature of a mental representation with that of a linguistic symbol supporting this picture of the mind, although the idea that a system of mental representations is identical in structure with a system of linguistic symbols has been argued over and over. I try to demonstrate this point through a close critical examination of Fodor's paradigmatic notion of 'double reduction.' My second claim is that the widespread contemporary assimilation of a mental representation with a symbol of a linguistic kind is no more than a prejudice. Finally I indicate that this prejudice cannot survive a rigorous critical examination. (shrink)

RESUMEN La psicopatologia contemporánea sufre de una brecha descriptiva respecto de la experiencia patológica, y la tradición de la psicopatologia contiene un capital descriptivo acumulado que debe ser explotado para la necesaria superación de este déficit. Se argumenta examinando el caso particular de la psicopatologia cognitiva de la esquizofrenia y del contenido de la experiencia del delirio de control, mostrando cómo la teoría de Henri Ey, así como la del automatismo mental del siglo xix en la cual tiene sus raíces, (...) contienen herramientas descriptivas importantes para establecer que la experiencia de un delirio de control es esencialmente diferente de la experiencia de una simple ilusión de control. ABSTRACT This article defends the general view that contemporary psychopathology suffers from a descriptive gap with respect to pathological experience and that the psycho-pathological tradition has accumulated a descriptive capital that should be used in the necessary effort to overcome this gap. This general thesis is argued for by examining the specific case of the cognitive psychopathology of schizophrenia and the experience of the delusion of control, showing how Henri Ey's theory and the 19th century theory of mental automatism in which the former is rooted contain important descriptive tools for establishing that the experience of a delusion of control is fundamentally different from that of a sheer illusion of control. (shrink)

La psicopatología contemporánea sufre de una brecha descriptiva respecto de la experiencia patológica, y la tradición de la psicopatología contiene un capital descriptivo acumulado que debe ser explotado para la necesaria superación de este déficit. Se argumenta examinando el caso particular de la psicopatología cognitiva de la esquizofrenia y del contenido de la experiencia del delirio de control, mostrando cómo la teoría de Henri Ey, así como la del automatismo mental del siglo xix en la cual tiene sus raíces, contienen (...) herramientas descriptivas importantes para establecer que la experiencia de un delirio de control es esencialmente diferente de la experiencia de una simple ilusión de control. (shrink)