In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Imagined Apotheoses: Drake, Harriot, and Ralegh in the AmericasWilliam M. HamlinPerhaps the two best known stories of Europeans being taken for gods by non-European peoples are those of Hernan Cortés in Mexico and Captain James Cook in Hawaii. Separated by two hundred sixty years, five thousand miles, and vast differences in cultural and linguistic context, these two incidents nonetheless share many traits in the conventional telling. Cortés and Cook (...) were both strong leaders, for instance, both capable of inspiring devotion among their subordinates. Both men became amateur ethnographers during their lengthy sojourns away from Europe, both sought to promote an image of respectful rather than rapacious foreign incursion, and both are said to have been taken for returning gods by the native peoples among whom they landed: Cortés for the Toltec culture-hero and demigod Quetzalcoatl, Cook for the Hawaiian deity Lono. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 1.“The Far Side” cartoon by Gary Larson. Courtesy of Chronicle Features, San Francisco.Recent scholarly studies and debates—among them the rather strident dispute between Gananath Obeyesekere and Marshall Sahlins over the alleged deification of Cook by eighteenth-century Hawaiians—have opened up these returning-god theories to skeptical critique and detailed justification; but such discussions have had little, if any, impact on popular imagination. 1 [End Page 405] Indeed, the idea that redoubtable European explorers can be (and often are) perceived as supernatural beings by non-European “primitives” has been uncritically perpetuated to this day by filmmakers, fantasists, writers of popular history, and purveyors of cultural literacy. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., for instance, informs our children that Caribbean islanders encountered by Columbus “asked if he had come from heaven”—the implication being, of course, that they took him for a god. 2 And in the recent film, 1492: Conquest of Paradise, we hear the indefatigable Admiral (played by Gerard Depardieu) claim that “on every island the natives welcome us with great generosity and trust.... Because of our appearance, we have been mistaken for gods, and are treated accordingly.” 3 Fortunately, we also have a “Far Side” parody of the cultural conceit on which such ideas in part rely, but the cartoon serves as well to demonstrate just how thoroughly the conceit has permeated our collective awareness (see figure 1). 4 Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 2.“It’s against my programming to impersonate a deity.” From The Return of the Jedi, dir. Richard Marquand, Lucasfilm, Ltd., 1983. All Rights Reserved. Courtesy of Lucasfilm, Ltd.Let me offer just one other example. Near the end of the popular 1983 film The Return of the Jedi, the forest-dwelling Ewoks begin to chant and salaam upon first glimpsing the golden robot C-3PO, who in turn tells his captured comrades, “I do believe they think I am some sort of god.” When Han Solo sarcastically asks the robot to use his “divine influence” to help extricate them from their predicament, C-3PO replies that such an action would be improper: “It’s against my programming to impersonate a deity.” Here we see, embedded within a film romance, both the classic trope of the apotheosized foreigner and the related motif of the foreigner’s reluctance to [End Page 406] play the god-role (see figure 2). It is worth noting, however, that while C-3PO may be unwilling to exploit the Ewoks’ misperception, Luke Skywalker is not; he uses the “Force” to convince the Ewoks of the robot’s magical prowess and, more to the point, to perpetuate their misapprehension. 5What I wish to suggest in this essay is that certain habitual Western assumptions or conceits regarding cross-cultural encounters—assumptions which have been usefully termed “myth models” inasmuch as they condition human perception and find frequent discursive expression—coexist easily but in fact disjunctively with certain other ideological structures in many early modern travel narratives and colonial accounts. Obeyesekere, in his provocative book on the supposed deification of Captain Cook in Hawaii, has linked such myth models to the conceptual structures of the longue durée as characterized by Fernand Braudel, and it is possible that they may also be... (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Until recently, many philosophers took Causal Decision Theory to be more successful than its rival, Evidential Decision Theory. Things have changed, however, with a renewed concern that cases involving an extreme form of decision instability are counterexamples to CDT :392–403, 1984; Egan in Philos Rev 116:93–114, 2007). Most prominent among those cases of extreme decision instability is the Psychopath Button, due to Andy Egan; in that case, CDT recommends a seemingly absurd act that almost certainly results in your death. This (...) renewed attention to decision instability has spurned an array of modifications to and rejections of CDT. I argue, however, that the Psychopath Button and its ilk are no counterexamples to CDT. That is, given the causalist’s commitments in Newcomb Problems, they already have the tools to justify CDT’s verdict in Egan-style cases of extreme decision instability. I first argue that there is no reason to think the Psychopath Button is a counterexample to CDT; in particular, many philosophers have placed too much weight on pre-theoretic intuition in Egan-cases, and apart from pre-theoretic intuition, arguments against CDT in cases of extreme decision instability are flawed. My second claim is that the causalist can provide good reasons for following CDT in cases of extreme decision instability. I present a new case, the Two Button Defense, that highlights precisely why the causalist can reasonably follow CDT in even the Psychopath Button. CDT therefore stands as a viable decision theory, without need for modification, restriction, or rejection. (shrink)

The injunction to “analyze the way you randomize” is well known to statisticians since Fisher advocated for randomization as the basis of inference. Yet even those convinced by the merits of randomization-based inference seldom follow this injunction to the letter. Bernoulli randomized experiments are often analyzed as completely randomized experiments, and completely randomized experiments are analyzed as if they had been stratified; more generally, it is not uncommon to analyze an experiment as if it had been randomized differently. This article (...) examines the theoretical foundation behind this practice within a randomization-based framework. Specifically, we ask when is it legitimate to analyze an experiment randomized according to one design as if it had been randomized according to some other design. We show that a sufficient condition for this type of analysis to be valid is that the design used for analysis should be derived from the original design by an appropriate form of conditioning. We use our theory to justify certain existing methods, question others, and finally suggest new methodological insights such as conditioning on approximate covariate balance. (shrink)

Is it morally important to vote? It is common to think so, but both consequentialist and deontological strategies for defending that intuition are weak. In response, some theorists have turned to a role-based strategy, arguing that it is morally important to be an excellent citizen, and that excellent citizens vote. But there is a lingering puzzle: an individual vote changes very little (virtually nothing in large-scale elections), so why would the excellent citizen be so concerned to cast a ballot? Why (...) bother with something that has so little effect on the common good? This paper answers by developing the idea of respect for a practice, and then arguing that respect for democracy will often require citizens to vote. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAssuming there are fictional objects, what sorts of properties do they have? Intuitively, most of their properties involve being represented—appearing in works of fiction, being depicted as clever, being portrayed by actors, being admired or feared, and so on. But several philosophers, including Saul Kripke, Peter van Inwagen, Kendall Walton, and Amie Thomasson, argue that even if there are fictional objects, they are not really represented in some or all of these cases. I reconstruct four kinds of arguments for this (...) unexpected conclusion; they concern the semantics of names, pragmatic force, creation, and representations’ qualitative content. But I find all the arguments flawed. I then argue for the contrary, employing a new perspective: representation of fictional objects begins with the works of fiction that originate them. A work of fiction represents its “native” objects because our culture bestows that property on it. I sketch conditions for such property bestowal and argue that they are satisfied in this case. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Two Creations: Metamorphoses: i.5–162, 274–415 OVID (Translated by C. Luke Soucy) The Metamorphoses of Ovid opens with the creation of the world, only to recount its destruction and recreation almost immediately after. These stories begin Ovid’s mythic anthology with a sustained exploration of the uncertain origin of humanity, the conflicts in its nature, and its uneasy place in a world governed by divine forces. The following excerpts (...) endeavor to reproduce and contextualize that exploration in a blank verse translation, preserving much of the original wordplay and employing the same number of lines as in the Latin. Before there were seas, lands, and arching skies, Throughout the whole world, nature bore one face, Which was called Chaos, an unordered, rough And tumble mass of lifeless weight, wherein Lay packed the jangling elemental seeds. 10 No Titan1 then brought sunlight to the earth, No Phoebe2 yet wrought full her lunar curve; Nor hung the Earth self-poised in swaddling air, With Amphitrite’s3 arms stretched round her banks. For though the land, the sea, and air were there, 15 The land could bear no tread, the waves no stroke, The mist no light. No being retained its shape, And each opposed with each, for in one self arion 28.3 winter 2021 1. The Sun, son of the Titan Hyperion. 2. Diana, here representing the moon. 3. A Nereid and the wife of Neptune, here representing the sea. 46 the two creations Heat battled cold, wet strove with dry, soft parts Struck against hard, and weight fought weightless things. 20 A god—and better nature—broke this strife. He tore the lands from sky and seas from land, And from the dense air split the crystal heaven. Then, after he released the separate forms, Plucked from that sightless mass, he fastened them 25 In place with common peace. Next, weightless fire Leapt up and claimed its place in vaulting heaven, With air beneath, the next by lightness placed. But denser earth sank under its own weight And drew down heavy masses by its side. 30 The circling water took hold last of all, And wrapped the solid earth inside its flow. Once he, whichever of the gods he was, Had so reduced the whole to living parts, He spun the land into a giant sphere, 35 And, to begin, lest all sides be alike, He ordered straits to stream and swell beneath The sweeping winds and clasp the circled earth. And he made springs and lakes and boundless pools, And tilted banks hemmed in by slanting streams, 40 A share of which the earth absorbs; the rest Runs to the sea, where, in a freer flood, It pounds no banks, but breaks on ocean shores. He ordered fields unrolled and valleys sunk, The forests wreathed with leaves, the mountains raised; 45 And, as two regions on both left and right Divide the sky (a fiery fifth between), So did the might of god segment its load: The same five bounds are stamped upon the earth. The middle zone is home to heat alone, 50 The outer two to snow, but those between He gave both flame and frost in measured fare, And over all, the air—as great a weight Compared to fire as water feels from earth. Ovid 47 He ordered there the mists and there the clouds, 55 And thunder, soon to frighten mortal minds, And, mixed with bolts of light, the flashing Winds. To them, the maker did not grant the air Outright (for even now, when each one blows In his own realm, the brothers quarrel so 60 They scarce withhold from shattering the world). So Eurus sought Arabian lands of dawn And Persian peaks aglow with morning rays, While near the western shores by sunset warmed, Dwells Zephyrus; and wintry Boreas seized 65 The Scythian north, while southern lands drip wet With constant clouds and rain by Auster’s hand. Above them all, the god let aether flow, A liquid lacking weight or earthly trace. Such boundaries had he scarcely set in place 70 Before the stars, which had so long been crushed In sightless gloom, began to light the sky. And... (shrink)

Exceptionally preserved fossils are the product of complex interplays of biological and geological processes including burial, autolysis and microbial decay, authigenic mineralization, diagenesis, metamorphism, and finally weathering and exhumation. Determining which tissues are preserved and how biases affect their preservation pathways is important for interpreting fossils in phylogenetic, ecological, and evolutionary frameworks. Although laboratory decay experiments reveal important aspects of fossilization, applying the results directly to the interpretation of exceptionally preserved fossils may overlook the impact of other key processes that (...) remove or preserve morphological information. Investigations of fossils preserving non-biomineralized tissues suggest that certain structures that are decay resistant are rarely preserved, and decay-prone structures can fossilize, albeit rarely. As we review here, decay resistance is an imperfect indicator of fossilization potential, and a suite of biological and geological processes account for the features preserved in exceptional fossils. Organisms decayed experimentally in seawater have been used as direct analogs for soft-bodied fossil taxa, with fossils representing a snapshot of a particular stage of decay. We argue that numerous geological and biological processes account for fossilization and that all of these should be considered when reconstructing extinct organisms. (shrink)

Exceptionally preserved fossils are the product of complex interplays of biological and geological processes including burial, autolysis and microbial decay, authigenic mineralization, diagenesis, metamorphism, and finally weathering and exhumation. Determining which tissues are preserved and how biases affect their preservation pathways is important for interpreting fossils in phylogenetic, ecological, and evolutionary frameworks. Although laboratory decay experiments reveal important aspects of fossilization, applying the results directly to the interpretation of exceptionally preserved fossils may overlook the impact of other key processes that (...) remove or preserve morphological information. Investigations of fossils preserving non-biomineralized tissues suggest that certain structures that are decay resistant are rarely preserved, and decay-prone structures can fossilize, albeit rarely. As we review here, decay resistance is an imperfect indicator of fossilization potential, and a suite of biological and geological processes account for the features preserved in exceptional fossils. Organisms decayed experimentally in seawater have been used as direct analogs for soft-bodied fossil taxa, with fossils representing a snapshot of a particular stage of decay. We argue that numerous geological and biological processes account for fossilization and that all of these should be considered when reconstructing extinct organisms. (shrink)

Culture, livelihoods and political-economic status all influence people's perception of introduced and invasive species, shaping perspectives on what sort of management of them, if any, is warranted. Indigenous voices and values are under-represented in scholarly discourse about introduced and invasive species. This paper examines the relationship between the Xeni Gwet'in First Nation (one of six Tsilhqot'in communities) and wild or free-roaming horses in British Columbia, Canada. We outline how Xeni Gwet'in people value horses and experience management actions, contextualising the controversy (...) over wild horses amidst power imbalances in the expression of environmental values. We suggest that Indigenous voices are vital to include when evaluating impacts of controversial species and developing management strategies. (shrink)

Critics charge that Kantian conceptions of human dignity and normative agency, which some suggest underwrite the modern doctrine of human rights, are parochial, unable to account for the dynamism and context-dependence of human rights, aloof from human rights practice, and incapable of distinguishing human rights from the vast array of other political rights constitutional democracies generally recognize as demands of justice. I argue here that whatever force these charges might have against human rights theories inspired by Kant’s work, they do (...) not impugn Kant’s own conception of human rights. By tying human rights to official attitudes toward justice rather than, as familiar approaches do, to concrete conformity with ‘minimum prerequisites’ of justice, Kant’s approach fits core features of human rights practice while providing a dynamic, context-sensitive guideline for auditing the conduct of states and public officials. Just as Kant’s critical writings argue that agents must be able to assume that the natural world of efficient causes is purposive for morality’s ultimate ends, we can profitably understand Kant’s political philosophy as claiming, analogously, that agents must also be able to assume that the juridical world of state action is purposive for justice. Kant’s conception of human rights, I suggest, identifies the conditions under which that assumption is warranted. (shrink)

Ronald Dworkin’s unity of value thesis underlies his influential moral, political, and legal thought. This essay presents an interpretation of the unity thesis designed to isolate its distinctly ethical character, elaborate Dworkin’s fundamental ethical arguments for it, and to utilize this reconstruction to correct misinterpretations that, I argue, underlie recent criticism. This criticism largely depends on construing the unity thesis within a familiar dualistic meta-ethical framework according to which Dworkin’s theory of value is classified as either constructivist or realist in (...) character. Both options, however, misapprehend the epistemological framework within which Dworkin defends value judgments in general, and therefore fail to challenge his use of that framework in defending the unity of value in particular. Correcting this oversight is essential to a proper understanding of Dworkin’s novel account of moral epistemology and of the moral and political program that his unity thesis sponsors. The paper concludes by suggesting how more profitable criticism of the unity of value might proceed. (shrink)

This paper argues that we can better understand Ronald Dworkin's thesis that both individuals and governments must strive to act in accordance with principles that comprise a coherent moral conception, or with what he calls 'integrity', as an instance of Immanuel Kant's fundamental ethical injunction to act in accordance with principles that have the form of law. This Kantian reading of Dworkin highlights the internal, constitutive relation between integrity and a key condition of political legitimacy that Dworkin long stressed: that (...) governments take individual rights _seriously_. Governments take individual rights seriously only by treating humanity as an end in itself, and governments treat humanity as an end in itself only by striving to act in accordance with an integrated system of practical laws. Acting with integrity, taking rights seriously and respecting humanity are thus internally related acts. (shrink)

This note examines the significance of Gylippus at Aen. 12.271–83 and argues that Virgil's narrative is an epitaphic gesture alluding to Nicander of Colophon, Anth. Pal. 7.435 and other epigrams from Anth. Pal. 7. Virgil's bilingual reader would participate in the Hellenistic Ergänzungsspiel and supplement further meaning to this otherwise generic scene.

I defend and clarify my arguments in "Real Representation of Fictional Objects" in response to criticisms from Joseph Sartorelli. In particular, I clarify why Kripke's notion of "levels of language" and a pragmatic principle suggested by van Inwagen do not support the view that works of fiction generate fictional objects but do not represent them.

In this paper, we study some new examples of ideals on $$\omega $$ with maximal Tukey type (that is, maximal among partial orders of size continuum). This discussion segues into an examination of a refinement of the Tukey order—known as the weak Rudin–Keisler order—and its structure when restricted to these ideals of maximal Tukey type. Mirroring a result of Fremlin (Note Mat 11:177–214, 1991) on the Tukey order, we also show that there is an analytic P-ideal above all other analytic (...) P-ideals in the weak Rudin–Keisler order. (shrink)

The essays explore the relationship between art and politics by considering the connection between the European presence there and aesthetic representations produced by traveling and resident photographers, thereby contributing to how the ...

The following work represents the extension of a debate that began in July of 2009. The authors felt it useful to commit to document their exchanges, and questions for one another, over the issues of building the Left project in the international context, where are the subjects to be found for alternative political projects, how are we to interpret the Iranian protest movement, and whether it is possible to resuscitate Marxism for our age.

This work considers the ways in which, throughout human history, maps have defined our limits as much as charted our exploration. These images act as a kind of ghost vision – a spectral overlay of the world created and accessed as data sets, satellite imagery, and geopolitical mapping, merged in an algorithmically generated 3D mesh. This brings with it a view of the world in which complementary and competing navigational vectors collage and collide. Yet, for all its apparent hyper-modern otherness, (...) its novelty and dexterity is still oriented around and contingent upon the temporal and electromagnetic limits of our biological inheritance. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bodhicitta and Charity:A ComparisonLuke PereraThe object of this paper is to present a comparison of bodhicitta and charity. These concepts are central to their respective traditions (Mahāyāna Buddhism, Christianity), and for the sake of keeping the comparison within reasonable limits I will focus on two sets of texts: the writings of the Indian Buddhist monk Śāntideva (late seventh and eighth centuries ce) and those of the French Catholic nun (...) Thérèse of Lisieux (1873–1897). My intention is that this comparison will help to clarify the similarities and the differences between the two concepts and provide thoughtful comment for Christians and Buddhists involved in interfaith dialogue and interested in comparative or interreligious theology.preliminary definitionsBodhicittaBodhicitta is a Sanskrit term, a compound of bodhi and citta, which appears regularly in the sūtras and śāstras composed by Mahāyāna Buddhist monks in India. Citta can mean mind, intelligence, thought, intention, or will, and bodhi (lit. awakening) refers to the state of all-embracing knowledge and freedom from cognitive and emotional limitations possessed by the buddhas. Bodhicitta, then, is the mind or thought that takes the supreme bodhi of the buddhas as its aim. Synonyms include cittotpāda (arising of the thought) and bodhicittotpāda (arising of the thought of bodhi). These three terms have always been associated with the resolve to become a buddha or a bodhisattva.1The resolve to become a buddha appears first in retellings of the story of the buddha Śākyamuni. Many lifetimes ago, the buddha-to-be was a pious young ascetic who had the fortune to encounter a buddha, and in his presence he vowed to become a buddha in the future.2 Thenceforth he was a bodhisattva, a being (sattva) devoted to the goal of complete enlightenment, the bodhi of the buddhas.3 In the Mahāyāna sūtras, the Buddha is shown teaching that the bodhisattva path is the supreme spiritual path. For a monk or layperson to begin the spiritual career of bodhisattva, they must generate the thought (cittotpāda), which takes bodhi as its aim (bodhicittotpāda): They must generate bodhicitta.The Abhisamayālaṃkāra, an Indian scholastic text attributed to the bodhisattva Maitreya, provides a classic definition: “to generate the resolve [to become a buddha] [End Page 121] is to desire perfect complete awakening for the sake of other [sentient beings].”4 Bodhicitta has two aspects: It is a resolve to attain the state of the buddhas and to work for the welfare of sentient beings. These two aspects combine in one career because the best way to help beings is to become an awakened buddha, capable of teaching them the way to deliverance. As another important text, the Bodhisattvabhūmi, relates:Furthermore, the bodhisattva, when fixing his thought on awakening, collects [his] thoughts and articulates [his] words thus: “Oh, may I be perfectly awakened unto the highest, perfect awakening, may I be the benefactor of all sentient beings and may I establish [them] in the absolutely perfect (or firm) extinction [i.e. Nirvāṇa] and in the insight of the Tathagata!” In this way, one generates the resolve [to become a buddha] when striving for one’s awakening and for the welfare of sentient beings.5The generation of bodhicitta requires preparatory actions such as confession of sins, solicitation of buddhas and bodhisattvas, and prolonged meditation on the benefits of bodhicitta and the sufferings of sentient beings. When the candidate is ready, he will vocalize his intention in the form of a vow in a ritual context, modeled on the monastic prātimokṣa vow.6 He will henceforth be bound by special bodhisattva precepts, which forbid harming sentient beings and creating difficulties for fellow Buddhist practitioners. Tibetan Buddhists identify two ritual traditions for the taking of the bodhicitta vow, each with their respective preparatory meditations, which they trace back to India. They associate Śāntideva with a lineage derived from the mythic bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, which includes the great monastic teacher and philosopher Nāgārjuna and his disciple Āryadeva (second and third centuries ce).The causes required for generating bodhicitta and its exact subdivisions have been... (shrink)