The model theoretic concept of truth has thus far been applied mainly to mathematical languages and theories. The paper presents an attempt to apply it to languages of empirical theories. Such an application must do justice to some characteristic features of empirical discourse. The paper outlines the main problems which a model theoretic theory of truth for empirical languages is bound to face and suggests some solutions to those problems.

The model theoretic concept of truth has thus far been applied mainly to mathematical languages and theories. The paper presents an attempt to apply it to languages of empirical theories. Such an application must do justice to some characteristic features of empirical discourse. The paper outlines the main problems which a model theoretic theory of truth for empirical languages is bound to face and suggests some solutions to those problems.

The law of excluded middle is usually considered as intrinsically connected with the realistic standpoint and incompatible with the idealistic position. This is just what Ajdukiewicz claims in his critique of transcendental idealism. The analysis of Ajdukiewicz's argumentation raises the problem of validity of the law of excluded middle for vague (or incomplete) languages. The problem is being solved by differentiating between the logical (or ontological) and the metalogical (or semantical) law of excluded middle: in contrast to the former, the (...) latter is claimed to be invalid for the languages in question, without thereby embracing the idealist position. (shrink)

The law of excluded middle is usually considered as intrinsically connected with the realistic standpoint and incompatible with the idealistic position. This is just what Ajdukiewicz claims in his critique of transcendental idealism. The analysis of Ajdukiewicz's argumentation raises the problem of validity of the law of excluded middle for vague (or incomplete) languages. The problem is being solved by differentiating between the logical (or ontological) and the metalogical (or semantical) law of excluded middle: in contrast to the former, the (...) latter is claimed to be invalid for the languages in question, without thereby embracing the idealist position. (shrink)

This is an attempt to meet the objections made by Anna and Andrzej Jerzy Jedynak in their article criticizing the views of this author concerning truth value of evaluative propositions. Replying to this criticism the author tries to show that his views do not lead to the elimination of the evaluative predicates like “morally good” by descriptive predicates like “considered to be morally good”, as the critics have claimed.

The approach adopted in the paper is based on the theory known as Montague grammar. Accepting, in general, that theory — especially in its modified version, which is due to Thomason and Kaplan — the author points out certain inadequacy in its treatment of the meaning of some indexical expressions and suggests some modification of its theoretical framework in order to avoid that shortcoming. It is claimed that to do justice to the meaning of so-called indefinite indexicals (such as we, (...) you, now) two kinds of dependence of their semantic values upon the context of use must be taken into account — a semantic (or lexical) and a pragmatic (or extralexical) one. (shrink)

The approach to the meaning of indexicals adopted in this paper is based on the theory known as Montague grammar. Accepting, in general, that kind of theory { especially in its modied version, which is due to Thomason and Kaplan 1 { I point out certain inadequacy in its treatment of the meaning of some indexical expressions and suggest some modication of its theoretical framework in order to avoid that shortcoming.