Semantic View of Theories

The companion piece to this article captures and generalizes empirical adequacy in terms of vagueness sets. In this article, I show that previous attempts to capture and generalize empirical adequacy in terms of partial structures fail. Indeed, the motivations for the partial structures approach are better met by vagueness sets, which can be used to generalize the partial structure approach.

In this paper I investigate Putnam’s model-theoretic argument from a transcendent standpoint, in spite of Putnam’s well-known objections to such a standpoint. This transcendence, however, requires ascent to something more like a Tarskian meta-level than what Putnam regards as a “God’s eye view”. Still, it is methodologically quite powerful, leading to a significant increase in our investigative tools. The result is a shift from Putnam’s skeptical conclusion to a new understanding of realism, truth, correspondence, knowledge, and theories, or certain aspects (...) thereof, based on, among other things, a better understanding of what models are designed (and not designed) to do. (shrink)

In philosophy of science two questions become central in the discussion of the nature of empirical science: 1) What is a theory, i.e. how is it built up, how does it work? And: 2) How does a theory relate to its corresponding experiential basis? To deal with these two questions modern philosophy of science has devised various ‘models’ on the nature and working of scientific theories. Some aspects of these models are widely held within the community of philosophers of science, (...) but others are still being discussed quite controversially. In this paper, we will consider both kinds of aspects. Particularly, we will analyze how the meaning of scientific concepts is determined; the axiomatic construction of a scientific theory; the idea of model building views as a bridge between theory and experience; the holistic semantic thesis of science; the question about the true of scientific theories; and, finally, the hierarchic structure of theories.En filosofía de la ciencia, dos cuestiones resultan centrales en la discusión acerca de la naturalezade la ciencia empírica: 1) ¿qué es una teoría ?, es decir, ¿cómo estáconstituida y cómo funciona? y 2) ¿cómo se relaciona una teoría con su correspondientebase experiencial? Para tratar estas dos cuestiones, la moderna filosofía de la ciencia ha desarrolladovarios “modelos” sobre la naturaleza y el funcionamiento de lasteorías científicas. Algunos aspectos de estos modelos son ampliamente aceptados por lacomunidad de filósofos de la ciencia, mientras que otros son todavía discutidos de manerabastante controvertida. En este trabajo, consideraremos ambos tipos de aspectos. En particular,analizaremos cómo se determina el significado de los conceptos teóricos, la construcción axiomática de una teoría científica, la idea de las concepciones sobre la construcción de modelos como puente entre la teoría y la experiencia, la tesis semántica holista de la ciencia, la cuestión acerca de la verdad de las teorías científicas y, finalmente, la estructura jerárquica de las teorías. (shrink)

A method of using co-citation data to identify scientific specialties and trace their development through time is outlined. These are related to the structuralist "theory net" construct. The method is purely "theoretical in that no algorithms for implementing the method are suggested. Even at this theoretical level, the discussion is incomplete in several ways. Important formal properties of some of the concepts employed remain to be clarified. The specific way these constructs relate to theory nets remains to be specified in (...) detail. (shrink)

Le développement considérable des simulations informatiques dans les sciences contemporaines impose une remise à plat des épistémologies des modèles. Franck Varenne propose de revenir sur les limites des notions de métaphore et d'analogie pour penser les modèles, en particulier quand il s'agit des modèles composés, des pluri-modèles et des modèles de simulation (à objets ou à agents), tels qu'ils se développent depuis une dizaine d'années. Il suggère que le paradigme linguistique, à l'oeuvre aussi bien dans la pensée analytique anglo-saxonne que (...) dans la pensée dialectique et pragmatique continentale, trouve ses limites manifestes devant les nouveaux usages épistémiques de telles simulations. Il propose que l'histoire et la philosophie des sciences contemporaines en prennent désormais toute la mesure. Sa conférence est suivie de la retranscription d'un débat fourni, d'abord oral, puis écrit, tel qu'il s'est prolongé, dans les mois qui ont suivi, avec plusieurs personnalités qui réfléchissent sur les modèles, sur les formalisations et sur la science contemporaine. On y verra quelques objections mais aussi beaucoup de points d'accord. Ce débat est l'occasion pour l'auteur d'expliquer davantage son approche et d'ouvrir encore la réflexion, aussi bien avec les scientifiques, les historiens qu'avec les philosophes. (shrink)

Dans cet ouvrage, Franck Varenne pose la question du réalisme scientifique, essentiellement dans sa forme contemporaine, et ce jusqu’aux années 1980. Il s’est donné pour cela la contrainte de focaliser l’attention sur ce que devenaient sa formulation et les réponses diverses qu’on a pu lui apporter en réaction spécifique à l’évolution parallèle qu’ont subie les notions de théories et surtout de modèles dans les sciences, à la même époque. Même si, bien sûr, on ne peut pas attribuer le considérable essor (...) des modèles au XXe siècle au projet qu’auraient eu les scientifiques de régler cette question, en grande partie philosophique, du réalisme – car les modèles scientifiques ont bien d’autres fonctions et ils proviennent de bien d’autres demandes techniques, cognitives et sociales –, son choix épistémologique a consisté à suivre la littérature contemporaine désormais classique, tant scientifique que philosophique, sur les théories puis sur les modèles afin d’une part, d’en rapporter l’évolution générale, mais, d’autre part aussi, afin de l’interroger de proche en proche, et systématiquement, sur ce qu’elle entend à chaque fois réévaluer ou remettre en débat au moyen de cette question persistante du réalisme et de la réalité en science. Au-delà de l’enquête historique, cette étude se révèle donc également comparative. Elle présente l’intérêt de mettre en évidence des similitudes de forme remarquables (identités, symétries, inversions, déplacements) entre des séquences argumentatives produites par des auteurs différents, dans des contextes distincts, au sujet de cette capacité qu’aurait – ou non – la science à rendre véritablement compte de la réalité. -/- Ainsi, via l’analyse épistémologique historique et comparative qu’en propose Franck Varenne, la question cruciale de la médiation du réel par nos outils conceptuels ou expérientiels reçoit dans ce livre l’éclairage d’auteurs dont les conceptions sont, pour certaines encore, méconnues du lecteur non anglophone : Peter Achinstein, Max Black, Ludwig Boltzmann, Nancy Cartwright, Pierre Duhem, Ian Hacking, Mary Hesse, Evelyn Fox Keller, Imre Lakatos, Ernst Mach, Ernest Nagel, Henri Poincaré, Willard V.O. Quine, Bas van Fraassen, etc. (shrink)

Analytical categories of scientific cultures have typically been used both exclusively and universally. For instance, when styles of scientific research are employed in attempts to understand and narrate science, styles alone are usually employed. This article is a thought experiment in interweaving categories. What would happen if rather than employ a single category, we instead investigated several categories simultaneously? What would we learn about the practices and theories, the agents and materials, and the political-technological impact of science if we analyzed (...) and applied styles, paradigms, and models simultaneously? I address these questions in general and for a specific case study: a brief history of systematics. (shrink)

In “The Toolbox of Science” (1995) together with Towfic Shomar we advocated a form of instrumentalism about scientific theories. We separately developed this view further in a number of subsequent works. Steven French, James Ladyman, Otavio Bueno and Newton Da Costa (FLBD) have since written at least eight papers and a book criticising our work. Here we defend ourselves. First we explain what we mean in denying that models derive from theory – and why their failure to do so should (...) be lamented. Second we defend our use of the London model of superconductivity as an example. Third we point out both advantages and weaknesses of FLBD’s techniques in comparison to traditional Anglophone versions of the semantic conception. Fourth we show that FLBD’s version of the semantic conception has not been applied to our case study. We conclude by raising doubts about FLBD’s overall project. (shrink)

The semantic view of theories is one according to which theories are construed as models of their linguistic formulations. The implications of this view for scientific realism have been little discussed. Contrary to the suggestion of various champions of the semantic view, it is argued that this approach does not make support for a plausible scientific realism any less problematic than it might otherwise be. Though a degree of independence of theory from language may ensure safety from pitfalls associated with (...) logical empiricism, realism cannot be entertained unless models or aspects thereof are spelled out in terms of linguistic formulations, which can be interpreted in terms of correspondence with the world. The putative advantage of the semantic approach -- its linguistic independence -- is thus of no help to the realist. I consider recent treatments of the model-theoretic view, and find that although some of these accounts harbour the promise of realism, this promise is deceptive. (shrink)

This paper explores a new reason for preferring a model-theoretic approach to understanding the nature of scientific theories. Identifying the models in philosophers' model-theoretic accounts of theories with the concepts in cognitive scientists' accounts of categorization suggests a structure to families of models far richer than has commonly been assumed. Using classical mechanics as an example, it is argued that families of models may be "mapped" as an array with "horizontal" graded structures, multiply hierarchical "vertical" structures, and local "radial" structures. (...) These structures promise important implications for how scientific theories are learned and used in actual scientific practice. (shrink)

In two occasions a Bibliography of Structuralism has been published in Erkenntnis (1989, 1994). Since then a lot of water has flowed under the bridge and the structuralist program has shown a continuous development. The aim of the present bibliography is to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the publication of An Architectonic for Science –structuralism’s main reference work– and of its recent translation into Spanish by updating the previous bibliographies with titles which have appeared since 1994 as well as before (...) that year but which are not included in them. As in the former deliveries, this bibliography only covers books and articles that are concerned directly with the structuralist approach in the philosophy of science. We would like to thank the many colleagues who have helped us in collecting all the information. Notwithstanding we apologize in advance for the possible entries that we missed to include in this third Bibliography of Structuralism. (shrink)

Various laws and theories in the natural and social sciences are presented with a view to discerning the syntactic and semantic characteristics of many idealizations in science. Three different kinds of idealizations are discussed: ideal conditions, ideal cases, and idealized theories. An ideal condition is a formula in which state variables occur, whose existential closure is false, and for which there is another formula that can be constructed out of the original formula such that the existential closure of the new (...) formula is true. An ideal case is a statement which is logically equivalent to a universal conditional which has an ideal condition as its antecedent. And an idealized theory is a set of false universal conditional statements. Alternative syntactic and semantic analyses are viewed and criticized. (shrink)

Thesemanticviewofscientifictheoriesassumesthedependenceofmodelsontheories.Someauthorschal- lenge that assumption by means of the study of certain models conceived as phenomenological. On the basis of the analysis of atomic and molecular models in quantum chemistry, in this article we will argue for an independence of models from theories, which cannot be interpreted as merely historical and context relative. Those models shows a conceptual independence that is constitutive of the modeling process; such independence cannot be conceived as a result of a contingent deficiency of the theory used, (...) deficiency that would be overcome by the future progress of science. (shrink)

During the last ten years John Beatty, Elisabeth Lloyd and I have argued that the semantic conception of theories is, in the context of biological theorizing, a richer conception of theory structure than the syntactic ("received view") conception. Specifically, I have argued semantic conception of theory structure better represents the structure of evolutionary theory and the relationship of this theory to phenomena. One aspect of the semantic conception that is in need of greater attention is the nature of explanation on (...) this conception. In this paper, I argue that the semantic conception provides a richer mo accurate account of scientific explanation, in particular, of evolutionary explanations. In essence, I argue that explanation involves an appeal to numerous theories in addition to the putative explanatory theory. Employment of these theories is not formally possible in a syntactic conception but is in a semantic conception. (shrink)

In this talk I do three things. First, I review what I take to be fruitful applications of the semantic view of theory structure to evolutionary theory. Second, I list and correct three common misunderstandings about the semantic view. Third, I evaluate the weaknesses and strengths of Horan's paper in this symposium. Specifically, I argue that the criticisms leveled against the semantic view by Horan are inappropriate because they incorporate some basic misconceptions about the semantic view itself.

The concept of a presentation of a theory is often introduced in discussions of the "semantic view" of theories to characterize the way in which models for a theory are specified. Presentations are most often thought of as definitions of the kinds of systems represented in the models. It is argued that the concept of a presentation can be widened to permit consideration of the links between epistemologically motivated accounts of theory structure and some metaphysically motivated accounts of the growth (...) of scientific knowledge. Conceptual maps are discussed as a possible elaboration of presentations which support Hull's metaphysical conception of theories as conceptual historical entities. (shrink)

A new PhD slated to teach a beginning undergraduate course on scientific reasoning recently asked me to recommend topics. I launched into a description of my “baby-Popper-plus-statistics” class – give them enough deductive logic to understand the Duhemian problem, do the Galileo case study, use the notion of severe test to introduce a bit of probability theory, then segue to the problem of testing statistical hypotheses…. My interlocutor was looking impatient. “But I’m a strong adherent of the Semantic Conception of (...) theories,” he said. “I can’t teach all that stuff about trying to falsify bold conjectures.” This was not a moment for proselytizing, so I loaned him a copy of Giere’s textbook, which is based on the Semantic Conception, and sent him happily on his way. However, this episode raises an interesting question, one that takes on some urgency as the Semantic Conception of scientific theories (SC) seems well on its way to becoming the new received view: What accounts of scientific method, confirmation and explanation does the SC support? (shrink)

responses to Sloep and Van der Steen, Biol. Philos. 1987 (2)33.

This paper aims at discussing from the point of view of a pragmatic stance the concept of model as an abstract replica. According to this view, scientific models are abstract structures different from set-theoretic models. The view of models argued for here stems from the conceptions of some important philosophers of science who elaborated on the notion of model, such as Suppe, Cartwright, Hempel, and Nagel. Differently from all those authors, however, the conception of model argued for here is typically (...) pragmatic, not semantic, i.e. it has not to do with the interpretation of scientific theories, but with the explanation and construction of given circumstances, from the point of view of the theory. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the notions of structure and models within the semantic approach to theories. To highlight the role of the mathematics used to build the structures which will be taken as the models of theories, we review the notion of mathematical structure and of the models of scientific theories. Then, we analyse a case-study and argue that if a certain metaphysical view of quantum objects is adopted, namely, that which sees them as non-individuals, then there would be (...) strong reasons to ask for a different mathematical framework for describing the structures that would be the models of the corresponding theory. In departing from the standard frameworks, we hope to bring to the scene, within the scope of the semantic approach, the importance of paying attention to some fundamental concepts usually only superficially touched by philosophers of science. (shrink)

Proponents of the semantic approach to scientific theories cite a number of critical publications as the origins of their positions. While the semantic view experienced widespread adoption by philosophers of science in the decades leading up to the 1990s, over the last two decades opposition to the view has increased demonstrably. This growing disaffection suggests a two-part question: What exactly are the objections to the semantic view of scientific theories, and does the view have the conceptual resources to combat its (...) opposition? This essay seeks to answer this question by performing a careful analysis of the positions of both advocates and adversaries of the semantic view. In addition, it is argued that to save the semantic view it is necessary to locate the source of the position’s problems and to retool its conceptual foundations. To ensure that the semantic approach has the resources to meet objections to it, exegetical analysis is performed, which demonstrates that the source of the view’s present-day woes lies in a subtle conflation contained in one seminal articulation of the view, van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image. It is argued that supplanting central aspects of that work with ideas from Suppes is the remedy needed to provide the semantic view with the necessary resources for becoming wholly defensible against its oppositions. (shrink)

Thirty years after the conference that gave rise to The Structure of Scientific Theories, there is renewed interest in the nature of theories and models. However, certain crucial issues from thirty years ago are reprised in current discussions; specifically: whether the diversity of models in the science can be captured by some unitary account; and whether the temporal dimension of scientific practice can be represented by such an account. After reviewing recent developments we suggest that these issues can be accommodated (...) within the partial structures formulation of the semantic or model-theoretic approach. (shrink)

CONTENTS: -/- 1 Introductory Remark; 2 Formalism of Empirical Theories; 3 Semantics of Formalized Languages; 4 Interpretation of Empirical Theories; 5 Interpretation of Observational Terms; 6 Interpretation of Theoretical Terms; 7 Main Types of Meaning Postulates for Theoretical Terms; 8 Some Other Kinds of Meaning Postulates for Theoretical Terms; 9 Main Types of Statements in an Empirical Theory; 10 Towards a More Realistic Account; 11 Concluding Remarks; 12 Bibliographical Note.

The epistemic status of Natural Selection has seemed intriguing to biologists and philosophers since the very beginning of the theory to our present times. One prominent contemporary example is Elliott Sober, who claims that NS, and some other theories in biology, and maybe in economics, are peculiar in including explanatory models/conditionals that are a priori in a sense in which explanatory models/conditionals in Classical Mechanics and most other standard theories are not. Sober’s argument focuses on some “would promote” sentences that (...) according to him, play a central role in NS explanations and are both causal and a priori. Lange and Rosenberg criticize Sober arguing that, though there may be some unspecific a priori causal claims, there are not a priori causal claims that specify particular causal factors. Although we basically agree with Lange and Rosenberg’s criticism, we think it remains silent about a second important element in Sober’s dialectics, namely his claim that, contrary to what happens in mechanics, in NS explanatory conditionals are a priori, and that this is so in quite specific explanatory models. In this paper we criticize this second element of Sober’s argument by analyzing what we take to be the four possible interpretations of Sober’s claim, and argue that, terminological preferences aside, the possible senses in which explanatory models in NS can qualify, or include elements that can qualify, as a priori, also apply to CM and other standard, highly unified theories. We conclude that this second claim is unsound, or at least that more needs to be said in order to sustain that NS explanatory models are a priori in a sense in which CM models are not. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to contribute to the discussion about the so-called “empirical claim” and “empirical basis” of theory testing. First, the proposals of reconceptualization of the standard notions of partial potential model, intended application and empirical claim of a theory made by Balzer (1982, 1988, 1997a, 1997b, 2006, Balzer, Lauth & Zoubek 1993) and Gähde (1996, 2002, 2008) will be first discussed. Then, the distinction between “global” and “local empirical basis” will be introduced, linking it with that (...) of “global” and “local or particular empirical claim”. After that, following Balzer (1997a), along the lines of Suppes (1962), I will present a way in which what count as ‘data’ for a theory can be modeltheoretically represented and conceptualized. Finally, the proposed analysis will be exemplified with the case of classical genetics (reconstructed in Balzer & Lorenzano 2000, Lorenzano, 1995, 2000, 2002). (shrink)

This paper consists of three sections. In the first one, some of the main developments in the philosophy of science through the xx century up to the present will be pointed out, and inserted them in the frame of some more general philosophical transformations, such as the so-called “linguistic turn” and “pragmatic turn”, respectively. In the second one, the established connection will be nuanced, from a revision of the work of a “classical” author such as Carnap. Finally, it will be (...) intended a kind of “balance and future perspectives”. (shrink)

It is the Introduction to Metatheoria’s Special Issue in homage to Joseph D. Sneed, in the fortieth anniversary of the publication of Sneed’s The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971, 2nd revised ed. 1979) first edition, which marks the birth of metatheoretical structuralism.

Scientific activity produces results of various types. In particular, science produces a special kind of knowledge or knowledges, assumed to be different from knowledge or common sense knowledge, from everyday experience and formulated in ordinary language; a more systematized knowledge, with greater range and accuracy, and intersubjectively controllable. To produce this kind of knowledge (or knowledge), we introduce new concepts, formulate hypotheses and laws and, ultimately, construct theories, being the result of a practice or specific activity, considering science as (perhaps), (...) the supreme intellectual achievement of mankind. Thus, philosophical theorizing of science, or “philosophy of science”, is characterized by the development of interpretative conceptual frameworks of philosophical character, in order to understand science. Philosophy of science is, not just part of metascience, but also a part of philosophy, precisely that which is responsible for analyzing science. (shrink)

Scientific activity produces results of various types. In particular, science produces a special kind of knowledge or knowledges, assumed to be different from knowledge or common sense knowledge, from everyday experience and formulated in ordinary language; a more systematized knowledge, with greater range and accuracy, and intersubjectively controllable. To produce this kind of knowledge (or knowledge), we introduce new concepts, formulate hypotheses and laws and, ultimately, construct theories, being the result of a practice or specific activity, considering science as (perhaps), (...) the supreme intellectual achievement of mankind. Thus, philosophical theorizing of science, or “philosophy of science”, is characterized by the development of interpretative conceptual frameworks of philosophical character, in order to understand science. Philosophy of science is, not just part of metascience, but also a part of philosophy, precisely that which is responsible for analyzing science. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to contribute to the discussion on the constitutive a priori in science by linking it with the discussion on scientific laws and theories, in such a way to show how the different senses of the notion of constitutive a priori are not incompatible to each other and that they can be precised in a unified, though differentiated, manner.

The aim of this article is to discuss and develop the diagnose of the Hardy-Weinberg law made by van Fraassen (1987, p. 110), according to which: 1) that law cannot be considered a law used as an axiom for the classical population genetics as a whole, since it is an equilibrium-law that holds only under certain special conditions; 2) it just determines a subclass of models; 3) its generalization shades off into logical vacuity; and 4) more complex variants of the (...) law can be deduced for more realistic assumptions. The discussion and development of such a diagnose will be carried out with the notions of another semantic conceptions of theories, related to that of van Fraassen, namely, the structuralist view of theories, and a rational reconstruction of classical population genetics made within the framework of such a metatheory, also presented in this paper. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the problem of scientific laws in general and laws of biology in particular. After reviewing the debate about the existence of laws in biology, I examine the subject under the light of the structuralist notion of a fundamental law and argue for the law of matching as the fundamental law of genetics.

In this paper, I discuss the problem of scientific laws in general and laws of biology in particular. After reviewing the debate around the existence of laws in biology, I examine the subject in the light of the structuralist notion of a fundamental law and argue for the law of matching as the fundamental law of genetics.

Taking as starting point Kuhn’s analysis of science textbooks and its application to Sinnott and Dunn’s (1925), it will be discussed the problem of the existence of laws in biology. In particular, it will be showed, in accordance with the proposals of Darden (1991) and Schaffner (1980, 1986, 1993), the relevance of the exemplars, diagrammatically or graphically represented, in the way in which is carried out the teaching and learning process of classical genetics, inasmuch as the information contained in them, (...) indispensable for the right development of that process, exceeds the information contained in the “laws” linguistically articulated and presented in the textbooks. However, it will be maintained that the information is implicit in the law that according to the structuralist concept of fundamental law and the reconstruction of genetics presented by Balzer & Dawe (1990), and later developed by Balzer & Lorenzano (1997) and Lorenzano (1995, 2000, 2002a) could be considered the fundamental law of classical genetics,the law of matching, clearly identified in this paper. (shrink)

In this comment on the work by Ulises Moulines I shall not refer to the interesting analysis of the ontological commitments that depends the treatment of the so-called «data models», nor shall I debate the general metaphysical principles proposed in his approach, adopting an experimentalist, instrumentalist, anti-realistic, positivist or empirical stance. I shall focus on the last part of his article in which he elaborates on the links between Wesley Salmon’s causalist approach and the structuralist analysis of explanation viewed as (...) theoretical subsumption, as he relates it to the structural analysis of the theoretical terms in light of a certain general shared understanding of the job of epistemology. (shrink)

Taking as starting point Kuhn’s analysis of science textbooks and its application to Sinnott and Dunn’s (1925), it will be discussed the problem of the existence of laws in biology. In particular, it will be showed, in accordance with the proposals of Darden (1991) and Schaffner (1980, 1986, 1993), the relevance of the exemplars, diagrammatically or graphically represented, in the way in which is carried out the teaching and learning process of classical genetics, inasmuch as the information contained in them, (...) indispensable for the right development of that process, exceeds the information contained in the “laws” linguistically articulated and presented in the textbooks. However, it will be maintained that the information is implicit in the law that according to the structuralist concept of fundamental law and the reconstruction of genetics presented by Balzer & Dawe (1990), and later developed by Balzer & Lorenzano (1997) and Lorenzano (1995, 2000, 2002a) could be considered the fundamental law of classical genetics,the law of matching, clearly identified in this paper. (shrink)

Contents: Foreword. Wolfgang BALZER and C. ULISES MOULINES: Introduction. José A. DÍEZ CALZADA: Structuralist Analysis of Theories of Fundamental Measurement. Adolfo GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA and Pedro REYES: The Theory of Finite Games in Extensive Form. Hans Joachim BURSCHEID und Horst STRUVE: The Theory of Stochastic Fairness - its Historical Development, Formulation and Justification. Wolfgang BALZER and Richard MATTESSICH: Formalizing the Basis of Accounting. Werner DIEDERICH: A Reconstruction of Marxian Economics. Bert HAMMINGA and Wolfgang BALZER: The Basic Structure of Neoclassical (...) General Equilibrium Theory. Klaus MANHART: Balance Theories: Two Reconstructions and the Problem of Intended Applications. Rainer WESTERMANN: Festinger's Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Structuralist Theory-Net. Rainer REISENZEIN: Wundt's Three-Dimensional Theory of Emotion. Pablo LORENZANO: Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics. Hinne HETTEMA and Theo A.F. KUIPERS: The Formalisation of the Periodic Table. C. ULISES MOULINES: The Basic Core of Simple Equilibrium Thermodynamics. Thomas BARTELBORTH: An Axiomatization of Classical Electrodynamics. Author's Index. Subject Index. (shrink)

This article presents a reconstruction of the so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics, which is intended to be more complete and adequate than existing reconstructions. This reconstruction has been carried out with the instruments, duly modified and extended with respect to the case under consideration, of the structuralist conception of theories. The so-called Mendel’s Laws, as well as linkage genetics and gene mapping are formulated in a precise manner while the global structure of genetics is represented as a theory-net. These (...) results are of methodological, philosophical and didactical relevance. (shrink)

The aim of the present communication is to contribute to the discussion about the existence of laws in biology. In order of it the argumentation of J.J.C. Smart against their existence and the discussion of it made by M. Ruse and R. Munson are first reconstructed. The examination of this controversy shows that, despite of the differences between the first of the authors mentioned and the other two in relation to the problem of laws in biology, the three share the (...) assumption according to which in the case that there are laws (in strict sense or fundamental) in genetics, they must be some of the so-called “Mendel’s laws”. In the present communication, and from a revision of the metascientific concept of fundamental law, the above assumption is questioned, proposing an alternative analysis, based on a structuralist reconstruction of genetics. (shrink)

The present paper is framed within one of the predominant currents of contemporary philosophy of science, which is based in case studies, in order to construct a solid, non-speculative, metatheory. In this paper classical genetics is formally analized and reconstructed with the instruments, duly modified and extended in accordance with the considered case, of the structuralist view of theories, in such a way that that theory can be characterized as a refinement of an earlier introduced model of genetics, which determines (...) the fundamental traits of any genetical model. Finally, from the reconstruction of classical genetics, the so-called “mendelism” is formally characterized trying to do justice, and to precise, some recent results in the historiography of genetics. (shrink)

Der orthodoxen Interpretation zufolge wird die Genetik als eine Disziplin dargestellt, deren Geschichte (von ihrem vermuteten Ursprung mit dem Werk Mendels an über die Werke der sogenannten «Wiederentdecker» de Vries, Correns und Tschermak und des englischen Mendelianers Bateson bis hin zur Arbeit Morgans) kontinuierlich, kumulativ und linear verlaufen sei. Im ersten Teil des Buches wird hingegen die Diskontinuität dieses Prozesses betont. Innerhalb der strukturalistischen Auffassung wissenschaftlicher Theorien wird die klassische Genetik im zweiten Teil in einer Weise rekonstruiert und formal analysiert, (...) die den im ersten Teil erarbeiteten Ergebnissen gerecht wird. (shrink)