Las nuevas técnicas de neuroimagen, que están comprendidas en el gran campo de las neurociencias, nos permiten indagar el estudio de la funcionalidad cerebral en el momento en el cual realizamos una determinada tarea o elaboramos un pensamiento. Además del estudio de los estados post-coma, se ha abierto así el gran capítulo de las así llamadas "neurociencias cognitivas", es decir, el estudio de las funciones simbólicas superiores que caracterizan a la persona humana. Somos hoy capaces de trazar el mapa de (...) la áreas cerebrales que están implicadas en la memoria, en las percepciones y en las emociones, en la elaboración del proceso decisional, hasta llegar a la conducta ética. El indudable enorme valor científico de estas investigaciones lleva consigo el riesgo de una peligrosa "invasión de campo", en argumentos de alcance ético que conciernen a otras disciplinas, de la filosofía a la antropología, de la teología a la psicología. La tentación de reducir la complejidad de la persona humana a una "máquina" neurológicamente predeterminada, con una arquitectura neuronal construida sobre la estructura genética no modificable, lleva en sí el pesado redimensionamiento de grandes instancias éticas como la decisión libre y la responsabilidad. Ha nacido una nueva disciplina, la neuroética, que se propone leer al hombre, en su individualidad y totalidad, a la luz de la neurobiología documentada de las neurociencias. En realidad, precisamente partiendo de los datos científicos, genéticos y neurológicos, podemos rigurosamente demostrar y afirmar que esta impostación es reductiva, limitada, con lagunas y, por tanto, objetivamente inaceptable. Se requiere la fundación de una ética de la neurociencias, más que la actual derivación de las neurociencias de la ética.The new neuroimaging technology allows us to investigate the study of brain function at the moment in which a specific task is executed or a thought is elaborated. In this way, the vast chapter on the so called "cognitive neurosciences" has been opened. Today we are able to map the areas of the brain involved in memory, perception and emotions, in the elaboration of the decisional process, all the way to ethical conduct. The temptation to reduce the complexity of humans to a neurologically predetermined "machine" with an unalterable genetic structure built with a neuronal architecture carries with it a heavy downsizing of important ethical issues, such as freedom of choice and personal responsibility. In reality, starting precisely from scientific, genetic and neurological data, we can state and rigorously demonstrate that this formulation is reductive, limited and faulty and therefore unacceptable objectively. We request the formulation of an ethics for neurosciences rather than the existing neurosciences of ethics into which we have draft. (shrink)

Foreword OLIVER LEAMAN Kentucky University It is an interesting question why Ibn Khaldûn has lasted so long with a high reputation in both the Islamic and ...

Written between 1978 and 2006, these essays engagingly address the most hidden tradition in European political thought: the unpolitical.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Prolegomena to a Comparative Reading of The Major Life of St. Francis and The Life of MilarepaMassimo A. RondolinoDifferent religious traditions in different cultures have recorded and transmitted the lives of individuals recognized as “perfected.” The particular doctrinal framework within which each of such figures is identified as “perfected” is certainly specific to the religious tradition that tells their life stories. Similarly, the social processes by which these religious (...) life writings are written, received, and circulated are appropriate to the historical and geographical contexts of their composition. Yet, narrative parallels can be detected across traditions, and the question arises whether these apparent similarities in the creation of such religious life stories across cultures, space, and time reflect actually similar doctrinal and political agendas. Could there be an underlying hagiographic process common to all these literary traditions, regardless of their compositional contexts? In other words, is the writing of spiritual lives a phenomenon that is contextual to a specific religious tradition, or is it rather a particular human response to given social and historical circumstances?I want to offer here a preliminary assessment of a study in comparative hagiology. To this end, I focus on two specific narrative traditions that pertain to two distinct religious, historical, and geographical contexts: the hagiographic writings on the medieval Christian St. Francis of Assisi (1182–1226) and the namthars on the Tibetan Buddhist Milarepa (Mi la ras pa; ca. 1052–1135). In particular, here I make some considerations on a comparative reading of the “standard versions” of their life stories: The Major Life of St. Francis (Legenda Maior Sancti Francisci) by Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (1221–1274), and The Life of Milarepa (Mi la ras pa’i rnam thar) by Tsangnyön Heruka, the “madman” of Tsang (gTsang smyon Heruka; 1452–1507).1The composition and reception of religious life writings is famously characteristic of early and medieval Christianity, with its complex and extensively studied production of hagiographic texts. Similarly, the compilation and distribution of life narratives in a religious context also plays a crucial role in the historical and cultural development of Tibetan Buddhism, with its extensive production of namthars (rnam thar, literally “great liberation” and, therefore, “stories of great liberation”). Within these large narrative traditions, St. Francis of Assisi and Milarepa eminently stand [End Page 163] out, both within and outside their respective cultural contexts, as two among the most renowned spiritual figures in Christianity and Tibetan Buddhism, respectively.2 Furthermore, both figures and their related narrative traditions have been the object of scholarly studies for nearly a century.3Indeed, the spirituality embodied by St. Francis and Milarepa has been already the focus of attempted comparisons that have essentially and consistently focused on a direct assimilation of their respective extreme asceticism and teachings of poverty and renunciation, by drawing extensively on the literary accounts of their lives.4 Yet, it is important to note that the lives of these two exceptional individuals are also almost exclusively known through the dominating perspective of a single author’s works. In fact, although one of the best-known texts on St. Francis is the anonymous Little Flowers of St. Francis (Fioretti di San Francesco, late fourteenth century), the saint’s life and deeds are primarily known through their rendering by Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, general minister of the Franciscan order. Similarly, the acts and teachings of Milarepa as they are familiar to Tibetan (and Western) audiences result primarily from the work of the wandering yogin Tsangnyön Heruka.Reflecting on the apparent parallelisms between the lives and teachings of St. Francis and Milarepa, though, I wonder whether such similarities may not extend beyond the spirituality that the saint and the repa embody. In particular, I am curious as to whether the analogies between the two figures that have been already outlined by several scholars may not actually arise from similarities in the sources’ underlying compositional dynamics and, in particular, in the authors’ approaches to the interpretation and retelling of these individuals’ lives as embodiments of a particular form of spirituality. In fact, if religious life writings are a form of communication that can be found in communities that belong to different traditions, times... (shrink)

Taking for granted a radical criticism of the universalistic value of a post-Protestant understanding of religion and of the nexus between political democracy and secularization, the article aims first at framing the perspective of multicultural jurisdictions within contemporary processes of change of religious pluralism on a transnational scale; secondly at framing that perspective within the intellectual tradition of legal pluralism; and finally at inquiring into the compatibility of the new conceptual constellation ‘post-secular society plus legal pluralism’ with a liberal frame.

It is no secret that we inhabit an increasingly irrational world, plagued by rampant pseudoscience, science denialism, post-truths and fake news. Or perhaps, human nature being what it is, we have always lived in such a world and we are now simply more keenly aware of it because of easy and widespread access to social media. Moreover, the stakes are higher, as pseudoscience in the form of the anti-vax movement imperils the lives of many, while climate change denialism literally risks (...) a collapse of the human ecosystem. So how do we deal with the problem? How do we talk to otherwise perfectly reasonable and functional people who nevertheless espouse all sorts of nonsense — and vote accordingly? In this paper I will explore a couple of real life conversations among many that I have had with believers in pseudoscience, and then present and discuss virtue epistemology as one approach to ameliorate the problem. No silver bullets are available, unfortunately, but it is our intellectual and moral duty to keep, as Carl Sagan famously put it, the candle of reason lit even when surrounded by the darkness of unreason. (shrink)