How are we to make sense of madness and psychosis? For most of us the words conjure up images from television and newspapers of seemingly random, meaningless violence. It is something to be feared, something to be left to the experts. But is madness best thought of as a medical condition? Psychiatrists and the drug industry maintain that psychoses are brain disorders amenable to treatment with drugs, but is this actually so? There is no convincing evidence that the brain is (...) disordered in psychosis, yet governments across the world are investing huge sums of money on mental health services that take for granted the idea that psychosis is an illness to be treated with medication. Although some people who use mental health services find medication helpful, many do not, and resist the idea that their experiences are symptoms of illnesses like schizophrenia. Consequently they are forced into having treatment against their wishes. So, how do we make sense of this situation? Postpsychiatry addresses these questions. It involves an attempt to rethink some of the fundamental assumptions of mental health work, showing how recent developments in philosophy and ethics can help us to clarify some of the dilemmas and conflicts around different understandings of madness. Throughout, the authors examine the conflicting ways in which politicians, academics, and mental health professionals appear to understand madness, and contrast this with voices and experiences that are usually excluded - those of the people who use mental health services. They then examine the power of psychiatry to shape how we understand ourselves and our emotions, before considering some of the basic limitations of psychiatry as science to make madness meaningful. In the final section of the book they draw on evidence from service users and survivors, the humanities and anthropology, to point out a new direction for mental health practice. This new direction emphasises the importance of cultural contexts in understanding madness, placing ethics before technology in responding to madness, and minimising 'therapeutic' coercion. (shrink)

Because psychiatry deals specifically with ‘mental’ suffering, its efforts are always centrally involved with the meaningful world of human reality. As such, it sits at the interface of a number of discourses: genetics and neuroscience, psychology and sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and the humanities. Each of these provides frameworks, concepts, and examples that seek to assist our attempts to understand mental distress and how it might be helped. However, these discourses work with different assumptions, methodologies, values, and priorities. Some are in (...) dispute with one another. At various times in the history of psychiatry, a particular form of understanding has become dominant and worked to marginalize .. (shrink)

It has often been emphasised that psychiatry is still an ‘expertise’ and has not yet reached the status of a science. Science calls for systematic, conceptual thinking which can be communicated to others. Only in so far as psychopathology does this can it claim to be regarded as a science. What in psychiatry is just expertise and art can never be accurately formulated and can at best be mutually sensed by another colleague. It is therefore hardly a matter for textbooks (...) and we should not expect to find it there. This quotation indicates that Jaspers was immersed in a major debate in nineteenth century philosophy of science: the Methodenstreit. His dismissive comments about the ‘art’ of psychiatry set the .. (shrink)

The dominance of technological paradigms within psychiatry creates moral and ethical tensions over how to engage with the interpersonal narratives of those experiencing mental distress. This paper argues that such paradigms are poorly suited for fostering principled responses to human suffering, and proposes an alternative approach that considers a view of relationships based in feminist theories about the nature of caring. Four primary characteristics are presented which distinguish caring from technological paradigms: a concern with the particular nature of contexts, embodied (...) practice, the dialogical basis of caring and the existential basis of caring. From this we explore the role of the moral imagination and our ability, through narrative, to acknowledge, engage with and bear witness to the injustices that shape the lives of those who suffer. This, we argue, is at the heart of caring. Clinical implications are discussed, including an exposition of the importance of narrative in recovery from trauma and distress. Narrative Psychiatry, The Sanctuary Model of care, and Soteria, are outlined as examples of this type of practice. (shrink)

Henriksen et al. use phenomenology as a tool to clarify the status of what they regard as the abnormal experiences of the condition called schizophrenia. This reveals phenomenology as a method of detailed scrutiny of these experiences to establish a theory about them in terms of the “dissolution of certain structures of self-consciousness” and “morbid objectification of inner speech”. Our commentary is in two parts. In the first, we set out a contrasting view of phenomenology, and its use in madness.1 (...) In the second, we exemplify this use of phenomenology and the meaningful nature of voices through evidence that links.. (shrink)

Psychiatric diagnosis depends, centrally, on the transmission of patients’ knowledge of their experiences and symptoms to clinicians by testimony. In the case of non-native speakers, the need for linguistic interpretation raises significant practical problems. But determining the best practical approach depends on determining the best underlying model of both testimony and knowledge itself. Internalist models of knowledge have been influential since Descartes. But they cannot account for testimony. Since knowledge by testimony is possible, and forms the basis of psychiatric diagnosis, (...) its very existence is a factor in support of an externalist model of knowledge in general. Internalist and externalist models of knowledge also suggest different ways of responding to the practical challenges of basing psychiatric diagnosis on testimony. Thus the argument in favour of externalism also supports a potentially empirically testable hypothesis about interpretation of non-native speakers for accurate psychiatric diagnosis: interpretation of non-English speakers should be as transparent and unhindered by specialised medical knowledge as possible. (shrink)

I present and discuss recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on apophaticism and divine ineffability. I focus on three questions: how can we call God ineffable without contradicting ourselves? How can we refer to an ineffable God? What is the point of talking about an ineffable God?

This chapter argues that the modernist agenda, currently dominant in mainstream psychiatry, serves as a disempowering force for service users. By structuring the world of mental health according to a technological logic, this agenda is usually seen as promoting a liberation from "myths" about mental illness that led to stigma and oppression in the past. However, it is argued that this approach systematically separates mental distress from background contextual issues and sidelines non-technological aspects of mental health such as relationships, values, (...) and meanings. This move privileges the gaze of the expert doctor who is trained to understand distress in terms of psychopathology. But, as this move empowers the doctor, it disempowers the service user. In part this is because the priorities of modernist psychiatry are generally at odds with the interests and concerns of services users, particularly those who see themselves as survivors of the mental health system. The chapter examines the implications of this for the psychiatrist's role in working with survivors towards recovery. (shrink)

We are very grateful to Mona Gupta and Peter Zachar for their commentaries on our paper. In our view, the main challenge for both commentators is this: do they have empirical evidence to refute our rejection (on evidence-based grounds) of the primacy of the current technological paradigm in psychiatry? Although opinions may differ about our choice of the philosophical tools we use to interpret the facts, unless there is good evidence to contradict our basic premise, their arguments will fail to (...) reach the evidence-based medicine (EBM) gold standard that they support. We do not believe their commentaries present any empirical evidence that contradicts our critique. Before we respond, we wish to stress two .. (shrink)

We are very grateful to both Matthew Ratcliffe and Thomas Szasz for taking the time to read and respond to our paper. Ratcliffe is broadly sympathetic to our efforts and provides a very convincing argument against mind–body dualisms by drawing on work from the phenomenological tradition. His comments extend rather than challenge our central thesis. Szasz, however, is dismissive of our position. As a result, most of our response is directed to his commentary. Ratcliffe uses the work of van der (...) Berg to make the case that any easy distinction between bodily and mental illness or suffering is false to our lived reality as human beings. Of course, in the day-to- day world of contemporary medical practice .. (shrink)

Functional relationships between romantic jealousy and traits, such as neuroticism or adult attachment styles, are well-known. For the first time, we conducted a joint analysis of the Big Five traits and attachment dimensions as predictors of jealousy, which considered gender differences as well as differences in infidelity experiences and relationship status. In 847 participants, path modeling showed that higher neuroticism, lower agreeableness, and lower openness predicted higher romantic jealousy. The attachment dimensions “anxiety” and “depend” partly mediated the effect of neuroticism (...) and fully mediated the effect of agreeableness on romantic jealousy. The direct and indirect relationships did not differ as a function of gender, relationship status, and infidelity experiences. These findings contribute to a better understanding of individual differences in romantic jealousy from a personality perspective. (shrink)