Recent challenges of the mechanistic world picture seem only to have strengthened the position of mathematics. So it continues to guarantee perfect predictability, the dream of physicalism. During recent decades, however, computer simulations have shown mathematicians that even simple sets of equations may have, not an exact, but a whole range of solutions. With some of their examples we demonstrate the unpredictable behavior of simple systems. As a result, the dream is over. On the other hand, mathematicians also discovered that (...) previously 'chaotic' phenomena could be represented by relatively simple formules. This leads to a dramatic increase in the explanatory power of mathematics. This change of the scientific scenery will have a profound methodological impact on the relationship between the natural and the other sciences. (shrink)

Attenderes Physicis; quaereres, utrumne ignis esset initium rerum, an vero. minutis editus et mirabilibus ementis perpetuus hie mundus, an mortalis esset.

How can we understand our human world, embedded as it is within the physical universe, in such a way that justice is done to both the richness, meaning and value of human life on the one hand, and what modern science tells us about the physical universe on the other hand? I argue that, in order to solve this problem, we need to see physics as being concerned only with a highly selected aspect of reality – that aspect which determines (...) how events unfold – the causally efficacious aspect. Physics cannot describe the experiential, and if it is extended so that it does so, physical theory would cease to be explanatory. The human world can, however, be understood in terms of a different kind of explanation, which I call “personalistic”. This is not reducible to physical explanation. The world is, in short, riddled with what may be called “double comprehensibility”. (shrink)

This paper aims first and foremost to unravel and clarify an interesting 17th century controversy around superposition in projectiles, which allegedly existed between the French Jesuit Honoré Fabri and the Italian physicist and astronomer Giovanni Alfonso Borelli. This conflict – initially described by the English mathematician John Wallis in a letter from 1670 to the secretary of the Royal Society – has been erroneously identified with Fabri's Dialogi physici (1669), a work written in response to Borelli's De vi percussionis (1669). (...) In fact, this “conflict” was nothing but Wallis's account of a contradiction between Borelli's above mentioned work and Fabri's Tractatus physicus de motu locali from 1646, while Fabri's 1669 work expressed views very different from those contained in his Tractatus physicus. I will try here to reconstruct Fabri's change of heart between 1646 and 1669 concerning projectiles and superposition, while tracing the real bone of contention between (the later) Fabri and Borelli – superimposing contrary motions – to its Aristotelian origins. My analysis will lead me to problematize the way modern historians usually interpret the relation between Aristotle's physical thinking and projectile theories of early modern theoreticians (e.g. Nicollò Tartaglia's). (shrink)

My dissertation concerns the question of how our desires and beliefs explain our bodily movements. This study aims to show that the solutions given to this question by both token physicalists, including Donald Davidson, Jerry Fodor, and Fred Dretske, and a proponent of a commonsense approach, Lynne Rudder Baker, are unsatisfactory. Finally, I discuss Daniel Dennett and argue that his theory is the only choice we have. ;All of the five philosophers claim that reasons cause actions. Davidson's theory fails to (...) answer the question at issue because, on his account, the intentional properties of reasons are causally inefficacious in producing bodily behavior. Although Dretske's and Fodor's theories do not have this problem, their accounts receive the challenge from externalists, who argue that our intentional properties are determined not only by intrinsic physicial properties, but also by our relation to the environment. Since our intrinsic physical properties determines our bodily behavior, intentional properties seem irrelevant to the production of bodily movements. In response to externalism, both Dretske and Fodor attempt to provide an account of intentionality. However, I argue that their accounts are unsatisfactory. A fortiori, they fail to show content has any explanatory role. ;Then I switch to Baker's commonsense approach. She rejects the Standard View of the physicalists, i.e., that to have a propositional attitude is to have a brain state that has propositional content, and endorses her 'Practical Realism.' I, however, contend that her rejection of the Standard View is not successful and that Practical Realism, being compatible with the Standard View, fails to provide any new insight into intentional explanation. So the question at issue is still unanswered. ;At the end, I discuss Dennett's theory, which also rejects the Standard View. According to Dennett, there is no ontological difference between our beliefs and the beliefs of a machine, a nation, and evolution, provided that their behavior can be interpreted from the intentional stance. Therefore, instead of providing an account of the intentional , Dennett attempts to dissolve our urge for such an account by "demystifying" our intentionality. (shrink)

Quine claims that his naturalized epistemology which is a science about science must take the place of traditional epistemology. Because physics is the paradigm of science for Quine, there is apparently no room for normative and intentional discourses in Quine's naturalized epistemology. However, Quine uses normative and intentional discourses in his naturalized epistemological inquiry. Hence, the problem addressed in this dissertation is the place of normative and intentional discourses in Quine's naturalized epistemology. ;My procedure is to examine critically the above (...) mentioned contradiction from two different angles. In an initial and external criticism I assume the in-principle gap between physicalistic discourse and normative and intentional discourses. In an internal criticism I assume the gap merely practical. In the former criticism I offer my own interpretation of the status of naturalized epistemology in Quine's philosophy and argue for the presence of a tension between methodological concerns and what Quine calls his physicalistic bias. I explain three manifestations of the tension in Quine's writings: his discussions of language acquisition, induction and scientific method in general. I also argue that methodological concerns play the ineradicable role in an epistemology, which Quine must and at least partially does recognize. In the internal criticism I discuss the nature of the gap between physicalistic discourse and normative and intentional discourses and examine and criticize Quine's behavioristic physicialism. On the basis of the criticism of Quine's behavioristic physicalism I criticize Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation which denies the fact of the matter for intentional discourse. ;I find, as a result, that because both methodological concerns and physicalistic bias are basic elements of Quine's naturalized epistemology, the resultant tension is serious. I also find that Quine's naturalized epistemology as it is cannot resolve the tension, whether we assume the gap as in-principle or merely practical. ;Thus, I conclude that as the unsettling status of normative and intentional discourses indicates, Quine's naturalized epistemology does not make a coherent whole. (shrink)

Secundum Petrum Bieri dualismus ontologicus hoc trilemma generat: 1) Status mentis non sunt status physici. 2) Status mentis causalitatem exerceunt in regionem statuum physicorum. 3) Regio statuum physicorum est causaliter clausa. Haec tertia propositio a Bieri “physicalismum methodologicum” exprimere dicitur. Ut hoc trilemma solvat, Bieri unum eius membrorum reicere suadet. Hylemorphismus causalitatem mentis ut causalitetem formalem explicat, relationem vero hominis ad mundum ut causalitatem efficientem. Unde clausura causalis mundi de causalitate efficiente intelligi potest, quae in physica investigatur. Liberum arbitrium ab (...) intentione mentis originem trahit. Etiam possibilitas libertatis humanae ex intentionalitate mentis explicari potest. Libertas adhuc hominis ut electio unae duarum optionum intelligi potest. Homo eligens rationes ponderat, quae sunt abstractae et distinctae a causis efficientibus rerum materialium, quae sunt concretae. Doctrina hylemorfica insuper fundamenum sufficiens ad problema identitatis personae per tempus solvendum praebere potest. Quoniam omnia elementa materialia in homine per tempus mutantur – imo DNA mutari potest –, principium identitatis immateriale esse debet. Pro principio identitatis igitur forma substantialis personae accipi potest, quae est metaphysica explicatio naturae mentis, quae actionem liberam electione deliberata per intentionalitatem libertatemque arbitrii inchoare potest)Peter Bieri formulates the assumptions of the ontological dualism via a trilemma: 1) Mental states are not physical states. 2) Mental states have causal effects in the realm of physical states. 3) The realm of physical states is causally closed. Bieri labels the third sentence of this trilemma as methodological physicalism. In order to solve this trilemma Bieri proposes to abandon one of the three premises. Hylomorphism explains mental causality as formal causality, and the relation between human beings and the world as efficient causality. Thus, the causal closure of the world can be understood as closure of the efficient causes, which are studied by physics. Free decision begins with the intentionality of the mind. The possibility of human freedom can also be explained through the intentionality of the mind. Human freedom can be understood as a choice between two alternatives. When choosing, human beings weigh reasons which are abstract and distinct from the efficient causes of material objects that are concrete. Hylomorphism can, further, provide sufficient grounds for solving the issue of personal identity through time. Since all the material elements in a human being change through time – even the DNA can change – the principle of identity cannot be material in character. Thus, it is the substantial form of a person (i.e. the metaphysical explanation of the mind, which is capable of initiating free action through its intentionality and freedom of choice in deliberate decision making) that can be accepted as the principle of identity. (shrink)

In 1720, Willem Jacob ’s Gravesande wrote Physicis elementa mathematica, experimentis confirmata. Sive introductio ad philosophiam Newtonianam. Although he was undoubtedly one of the most important popularizers of Newtonian physics, experimental methodology and epistemology in the 1720s, his empirical claim somehow backfired: in applying tenets of Newtonian methodology, he was ultimately led to validate the Leibnizian principle of the conservation of living forces, contrary to the Newtonians. This conclusion invited a great deal of anger, particularly from Samuel Clarke who, in (...) a volume of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society from 1729, accused ’s Gravesande of having written the book with the aim of “darkening Newton’s philosophy”. In a reply, which ’s Gravesande published as a supplement to his Essay upon a New Theory of the Collision of Bodies, he developed a hybrid methodology that relied upon both experimentation and reason. In my paper, I shall thoroughly analyse this interesting combination. (shrink)

De qua cum Mathesi Physices conjunctione praecipue monendum est, ut caveamus, ne rationes pure mathematicas cum rationibus physicis confundamusHegel, in seiner Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum (Werke, XIV, S.4).

De qua cum Mathesi Physices conjunctione praecipue monendum est, ut caveamus, ne rationes pure mathematicas cum rationibus physicis confundamus Hegel, in seiner Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum.

Albert the Great’s theological and exegetical-biblical works often reshape naturalphilosophical doctrines derived from his earlier Aristotelian paraphrases. Accordingly, Albert’s caveats, distinguishing the treatment of topics in physicis and in theologicis, are not abstract disciplinary borderlines but point out to his Dominican students that he will return to crucial matters of the peripatetic paraphrases, recontextualizing them in later works. This article illustrates such interdisciplinary dynamics by analyzing Albert’s commentary on Gen., 1, 20-23, the fifth day of creation, as discussed in STh., (...) II, xi, 60. Albert questions the seeming asymmetry arising from a single element, water, giving rise to two different outcomes: birds for the sublunar sky and reptiles for the earth. The arguments put forth by opponents and Albert’s solution draw upon earlier natural-philosophical works of his, namely De animalibus, De vegetabilibus, and De sensu et sensatu. Notably, Albert reuses his doctrine of humiditates in living bodies and generative processes (such as humidum seminale, humidum vaporativum, humidum spirans, humidum manens). Additionally, Albert analyzes the processes of subtiliatio and digestio, which transform siccum terreum into the matter required for the formation of animate bodies. (shrink)

The preponderance of the evidence indicates that Richard Rufus wrote the commentary on Aristotle’s Physics I published in 2003 as well as two commentaries on the Metaphysics. Rufus’ Aristotle commentaries date from the 1230’s as is clear from his own and Roger Bacon’s references. Twice in an undisputed Metaphysics commentary Rufus cites the distinctive and unchanging views about instantaneous change he stated «in Physicis» or «super librum Physicorum». Of course, some of his other opinions changed. In the course of claiming (...) that these changes do not militate against the attribution, this article addresses the general question: What are the appropriate standards for an attribution? (shrink)