Between the fourth and the recent fifth IPCC report, science as well as policy making have made great advances in dealing with uncertainties in global climate models. However, the uncertainties public decision making has to deal with go well beyond what is currently addressed by policy makers and climatologists alike. It is shown in this paper that within an anthropocentric framework, a whole hierarchy of models from various scientific disciplines is needed for political decisions as regards climate change. Via what (...) is sometimes referred to as ‘uncertainty cascade’ in the technical literature, the uncertainties of various models accumulate in the input to political decision making. This paper aims to chart the uncertainties in the multi-disciplinary enterprise of current climate modeling in broad strokes. It is shown that the uncertainty cascade makes it impossible to quantify uncertainties in the form of probability estimates. Moreover the paper highlights how global climate models fail to provide probability estimates. A better treatment of the uncertainties of climate predictions on the political level would require an overhaul of the current IPCC practice that separates the various scientific fields in various working groups. (shrink)
In the applied sciences and in engineering there is often a significant overlap between work at universities and in industry. For the individual scholar, this may lead to serious conflicts when working on joint university–industry projects. Differences in goals, such as the university’s aim to disseminate knowledge while industry aims to appropriate knowledge, might lead to complicated situations and conflicts of interest. The detailed cases of two electrical engineers and two architects working at two different universities of technology illustrate the (...) kinds of problems individual scholars face in university–business collaborations. These cases are based on qualitative interviews and additional data and demonstrate that, while value conflicts emerge on the organizational level, it is primarily the individual researcher who must deal with such conflicts. This analysis adds to existing studies in two ways: first, it explicitly addresses normative issues framed in terms of ethical and social values, thereby going beyond the common social-science perspective of university–business collaboration. Secondly, it provides qualitative insights, thereby identifying details and issues not apparent in quantitative studies. In particular, it is evident that university–industry collaborations are prone to value conflicts not only in research but also in education and job training. (shrink)
Some risks have extremely high stakes. For example, a worldwide pandemic or asteroid impact could potentially kill more than a billion people. Comfortingly, scientific calculations often put very low probabilities on the occurrence of such catastrophes. In this paper, we argue that there are important new methodological problems which arise when assessing global catastrophic risks and we focus on a problem regarding probability estimation. When an expert provides a calculation of the probability of an outcome, they are really providing the (...) probability of the outcome occurring, given that their argument is watertight. However, their argument may fail for a number of reasons such as a flaw in the underlying theory, a flaw in the modeling of the problem, or a mistake in the calculations. If the probability estimate given by an argument is dwarfed by the chance that the argument itself is flawed, then the estimate is suspect. We develop this idea formally, explaining how it differs from the related distinctions of model and parameter uncertainty. Using the risk estimates from the Large Hadron Collider as a test case, we show how serious the problem can be when it comes to catastrophic risks and how best to address it. (shrink)
The debate over the civilian use of nuclear power is highly polarised. We argue that a reasonable response to this deep disagreement is to maintain that advocates of both camps should modify their positions. According to the analysis we propose, nuclear power is neither entirely right nor entirely wrong, but rather right and wrong to some degree. We are aware that this non-binary analysis of nuclear power is controversial from a theoretical point of view. Utilitarians, Kantians, and other moral theorists (...) make sharp, binary distinctions between right and wrong acts. However, an important argument speaking in favour of our non-binary analysis is that it better reflects our considered intuitions about the ethical trade-offs we face in discussions of nuclear power. The aim of this article is to make this argument sharp by explaining how it can be rendered compatible with, and supported by, the Capability Approach, which is quickly becoming one of the most influential frameworks for thinking about human development. (shrink)
In the applied sciences and in engineering there is often a significant overlap between work at universities and in industry. For the individual scholar, this may lead to serious conflicts when working on joint university–industry projects. Differences in goals, such as the university’s aim to disseminate knowledge while industry aims to appropriate knowledge, might lead to complicated situations and conflicts of interest. The detailed cases of two electrical engineers and two architects working at two different universities of technology illustrate the (...) kinds of problems individual scholars face in university–business collaborations. These cases are based on qualitative interviews and additional data and demonstrate that, while value conflicts emerge on the organizational level, it is primarily the individual researcher who must deal with such conflicts. This analysis adds to existing studies in two ways: first, it explicitly addresses normative issues framed in terms of ethical and social values, thereby going beyond the common social-science perspective of university–business collaboration. Secondly, it provides qualitative insights, thereby identifying details and issues not apparent in quantitative studies. In particular, it is evident that university–industry collaborations are prone to value conflicts not only in research but also in education and job training. (shrink)
In recent years, computational sciences such as computational hydrodynamics or computational field theory have supplemented theoretical and experimental investigations in many scientific fields. Often, there is a seemingly fruitful overlap between theory, experiment, and numerics. The computational sciences are highly dynamic and seem a fairly successful endeavor---at least if success is measured in terms of publications or engineering applications. However, for theories, success in application and correctness are two very different things; and just the same may hold for "methodologies" like (...) computer simulations. A lively debate on the epistemic status of computer simulations has thus emerged within the philosophy of science. This paper discusses possible problems when computer simulation and laboratory experiment are intertwined. In present experiments, stochastic methods in the form of Monte Carlo simulations are often involved in generating experimental data. It is questioned as to how far a realistic stance can be maintained when such stochastic elements are involved. Taking experiments in high energy physics as a study case, this paper contends that using these types of entangled material and numerical experiments as a source of new phenomena or for theory testing must presuppose a certain understanding of causality and thus binds us at least to a weak form of realism. (shrink)
Climatologists have recently introduced a distinction between projections as scenario-based model results on the one hand and predictions on the other hand. The interpretation and usage of both terms is, however, not univocal. It is stated that the ambiguities of the interpretations may cause problems in the communication of climate science within the scientific community and to the public realm. This paper suggests an account of scenarios as props in games of make-belive. With this account, we explain the difference between (...) projections that should be make-believed and other model results that should be believed. (shrink)
Designing complex products involves working with uncertainties as the product, the requirements and the environment in which it is used co-evolve, and designers and external stakeholders make decisions that affect the evolving design. Rather than being held back by uncertainty, designers work, cooperate and communicate with each other notwithstanding these uncertainties by making assumptions to carry out their own tasks. To explain this, the paper proposes an adaptation of Kendall Walton’s make-believe theory to conceptualise designing as playing games of make-believe (...) by inferring what is required and imagining what is possible given the current set of assumptions and decisions, while knowing these are subject to change. What one is allowed and encouraged to imagine, conclude or propose is governed by socially agreed rules and constraints. The paper uses jet engine component design as an example to illustrate how different design teams make assumptions at the beginning of design activities and negotiate what can and cannot be done with the design. This often involves iteration – repeating activities under revised sets of assumptions. As assumptions are collectively revised, they become part of a new game of make-believe in the sense that there is social agreement that the decisions constitute part of the constraints that govern what can legitimately be inferred about the design or added to it. (shrink)
Bis in die Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts war die philosophische Ethik neben Vertragstheorien geprägt von zwei ethischen Theoriefamilien: der deontologischen Ethik und dem Konsequentialismus, Letzter vor allem in Form des Utilitarismus. Diese beiden Ethiktheorien scheinen in vielerlei Hinsicht diametral entgegengesetzt zu sein, etwa wenn die moralische Korrektheit einer Handlung entweder an ihren Folgen oder in Übereinstimmung mit einem allgemeinen moralischen Gesetz bemessen wird. Dennoch sind es in beiden Theorien die Handlungen, die bewertet werden.