Why is there a specific problem with biological individuality? Because the living realm contains a wide range of exotic particular concrete entities that do not easily match our ordinary concept of an individual. Slime moulds, dandelions, siphonophores are among the Odd Entities that excite the ontological zeal of the philosophers of biology. Most of these philosophers, however, seem to believe that these Odd Cases oblige us to refine or revise our common concept of an individual. They think, explicitly or tacitly, (...) that to be a living, evolutionary entity is to be a living individual. In this paper, we explore an alternative proposal: the variety and oddity of the forms of the living realm might be ontologically regimented through an increase in the categorial complexity of the living realm, by admitting, beside living individuals, living non-individuals or by acknowledging, more generally, that the evolutionary development of the living forms is not necessarily a process of building individuals, that life is not necessarily individuals-oriented. We claim that, from an ontological point of view, the spectacle of the living realm obliges us to take aggregativity seriously. (shrink)

Résumé — Cet article examine les raisons pour lesquelles Kant a nié que la concevabilité soit un guide pour la possibilité. Nous montrons que ces raisons tiennent à la relation interne entre possibilité et existence et à la facticité de l’existence. Nous comparons la facticité de l’existence selon Kant à la facticité de certaines nécessités selon Kripke. Nous concluons que, tandis que Kripke conteste seulement la fiabilité de la méthode de concevabilité, Kant soutient qu’elle débouche, au mieux, sur des concepts (...) possibles de choses et non point sur des concepts de choses possibles.— We examine the reasons why Kant has denied that possibility should be a guide to possibility. We show that the main reasons are the internal relation between possibility and existence and the facticity of existence. We compare the facticity of existence, according to Kant, and the facticity of some necessities, according to Kripke. We conclude that, while Kripke’s conception only addresses the reliability of the conceivability method, Kant argues that conceivability gives access to possible concepts of things, and not to concepts of possible things. (shrink)

Comment simuler permet-il de connaître ? Nous distinguons la simulation subjective comme jeu de faire-semblant et la simulation objective consistant à faire simuler un comportement ou un processus par un dispositif contrôlable. Nous suggérons que la simulation compréhensive d’autrui relève de la seconde classe : nous faisons de notre propre esprit un simulateur contrôlable de celui d’autrui.How does simulation contribute to knowledge ? We shall distinguish between simulating, as a subjective game of make-believe, and simulating by using an objective device (...) as a controllable simulator of natural process or of human behaviours. We suggest that the comprehensive simulation of others is objective : we make our mind a controllable simulator of other people minds. (shrink)

Most of the readers of Frege's first Logical Investigation, have been convinced that, according to Frege, the sense of was a private one, that an I-thought was a private thought. But it is not the case: the famous Fregean distinction between private representations and public thoughts seems an explanation and a generalization of the I-thought problem as much as an anti-Cartesian repetition of the Cartesian Second Meditation. Frege's position concerning indexical thoughts is that they are public thoughts, for the sense (...) of an indexical expression is not related to private representations but to some semiotical aspects of the public context of its utterance. (shrink)

Si l’usage contemporain du concept de sujet s’est introduit en philosophie à la faveur d’une substantivation des mots « je » et « moi », cet usage peut-il résister à une compréhension moins fantastique du sens du mot « je »? Nous montrons en quoi le penseur d’une pensée en première personne peut être littéralement considéré comme un sujet absolu, la subjectivité étant alors moins synonyme d’intériorité que d’inhésion ou de prédication réelle.Ce que « Je » dit du sujetIs the (...) contemporary use of the old concept of subject a by-product of the Ego’s philosophies? We show in which sense the thinker of an I.Thought can be seen as an absolute subject in regard of the predicates of his I.Thoughts, because of his cognitive inarticulateness. Subjectivity can then be viewed much more as predicates’ inhesion than as interiority. (shrink)

La fuite des cerveaux est-elle un phénomène individuellement légitime, mais socialement fâcheux ou bien enveloppe-t-elle une forme d’injustice à l’égard des populations qui en subissent les effets ? Nous construisons un modèle simplifié de ce phénomène permettant de faire apparaître ce qu’il y a d’éthiquement problématique dans la fuite des cerveaux et quels types de remèdes pourraient y être apportés.

Abstract : That paper proposes an interpretation of the kantian theory of I-thoughts and self-knowledge. We show that Kant has admitted the humean theory of the elusiveness of the Self, but that he hasn’t endorse a “no-owner theory”. He has argued in favor of the apriority of the « I think ». We scrutinize how that conception can be applied to some varieties of ordinary I-thoughts and stress upon its difficulties.

Par le canal de l’informatique, le concept de « simulation » et la pratique qu’il désigne sont devenus des composantes essentielles des sciences contemporaines, qu’il s’agisse des sciences physiques, des sciences biologiques ou des sciences de la cognition. Toutefois, en raison de ce vaste spectre d’emplois, le mot « simulation » n’échappe pas aux dérives sémantiques qui affectent..